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 ABSTRACT 
 
The aim of the present study is to conceptually integrate insights from governance 
theories of the firm to the research area of mergers and acquisitions (M&A). The 
primary governance theories of the firm are understood to consist of the neoclassical 
view of the firm, the nexus of contracts perspective, agency theory, early incomplete 
contracting theory, transaction cost economics and property rights theory.  
This study uses a bipartite research agenda, consisting of conceptual and bibliometric 
methodologies to investigate two aspects of conceptual integration. Firstly, the role of 
the governance theories in the de facto structuring of the M&A discourse, with a focus 
on disciplinary research orientations, underlying theories and key antecedents to 
performing M&A research, is investigated. Secondly, the contribution of the 
governance theories to M&A in the form of interlinkages between the two discourses is 
analyzed. It is shown that the governance theories assume significant roles that vary vis-
à-vis their importance and function within the M&A discourse.  
Based on various types of identified interlinkages between governance theoretical 
thinking and the M&A discourse, a novel, holistic governance perspective to M&A is 
presented. This perspective, consisting of an academically oriented exploratory mapping 
of the research field as well as a set of suggestions on how to apply governance theory 
into M&A decision-making, is intended to stimulate further integrative research in the 
area of M&A. Simultaneously, it demonstrates the usefulness of a general governance 
perspective to management research and highlights the need to consider governance not 
as an administrative exercise, but as an area of strategic decision-making.   
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1 Motivation for the study 
 
In the 1990s, discussion of corporate strategy was dominated by the so-called competence 
paradigms, e.g. the resource-based and knowledge-based views as well as core competence 
and distinctive capability thinking (Sanchez and Heene 1997).  It is not surprising that this 
discussion has also penetrated the study of mergers and acquisitions (M&A). After all, M&A 
is one of the key issues in corporate strategy. As the understanding of the nature of M&A 
processes has improved, the focus of strategic M&A research has increasingly shifted to 
value creation through corporate renewal based on the development of firm competences 
(Haspeslagh and Jemison 1991, Jemison and Sitkin 1986, Hitt et al. 1993, Shanley and Corea 
1992).  At the same time, however, the existence of two primary strategic management 
research paradigms, the governance and competence perspectives, both of which can be 
argued to be based on distinctive theories of the firm, has been acknowledged (Williamson 
1999, Madhok 2002, Foss 1999, Langlois and Foss 1999, Hoskisson et al. 1999, Lockett and 
Thompson 2001, Hodgson 1998). Unlike the competence perspective, the significance of the 
governance perspective to the study of M&A has not been explicitly recognized.  
 
In real life, M&A deals with both worlds. The role of competence in motivating, justifying 
and performing M&A as well as making them succeed is undeniable. Simultaneously, there 
are a number of issues in M&A that deal with how economic activity is governed within the 
boundaries of the involved firms. Intuitively, at least two categories of ‘M&A related 
governance’ exist. Firstly, M&A is intimately involved with the governance of different 
stakeholder groups, e.g. the owners, managers, employees and directors of the company. 
Corporate governance issues are intimately related to many real-life M&A. The preservation 
of property rights and shareholder value is also a governance issue. The incentives, 
information and risk preferences of various actors and actor groups need to be understood to 
establish a full picture of M&A. Additionally, many of the psychological and behavioral 
aspects of M&A decision-making, e.g. understanding the limits of human cognition, 
managers’ empire-building ambitions and the problematic role of investment bankers, are 
essential issues that deal with stakeholder group governance in the context of M&A. 
 
Secondly, there are also a number of issues in M&A that deal with the more administrative 
governance of the M&A transaction and the involved firms. Such issues include the legal 
dialogue around contracting e.g. the new corporate entity, determining the exact boundaries 
of the firm according to financial indicators through investment and divestment decisions, 
establishing new reward, control, monitoring and reporting mechanisms and financial 
restructuring of the firm. On the grassroot level, there is the huge administrative task of 
reorganizing the functioning of everyday life and getting to know new colleagues after an 
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M&A project. In conclusion, it seems rather self-evident that there is a governance aspect to 
M&A as much as there is a competence aspect. 
 
However, a theoretical perspective to M&A that would concentrate on the insights of the 
governance theories and integrate them under one common heading is missing. Building one 
could possibly develop strategic thinking in M&A in both the academic and professional 
communities. On the one hand, it could possibly encourage more research governance-based 
M&A research and thus develop M&A thinking. On the other hand, it might be able to 
interweave the many complex messages of a wide academic field into a single cognitive 
framework straightforward enough for managers to adopt in their dialogue. All things 
considered, it seems that there is substantial motivation to engage in fundamental theoretical 
M&A research from a governance perspective.  
 
 
1.1.1 M&A as a research area 
 
M&A is a peculiar social scientific phenomenon in that it “cuts across numerous 
disciplinary boundaries” (Marchildon 1991, p. xi). Academically, M&A has been scrutinized 
from the viewpoint of a multitude of disciplines, e.g. finance, economics, law, business, 
strategy, organization theory, human resource management and sociology. M&A is, however, 
also an interesting real-life phenomenon, proof of which is the wealth of attention it receives 
from managers, politicians, legislators and the media. M&A is also an important driver of 
change of the way economic life is organized and business is conducted, or more formally, 
‘the organization of economic activity’1.  
 
 
Definitions 
 
The interdisciplinary nature of the M&A discourse is reflected in the versatile definitions 
provided in the literature. Some definitions emphasize the organizational context of M&A:  
 
"The term 'merger' has two meanings in the context of 
combining organisations. Merger can refer to any form of 
                                                 
1 The organization of economic activity is a fundamental issue, in which the theories of the firm are assumed to 
be interested at the level of the organization. The origin of the concept relates to Ronald Coase’s (1937) ideas 
about the institutional structure of production, which was originally a rather simple set of determinants but has 
since then been conceptualized to be determined by a plethora of issues. In the study of the institutional structure 
of production or the organization of economic activity, two major streams exist. The governance perspective 
(see especially Williamson 1996, 1999) emphasizes a diverse set of contracting and transacting characteristics, 
e.g. asset specificity, appropriation, ownership, incentives, information, authority, self-interest and so on. The 
competence perspective (including various organizational routine, resource, knowledge and capability 
emphases, see e.g. Nelson and Winter 1982, Barney 1991, Peteraf 1993, Teece, Pisano and Shuen 1997, 
Ghoshal and Moran 1996, Kogut and Zander 1996, Conner 1991) focuses on the firm’s ability as an institutional 
mechanism to organize economic activity in a way that markets cannot, yielding an opportunity for sustainable 
superior-to-market performance. 
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combination of organizations, initiated by different kinds of 
contracts. The more specific meaning that separates mergers 
from acquisitions is that a merger is a combination of 
organizations which are similar in size and which create an 
organization where neither party can be seen as the 
acquirerer." (Vaara 2000, p. 82) 
  
Other definitions highlight the importance of corporate identity: 
 
“Consolidation implies the combining of two or more firms 
submerging .. into a new corporate identity, while 
acquisition involves .. a company which retains its corporate 
identity” (Marchildon 1991, p. xi) 
 
"Merger – the absorption of one firm by another.  A 
combination of two or more companies in which the 
resulting firm maintains the identity of the acquiring 
company" (Scott 1997)  
 
Dictionary definitions work on a very general level and highlight the difficulty of drawing 
boundaries between mergers, acquisitions and takeovers: 
 
“[A merger is a] fusion of two companies or, sometimes, an 
acquisition or a takeover of one company by the other” 
(Reuters 1982: Glossary of International Economic and 
Financial Terms.) 
 
Some definitions stress the disappearing of the former corporate entities more than the 
birth of a new one: 
 
A merger occurs when "two or more enterprises cease to be 
distinct or there are arrangements in progress or being 
contemplated that will lead to enterprises ceasing to be 
distinct” (Competition Bureau, Government of Canada, 
2001) 
 
In recent management literature, the negotiation aspect is emphasized: 
 
“The word merger refers to negotiations between friendly 
parties who arrive at a mutually agreeable decision to 
combine their companies .. In general, mergers reflect 
various forms of combining companies through some 
mutuality in negotiations” (Weston et al. 2001, p. 6) 
 
Some definitions stress the complementarity and learning rationales of the mergers: 
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A merger happens when two firms combine their practices 
in order that each gains a new area of expertise (Holtzman 
1994) 
 
Elsewhere, traditional economics literature has at times put it rather simply: 
 
“[A merger:] Firms combine the factors of production in 
different proportions” (Jervis 1971, p. 1)  
 
While recent, arguably academically sound definitions give more emphasis to the M&A 
process: 
 
The expression M&A has been established to represent both 
joint agreement between the management of two firms to 
merge that is submitted to the shareholders for approval 
(including consolidation where the separate firms are 
dissolved into a new joint corporate identity) and 
acquisition of one firm by another through tender offer (i.e., 
publicly announced takeover bid) (Larsson 1990, cf. Jensen 
1985) 
 
In financial literature, capital structure has often been seen as the key: 
 
“A merger .. is an amalgamation or fusion of two or more 
firms into a new firm with a different capital structure” 
(Reid 1968, p. 22)  
 
In legal dialogue, the European Union's definition2 of "concentration", implying the 
common features of both mergers, acquisitions and other arrangements leading to the 
agglomeration of economic entities, is often employed. According to it, a merger occurs 
when: 
a) Two or more previously independent undertakings merge 
b) One or more persons already controlling at least one undertaking, or one or more 
undertakings, acquire, whether by purchase of securities or assets, by contract or 
by any other means, direct or indirect control of the whole or parts of one of more 
other undertakings. 
c) The creation of a joint venture performing on a lasting basis all the functions of an 
autonomous economic entity. 
 
As can be seen in the definitions, the phrase ‘mergers and acquisitions’, or M&A, is a 
reference to two categories of merger activity: mergers by consolidation and mergers by 
acquisition. Scholarly literature generally holds the term ‘merger’ to include both 
                                                 
2 Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 of 21 December 1989 on the control of concentrations between 
undertakings, published in the Official Journal. Only the published text is authentic: Official Journal C 385, 
31.12.1994, p. 12. 
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consolidation and acquisition activity, but this study uses the term M&A (mergers and 
acquisitions) to encompass both fields. In essence, M&A can, and has been, treated as a 
single phenomenon in management, economics, business history, industrial organization, law, 
econometrics and finance alike (Marchildon 1991). 
 
In this study, mergers and acquisitions, or M&A, is treated as a single business 
phenomenon. This is not to omit the differences between e.g. mergers, acquisitions and 
takeovers. Rather, the analysis concentrates on the effect M&A, as a whole, has on the 
organization of economic activity. With respect to the organization of economic activity, the 
different ‘modes’ of M&A are perceived to be similar, the essential issues being the 
extension in firm boundaries, the death and birth of a new organizational entities and a 
change in the internal organization logic of firms. 
 
 
Research in M&A  
 
The M&A discourse, consists of the academic insights into the phenomenon of mergers 
and acquisitions (M&A). The other research area scrutinized in this study is governance 
theoretical research, which, at the level of the firm, can be perceived to consist of the various 
governance theories of the firm. In the research process related to this study, these two 
research areas have been investigated conceptually in order to build a solid understanding of 
the two. The conceptual analyses of the M&A and governance discourses are affixed to this 
study as Appendices 1 and 2 respectively. There are four reasons for this. Firstly, some of the 
issues within the conceptual analyses are very much repetitive to readers familiar with either 
or both. It is perceived unnecessary to include them as a part of the core study, since they 
would occupy a disproportionately large fraction of the space in this document compared to 
their intellectual input. Secondly, having said this, it would not seem a logical exercise to cut 
the conceptual analyses simply in order to fit them in the main section of the study. 
Performing a thorough conceptual analysis is vital for the theory-building exercises in this 
study and thus their content should attempt to be somewhat exhaustive. Thirdly, as 
appendices, the conceptual analyses are available to readers as separate passages, which 
improves their usability in acquiring a general overview of either field. Finally, including 
them as Appendices also reflects the true chronological research process performed for this 
study. The research process started with separate research efforts that concentrated on 
performing the conceptual analyses, which were consequently used in the more acute 
formulation of the rest of the research project. 
 
Research on M&A received increased attention and grew in popularity during the last two 
decades of the 20th century. There are generally two sets of reasons for increasing academic 
attention on M&A. Firstly, a number of interesting M&A 'sub-phenomena' have taken place 
in the business world during the last few decades. These sub-phenomena include a) merger 
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waves, b) the increasing role of corporate governance struggles in M&A, c) sustained 
demerger activity, d) the prevalence of difficulty and disagreement in measuring the success 
of M&A, e) the counterintuitive unsuccessfulness of M&A, f) attitudes and behavior of M&A 
professional service providers and h) the non-prescribeability of post-merger processes. 
Particularly empirical management research has taken an interest in studying these M&A 
sub-phenomena, some to a greater extent than others. Many if not all of these sub-phenomena 
are relevant, interesting topics of both academic and managerial discussion.  
 
Secondly, social scientific research streams that are interlinked, overlapping and parallel to 
M&A research have developed remarkably during the past few decades. These relate and are 
strongly reflected to the various disciplinary orientations from which M&A has been 
researched during the last few decades. Some particularly advanced management research 
areas, e.g. corporate finance, capital markets, strategy, organization theory, corporate culture 
and human resource management can be said to have spurred research in M&A. 
 
Some of the advances in these fields are naturally related to the M&A sub-phenomena and 
they are subsequently analyzed in their context below. More importantly, however, some of 
the advances in these orientations are particularly reflected in the types of motivations and 
justification presented for the existence of M&A. M&A is typically a phenomenon-oriented 
research topic, which can be approached from basically any research angle. Naturally, the 
prominent and advancing theoretical approaches are thus most likely to present new 
viewpoints to M&A and reveal the most interesting research findings. 
 
M&A research has conventionally been seen to be organized in more or less well 
demarcated research streams or schools of thought. There are a number of merited, yet 
qualitative, reviews of the M&A literature (see e.g. Haspeslagh and Jemison 1991, Larsson 
and Finkelstein 1999, Cording et al. 2002, Weston et al. 2001, Gammelgaard 1999, Kim 1998 
Bengtsson 1992 and Auerbach 1988). Table 1 presents some of the more recent 
categorizations of the M&A research streams. 
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Table 1: M&A research streams as identified in recent overviews of M&A literature 
 
Cording et al. 2002 Larsson and Finkelstein 1999 Weston et al. 2001 
Haspeslagh and 
Jemison 1991 
Overpayment Strategic management Process Capital markets 
Agency problems Economics Strategy Strategy 
CEO hubris Finance Finance Organizational behavior 
Top management 
complementarity 
Organizational 
research Agency problems Process 
Experience Human resource management Hubris  
Employee distress  Redistribution  
Conflicting cultures    
Process    
 
 
There are some common denominators in the way M&A research has been categorized. 
Most of the overviews, including the ones in Table 1, agree over the significant positions of 
a) strategic management, b) finance-oriented, c) economics, d) process and e) culture/HRM 
research. Particularly Haspeslagh and Jemison’s (1991) categorization into the ‘capital 
markets school’, the ‘process school’, the ‘strategic school’ and the ‘organizational behavior 
school’ has been popular. 
 
The different schools of thought have employed rather different methodologies in their 
scrutiny of  M&A.  Particularly what Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) peg the capital markets 
school, and arguably also economics and finance-oriented M&A research in general, are 
highly appreciative of quantitative, event study and non-linear regression methodologies 
(Brown and Warner 1985, White 1980). In essence, they measure the changes in share prices 
that take place over a short time interval around the announcement of the deal to determine 
the share price, and consequently shareholder wealth, effect of the M&A in question. Albeit 
much criticized (see e.g. Stallworthy and Kharbanda 1988, Acharya 1988, 1993, Eckbo, 
Maksimovic and Williams 1990), the use of event study methodology has been justified by 
economics assumptions (e.g. the efficient market hypothesis) and remains popular. 
 
Also research in the strategic school of M&A research has relied heavily on empirical and 
statistical methodologies based on data from the stock markets and financial statements. Most 
notably, researchers concentrating on the performance effects of acquisitions, starting with 
Kitching’s seminal studies (Kitching 1967, 1974), have attempted to find statistically 
significant correlations between various characteristics of the involved firms and their share 
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price performance and/or profitability. Strategic research concentrating more on the 
improvement of acquisition success has been keener on case studies (e.g. Jones and Pollitt 
1999, Cliffe 1999, Campling and Michelson 1999), success stories, narratives (Vaara 2002) 
and other qualitative methodologies, and the linkage to the research and findings of the 
strategic acquisition performance research seems surprisingly weak (cf. Haspeslagh and 
Jemison 1991, p. 303). The process school, which is essentially strategic M&A research that 
goes deeper into the steps and dynamics of the M&A process, shares the interest in case study 
methodology (e.g. Bastien and Van de Ven 1986). The process school and the organizational 
behavior oriented M&A research incorporate, in addition to case studies (e.g. Difonzo and 
Bordia 1998, LeRoy and Ramanantsoa 1997), also survey-type research yielding both 
qualitative and quantitative results.  
 
In general, M&A research is characterized both methodologically and vis-à-vis its 
research strategies and approaches by its rather strong economics tradition emerging from 
e.g. the fact that influential early M&A researchers (e.g. Kitching) were trained economists. 
Arguably, the economics tradition still shows in a) the polarized debate concentrating on 
looking for either a ‘yes’ or a ‘no’ answer to the question whether acquisitions create value, 
b) the way M&A research is concentrated on the analysis of discrete structural alternatives (to 
merge or not to merge, or alternatively, to merge or to acquire), c) the large amount of 
statistical and quantitative research and d) the lack of pure conceptual research. The trend, 
however, seems to be in favor of increasing methodological variety, as e.g. economics-
flavored case studies have increased significantly over the past few years (see e.g. Bruner 
1999, Vita and Sacher 2001, Weiss 1994). 
 
 
1.1.2 Problematization 
 
This study belongs to an overall research effort interested in the organization of economic 
activity in contemporary societies. This type of research is characterized by the appreciation 
of the need for multiple disciplinary perspectives to single management research phenomena, 
investigation at different levels of analysis (e.g. individual, firm, inter-organizational, 
industry and global) as well as a general appreciation of conceptual research aiming at 
building frameworks and mental models that operate as cognitive frameworks for academics 
and professionals (cf. Meind, Stubbart and Porac 1996).  
 
Much of the firm-level analysis of the organization of economic activity has taken place in 
what have become known as the theories of the firm (TOFs), which essentially concentrate 
on the implications contracting has on the essential questions of the existence, boundaries and 
internal organization of the firm (Foss 2000). Theories of the firm can generally be divided 
into governance and competence perspectives (Williamson 1999, Foss 2000). Governance 
perspectives emphasize the institutional nature of the firm as an organizational entity and pay 
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more attention to the boundaries of the firm, whereas the competence perspectives, like 
knowledge- and resource-based theories of the firm (See e.g. Rumelt 1974, Nelson and 
Winter 1982, Richardson 1972, Hamel and Prahalad 1994 and Demsetz 1993) or the view of 
the firm as an information processor (e.g. Cremer 1990 and Aoki 1986) can be perceived to 
emphasize the internal organization of the firm.  
 
Governance theoretical research has generally manifested an ability to deal with numerous 
management research topics, especially ones that involve significant changes in the 
organization of economic activity. Altogether, M&A seems to be representing a large and 
ever-growing proportion of the total change in the organization of economic activity in 
contemporary society, given that economic historians have been reporting growth in both 
their average size and their number. Whilst M&A is but one aspect amongst many3, it has 
also been argued to be the primary driver of the reorganization of economic activity (See e.g. 
Williamson 1996, Ch. 11). M&A, given that it deals with the amalgamation of two or more 
individual firms into one, is also a management research topic, which essentially deals with 
the boundaries of the firm.  
 
Despite all this, governance theoretical research on M&A has been surprisingly 
uncommon. The governance theories of the firm have been perceived to represent fragmented 
approaches that have been applied, if at all, individually to specific narrow topics within the 
M&A discourse (for examples of such narrow applications see such classics as e.g. 
Williamson 1985, Jensen and Ruback 1986, Roll 1986, Morck, Schleifer and Vishny 1990, 
Amihud and Lev 1981 or more recently e.g. Holmström and Kaplan 2001, Matsusaka 2001, 
Chi 2000, Pagano 2000). The prime motivation for this study is that the governance 
perspective, which is not a collection of segregate, conflicting theories but a cognitive 
framework through which various governance theoretic insights can be united, holds 
considerably more potential for M&A research than has thus far been realized. Consequently, 
one of the key foci of this study is to analyze M&A literature and research and the role of 
governance theory in it.  
 
This study attempts to interlink the governance and M&A discourses4 at different 
conceptual levels and build an overarching interdisciplinary discussion. In doing this, this 
study also answers the recent call for research permeating the boundaries between 
                                                 
3 Besides M&A, there are numerous other ‘reorganizers’ of economic activity, e.g. cooperative arrangements 
between firms, changing industry logic, change in the nature of work, the emergence of the network society, the 
changing nature of time and space, the opening of global market places and so on (See e.g. Castells 1996, 
Tikkanen and Parvinen 2002b). 
4 In other words, this study concentrates on the bulk of reputable academic output around the topics of the 
governance theories of the firm and M&A. The former is understood to consist of institutional and 
organizational economic analyses at the level of the firm, tackling questions concerning the existence, 
boundaries and internal organization of firms. The latter is understood to consist of academic writings around 
mergers, acquisitions, takeovers, acquisitive behavior, consolidation, integration and amalgamation of 
companies.  
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management and economic theory. While the main case of this study (M&A) is a 
management discourse, the tools employed (governance theories of the firm) originate from 
economics. By and large, the present study thus attempts to advocate an interdisciplinary 
research orientation by applying the economics-flavored governance theories to M&A as a 
management research topic.  
 
 
1.1.3 Towards the research questions 
 
The focus of this study is to tackle the problematization of the M&A discourse as 
described above. In this section, the problematization is attempted to be refined into a general 
research aim and in order to form a logical thought sequence that originates from the 
motivations of this study and leads to the acute formulation of the research questions. 
 
As outlined above, there are two general research areas in this study, i.e. the M&A 
discourse and the contribution of the governance theories of the firm to the M&A discourse. 
Within these two research areas, the study has a more defined research focus that is defined 
as the knowledge gaps that are perceived to exist in the interplay of the governance and M&A 
discourses. Despite many merited overviews of the M&A discourse (e.g. Haspeslagh and 
Jemison 1991, Larsson and Finkelstein 1999, Cording et al. 2001, Weston et al. 2001, 
Gammelgaard 1999, Kim 1998), there has not been a rigorous effort to map the structuring of 
the discourse systematically. Furthermore, no systematic effort to apply the governance 
perspective to a particular management research phenomenon (such as M&A) as a 
meaningful whole, not as individual theories, has been encountered during the research 
process. What is more, the governance theoretical treatment of M&A is perceived to be 
generally weak and in need of reinforcement. These limitations in current governance 
theoretical and M&A research can be perceived to comprise a conceptual knowledge gap 
whose identification is vital in the process of problematization of this study (cf. Locke and 
Golden-Biddle 1997). 
 
Succeeding at dealing with these topic-related foci in meaningful depth requires limiting 
the scope of the study otherwise. This study assumes that the academic output on M&A 
represents both a reliable source of information regarding the nature of M&A discourse and 
that there is an intimate relationship between the major contours of the academic M&A 
community and professional M&A. In other words, high-level academic investigation is 
assumed to be needed to both identify empirically and conceptualize independently issues 
that are useful for M&A decision-making. The focus of this study is what underlies the M&A 
discourse. The analysis is focused to operate on a high level of abstraction, implying that 
most of the theory-building in this study focuses on how the governance perspective can be 
perceived to influence M&A through academic and professional mindsets, as opposed to 
focusing on e.g. the particular influences of governance insights on the particular strategies of 
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particular firms. The focus is thus primarily on looking for the structuring and influence of 
governance theories within the M&A literature and only secondly on structuring the various, 
disciplinary ‘schools’ of M&A thought. Methodologically, this means that this study focuses 
on scrutinizing the M&A discourse on the basis of what has been written in leading academic 
journals during the past ten years. 
 
Subsequently, the aim of this thesis is to map the actual structuring of the M&A discourse 
using both objective and subjective methodologies5. Thus the aim is firstly to map different 
research orientations in M&A literature. Secondly, the aim is to identify the theories, which 
have been used in M&A research as well as the key antecedents that have motivated M&A 
research. Thirdly, the aim is to appraise the contribution of the governance theories of the 
firm to the M&A discourse, which is assumed to operate on at least three different levels, 
namely a) the interlinkages between the academic roots and traditions between the two 
discourses, b) the academic output that derives intellectual input from the governance 
theories to the analysis of M&A and c) the use of governance based insights in building on 
managerial understanding about M&A and facilitating decision-making.  
 
These research aims have been formulated as the principal research questions of this 
study. The research questions and their sub-questions are formulated as: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 While the conceptual analysis is primarily based on subjective judgment, the bibliometric analysis yields 
objective statistical results about the structuring of the discourse. 
Research Question 1:   What is the de facto structuring of the M&A discourse? 
 
Sub-Question 1a:  What are the disciplinary research orientations? 
 
Sub-Question 1b:  What are the theories used in M&A articles? 
 
Sub-Question 1c: What are the key antecedents of performing M&A research?
Research Question 2:   What is the contribution of the governance theories of  
the firm to M&A? 
 
Sub-Question 2a:  How are their intellectual roots and traditions interlinked? 
 
Sub-Question 2b: How do they cross-fertilize academically, i.e. how does M&A 
literature derive input from the governance theories? 
 
Sub-Question 2c: What is the potential for a governance-based framework for 
M&A decision-making? 
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The first research question tackles what has really been said about M&A, i.e. mapping the 
de facto structuring of the M&A discourse. The aim is not to perform this in a qualitative 
and/or descriptive manner, but through systematic analysis of M&A articles published during 
a fixed time period. More specifically, this study maps the M&A discourse vis-à-vis the 
disciplinary research orientations, theories and antecedents used in a body of M&A research 
that can be argued to represent the current state of the M&A discourse. 
 
The second research question is interested in the contribution of the governance theories of 
the firm to M&A both as an academic discourse and as a business phenomenon. There are 
three levels at which such contributions are sought. Firstly, the interlinkages between the 
intellectual roots and academic traditions of both worlds are explored. Secondly, their cross-
fertilization in academic research is analyzed. Finally, this study is also interesting in 
determining the potential for a governance-based framework for M&A decision-making. This 
means that one of the main purposes of this study is to develop governance thinking in a 
direction, which makes it more available to managerial dialogue and more applicable to 
M&A decision-making situations. 
 
The research questions engulf a wealth of literature6 and traverse disciplinary boundaries. 
They lead to a dilemma of how to gather the wealth of information in these domains, harness 
it in a plausible way, investigate what is relevant in it and process it into a communicable 
format7, so that it could actually increase understanding of M&A. Thus, despite the fact that 
the aforementioned research questions set the primary targets of the present study, this study 
has a further aim in developing cognitive frameworks based on the answers to the research 
questions. This is done by building an arsenal of propositions that, besides tackling the 
research questions, act as a basis for building the frameworks. As is indicated in the sub-
questions to Research Question 2, a perspective combining academic and decision-making 
oriented viewpoints is aspired. In practice, this means that the general governance perspective 
to M&A advocated in this study consists of two approaches. The explanatory governance 
approach to M&A addresses primarily academic audiences interested in M&A research by 
mapping the questions, answers, shortcomings, knowledge gaps, future knowledge gaps and 
others implications of the conceptual interplay between the two discourses. The prescriptive 
governance approach to M&A, then again, addresses both academic audiences and 
practitioners by identifying ways in which the governance approach could be used as a 
cognitive framework in M&A decision-making. 
 
 
                                                 
6 See Appendices 1 and 2 for a conceptual overview of the research in the M&A and governance theoretical 
discourses respectively.  
7 To increase the readability and prepare the reader for the language and concepts in the area of the study, a 
semantical overview of the terminology is presented in Appendix 3. 
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1.2 Research Strategy 
 
The research strategy of this study is crystallized in two issues. Firstly, the concept of 
meta-analytical research and the selection of two particular meta-analytical research 
approaches, bibliometric and conceptual research, are explained and linked to the aims and 
research questions of this study. Secondly, an overview of the research process is given 
together with a detailed description of the essential research materials and the way in which 
the selected methods have been used in this study. 
 
 
1.2.1 The meta-analytical research approach 
 
Why meta-analytical research? 
 
The more extensive research effort that this study belongs to aims at drawing implications 
from conceptual interplay to managerial reality in the context of any phenomenon. The 
governance perspective presented in this study operates through the cognitive constructs of 
academics and practitioners, both of which have been seen as essential to the development of 
organization science (Meindl, Stubbart and Porac 1996). Through its influence on academics’ 
cognitive constructs, the governance perspective attempts to develop organizational thinking 
that considers key governance theoretical questions, e.g. concerning the boundaries, existence 
and internal organization of firms (Foss 2000). Through its influence on practitioners’ and 
managers’ cognitive constructs, then again, the governance perspective aims at enlightening 
managers about key governance issues in decision-making settings, without attempting to 
prescribe much about the management of businesses themselves (cf. Weick 1989). This 
represents a fundamental departure from conventional strategic management thinking. In a 
nutshell, a higher-level aim of this study is to advocate a governance based perspective to 
management research and predict that whilst it is not yet mature, it is already imminent.  
 
The aim of influencing and building on cognitive constructs has an influence on the 
methodological assortment of this study. Conceptual research has traditionally been 
perceived to suit such framework-building exercises well. Building an understanding of the 
conceptual rootings of a particular research area, reported often in a more profound overview 
of the literature characterized by ponderings of near-metatheoretical depth, has customarily 
been the methodology of choice. This study has taken the underlying methodology one step 
further by first engaging in profound conceptual research and then using this to construct a 
robust arsenal of bibliometric analyses in order to investigate the de facto structuring of the 
M&A discourse8. Subsequently, results of both the conceptual analysis of the literature and 
                                                 
8 While the conceptual analysis of the M&A and governance theory of the firm literatures focus on subjectively 
identifying and forming an understanding about the content of the both fields of research respectively and 
independently, the bibliometric methodology is employed in order to bring in an objective measure. While 
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the bibliometric analyses are discussed in the context of a cognitive framework building 
exercise. 
 
In the following, a summary of the basic postulates of performing meta-analytical research 
is given. Firstly, the alternative ways of performing meta-analytical research are outlined. 
Secondly, the employment of bibliometric methodology to meta-analytical research and 
management research is investigated in particular, given that it has been selected as the 
primary methodology of this study. Thirdly, the possible shortcomings and limitations of 
performing meta-analytical research, in general and with the selected methods, are given in 
order to include a critical perspective to the issue. 
 
 
Performing meta-analytical research 
 
There are a number of ways of performing research on research, i.e. investigating earlier 
research efforts with the aim of identifying new issues from the whole that could not be 
identified by looking at the studies individually. In different disciplinary fields, such research 
is labeled differently. In social science, research concentrating on the deeper theoretical 
nature and development of a certain discourse is often called ‘metatheoretical research’. If the 
research is not theory-centered or even if it includes analysis of other aspects of the discourse, 
the term ‘meta-analysis’ is employed more loosely. The disciplinary variety in the use of such 
terms is exemplified by the fact that in medicine, ‘meta-analysis’ refers to a specific set of 
statistical tools that are used to extract statistically significant findings from a bulk of earlier 
quantitative research findings (Cook 1991). 
 
 Meta-analytical research in social science comes in a variety of forms (see e.g. Glass 
1976, 1981, Cooper and Hedges 1994). Perhaps the most common are ‘literature review’-type 
studies, where literature within a defined discourse or set of discourses is selected by 
judgment and reviewed in order to find some general meaningful patterns. This type of 
research, especially if the area of investigation is demarcated by a set of concepts, overlaps 
with the notion of ‘conceptual analysis’, which in its purest form is an investigation of the 
state and nature of the discourse surrounding the key concepts. Meta-analytical research can 
also come in the form of ‘discourse analysis’, which usually refers to the careful investigation 
of the communication, e.g. speech or exchange of journal articles, in a given context. Thus, 
discourse analysis can be performed just as well in the context of a given academic discourse 
                                                                                                                                                        
elements of subjectiveness also creep into the bibliometric analyses (e.g. the selection of articles incorporates 
some qualitative judgment and the network analysis is entirely based on a subjective selection method, despite it 
being proven robust), the bibliometric study can be argued to increase the level of objectiveness dramatically. 
However, the conceptual and bibliometric analyses, as such, only reveal the structuring of the literature. The 
structure of the discourse requires further analysis that nears metatheoretical depth. By discussing the 
governance theoretical insights within the M&A literature, this study thus attempts to engage in fundamental 
metatheoretical discussion of the M&A discourse. 
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or debate or in the context of a documentation of managerial discussion about a particular 
business phenomenon. Even though all of the above can incorporate a longitudinal 
dimension, there is a separate type meta-analysis that is often coined ‘historical analysis’ or 
‘historiography’, which concentrates on the development of the selected research area 
through time.  
 
With the partial exception of historiography, the above meta-analytical methods are ones 
that rely mainly on qualitative analysis and more or less judgment-based account of the 
literature (or other research material). There are, however, also a number of methodologies 
that analyze the performed research quantitatively. Most importantly, research that 
statistically analyzes previous research literature in terms of e.g. the authors, research 
findings, topics, theories, antecedents, outcomes, research processes, methodologies or levels 
of analysis, i.e. ‘bibliometric analysis’, operates with varying degrees of statistical 
sophistication. The degree of statistical complexity of the employed analyses is largely 
dependent on the type of issues under investigation. For example, citation networks and 
quantitative research results are often subjected to more complex analyses, whereas very 
qualitative issues (authors, levels of analysis) are mainly investigated vis-à-vis their 
frequency of appearance. (Hedges and Olkin 1985, Rosenthal 1991) 
 
Quite recently, the value of meta-analytical research can be argued to have been 
‘rediscovered’. In addition to the well-known fundamental benefits of meta-analysis in 
improving the error and bias of research findings across a large set of replication studies 
(Hunter and Schmidt 1990, Hunter, Schmidt and Jackson 1982), other benefits relating to the 
ability to unveil grand theoretical constructs as well as detailed theoretical relationships have 
been emphasized (Eden 2002). For example, meta-analysis has recently been argued to be 
able to “which kind of further research will be the most worthwhile” (Eden 2002, p. 843). 
Eden (2002) argues that the findings of meta-analysis can raise insights into both what kind 
of replication research is necessary as well as what is the direction for new theory 
development. Altogether, the argument is that meta-analysis that sheds new light on how or 
why a relationship occurs and provides a novel theoretical framework to support it should be 
favored over mere tallying of existing literature.  
 
The bibliometric methodology in this study represents this ‘newer’ type of meta-analytical 
research, and thus attempts to act as something of a pathfinder for the already foreseeable 
surge of meta-analytical research in the field of general management research, and not only in 
the conventional playgrounds of meta-analytical behavioral, medical and marketing research 
(Eden 2002). What is more, this study attempts to point out that in management research, 
meta-analysis has a much broader area of application than the mere synthesis of replicated 
study results. It can be argued that meta-analytical studies have the primary role of 
constructing a fuller understanding of a given issues, may it be a phenomenon, theory or 
other construct, and perhaps only a secondary role in strengthening the credibility of given 
  16 
empirical associations by reducing error and bias. By and large, the present study, with its 
bibliometric and conceptual analysis, attempts to succeed in this perceived primary role. 
 
 
Performing bibliometric research 
 
Bibliometric analysis has been widely applied in social sciences for discussing the state of 
an academic discourse relating to a real-life phenomenon, even though, as Puro (1996) puts 
it: 
 
  “It is evident that bibliometrics cannot analyze ‘scientific reality’ as  
  such, but only qualities which have been seen to have significance  
  in the field” (Puro 1996, p. 54). 
 
Puro (1996, 54-55) adds that once these significant issues have been discovered and the 
most crucial theorists found, it will also be possible to evaluate the philosophical background 
behind the most crucial theories. Here, attention is also paid to the way the theories and 
theorists have contributed to the development of traditions and paradigms in the research, and 
equally importantly, also the management of M&A. 
 
There are a number of seminal studies introducing and evaluating the nature of 
bibliometric inquiry in social scientific, and other, research. Pritchard (1969, p. 349) defines 
bibliometrics as “the application of mathematics and statistical methods to books and other 
media of communication”. Since academic discourse today has moved to and is most active 
in journal articles, they have been selected as the source material for the bibliometric analyses 
in this study. According to an alternative definition (Broadus 1987, p. 376), bibliometrics is 
“the quantitative study of physical published units, or of bibliographic units, or of the 
surrogates for either”. This definition is close to the conception of bibliometrics employed in 
this study, given that it emphasizes the importance of physical published units (e.g. journal 
articles) as opposed to other means of communication and publication.  
 
The use of bibliometric methodology also needs to be scrutinized from the viewpoint of 
the general aims of this study. The bits of data which consist the bibliometric material of any 
study need to contain certain information, and the analysis methods need to be able to extract 
and organize the information in an enlightening yet rigorous way. Given that the aims of this 
study include the identification of the most influential contributors and contributions, and the 
most significant theoretical underpinnings underlying the de facto structuring of recent 
research on M&A, the bibliometric material must include at least information regarding 
authors, articles, books, years and their interlinkages. Journal articles include all this 
information, and citation analysis thus seems an appropriate tool for the accomplishment of 
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the aim of investigating the structuring of a network of scientific artifacts and products 
(Amsterdamska and Leydesdorff 1989, Cole and Cole 1973, Price 1986).  
 
Citations analyses can be argued to be a useful tool for investigating interlinkages between 
scientific articles, which altogether form a network of articles, book and author relationships. 
Citation analysis acts as “a useful tool in studying various networks of relationships among 
authors, journals, and fields in an objective and quantitative manner” (So 1988, p. 237). On a 
more practical level, citation analysis yields results with which single units (e.g. articles) or 
clusters (groups of interrelated articles) can be evaluated and ranked vis-à-vis their frequency 
of appearance and the centrality of their position in the citation network. The frequency 
distribution results yield, provided that they analysis is performed properly and the results are 
interpreted by experts, both revealing and reliable information (Garfield and Welljams-Dorof 
1992). The frequency results can not only be used to rank authors and articles, but also to 
analyze the relative productivity of associated universities, departments and institutions, even 
strands of scientific policy. (Garfield and Welljams-Dorof 1992, Price 1986) 
 
There are, however, also pitfalls to bibliometric studies. Firstly, they must be performed 
thoroughly, with expert interpretation and without simplification that might arise from an 
overemphasis of simple patterns in a complex bibliometric network (Puro 1996, p. 55); “the 
problem lies in the fact that quantitative results are interpreted to be answers in themselves”. 
It is rather evident to any scholar familiar with the variety of different statistical tools 
available for the analysis of citation networks that our ability to interpret and understand what 
the bibliometric results actually mean is far less developed than our ability to process and 
quantitatively analyze the bibliometric data mass. Bibliometric studies have been criticized 
for their inability to produce explanations for the states and structures of academic discourses.  
 
Given this criticism highlighting that bibliometric studies simply describe “what most 
other colleagues do” and that bibliometric indicators measure “popularity rather than 
anything else” (Moed 1989, p. 474), this study aims at performing a thorough interpretation 
of the results produced. The simple frequency distribution analyses of most-cited authors, 
articles and journals have been complemented with statistically more complex network 
centrality analyses. The aim here is to provide more information on the relationships between 
the different underlying theories and antecedent factors in order to avoid the 
oversimplification problem and basing the conclusions on a mere few sets of most-cited 
frequencies. 
 
Most importantly, this study does not rely on the bibliometric results alone, but also 
incorporates a qualitative conceptual analysis of the mergers and acquisitions and governance 
theory of the firm discourses to enrich the current investigation. The network centrality 
analysis and the conceptual analysis provide plenty of information regarding the intellectual 
roots and traditions of the M&A discourse, thereby significantly reducing the possibility of 
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oversimplification and misinterpretation. They also allow us to make deeper conclusions 
regarding the de facto structuring of the discourse and the interplay this structuring with how 
M&A is viewed in academic arenas and performed in business arenas today. 
 
In management research, bibliometric research is, by and large, rather common. The most 
common application in general management research has, by far, been comparing, analyzing 
and ranking academic journals, the sources of bibliometric data (See e.g. Johnson and 
Podsakoff 1994, Gomez-Mejia and Balkin 1992, Franke et al. 1990 and Coe and Weinstock 
1984) or the level of research at university faculties or departments (e.g. Henry and Burch 
1974, Doyle and Arthurs 1995, Thomas and Watkins 1998) using citation or network 
analysis. Another field in which bibliometric methodology has been utilized is the so-called 
science and technology (S&T) systemic studies with applications to research policy and R&D 
management (Kostoff and Schaller 2001, Tijssen and Van Raan 1994, Hugunin, Thomas and 
Wilemon 1992). 
 
Furthermore, bibliometric research, i.e. citation and/or bibliometric network analysis, has 
been applied to a wide range of issues within various disciplines and research problems. It 
has e.g. been used in determining the structuring of journal networks and the regional 
integration of management research (Danell 2000, Usdiken and Pasadeos 1995), the drawing 
of disciplinary boundaries between production and operations management, operations 
research, management science and industrial engineering (Pilkington and Liston-Heyes 1999) 
and academic career progression (Park and Gordon 1996).  
 
Some of the above studies as well as other bibliometric research are also conceptual or 
even meta-analytical in nature. At the deepest and arguably most profound level of analysis, 
bibliometric methodology has been used in researching research. For example, citation 
analysis has been employed to e.g. reveal the tendency of researchers to overgeneralize 
seminal research contributions (Bamber, Christensen and Gaver 2000) and to draw precise 
disciplinary boundaries (Pilkington and Liston-Hayes 1999), whereas network centrality 
analysis has been used to analyze disciplinary networks in e.g. inter-organizational network 
research (Oliver and Ebers 1998), public administration research (Toonen 1998) and 
entrepreneurship research (Dery and Toulouse 1996, see also Ratnatunga and Romano 1997). 
 
In research on mergers and acquisitions, bibliometric methodologies are, if not 
unprecedented, at least rare. Citation analyses or citation network analyses concerning M&A 
research were found neither in the search engines used in the study process9, nor among the 
M&A material scrutinized and listed in the bibliography of this study. 
 
                                                 
9 E.g. The ISI Web Of Science, The Social Science Citation Index, Abi Inform, Ebsco HOST, Proquest 2000 
and Google 
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There are at least three reasons why structured and comprehensive bibliometric analysis 
should be performed on the M&A discourse from a methodological point of view. Firstly, the 
bibliometric research on management related topics has shown that bibliometric 
methodologies can be successfully applied to researching research, i.e. investigating the 
underlying intellectual theories and underpinnings of a given discourse. M&A, if any, is an 
interdisciplinary field, where the intellectual bases are neither self-evident nor 
uncontroversial. Employing bibliometric methodologies in order to investigate the major 
contributors, contributions, theories, traditions, paradigms and their interlinkages seems valid 
in a field which has generally been continuously rising in academic and managerial 
importance over the past century. The nature and state of M&A research also needs to be 
figured out well before research on the role of M&A as a driver of the (re-)organization of 
economic activity, the wider social scientific research context of this study, can be 
commenced. 
 
Secondly, previous research by the author (Parvinen 2001) and the conceptual research 
performed in this study on the M&A discourse (Appendix 1) and the governance theories of 
the firm (Appendix 2) suggest that there could be substantial avenues for cross-fertilization 
between the M&A discourse and the governance theories of the firm. A structured and 
comprehensive bibliometric analysis is required to analytically map the role of different 
theories and paradigms in the M&A literature, thereby deepening and complementing our 
understanding of the state of the discourse. A bibliometric study is also needed to establish an 
objective and credible ground for a governance perspective to mergers and acquisitions, and 
justify further interdisciplinary research. Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, a proper 
bibliometric study, in fact any bibliometric study, is needed about the M&A discourse since 
there simply doesn’t seem to be one available.  
 
Given that a significant share of bibliometric research orbits around citation analyses, 
another significant issue deals with the way the habits and traditions of referencing have 
evolved. Most importantly, one has to recognize the social dimensions of referencing. In 
contemporary social scientific research, referencing is not only a way to indicate which 
sources have been used in the study, but it is also a social signal. Using a certain way of 
citing references helps the researcher to construct intertextual coherence, which is these days 
considered essential in striving towards contributing to the body of knowledge through 
academic research (Locke and Golden-Biddle 1997). 
 
How does this coherence construction show in how referencing is done in practice? For 
example, it is common that researchers use a systematic pattern of referencing to e.g. key 
concepts, authors or journals to anchor their output to a certain discussion. Referring 
consistently and as much as possible to the very journal outlet the researcher is aiming to be 
published through at is conventional. Similarly, researchers aim at legitimizing their research 
by referring to high-rank journals and seminal works of reputed authors. Additionally, the 
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writers who have established the respect of the academic community can be seen to have a 
need to institutionalize themselves through very selective referencing to both their own works 
as well as those of others. Typically, reputed authors make fewer references on the whole. 
 
 
A critical view on meta-analysis  
 
Meta-analytical research strategies that attempt to refine a major part of a given research 
area, like the present study, must also be viewed critically. There are at least two instances 
that can be perceived to erode the credibility of any grand attempt to establish a new 
theoretical perspective on the basis of meta-analytical research. Firstly, there is the general 
question of whether meta-analytical research can actually support theory-building in a wide 
disciplinary field such as M&A, and secondly, there is the problem of defining and 
implementing the selected methodologies so that they yield results with maximal credibility.  
 
There has been extensive discussion on the multi-paradigm problem in social sciences and 
whether overarching and holistic theoretical frameworks are sustainable or even needed (See 
e.g. McKelvey 1997, Scherer 1998, Gioia and Pitre 1990, Schultz and Hatch 1996). 
Arguably, building overarching theoretical proposals is needed to decrease the multi-
paradigm problem, but at the same time this exercise is controversial because of multi-
paradigmatic nature of social science and real life (McKelvey 1997). The present study 
attempts to build a holistic perspective of M&A that would integrate insights from various 
governance theories of the firm, which, then again, represent somewhat different currents of 
the field of institutional and organizational economics10.  In this sense, the present study is an 
acute example of the type of research that can be argued to suffer from the general multi-
paradigm problem in integrative theory building. However, other researchers contend that the 
multi-paradigmatic nature of social science, while it is true and sometimes problematic, 
should not be allowed to stifle ambitious integrative theory-building, but researchers should 
rather admit that they are “living with multiple paradigms” (Schultz and Hatch 1996, p. 529, 
see also Kaghan and Phillips 1998). According to this view, by focusing on the connections 
between the paradigms and allowing for a more fluid and dynamic conception of boundaries 
between scientific fields and between science and society, the adverse effect that the multi-
paradigm problem has on grounded theory-building can be alleviated. While admitting the 
potential weaknesses of its methodological approach, the present study supports this view. 
 
                                                 
10 In essence, the highest-level concept is organizational economics (OE), in which institutional analysis at the 
level of the organizations plays a key role. The governance theories of the firm can be thought to constitute an 
overwhelming majority of the institutional economics (IE) literature. Organizational economics also includes 
e.g. evolutionary economics approaches (see e.g. Nelson and Winter 1982), which are essentially departures 
from the institutional tradition. The competence based theories of the firm can be said to have emerged from the 
evolutionary approaches. By and large, this study uses the general term ‘institutional and organizational 
economics’ (IOE) to describe the economics based organizational research tradition.  
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The problem of defining and implementing the selected methodologies so that they yield 
results with maximal credibility is well reflected in this study. Despite careful formulation 
and execution of the bibliometric research agenda, including a one-by-one coding of over 30 
000 data cells and a time-consuming definition of the journals whose articles were to act as 
the research material, disciplinary bias and subjective attitudes creep into the results. Probing 
deep into the metatheoretical structure of a discourse requires employing bibliometric 
analyses that rely not only on objective citation counts, but also on subjective evaluation of 
the research material. In the context of this study, this implied that network centrality 
analyses were performed.  
 
With hindsight, it is easy to provide an example of an instance where the author’s 
subjective knowledge and the nature of the phenomenon (M&A) under investigation 
influenced the network analysis results. As will be seen in Chapter 2, organization theory 
authors and antecedents were poorly represented in the citation and network centrality 
analyses respectively. This boils down to a few things. Firstly, it seems that mergers and 
acquisitions are coined not only mergers and acquisitions, but also something else in the 
rather distinctive language of organization theory. Consequently, fewer organization theory 
articles were selected, which affected all of the bibliometric analysis results. Secondly, in the 
network centrality analysis, it was equally difficult to try to define organization theory-
oriented antecedents that could be identified amongst the articles. M&A, as a real-life 
phenomenon, is rather significant and research on it is, possibly because of this, very 
phenomenon-centered and thus far away from the language of organization theory. The result 
was that no real organization theory antecedents were defined and the role of organization 
theory in the bibliometric results was mitigated further. Thus, with hindsight, it seems that 
including organization theory and behavior journals in the journal list was not enough. It 
could be argued that all this boils down to the economics and management background of the 
author and the lack of organization theory knowledge, but then again all researchers have 
some background and some mindset. In any case, this example illustrates the difficulties of 
designing and executing meta-analytical research in an attempt to engage in theory building. 
 
 
1.2.2 The research process 
 
In this Section, a detailed account of the research process for the present study is given. 
The research for the study was performed between October 2000 and July 2002. The first 
location in which a bulk of the preparations and much of the conceptual research was done 
was the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE). During the time spent at 
LSE, which actually already began in 1998, a wealth of literature about the governance 
theories of the firm and M&A was accessed through LSE’s electronic and offprint collections 
and rich sources of the British Library of Political and Economic Sciences (BLPES). The 
time at LSE, which saw a longer six month stay at the Stockholm School of Economics as 
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well as somewhat frequent short visits Finland and the University of Oulu, can be seen to 
have laid the foundation for the study and many of the key thoughts date back to that time. 
The LSE period ended in the first versions of the conceptual analyses of the two discourses 
being finished in September 2001. 
 
After this, the author moved to Helsinki, Finland and started working at the Helsinki 
University of Technology Executive School of Business (HUT ESB), which enjoys the 
intellectual and academic support of the university’s Department of Industrial Engineering 
and Management. During this time, the final form of the study started forming and the 
bibliometric methodology was designed and discussed in depth in November-December 
2001. Subsequently, the bibliometric data was acquired from the ISI Web of Science in 
January 2002 and the bibliometric tests were performed early that year. During the 
bibliometric research the National Resource Library of Economics and Business in Finland 
was also of great help. The interpretation of the results and the integrative theory building 
took place for the first part of 2002, and core of the research was essentially done by July 
2002. This was ensued by an intense period of writing and reviewing, which resulted in the 
present research report. The LSE and BLPES were visited a number of times during the 
research. 
 
Essentially, the two-fold methodology, consisting of conceptual and bibliometric analyses, 
in this study were composed to facilitate the building of a holistic, governance theory-based 
cognitive framework for looking at M&A, a governance perspective to M&A. In the 
following, the detailed processes with which the two methodologies have been employed are 
given, together with a note on the dynamics of development of the theory-building project. 
 
 
Conceptual research 
 
The conceptual research accounts of the M&A and governance theory of the firm literature 
yield significant information addressing the research questions directly. However, they also 
lay the foundation for the bibliometric study. Both analyses look into the key conceptual 
issues of the two discourses, namely the key concepts and issues that they raise, the 
definitions and delimitations of the discourses, the research orientations they use as well as 
the key research findings. The conceptual analysis of M&A literature in Appendix 1 begins 
by addressing some of the contemporary motivations for researching M&A. This is followed 
by an overview of the definitional boundaries of the M&A discourse, the justifications and 
motivations for performing M&A and different perspectives presented about the processes 
internal to M&A. Analyzing distinct streams of M&A research, namely the capital markets 
stream, the strategic stream, the process stream and the organizational behavior stream, as 
well as identifying the types of questions they pose about the organization of economic 
activity play a central role in this analysis. 
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Subsequently, the economic foundations of corporations are explored through a conceptual 
analysis of theories of the firm in Appendix 2. Here, a categorization and overview of the 
various governance theories, namely neoclassical economics, the nexus of contracts 
perspective, agency theory, early incomplete contracting, transaction cost economics and 
property rights theory, is given. With every theory, an explicit mention of the key messages 
and authors is given together with a separate account for the way the theories have been 
related to M&A and adjunct concepts. Emphasis is placed on identifying the contribution of 
the governance theories on M&A. Finally, the shortcomings of the governance theories as 
well as the potential contributions from the competence perspective to strategy research are 
outlined.  
 
The conceptual research preceded the bibliometric analysis primarily for two reasons. 
Firstly, two knowledge gaps were perceived to prevail. The first knowledge gap related to the 
lack of systematic meta-analytical research (even of the review-type) on M&A. Secondly, it 
seemed that whilst the developments of the 1990s brought insights from the competence 
perspectives to the firm and its strategy to the analysis of M&A, the governance aspects have 
not received enough attention. Thus the conceptual research was employed as the first step 
towards filling these knowledge gaps. Secondly, a solid conceptual overview was perceived 
to be needed before the bibliometric study could be performed well. The exact bibliometric 
methodologies, the theory and antecedent formulation and the interpretation of the results 
was only possible in the light of the knowledge acquired during the process of constructing 
and writing the conceptual analyses.  
  
 
Bibliometric research 
 
The driving idea behind performing a bibliometric analysis is that it can used to discover 
not only the superficial structuring of a discourse but also the underlying theories. In M&A, 
the intellectual bases are neither self-evident nor uncontroversial, given its inter-disciplinary 
nature. Two sets of bibliometric methodology, citation analysis and network centrality 
analysis are used. Both rely on the same research material. This Section describes the 
bibliometric methodologies, nature of the research material and the process in which the 
bibliometric research has been performed. 
 
This study employs two sets of bibliometric methodology. Citation analysis (Cole and 
Cole 1973) is employed for the identification of major pillars of the M&A discourse, whereas 
network centrality analysis (Bonacich 1972, Freeman 1979, Wasserman and Faust 1994, 
Scott 1992) is used to investigate the relative positions and relationships of theories and 
phenomenon-oriented antecedents within the network represented by the M&A articles.  
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On the whole, the purpose of the bibliometric methodologies is to provide an analytically 
oriented, objective and empirical background backbone for the general research aim of this 
study, establishing a better understanding of the de facto structuring of the M&A discourse. 
The bibliometric methodologies and data have thus been chosen with this aim in mind. 
 
 
Citation analysis 
 
The first part of the bibliometric research methodology used in this study is citation analysis 
(Cole and Cole 1973). The basic citation analysis aims at identifying the key contributors and 
contributions in the M&A discourse as well as building an understanding of the temporal and 
outlet patterns of publishing. This aim is attained by performing the following analyses: 
 
a) Most-published first authors 
b) Most-cited first authors 
c) Most-cited texts (books and articles) 
d) Temporal pattern of articles published 
e) Temporal pattern of articles cited 
f) Outlet pattern of articles published 
g) Outlet pattern of articles cited 
 
The most-published authors analysis refers to the characteristics of the article material, i.e. 
the number of articles published by each author. Due to the source of the bibliometric data, 
only the first authors are visible in the most-published authors analysis. The same applies to 
the most-cited author analysis; again only the first authors appear in the bibliometric data and 
thus the analysis focuses on the frequencies with which the first authors are quoted in the 
selected body of articles. This implies that authors with significant numbers of second- and 
third-authored articles are emphasized relatively significantly less. Despite the fact that first-
authors are often considered the main contributors to scientific articles, this presents some 
questions about the validity of the author citation data, especially since it is sometimes 
customary to list the authors not in order of contribution, but in alphabetical order. 
 
In the case of most-cited texts i.e. books and articles, the aim is to identify the texts that 
have been most influential in the M&A discourse during the time period of this study. Given 
that many of the authors which are considered influential in the M&A discourse have 
contributed across disciplines and from a number of different angles, the identification of 
major works can be considered to be as important as the first author analyses11. Whereas 
                                                 
11 In fact, the most-cited first author and the most-cited article analyses complement each other. Whereas the 
most-cited first author analysis potentially downplays some significant second authors, the article analysis 
accounts for all contributors. On the other hand, the most-cited first author analysis highlights the authors who 
have been productive in publishing for a long time and are not simply picked out because of a single seminal 
article. 
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citation analysis has traditionally been used to compare and rank central authors responsible 
for the contents of a discourse (see e.g. Moed 1989), this study focuses more on investigating 
the intellectual roots (indicated by central source references) and structuring (indicated by the 
dependencies between the disciplinary traditions, contributors, references, theories and 
antecedents) of the discourse. For this purpose, it is important to be able to pinpoint 
individual articles. At the level of a single article, the identification of e.g. key theoretical 
messages or empirical research results is much easier and more meaningful than trying to 
deduce them from the general research profile of a well-published and/or –cited author. 
Regardless of whether the articles or the authors are considered the more significant 
indication of the structuring of the discourse, both are relevant for understanding it and are 
thus employed in this study. 
 
Beyond the most-published first author, most-cited first author and most-cited text 
analysis, the temporal and outlet distributions of the M&A discourse are also analyzed. The 
aim of mapping the temporal pattern of the published M&A articles is to see how the 
popularity of M&A as a research article topic has developed. Additionally, the effect of the 
time at which the articles were published on the results can only be analyzed if the mean, 
mode and distribution of the article publishing years are known and taken into account. The 
temporal pattern of the cited articles is even more significant. The temporal pattern of 
citations of a bibliometric data set in a 10-year interval is generally known to be weighed to a 
5-6 years before publication. In order to generalize the results of the citation analyses, i.e. 
removing their temporal embeddedness to the selected time frame12 and drawing conclusions 
regarding a longer period of time, the bibliometric data needs to be adjusted to the temporal 
profile of the citations. Thus the temporal pattern of the cited articles is useful in extracting 
further information from the other citation analyses in addition to being interesting in itself.  
 
The outlet pattern of the published and cited articles, then again, gives a general picture of 
where and from which angles the M&A discourse has been built. Knowing the distribution of 
articles and references per journal can be used to complement the discussion of the 
development of the discourse and the relative importance of different research traditions in it. 
Furthermore, the outlet profiles used as a part of the explanation for the relative dominance of 
some paradigms over other and establish linkages between paradigms, authors, institutions 
and the development of the discourse through time. 
 
 
Network centrality analysis 
 
The second part of the bibliometric research methodology used in this study is network 
centrality analysis. As opposed to citation analysis, which attempts to point out central 
                                                 
12 The 11 years in 1991-2001 in the case of this study 
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contributions and contributors within a discourse, network analysis attempts to “analyze the 
forest of research rather than individual trees” (Oliver and Ebers 1998, p. 550). The network 
analysis here deals with the same discourse as the citation analysis, i.e. mergers and 
acquisitions, and derives from the same bibliometric data as above, i.e. the 567 journal 
articles from 1991-2001. 
 
The network analysis thus maps the research performed on M&A as represented by the 
materials and explores the theoretical and phenomenon-oriented patterns that underlie this 
research by measuring their frequency of appearance and position within the research 
network. The aim of the network analysis is to distinguish the key theories and antecedents13 
that have been employed as intellectual roots to the M&A discourse in past research and 
point out their interrelations. Additionally, the network analysis attempts to indicate the 
relative importance of different theoretical paradigms and explain the type of roles specific 
theories have undertaken in the development of the discourse. The network analysis hence 
offers this study a deeper investigation of the interplay of the roots of the discourse, which, as 
a whole, should strengthen our understanding of the structuring of the M&A discourse and 
possibly yield implications regarding research and application of M&A theory to decision-
making. 
 
Network analysis of journal articles is based on building a database, which indicates the 
presence or absence of different facets, 28 theories and 25 antecedents in the case of this 
study, in each article. The database was built by familiarizing with each article and selecting 
the significantly influential theories and the significantly present antecedents within the 
articles14. The presence of a selected facet is denoted in each respective article by giving it 
the value 1 and the absence by 0. The database ends up as a binary matrix with which 
statistical analyses can then be performed. 
 
The different facets are thus linked to each other by their presence in the same article and 
articles are linked to each other by a facet they share in common. This study employs four 
analyses to the ‘M&A discourse network’: 
 
a) Frequencies of theories employed 
b) Frequencies of antecedents present 
                                                 
13 The key theories are the theoretical cornerstones employed and referenced in the articles. Antecedents for 
M&A research in the present study refer to the primary motivation for writing the article in the first place. It is 
especially important to understand that there is a difference between the antecedents for performing M&A and 
writing an article about M&A. Here, the term ‘M&A antecedents’ refer to the latter. 
14 In the context of this study, a minimum of zero and a maximum of eight theories and an equal amount of 
antecedents were chosen. To moderate the emphasis on articles with a large number of theories and antecedents, 
a combined minimum of least one and a combined maximum of ten theories and antecedents were chosen for 
each article. Articles containing no theory or antecedent were thus effectively excluded from the network 
centrality analysis. 
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c) Bonacich eigenvector centrality 
d) Betweenness centrality 
 
The frequencies of the theories employed indicate which theories have been most 
commonly employed and which antecedents are most commonly present in the M&A 
discourse. Since the breadth or acuteness of theories and theory descriptions is difficult, the 
frequencies of the theories and antecedents should not be considered without careful 
interpretation. The frequencies, together with the findings of the citation analysis and the 
conceptual analyses, however, give a good overall picture of the relative dominance of the 
different paradigms. In addition, comparing the frequencies of single theories or antecedents 
to the number of articles in the material gives an indication of what proportion of the 
literature acknowledges each facet, which can be argued to be interesting as such. 
 
In order to determine and compare the centrality of the various theories that are employed 
and antecedents that are present within the M&A research, statistical centrality measures 
need to be employed. The analytical techniques employed here, i.e. Bonacich eigenvector 
centrality and betweenness centrality, are indicators of network positions of the theories and 
antecedents (Oliver and Ebers, 1998, p. 557): 
 
Bonacich eigenvector centrality  (Bonacich 1972, 1987): According to this 
measure, the centrality of a concept equals the sum of its connections to other 
concepts, weighed by the centrality of each of these concepts (Bonacich 1972, 
1987). This measure thus provides information on the concepts that have been 
at the core of research on inter-organizational relations and networks.  
  
Betweenness centrality (Freeman 1979): This measure indicates the degree to 
which a focal theory is located on the shortest connecting path between any 
other theories. Bridging ability (high betweenness centrality) is an actor-level 
attribute, referring to the ability to connect to other network actors who cannot 
or who do not wish to connect directly. With reference to networks of theories, 
a high score on betweenness centrality means that the theory is connected to one 
other theory in one particular article, and to another theory in another article. 
Thus, the theory has the ability to connect two theories that are not directly 
connected in any other article. Such a bridging ability could not be an attribute 
of wide and/or flexible theories, or be related to specific characteristics of the 
theory, for example, the levels of analysis on which it is based, the structure of 
the hypothesis extracted from it or the specification of its testability. 
 
 
The network centrality measures thus analyze the centrality and the bridging ability of the 
theories and antecedents, revealing a) which theories are interlinked to which theories, b) 
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which theories are linked to which antecedents and vice versa and c) which antecedents are 
linked to which antecedents. These interlinkages can also be interpreted as the ‘relative 
importance’ (centrality) and ‘relative cross-fertilizing ability’ (bridging), thus deepening our 
understanding of the function, role and interplay of different theories and antecedents in the 
formation of the M&A discourse.  
 
The process of performing the bibliometric analyses and their results are examined as 
follows. Firstly, the journal and article selection processes are discussed respectively in order 
to shed light on the rationales of the bibliometric data acquisition process and nature of the 
resulting research material in general. Chapter 2 will then explain the performed bibliometric 
analyses in detail and exhibit the respective results. 
 
 
Selecting the core journals of the M&A discourse 
 
The purpose of the selective citation and network centrality analyses applied on the core 
journals involving merger and acquisition related discourse was to analytically identify the 
relative importance of key authors, articles, journals and topics, and to facilitate drawing 
conclusions relating to the interlinkages between the M&A and governance discourses in the 
next Chapters.  
 
Two initial challenges in the effort of choosing a representative population of articles can 
be outlined promptly. On one hand, the population of articles should encompass an extensive 
period of time. Many of the seminal contributions identified in the conceptual analyses date 
back to the 1950s (Lindblom 1959, March and Simon 1958, Selznick 1957), the 1960s 
(Ansoff 1965, Chandler 1962, Andrews 1971, Steiner 1979, Cyert and March 1963) and even 
earlier than that (Berle and Means 1932, Ricardo 1815). This surfaces the problem of the time 
frame in which the journal articles are studied. On the other hand, the selection of journals 
must permeate wide enough a disciplinary base to capture enough of the M&A related 
articles to be statistically significant and not to exclude any significant publications. 
 
The problem of selecting the right ‘core journals’ was solved as follows. The notion of a 
‘core journal’ is often annexed to the fact that it is an academically distinguished, well-
referenced publication. Core journals in management have in the past been ranked using 
various methodologies including author opinions (e.g. Hubbard and Vetter 1996, Niemi 
1988), citation analysis (e.g. Franke et al 1990, Gordon and Purvis 1991, Johnson and 
Podsakoff 1994) and faculty surveys (e.g. Macmillan 1989, Extejt and Smith 1990, 
Henderson et al. 1990, Gomez-Mejia and Balkin 1992, Kirkpatrick and Locke 1992, van 
Fleet 1995, Glick et al. 1997). 
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Here, two core journal selections were performed using a mix of different methodologies. 
This was felt necessary, as the aim was to include a much wider selection of journals in order 
to cover a wide disciplinary and geographical spread. Given the interdisciplinary and 
multifaceted nature of mergers and acquisitions as a research area, journals in various 
disciplines were included15.  
 
In order to bring in qualitative judgment into the journal selection process, the journals 
were selected using a combination of qualitative judgment and quantitative rankings. This 
was performed by firstly engaging in multiple consecutive judgment selections, then 
screening the journal list using a number of rankings and finally ensuring the representation 
of a diverse disciplinary, geographical and institutional representation of journals. In practice, 
this resulted in the following procedures. 
 
Firstly, the choice for the core list of journals, which was then to be developed further 
using other methodologies (see below), was selected by judgment. The author made the first 
selection of 50 journals from the Social Science Citation Index (SSCI) journal list16. This was 
followed by an independent selection from the same list by a more senior researcher who 
judged the same list and ended up with 56 journals, of which 78% coincided with the original 
selection. After two further rounds of discussion with senior colleagues, the journal list was 
revised to include 58 journals within the SSCI.  
 
The choice of journals attempts, along the lines of Oliver and Ebers (1998), to avoid 
sample-selection bias by accessing as wide range of sources as possible, including 
contributions from different disciplinary origins and avoiding geographical bias in author and 
research setting origins and including both institutionally connected and independent 
journals. Therefore, additional measures were undertaken to further refine the 
representativeness of the journal list.   
 
Rankings published for economics, management and finance related journals were then 
reviewed. A number of earlier journal ranking articles and associated papers (see e.g. 
Siggelkow 2001, Coe and Weinstock 1984, Extejt and Smith 1990, Sharplin and Mabry 1985, 
                                                 
15 All of the relevant categories in the Social Sciences Citation Index were covered as business, economics, 
management, finance, sociology, law, industrial relations, psychological and accounting journals were included 
in the list. 
16 The Social Sciences Citation Index was accessed through the ISI Web of Science. The SSCI is a 
multidisciplinary database, with searchable author abstracts, covering the journal literature of the social 
sciences. It indexes more than 1,725 journals spanning 50 disciplines, as well as covering individually selected, 
relevant items from over 3,300 of the world's leading social scientific journals. Provides access to current 
information and retrospective data from 1956 forward. The SSCI averages 2,700 new records per week and 
includes approximately 50,500 new cited references per week. It contains a current total of over 3.15 million 
records and as of January 1992, it has contained searchable, full-length, English-language author abstracts for 
approximately 60% of the articles in the database. The ISI Web of Science provides access to the last 10 years 
of publications, which was convenient for the purposes of this study. 
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Gomez-Mejia and Balkin 1992, and Johnson and Podsakoff 1994) were reviewed in the 
process of selecting the journals. The rankings consider separately and jointly a number of 
ranking criteria, most importantly research stimulation (measured my citations), reputation 
(measured by surveys) as well as more complex dependency network analyses based on 
Salancik (1986).  
 
In further refining the selection of journals, the journal list was amended by checking 
through Siggelkow’s (2001) rankings of strategy, organization behavior and economics 
journals. The ten highest ranked journals from each discipline vis-à-vis both stimulation and 
reputation were made sure to be included in the list17. The article list was further checked 
using the SSCI Journal Citation Report (2000) by choosing the five journals with the highest 
number of citations in all relevant categories; business, business/finance, economics and 
management. In this process, a total of three journals18 in the disciplinary lists were found to 
be missing from the list, and they were consequently added.   
 
After this, qualitative judgment was again exercised, as geographical diversity was 
ensured through the representation of European journals and journals from independent, non-
institutional publishers. Furthermore, the aim was to only include academic journals 
representing scientific papers concerning M&A. This was the major motivation behind 
making, after lengthy consideration and discussion, the decision of not including Mergers 
and Acquisitions, which has a conspicuous trade journal profile, in the journal list. Finally, 
some minor changes were made for reasons of convenience and economy.  
 
Consequently, the following journals were included in the final list with which the 
bibliometric analyses were performed: 
 
List of 65 core journals included in the bibliometric analysis of the mergers and 
acquisitions discourse 
 
ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT JOURNAL  
ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT REVIEW  
ACCOUNTING ORGANIZATIONS AND SOCIETY 
ACCOUNTING REVIEW 
ADMINISTRATIVE SCIENCE QUARTERLY  
ADVANCES IN STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT 
AMERICAN BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL 
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW  
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS AND SOCIOLOGY 
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY  
AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW 
                                                 
17 By doing this, the following journals were included: Journal of Economic Theory, Journal of Applied 
Psychology, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Organizational Behaviour and Human Decision 
Processes and American Sociological Review 
18 Review of Financial Studies, Journal of Monetary Economics and Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 
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ANTITRUST LAW JOURNAL  
BRITISH JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT  
CALIFORNIA MANAGEMENT REVIEW  
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE-AN INTERNATIONAL REVIEW  
ECONOMETRICA 
ECONOMICA 
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC REVIEW  
HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW  
HUMAN RELATIONS 
INDUSTRIAL MARKETING MANAGEMENT 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW  
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF FINANCE & ECONOMICS 
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 
JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS  
JOURNAL OF APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 
JOURNAL OF BANKING & FINANCE  
JOURNAL OF BUSINESS 
JOURNAL OF BUSINESS RESEARCH 
JOURNAL OF BUSINESS VENTURING  
JOURNAL OF CORPORATE FINANCE  
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION 
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY 
JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS & MANAGEMENT STRATEGY 
JOURNAL OF EVOLUTIONARY ECONOMICS  
JOURNAL OF FINANCE  
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL AND QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS 
JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS 
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS STUDIES 
JOURNAL OF LAW ECONOMICS & ORGANIZATION  
JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT 
JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT INQUIRY  
JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT STUDIES 
JOURNAL OF MARKETING 
JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS 
JOURNAL OF MONEY CREDIT AND BANKING 
JOURNAL OF PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY  
LONG RANGE PLANNING  
MANAGEMENT SCIENCE 
MIS QUARTERLY 
MIT SLOAN MANAGEMENT REVIEW 
OMEGA-INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT SCIENCE  
ORGANIZATION 
ORGANIZATION SCIENCE  
ORGANIZATION STUDIES 
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR AND HUMAN DECISION PROCESSES   
ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS  
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 
RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 
REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES  
REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES 
SMALL BUSINESS ECONOMICS 
STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT JOURNAL 
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All in all, the list of 65 journals shown above can be argued to constitute a representative 
journal population from which articles discussing mergers and acquisitions can be screened. 
The presented selection of journals is supported by earlier studies containing bibliometric 
analyses of so-called ‘first tier journals’. There are numerous categorizations of the use so-
called first-tier or core journals in management research. In this study, a wide perspective is 
employed to avoid advocating somebody’s subjective perspective on the definition of a core 
journal.  
 
With the exception of one more extensive study (Siggelkow 2001), the previous selections 
of core journals have been rather similar to each other. This is evident in Table 2, which 
shows the journals that have been listed in recent and relevant bibliometric analyses. The 
studies referred to are those of Siggelkow (2001), Franke et al. (1990), Coe and Weinstock 
(1984), Gomez-Mejia and Balkin (1992), Extejt and Smith (1990) and Johnson and Podsakoff 
(1994). Highlighted is the fact that the current study attempts to cover not only a wide 
disciplinary field, but be exhaustive in some sense, ensuring the inclusion of what most 
experts would call core journals at the expense of including journals which others would peg 
as non-core. 
 
Table 2: Comparison of the selected 65 core journals to the journal selection in previous bibliometric 
analyses investigating diverse topics in management research 
 Franke et al. 
1990 
Coe and 
Weinstock 
1984 
Gomez-Mejia 
and Balkin 
1992 
Extejt and 
Smith 1990 
Johnson and 
Podsakoff 
1994 
Siggelkow 
2001 
AMJ X X x x x x 
AMR X x x  x x 
AOS      x 
AR      x 
ASQ x x  x x x 
AM       
ABLJ       
AER      x 
AJES       
AJS     x x 
ASR      x 
ALJ       
BJM       
CMR x x x  x x 
CG       
ETR      X 
ENM       
EER      x 
HBR x x x  x x 
HR   x  x x 
IMM       
IER       
IJFE       
IJIO      x 
JAE      x 
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JAP   x  x x 
JBF      x 
JB  x x   x 
JBR   x  x x 
JBV   x   x 
JCF       
JEBO      x 
JET      x 
JEMS      x 
JEE      x 
JOF      x 
JFQA      x 
JOFE      x 
JIE      x 
JIBS   x  x x 
JLEO      x 
JMN x  x  x x 
JMI       
JMS x  x  x x 
JMR      x 
JME      x 
JMCB      x 
JPSP     x x 
JPE      x 
LRP x x x  x x 
MS x x x  x x 
MIS       x 
SMR x  x  x x 
OME       
ORG       
OSC      x 
OS x  x   x 
OBH   x x x x 
OD x  x  x x 
QJE      x 
RJE      x 
RES      x 
RFS      x 
SBE       
SMJ x  x  x x 
 
 
Furthermore, the issue of involving journals from a relevant period of time was addressed. 
Because of the temporal focus of this thesis, namely addressing the structuring of the M&A 
discourse for contemporary academic and managerial purposes, journal articles from the time 
period of 1991-2001 were chosen. The limited scope of time is made up to by the fact that the 
conceptual analysis as a methodology savors the durability of the argument’s relevance 
through time. It must also be acknowledged that organization theory paradigms as well as the 
theories of the firm in economics, many of which date before the chosen range, seem more 
robust through time than management discourses. Additionally, the conceptual analysis (See 
Appendices 1 and 2) as such manifests the crucial role of many of the basic works on 
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management before this time period, and Chapter 3 does consider the chronological patterns 
of the key publications.  
 
Thus this time frame was perceived sufficient for the purposes of verifying the appraisal of 
the meta-analysis as well as observing the de facto relative importance of the key texts to the 
M&A discourse. As the temporal publishing and citing profiles of the articles and references 
indicate, this time period facilitates a thorough analysis of references all the way to the 1970s, 
which was perceived to be sufficient given the rapid development of the academic M&A 
discourse during the past three decade following the conglomerate merger wave of the 1960s 
and 70s. 
 
 
The selection of articles 
 
The next step from choosing the core journals in fields relevant to the M&A discourse was 
the selection of articles in these journals.  
 
Given the amount of articles under investigation, a Social Science Citation Index database 
search was performed using the words "merger", "acquisition", "mergers" and "acquisitions" 
as search words for the titles, keywords given by authors and editors as well as for the 
abstracts of the articles. Naturally, not all articles containing issues about M&A will be found 
using this search string. Many could argue that articles including such terms as "demerger", 
"takeover", "horizontal integration", "vertical integration", "consolidation" and 
"amalgamation" should be included in the list. The database was checked for articles 
containing any of the latter keywords and neither of the prior, and all the ones found that 
dealt with M&A were included in the list. 
 
There were no additional articles found using "demerger", "consolidation", "horizontal 
integration" or "amalgamation" that would have discussed M&A (and not mentioned either 
"merger" or "acquisition") in the sense of this study. "Takeover" and "takeovers" as search 
words gave a relatively large number of articles. These articles are, however, were excluded 
from the original M&A article population, since literature that dominantly employs the word 
"takeover" often has a very narrow focus on M&A and would thus distort the bibliometric 
analysis19.  
 
                                                 
19 A brief familiarization with the takeover literature indicated that it is significantly skewed in the direction of 
hostile takeovers, financial instruments employed as anti-takeover defense mechanisms, antitrust legislation and 
certain individual takeover cases. The article population produced with the search words ‘merger’ and 
‘acquisitions’ included a large number of articles discussing takeovers too, and thus it was felt that the true 
significance of takeovers in the M&A discourse was actually better represented in the bibliometric study by 
excluding articles that made no significant reference to ‘merger’ or ‘acquisition’, only ‘takeover’. 
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The search word "vertical integration" had to be rejected. This was due to the fact that 
nearly all of the found additional articles focused not on vertical integration as M&A but as a 
central concept and theoretical building block of transaction cost economics. Thus, the author 
and article analyses of the bibliometric study would have been distorted. Separate analysis of 
these articles is not necessary, since the dominance of transaction cost economics is explicit 
in these studies20. 
 
Naturally, all the articles selected in this fashion had to be short-read to extract the articles 
actually dealing with M&A and to extract those not belonging to this area. A large number of 
articles were excluded simply because the word "acquisition" has so many additional 
meanings. Articles not focusing on corporate acquisitions, but mentioning the word 
acquisition in some other context comprised the vast majority of the excluded articles21. 
 
Along the lines of Puro (1996), writings that were not perceived to be scientific articles 
were excluded. This includes numerous industry reports, book reviews, introductory and 
editorial comments as well as announcements. From then on the basis of the selection of 
articles was the definition of the M&A discourse, outlined more carefully in Appendix 2. 
That is, an article whose key focus was the process, rationale, management, outcome, or other 
contingency of a completed or attempted merger, acquisition, takeover or a demerger were 
included. Topics falling under these headings included articles dealing with e.g. 
diversification through acquisitions, corporate cash reserves in financing acquisitions, the 
resource allocating outcomes of M&A, the role of raiders and takeovers in disciplining the 
market for corporate control, shareholder value outcomes of mergers, acquisition policy for 
multi-supplier systems and the role of information in market entry through acquisition. 
 
In the case of articles that had ambiguous topics or included a large number of issues from 
different disciplinary viewpoints, the conceptual analysis of the M&A literature was again 
utilized. Keeping in mind the basic aim of better structuring the M&A discourse, ambiguous 
cases were considered individually. Included were articles that had M&A as one of their key 
theoretical and/or phenomenon-related foci. For example, an article on the role of chief 
executive officers, their incentives and individual characteristics in takeover resistance 
(Buchholtz and Ribbens 1994) was included in the list, but an article focusing merely on the 
interplay of boards and chief executive officers in restructuring (Johnson, Hoskisson and Hitt 
1993) was excluded because it only gives M&A as one of many examples. Likewise, an 
article the impact of ownership changes on internal labor markets (McGuckin and Nguyen 
                                                 
20 Examples of studies emerging with ‘vertical integration’ include e.g. Ghoshal and Moran 1996, Poppo and 
Zenger 1998, Robertson and Gatignon 1998, Davis and Duhaime 1992 and Williamson 1991, all of which are 
evidently very much transaction cost economics flavored articles. 
21 The excluded articles related to some other discourse (shown in parentheses) and referred most often to 
technology (R&D), information (many), skill (social psychology, HRM), capital (finance), or knowledge (many) 
acquisition. Other miss-hits included capacity, resource, campaeus, learning, expectancy, stimuli, customer, 
human capital and capability acquisition. 
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2000) since it focuses on ownership changes was included, but another on corporate 
tournaments and firm size-wage relations was excluded because it focuses on human capital, 
not corporate, acquisition. Elsewhere, articles that only referred to or made a passing mention 
of M&A, but were not centrally interested in M&A, were excluded.  
 
Also excluded were articles where the perceived M&A process was just an object of mere 
speculation, with little intent to actually M&A to the academic research agenda in the articles. 
In other words, excluded in this way were e.g. articles, which listed a wide array (e.g. over 
five) of different organizational circumstances with M&A being one of them. In ambiguous 
cases, factual ‘M&A activity’ occurring in the form of e.g. asset interchange, organizational 
agglomeration or hierarchical reorganization was the general guideline for inclusion. This by 
no means implies that purely theoretical articles were excluded. On the contrary, as long as 
one of the main foci in the article dealt with the one of the aspects of the definitions provided 
in this study, the article was included. 
 
After this round of detailed selection, the 567 articles were found, chosen and familiarized 
with during a more or less six-month period starting in January 2002. The abstracts of the 
articles, together with the title, keywords and author names and all references were read from 
all articles. Access to 389 full text articles, either in Adobe Acrobat pdf or paper format, 
representing 69% of the article population was acquired, with the others analyzed on the basis 
of, arguably, somewhat insufficient information. Having familiarized with the articles, it 
would, however, seem justified to argue that an overwhelming majority of the articles could 
have been analyzed on the basis of the abstracts and references. Since qualitative network 
analysis is limited to as few basic variables as two (i.e. theories and antecedents), this 
information could have most often been extracted from well-structured abstracts and with a 
careful investigation of the key literature sources. The results of this bibliometric analysis 
would therefore be, with extremely high probability, very similar even if the whole analysis 
had been performed solely on the basis of abstracts and referencing information.  
 
 
Cognitive framework building 
 
The conceptual and bibliometric analyses facilitate the building of a cognitive framework 
for governance-based M&A thinking in Chapter 3. In practice, this implies a definite process 
starting with moving towards a fuller picture of the de facto structuring of the M&A 
discourse by discussing dominant perspectives, i.e. key theories, linking theories and 
antecedents identified in the bibliometric study. The developing picture of the M&A 
discourse is compared to the existing body of knowledge represented by the view of the 
M&A discourse presented on the basis of the conceptual analysis. A number of differences 
between the two representations are identified, and the de facto picture of the M&A discourse 
is found to be characterized by the strong presence of governance theoretical authors, 
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antecedents and insights. Also, a slightly refined picture of the disciplinary orientations 
within the M&A discourse is proposed. Five disciplinary M&A research streams are 
perceived to exist (finance, strategy, process, humans and organizations, and law and 
economics), which represents both the findings of the citation analysis and an amalgamation 
of the findings recent analyses of the M&A discourse (e.g. Weston et al. 2001, Larsson and 
Finkelstein 1999, Kim 1998, Cording et al. 2001, Haspeslagh and Jemison 2001 and 
Gammelgaard 1999).   
 
The framework building exercise then moves on to discuss the nature of paradigmatic 
linkages, given that its principal aim is to identify such linkages between the governance and 
M&A discourses. Three levels of linkages are subsequently analyzed, namely linkages in 
intellectual roots and traditions, linkages through academic cross-fertilization and linkages 
through shared views on factual M&A affairs. The analysis of the linkages is complemented 
with an evaluation of the general level, assumption-specific and theory-specific criticisms of 
the governance theories of the firm and their implications for the applicability of governance 
theories to M&A analysis.  
 
Together, the new, governance-flavored picture of the M&A discourse, the paradigmatic 
interlinkages and the understanding of the shortcoming of governance theory a) facilitate 
arguing for and b) show the need for a holistic governance perspective to M&A. This 
conceptual perspective aims at pulling together the insights of the governance theories of the 
firm. Two variants of this holistic governance approach are proposed, an explanatory avenue, 
concentrating on mapping the academic contribution of governance theory on M&A, and a 
prescriptive avenue, concentrating on developing cognitive models for using governance 
theoretical thinking in M&A decision-making. The ‘holistic governance perspective to 
M&A’ is thus essentially a way to present a number of findings that are connected by their 
origin in governance theoretical academic output under one distinct heading that can be 
operated as both managerial (pragmatic, prescriptive) or academic (theoretical, explanatory) 
cognitive frameworks.  
 
 
1.3 On validity and reliability 
 
This section analyses the methodological validity of the bibliometric analysis employed 
and discusses the limitations of the research data and methodology. In this context, it is 
necessary to highlight the role of the bibliometric study as a complement to a body of 
conceptual research performed about the M&A and theory of the firm discourses. 
Nevertheless, the aim is to investigate and acknowledge the methodological flaws and 
problems with the present study and start discussing the limitations that these may have 
regarding the conclusions that are drawn from the analyses as the discussion is continued and 
extended in Chapters 3 and 4. 
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The most notable insufficiency in the material used for the citation analyses is that the 
bibliometric data could only be analyzed vis-à-vis the first author of each work and reference. 
The natural outcome is that the importance of second and third authors of articles and books 
are downplayed in the most-published and most-cited author analyses.  
 
The detrimental effect of the limitation to first-author referencing on the most-cited author 
analysis is alleviated by the use of the most-cited article analysis. Even though some 
significant second authors might be left without attention in the most-cited author analysis, 
the book and article level analysis is able to account for all authors. Comparing the results of 
the most-cited first author and the most-cited article analyses reveals two findings that 
support the validity of the first author referencing results. Firstly, the authors appearing in the 
most-cited first author list are well represented in the article comparison. 13 of the 16 most-
cited first authors also appear among the 30 most-cited articles22. Secondly, when the article 
citation counts of authors that appear as second or third authors in the most-cited article 
comparison were added to their first author counts, only three notable changes occurred. 
Namely, Andrei Shleifer’s position was further enforced and two acknowledged contributors, 
Paul Ruback and David Jemison, entered the most-cited author list somewhere around the top 
10-20. All in all, the results converge to a very large extent. In any case, the results of the 
most-cited text and article analysis can be considered more valid than the most-cited first 
author results. This is also reflected in how the results are interpreted.  
 
Some authors have criticized the use of simple citation analyses for focusing on quantity 
instead of quality (see e.g. Puro 1996, p. 55-57). An alternative method incorporates not only 
the number of citations, but also the position of citations as an equally significant variable 
(See Small 1982, Moravcsik and Murugesan 1975, p. 87-88). According to this view, the 
value and significance of citations depends on their location in the text and on how they are 
used. In practice, such a methodology does not consider all citations in the text but e.g. limit 
the number of citations considered for each article, consider only the most influential 
citations in an articles, consider only the citations appearing in the theoretical parts (e.g. 
introduction, separate theory section, discussion and/or conclusion) and so on.  
 
Despite the merits of focusing the study and potentially pinpointing the more central 
references from each study, there are some considerable difficulties with such qualitative 
citation analytical methodology. Firstly, it incorporates an element of subjective judgment in 
the selection process. If not all citations and authors are considered, how can the significant 
references in an articles be systematically picked out without bias? If the number of 
references per article is restricted, some important references are left outside consideration. 
                                                 
22 The exceptions are Berger, Asquith and Hitt. The reason for Berger's and Hitt's absence is due to their fertile 
publication in the 1990s, with no single article thus being filtered to the top 30. 
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For example, articles drawing on a wide disciplinary basis, as is often the case with e.g. 
M&A articles, would need to list at least 5-10 references and still important contributors 
would be left out. At the same time, some non-influential references would surely be included 
because of a fixed number of considered references in the case of an article with a very 
narrow theoretical basis. Robustness tests, i.e. trying out different fixed number of considered 
articles and seeing if the results vary, could verify the reliability of the test, yet none of these 
seem to have employed in academic management enquiry. If, then again, the number of 
contributors considered per article is left to the author to decide in the context of every 
article, the subjective selection bias issue is emphasized.  
 
Secondly, there is the issue of data analysis. If the whole body of references is analyzed, as 
is done in this study, the process can be semi-automatized and statistical analyses employed. 
This yields two benefits. On one hand, it allows for larger populations of articles to be 
analyzed in less time and, on the other hand, this focuses research attention to the 
interpretation and discussion of the results. In the context of this study, the decision of 
including all references in the bibliometric data saved time and energy to perform a second 
bibliometric analysis, the network centrality analysis, and incorporate a thorough conceptual 
analysis as a further basis for the discussion. 
 
Furthermore, it is evident that not all major journals that deal with various aspects of 
M&A were covered and thus all relevant studies were not included. As Oliver and Ebers 
(1998, p. 570) note, a bibliometric study drawing from a clearly defined group of journals 
within a clearly demarcated time window is not investigating a sample, but rather a 
population of articles within those boundaries. Since all M&A related articles were included 
according to best possible judgment, the analysis is, indeed, of the M&A article population 
published in the 65 core journals during the 1991-2001 period. After this contention, the key 
methodological question arising is that of the generalizability of the study, and whether the 
analyzed article population can be used to draw conclusions about the entire M&A discourse 
during 1991-2001 and at other times.  
 
There seems to be fairly good grounds to argue that the performed results are 
generalizable on the basis of the following. Firstly, the convergence of the various studies 
indicates that there seems to be a number of theory and content related features that unite the 
field of M&A research, despite the fact that M&A research is widespread in a number of 
ways. The bibliometric results indicate that there are journals in several disciplines 
(economics, strategic management, finance and law) that have published widely in M&A. 
The citation pattern of the analyzed 567 articles is also relatively widespread, and the list of 
most-cited journals is very reminiscent of general referencing statistics published by e.g. the 
ISI Web of Science. The most-published first author list also indicates that there is 
overwhelming dominance of neither a particular researcher nor a stream of thought.  
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What is more, similar results emerge from the different bibliometric studies. The most-
cited first author, most-cited article and frequency results of the network analysis present 
converging findings23 concerning the theory and content of the M&A discourse, which are 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 3. These results are also strongly supported by the 
findings and propositions of the conceptual analyses of the TOF and M&A discourses 
presented in Appendices 1 and 2. 
 
Another indication supporting the generalizability of the results is that the temporally 
adjusted analysis complemented and further deepened the results of the bibliometric study, 
thus yielding a fuller picture of the intellectual bases and the academic structuring of the 
M&A discourse. It seems justified to argue that the results presented in the bibliometric 
analyses represent not a biased sample drawn from the 1990s top management journals, but 
rather the general features of the field of M&A research.  
 
The content validity of the network centrality analysis might suffer from the fact that the 
original list of facets designed on the basis of previous knowledge accumulated during the 
conceptual analysis of the M&A and TOF discourses turned out not to be all-inclusive. Thus 
four facets had to be added during the coding process. This may have reduced the content 
validity of the coding given that the absence of a necessary facet might have influenced the 
selection of facets for the previously coded articles. This effect was alleviated by applying the 
facets that had been added during the coding process to the previously coded articles. This 
nevertheless presents an unsystematic element in the coding process.  
 
The network centrality test, then again, was performed using subjective evaluation in the 
selection of the theory and antecedent facets, the definitions of the facets and, most 
importantly, the coding of the articles according to the presence or absence of each facet. 
With the subjective element involved, the greatest methodological concern is placed on the 
reliability of the test, i.e. whether repeating the test would yield the same results. While the 
reliability of the process of selecting and defining the facets is difficult to evaluate, the 
reliability of the coding process could be tested with robustness tests performed by having 
two colleagues repeat a part of the coding process.  
 
The reliability of the selection and definition of the necessary facets can thus only be 
evaluated qualitatively. One relieving factor is that many of the theory and some of the 
antecedent facets have been successfully used by Oliver and Ebers (1998) in their study of 
the networking discourse. Another encouraging factor arises from the fact that the colleagues 
performing the robustness test found few facets to be missing. The only comment regarding 
the theory facets was that the rather coarse heading of ‘organizational behavior’ was too 
                                                 
23 Namely, emphasizing the key positions of agency theory, transaction cost theory and the governance theories 
of the firm in general, together with the relatively equally important positions of the competitive and resource 
based views on corporate strategy as well as the prevalence of corporate finance literature.  
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broad and all-inclusive. The antecedents were perceived to be slightly more problematic, with 
such antecedents as ‘restructuring’, ‘ownership structure’, ‘horizontal integration’ (which was 
explicitly explained to be included in the ‘Diversification and conglomerates’ category in 
case the article dealt with diversifying horizontal integration) and ‘vertical integration’ being 
perceived missing.  
 
To test the robustness of the coding in the network analysis, a random sample of 30 
articles from the article population was coded by two colleagues from the Helsinki University 
of Technology and the coding results were compared to those by the author. One of the se 
codings was performed so that the total number of antecedents and theories given for each 
article was known exactly and the other so that the total number of antecedents and theories 
was not known.  
 
For the first 30 articles tested with the known number of facets given, the two codings 
converged on 1455 out of a total of 1560 codings. This represents an agreement rate of 93%, 
which can generally be considered to be completely satisfactory (Collin et al. 1996, Oliver 
and Ebers 1998, p. 555). One might assume, however, that this excellent result would be 
mitigated by the fact that during the coding, the number of antecedents and theories given for 
each article was known. The second robustness test coding, i.e. the one performed without 
knowledge of the number of facets allocated for each article by the author, proved this 
assumption wrong. The agreement rate was again 93%, with 1451 out of the total of 1560 
codings converging. 
 
On the whole, picking out the antecedents turned out to be more difficult than theories, 
which can be speculated to be partly because of the more successful selection and definition 
of the theory facets. The convergence in selecting theories was 96% and 94% for the two 
tests vs. 91% and 92% for the antecedents respectively. On the whole, the coding process 
thus seems very robust and reliable, given that both the colleague who knew the number of 
facets he was supposed to allocate and the one that didn’t know ended up with the same 
approximate average agreement rate: 93%. 
 
 
1.4 Structure of the study  
 
This study is structured in a way, which reflects the structure of the methodology. The 
conceptual analyses of the M&A and governance theory of the firm literatures, which act as 
somewhat independent research entities that underlie the bibliometric analyses and the 
framework-building, are reported separately as Appendices 1 and 2. Including them as 
Appendices is thus also justified by the fact that these two analyses represented two rather 
discrete work packages during the research project leading to this study.  
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Chapter 2 deals with the results of the bibliometric analysis of the M&A literature. It 
concentrates on exhibiting the results of the data in the performed bibliometric analyses. 
Subsequently, Chapter 3 interprets the results of the bibliometric and conceptual studies and 
aims at making propositions that address the research questions directly. Here, some 
paradigmatic discussion is presented together with a discussion of the interlinkages between 
the M&A and governance paradigms on three levels (Section 3.1). Chapter 3 thus both 
ascertains the contents of the cognitive framework-building exercise (Section 3.2) and 
presents two approaches under the common heading of a governance perspective to M&A 
(Section 3.3).  
 
Finally, Chapter 4 concludes the present study. Here, particular attention is paid to 
bringing together all of the research propositions made in Chapter 3 and relating them to the 
research questions posed in this study. This is followed by an analysis of the contributions of 
this study to the existing body of knowledge. Seven contributions are predicted together with 
a realization of the fact that the true contribution will only be revealed in time. Additionally, 
while the shortcomings of applying the governance theories to M&A are already evaluated at 
the end of Chapter 3, Chapter 4 also includes an in depth analysis of the shortcomings of the 
holistic governance perspective to M&A as a whole. The shortcomings are perceived to yield 
important information about the limits of the perspective and the need to complement it with 
other research perspectives. Consequently, this study is rounded off with an account of the 
future research avenues it proposes both in the direction of the M&A discourse and in the 
direction of the developed governance perspective.  
 
By and large, this study can be seen to contain a general governance proposition. Despite 
the fact that this study is limited in its phenomenon focus (only M&A), its methodology (only 
conceptual and bibliometric, no phenomenon-oriented empirical methodology) and the 
exhaustiveness of its implications (only a collection of governance theoretical insights into 
M&A), it represents a somewhat new orientation to management research. The idea of the 
use of governance as a holistic management research perspective, i.e. using the governance 
theories as a theoretical framework for scrutinizing a variety of real-life management issues, 
has been emerging (see e.g. Williamson 1999, Madhok 2002), but has not yet surfaced in any 
particular form.  
 
This study attempts to point out that the ‘governance perspective’ could be developed into 
a new management research orientation that would both enjoy academic appreciation and be 
applicable to different business phenomena. Arguably, the governance perspective has always 
been stronger as a conceptual framework than an operational decision-making tool. On the 
basis of this study, the governance perspective seems promising in its ability to create 
constructs of the real world. The application of the governance perspective requires, in any 
case, a constructivist worldview, since the messages are so abstract that application directly, 
without the cognitive interplay between the literature based constructs and the managers’ or 
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academics’ mindsets is very hard. It is also this type of interplay that has attracted much of 
the criticism. Without an understanding of managerial cognitions, constructivism and the 
interplay between academic lessons and the mindset with which they are used, making 
decisions based on the governance theories can indeed be “bad for practice” (cf. Ghoshal and 
Moran 1996). 
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2 DATA ANALYSIS 
 
 
Chapter 2 sets to the task of complementing the findings of the conceptual analyses in 
Appendices 1 and 2 by employing bibliometric analysis to the identification of the de facto 
structuring of the M&A discourse. The aim of the bibliometric analysis in this study is to 
identify the most influential contributors and contributions, and hence the most significant 
theoretical underpinnings of recent research on mergers and acquisitions. It is necessary 
starting point for the analysis is clarifying what is actually meant by ‘the de facto structuring 
of the M&A discourse’.  
 
Mergers and acquisitions, or M&A, is understood here as a general concept implying a 
process of change dealing with, most importantly, a) a new way of organizing activities and 
assets, b) the human interplay that the new organizational reality creates and c) the role of the 
change in financial structure. In general, M&A is seen as a vehicle for the reorganization of 
economic activity. M&A is defined carefully in the Introduction and Section 6.1 of Appendix 
1. 
 
Even though this is not meant as only a discourse analytical study, it is still necessary to 
carefully define what is meant by discourse in the phrase ‘the M&A discourse’, which is used 
often in this study. "A good working definition of a discourse should be that it is a system of 
statements which constructs an object" (Parker 1992, p.5). This implies that, as is outlined in 
Section 6 in Appendix 1, M&A is perceived as a single field of academic research, and is not 
a mere heading for separate research streams dealing with e.g. acquisitions, takeovers, 
conglomerate mergers and so on. As Pera (1994) proposes, the tension between normative 
and descriptive philosophies of science can be overcome by focusing on research subjects, 
which are unified by a common rhetoric. It is the M&A discourse, and not e.g. its 
aforementioned segments, which can be said to be the highest level of analysis with its own 
rhetoric. This further reinforces the motivation of selecting ‘the M&A discourse’ as the 
research object. It also justifies the exclusion of takeover discourse from the sphere of this 
study, since it arguably has a completely different rhetoric24.  
 
Another term that needs definition is ‘the de facto structuring’. Mapping the de facto 
structuring of the M&A discourse is the key task and contribution of the bibliometric 
analyses in Chapter 2. The aim is to engulf a large enough population of articles to be able to 
argue that it represents the whole M&A discourse. Subsequently, the necessary bibliometric 
tests are employed on this population in order to be able to answer the first research question 
of this study. Namely, the M&A discourse is analyzed its vis-à-vis its important intellectual 
                                                 
24 This has an explicit impact on the way the articles are selected in the bibliometric study, see Section 2.2.4 
below 
  45
sources (authors, texts), the theories the M&A discourse uses and the antecedents that explain 
scientific output related to M&A. The bibliometric tests can be argued to yield indisputable 
evidence of these issues and thus provide an empirical backbone for the analysis of the M&A 
literature. 
 
With these aims and questions in mind, Chapter 2 is structured as follows. Firstly, an 
overview of bibliometrics as a research method, focusing on the background of bibliometric 
analysis in social science research and its application to management research, is given. 
Secondly, the data and exact methodologies employed in the bibliometric analysis are 
outlined. Thirdly, the results of the bibliometric analyses are investigated. Chapter 2 is 
capped with an explicit elaboration of how the bibliometric tests answer the first research 
question of this study. 
 
 
2.1 Data organization 
 
In this section, the features and results of the performed bibliometric analyses are outlined 
in detail. The organization of the data material is first briefly overviewed, followed by the 
identification of key contributions in the M&A discourse facilitated by the citation analysis 
results including first author publishing and referencing frequencies, key article referencing 
frequencies as well as temporal and outlet patterns of articles published and referenced. An 
analysis of citation frequencies with adjustment to the temporal citation profile of the whole 
data population deepens this analysis. The analyzed article population of 567 M&A related 
articles is found in Appendix 4, listed alphabetically according to journal and then 
chronologically according to the date of publication. 
 
Key theories and antecedents of the M&A discourse are identified. Here, the results of the 
network centrality analysis, discourse structuring and further theory development, together 
with an interpretation of the hypothetical potential for conclusive judgment, are laid out. The 
results presented in Sections 2.3 and 2.4 are deepened and further elaborated in much more 
depth and detail in Chapter 3. 
 
In total, the selected journals in 1991-2001 included 567 articles on M&A in the SSCI 
database. The total number of articles found with the database search using the words 
"merger", "acquisition", "mergers" and "acquisitions" was 987, and thus 420 articles were 
dropped during the post-search selection. An additional database consisting of 105 articles on 
takeovers was also compiled, but wasn’t analyzed separately in this study. For the purposes 
of the bibliometric analysis, the articles were then organized in groups according to the 
journal they were published in. Within the groups, the articles appeared in order of the time 
of publication. The following information was listed for each article in the article list: 
author(s), title, source, number of cited references, keywords given by authors and editors, 
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abstract, all cited references, times cited within the SSCI database, page count and 
publication date, etc. 
 
Example:    Author(s): Ramaswamy K  
      Title: The performance impact of strategic similarity in horizontal  
      mergers: Evidence from the US banking industry  
      Source: ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT JOURNAL 1997, Vol 40, Iss 3, pp 697-715  
      No. cited references: 49  
      KeywordsPlus: CORPORATE ACQUISITION; PROFITABILITY; FIRM  
      Abstract: This study examined the impact of strategic similarities between  
      target and bidder firms on changes in postmerger performance. Set in the  
      U.S. banking industry, the empirical examination shows that mergers  
      between banks exhibiting similar strategic characteristics result in  
      better performance than those involving strategically dissimilar banks.  
      Cited references: ALLISON PD-1990-SOCIOL-METHODOL-P93 
      BOWDEN EV-1980-REVOLUTION-BANKING 
      BUONO AF-1989-HUMAN-SIDE-MERGERS-A 
      CHATTERJEE S-1988-ACADEMY-MANAGEMENT-B-P7 
      CHATTERJEE S-1992-STRATEGIC-MANAGE-J-V13-P319 
      CHATTERJEE S-1986-STRATEGIC-MANAGE-J-V7-P119 
      CHOI D-1983-J-FINANC-RES-V6-P239 
      CLARKE DB-1988-CHEM-GEOL-V73-P15 
      COHEN J-1983-APPLIED-MULTIPLE-REG 
      COMPTON EN-1991-PRINCIPLES-BANKING 
      CRONBACH LJ-1970-PSYCHOL-BULL-V74-P68 
      DATTA DK-1991-ADV-STRATEG-MANAGE-V7-P157 
      DESS GG-1984-ACAD-MANAGE-J-V27-P487 
      DRAZIN R-1985-ADM-SCI-Q-V30-P514 
      ECKBO BE-1983-J-FINANC-ECON-V11-P241 
      HARRISON JS-1993-ACAD-MANAGE-J-V36-P1026 
      HARRISON JS-1991-J-MANAGE-V17-P173 
      HAWAWINI GA-1990-MERGERS-ACQUISITIONS 
      HEMPEL GH-1986-BANK-MANAGEMENT 
      HOPKINS DH-1987-J-MANAGE-V13-P557 
      INGHAM H-1992-J-MANAGE-STUD-V29-P195 
      JEMISON DB-1986-ACAD-MANAGE-REV-V11-P145 
      JENSEN MC-1983-J-FINANC-ECON-V11-P3 
      KIESLER S-1982-ADM-SCI-Q-V27-P548 
      KUSEWITT JB-1985-STRATEGIC-MANAGE-J-V6-P151 
      LUBATKIN M-1983-ACAD-MANAGE-REV-V8-P218 
      LUBATKIN M-1996-ACAD-MANAGEMENT-EXEC-V10-P21 
      LUBATKIN M-1987-STRATEGIC-MANAGE-J-V8-P39 
      MEEKS G-1981-J-IND-ECON-V29-P335 
      MILES RE-1978-ORG-STRATEGY-STRUCTU 
      MILLER D-1978-MANAGE-SCI-V24-P921 
      NAHAVANDI A-1993-ORG-CULTURE-MANAGEME 
      PANZAR JC-1981-AM-ECON-REV-V71-P268 
      PORTER ME-1980-COMPETITIVE-STRATEGY 
      POST AM-1994-ANATOMY-MERGER-CAUSE 
      PRAHALAD CK-1986-STRATEGIC-MANAGE-J-V7-P485 
      RAVENSCRAFT DJ-1987-MERGERS-SELL-OFFS-EC 
      ROGERS D-1993-FUTURE-AM-BANKING-MA 
      ROSE PS-1989-INTERSTATE-BANKING-R 
      ROSE PS-1988-REV-BUS-ECON-RES-V24-P1 
      ROUSSAKIS EN-1989-COMMERCIAL-BANKING-E 
      SALTER MS-1979-DIVERSIFICATION-ACQU 
      SHELTON LM-1988-STRATEGIC-MANAGEMENT-V9-P279 
      SINGH H-1987-STRATEGIC-MANAGE-J-V8-P377 
      SNOW CC-1980-ADM-SCI-Q-V25-P317 
      STEMPER RG-1990-GUIDE-SUCCESSFUL-CON 
      THOMAS AS-1991-STRATEGIC-MANAGE-J-V12-P509 
      WERNERFELT B-1984-STRATEGIC-MANAGE-J-V5-P171 
      ZAJAC EJ-1989-STRATEGIC-MANAGE-J-V10-P413 
 
      Times Cited: 6  
      Source item page count: 19  
      Publication Date: JUN  
      IDS No.: XH205  
      29-char source abbrev: ACAD MANAGE J 
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It is important to mention that while the network centrality analysis relied on all 
information available about the articles (including the full text of the articles in most of the 
cases), the citation analysis relied on the type of data listed above. A notable issue in the 
appearance of the data in each article is the way the cited references are abbreviated, i.e. only 
the first author is mentioned. This automatically creates some distortion to the citation 
statistics of single authors. Even though it is a common practice that the person primarily 
responsible for the article is placed as the first author, many authors, however, write in groups 
of researchers and often use e.g. the most senior and prestigious author as the first author. It is 
also very common to simply list the authors in alphabetical order. Similarly, some pairs or 
groups of authors often get fixated in the way of determining who the first author is. This 
results in the partial neglect of some authors in the most-cited author analysis (see Section 
2.3.2). For example, authors like William Meckling (Jensen and Meckling 1976), James 
Brickley and Jeffry Netter (Jarrell, Brickley and Netter 1988) or Andrei Shleifer and Robert 
Vishny (Morck, Shleifer and Vishny 1990) are surely underappreciated in the most-cited first 
author analysis below. 
 
Given that the data for each article includes also journals, years, volumes and page 
numbers for the references, this fact does not distort the process of identifying the most 
referenced articles (see Section 2.3.2), which, as is later contended, arguably more important 
for the purposes of this study. 
 
 
2.2 Identification of key contributions in M&A discourse 
 
This section identifies the key aspects of the M&A discourse as it emerged in the 
bibliometric study. Given the large number of articles and the abundance of data in each 
article, it was possible to measure a number of citation analytical statistics. The aim of the 
bibliometric study is, firstly, to acquire a rough understanding about the structuring of the 
M&A discourse vis-à-vis a) the authors who have published most M&A related articles in 
1991-2001, b) authors who have been referred to most in M&A related articles in 1991-2001, 
c) the articles which have been referred to most in M&A related articles in 1991-2001 and d) 
the years in which the articles were published, the years in which their cited references were 
published as well as the journals in which the articles and their references were published.  
 
Secondly, partly on the basis of these analyses, the aim is also develop a more refined 
understanding of the central topics, concepts and theories in the M&A discourse, dominant 
underlying antecedents and intellectual roots of M&A put forth in the articles. While the first 
set of aims is essentially dealt with by the citation analyses above, tackling the second set of 
aims is done primarily through the network centrality analyses. 
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Initial descriptive frequency distributions 
 
This section presents and analyzes the more elementary descriptive frequencies and 
distributions from the bibliometric data. To satisfy the prior set of aims, the most published 
first authors in the total of 567 M&A articles containing a total of 21 438 references was 
measured. All authors that have published three of more M&A related articles in the selected 
core journals are shown in Table 3. Likewise, a list with the number of references within 
these articles to first authors with at least 30 references was compiled. Of this list, the 16 
most frequently referenced authors are presented in Table 4. Accompanying the list of 
reference authors is a compilation of the most influential source articles and their frequencies 
of appearance in the 567 M&A related articles in 1991-2001. The inclusion of the article-
specific referencing was felt to be extremely important given that the bibliometric material a) 
does not give credit to all authors but only the first author and b) many of the authors have a 
number of significant articles whose relative weight is necessary to be evaluated. An 
abbreviated list of 30 most influential source articles is presented in Table 5. Finally, the 
frequency distributions of the years of publishing and referencing as well as journals of 
publication and referencing were created. The temporal distributions are illustrated in Figure 
1 and Figure 2 and the journal distribution in Table 7 and Table 8. More extensive listings of 
the citation analysis results can be found in Appendix 4. 
 
 
Most-published first authors 
 
A cornerstone of the analysis of the 567 M&A related articles found in the 65 core 
journals is investigating the most published first authors among these articles. All authors 
with three or more first-authored articles among the 567 M&A related are shown in Table 3. 
 
Table 3: Authors with three of more M&A related articles in the selected core journals in 1991-2001 
Author 
No. of M&A    
         articles 
           1991-2001 
Werden, GJ 6 
Haunschild, PR 5 
Lubatkin, M 5 
Capron, L 4 
Chatterjee, S 4 
Gupta, A 4 
Matsusaka, JG 4 
Servaes, H 4 
Berger, AN 3 
Bergh, DD 3 
Carow, KA 3 
Cornett, MM 3 
Datta, DK 3 
Denis, DJ 3 
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Harrison, JS 3 
Houston, JF 3 
Hubbard, RG 3 
Larsson, R 3 
McAfee, RP 3 
       Schwert, GW 3 
 
 
As is seen in Table 3, the 567 M&A related articles published in the 65 core journals are 
well-spread, with no author dominating the discourse. M&A is typically an issue that can be 
approached from multiple research angles and thus the authors are diverse in both number 
and disciplinary orientation. 
 
The list of authors in Table 3 gives a preliminary indication about the many disciplinary 
angles that have been central to the M&A discourse during the ten-year period between 1991 
and 2001. At the top of the list is Gregory Werden, an industrial economist, who has 
published extensively on the market efficiency outcomes of M&A. He is followed by Pamela 
Haunschild, who has studied e.g. interlocks, interorganizational imitation and managerial 
overcommitment in the context of M&A. Another author with five first-authored articles is 
Michael Lubatkin, whose research in the 1990s concentrated, in addition to shareholder value 
outcomes also on business cycles, merger waves and international M&A. 
 
There are also a number of advocates of the resource based view (e.g. Laurence Capron, 
Sayan Chatterjee, Donald Bergh), which is seen as the dominant strategic management 
paradigm of the 1990s, among the most-published first author list. Represented are also 
banking and antitrust authors (e.g. Allen Berger, Atul Gupta, John Matsusaka and Marcia 
Millon Cornett, Kenneth Carow, William Schwert and Joel Houston) as well as 
representatives of numerous other perspectives to M&A, e.g. taxation and M&A transactions 
by Henri Servaes, organizational and HRM issues in M&A by Rikard Larsson, 
organizational, environmental and cultural fit by Deepak Datta, performance effects of 
corporate restructuring by David Denis, industry-specific contemporary M&A issues by Joan 
Harrison, internal control and financing issues by Glenn Hubbard and pure economics 
analysis by Preston McAfee). 
 
The most significant finding, nevertheless, is that this analysis yields no apparent results 
vis-à-vis contributing to our understanding of the structuring of the M&A discourse, since no 
meaningfully dominant authors can be pointed out. The discourse in the 1990s has been well 
spread in terms of disciplinary orientation, geographical diversity, publication outlet as well 
as, ultimately, authors. The influence of the corporate finance/capital markets perspective, 
undoubtedly reinforced by the deregulation and further internationalization of the global 
capital markets during the 1990s is evident, as is the input of the strategic paradigms 
concentrating on resources, competencies and capabilities.  
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Most-cited first authors 
 
The most-cited first author analysis reveals is a fundamental method of mapping the 
intellectual origins and structuring of a discourse (Budd and Raber 1996). The 16 authors 
who have first-authored articles that are most frequently quoted in the 567 M&A related 
journal articles are listed in Table 4. 
 
Table 4: 16 most-cited first authors 
 
 AUTHOR NUMBER OF 
CITATIONS 
1 JENSEN MC 344 
2 WILLIAMSON OE 164 
3 BERGER AN 157 
4 MORCK R 147 
5 LUBATKIN M 140 
6 PORTER ME 137 
7 CHATTERJEE S 120 
8 SHLEIFER A 113 
9 JARRELL GA 108 
10 FAMA EF 107 
11 BRADLEY M 105 
12 WALSH JP 102 
13 RAVENSCRAFT DJ 100 
14 ASQUITH P 97 
15 ECKBO BE 94 
16 HITT MA 93 
 
It seems justified to present just the 16 most cited first authors in Table 4 and analyze them 
as a group separate from the others. There are two good reasons for this. Firstly, the list of all 
first authors who have been referenced to 30 times or more consists of 93 names and it would 
not be meaningful to analyze all of them in this context. Thus the line had to be drawn 
somewhere where the resulting number of first authors would permit meaningful in-depth 
analysis and be convenient. Secondly, the 16 authors were quite clearly cited more frequently 
than others, i.e. the 17th most cited author (Bruce Kogut) had 12 references less than the 16th 
which forms a considerable chasm between the 16 most-cited authors and the rest. The 
analysis can thus be focused on the 16 most referenced authors.  
 
The overwhelming dominance of Michael Jensen, with 344 references representing over 
twice as many as anyone else, is quite evident. Jensen has contributed, together with a few 
colleagues (most importantly Eugene Fama, Paul Ruback and William Meckling) to a 
number of governance-oriented theories of the firm, most importantly agency theory, but also 
property rights theory and the nexus of contracts perspective. The latter two do not appear in 
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this list primarily due to the first author referencing limitation to the methodology. Beyond 
the contributions to the governance perspective, Jensen’s position as the undisputed leader of 
the first author referencing list is also explained by the diversity of his publication in a two 
key arenas close to the world of M&A. His has contributed extensively to not only the 
governance theories of the firm like agency theory, property rights theory and the nexus of 
contracts perspective, but also the theory of finance (see e.g. Jensen and Meckling 1976, 
Jensen 1978, Jensen and Smith 1984, Fama and Jensen 1985, Jensen 1989). As can be seen in 
the article-specific citation analysis (Table 5), Jensen has first authored a number of articles 
in a variety of journals and thus attained the interest and respect, and subsequently references, 
of a wide array of scientific communities.  
 
The second most cited author is Oliver E. Williamson, an important contributor in a 
different and distinct approach to the theory of the firm, namely transaction cost economics 
(see Williamson 1975, 1985). There are a number of explanations for Williamson’s 
appearance close to the top of the list that can be briefly mentioned here25. Most importantly, 
transaction cost economics concentrates on issues that are very close to the realm of M&A, 
e.g. the boundaries of the firm, vertical integration, contracting etc26. Furthermore, 
Williamson has published two major books and a set of seminal articles during an extensive 
period of time27, which make him influential across three decades and thus also referenced 
steadily in the 1990s. Also the fact that Williamson has written nearly all of his books and 
articles either alone or as the first author has an impact on his first author referencing 
frequency. With 164 references, Williamson is very close to the next few first authors, but it 
is still very interesting that the top two first authors are undisputedly governance theorists.  
 
After Jensen and Williamson, the following three authors (Allen Berger, Randall Morck 
and Michael Lubatkin) are conspicuously authors that have written about M&A issues and/or 
M&A as a phenomenon explicitly and not contributed via the development of specific 
theories. Allen Berger, with 157 references, is a known contributor in banking and antitrust 
related M&A issues whose research covers a variety of topics related to financial institutions, 
including e.g. efficiency and productivity growth, capital, credit rationing and credit 
crunches, small business finance, the effects of bank mergers and market structure. Berger is 
thus first and foremost a finance and economics oriented M&A researcher.  
 
Randall Morck, with 147 references, is known for his research on a wide array of issues 
related to M&A. Even though Morck has published extensively using a finance orientation 
                                                 
25 Chapter 3 provides an in-depth elaboration of the role and interplay of the various governance theories of the 
firm in the M&A discourse, while this section focuses most importantly on the presentation of the bibliometric 
data and results.  
26 See Section 7.1.5 in Appendix 2 for a close elaboration nature of transaction cost economics and its key 
contributions to M&A 
27 Williamson published ‘Markets and Hierarchies’ and ‘The Economic Institutions of Capitalism’ in mid-70s 
and mid-80s respectively and has continued to write journal articles through the 1990s.  
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(see e.g. Morck, Shleifer and Vishny 1989, 1990b, Morck and Barone-Adesi 1990 and 
Morck, Kaul and Mehrotra 2000) and thus been referenced in many of the same research fora 
and articles as Jensen’s more financial theory oriented articles (Jensen and Meckling 1976, 
Jensen 1978, Jensen and Smith 1984, Fama and Jensen 1985, Jensen 1989), he is perhaps best 
known for one of his less technical articles on the adverse influences of managerial objectives 
in M&A (Morck, Shleifer and Vishny 1990a). Morck’s collaborator Andrei Shleifer, who 
ranks 8th with 113 references is a corporate finance theorist, whose contributions focusing on 
e.g. asset ownership, privatization and corporate governance have been amply applied to the 
context of M&A. Another important contributor in this stream of thought is Robert Vishny, 
who is undoubtedly discriminated against by the first author limitation in the first author 
referencing statistics. An expert in the market for corporate control and governance, 
privatization, the behavior of institutional investors and stock prices as well as the economics 
of corruption and rent-seeking behavior, Vishny has collaborated widely with Morck and 
Shleifer and thus established himself among the important contributors in the field. 
 
Michael Lubatkin, who has been referenced 140 times in the data, is best known for his 
research on M&A performance outcomes and M&A related event studies, most importantly 
on the integration of theory and empirical evidence in M&A research (Lubatkin 1983) and on 
the relationship between shareholder gains and the relatedness of merging firms (Lubatkin 
1987). 
 
These M&A-oriented authors are followed by two well-known corporate strategy authors, 
Michael E. Porter (137 references) and Sayan Chatterjee (120 references). Arguably, M&A 
has had an ever more important role in corporate strategy-making and strategy literature is 
naturally able to contribute across such top management theories and decision-making 
areas28. Further evidence of this is the presence of two further contributors of resource-based 
M&A thinking, namely Michael Bradley (see e.g. Bradley, Desai and Kim 1988) as the 11th 
most-cited and Michael Hitt as the 16th most cited first authors29.  
 
Gregg Jarrell and Eugene Fama are the next two in the list, with 107 and 105 references 
respectively. While Fama has contributed widely to the development of the theory of the 
firm30, Jarrell has published widely in issues related to the economics of corporate control, 
the economics of regulation, applied corporate finance and stock price reactions and e.g. 
                                                 
28 For a useful elaboration of the use of M&A as a strategic decision-making option, see the 'Harvard Business 
Review on Strategies for Growth, 2000' and 'Harvard Business Review on Mergers & Acquisitions, 2001' from 
the Harvard Business Review Series. 
29 It must be noted that Michael Hitt, together with his colleagues Duane Ireland and Robert Hoskisson, 
published productively all through the 1990s and would surely rank somewhat higher on any M&A citation 
analysis that focused on a more recent time frame than the 1991-2001 one employed here.  
30 Especially the nexus of contracts perspective and the more formal principal-agent research, see Section 7.5.2-
7.1.3 in Appendix 2 and Fama 1980, 1983 
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provided a famous overview of evidence on the shareholder value benefits of M&A and anti-
takeover tools (Jarrell , Brickley and Netter 1988).  
 
James Walsh, 12th with 102 references, has concentrated on the psychological and 
managerial side of M&A, researching e.g. top management turnover and managerial 
cognition in M&A target companies (Walsh 1988, 1989) and CEO compensation and asset 
restructuring decisions (Margolis and Walsh 2001). In addition, Walsh has also explored the 
fundamentals of the firm, working in the borderline between the fundamental neo-classical 
efficiency assumptions and the theory and practice of social innovation. 
 
David Ravenscraft, 13th with 100 references, is another M&A researcher with a financial 
orientation, has contributed, in addition to M&A, to economics flavored issues such as 
antitrust, game theory and vertical integration. He is perhaps best known for the book 
‘Mergers, Selloffs and Economic Efficiency’ (Ravenscraft and Scherer 1987), which 
demonstrates the substantial inefficiencies and profitability declines resulting from the U.S. 
conglomerate merger wave of the 1960s and 1970s. 
 
Paul Asquith, 14th with 97 references, is another finance theory specialist who has also 
contributed to not only the M&A discourse but also pure finance topics such as dividend 
policy, financial distress, equity short sales and market efficiency, with mostly empirical 
research data.  
 
Espen Eckbo appears as the 15th most-cited first author with 94 references. Eckbo is 
known for his M&A valuation related studies, especially for his testing (Eckbo 1983) and 
rejecting (Eckbo and Wier 1985 and Eckbo 1985) of the market power theory of takeovers, 
i.e. that increased monopoly in product markets explains takeover gains.   
 
Thus, the first author referencing statistics summarized in Table 4 provide an interesting 
insight into the intellectual roots from which the M&A discourse has drawn its theoretical 
underpinnings in the 1990s. On the basis of the above results, a number of observations can 
be made. Firstly, the most-cited first authors represent a rather wide spectrum of disciplines 
ranging from pure theory of the firm (Jensen, Williamson, Fama) and applications 
operationalizing theories of the firm (Jensen, Jarrell) to finance literature (e.g. Berger, Jensen, 
Morck, Shleifer, Ravenscraft, Eckbo and Asquith), strategy literature (e.g. Porter, Chatterjee, 
Hitt, Bradley) and various issues dealing directly with M&A from a particular research angle 
(Lubatkin, Walsh). 
 
Secondly, despite the evident plurality of the disciplinary origins of the referenced first 
authors, authors who have played a significant role in the development of different 
governance theories of the firm seem to be well represented. On the basis of the first author 
referencing data, it is the governance theories of the firm that appear to be dominant. In order 
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to validate this suggestion, an analysis of the referencing at the level of single articles needs 
to be performed (see below) and a justified arsenal of propositions about how and why the 
governance theories of the firm are and should be linked to M&A theory and phenomena 
needs to be developed (see Chapter 3). 
 
A third and less surprising finding is that the balance of the influence of finance and 
strategy literature on the M&A discourse, measured in the first author referencing 
frequencies, seems to be remarkably equal, with some 300-400 references among the top 16 
first authors for both31. It is hardly surprising that some pure strategy and finance theorists are 
present at the top of the list. It is more interesting which authors have made it there and 
authors have made it there and why32. 
 
Fourthly, the relatively weak position of the competence perspective to the theory of the 
firm needs to be asserted. Despite the dominance of the resource- and knowledge-based 
views to corporate strategy in the 1990s (See e.g. Rumelt et al. 1994, Hamel and Prahalad 
1990, Barney 1991, Peteraf 1993), only Chatterjee, Hitt and Bradley have made it to the list 
of top-16 most-cited first authors with none of them in the top-6. As an increasingly polarized 
discussion about two substituting perspectives to the firm, the governance and the 
competence perspectives, is observed (Williamson 1999), it feels relevant to enquire why the 
competence perspective has not risen to dominate the present data33. 
 
Moreover, the data on first author referencing of M&A articles sets up an interesting 
discussion about the intellectual origins and disciplinary streams of the M&A discourse. It 
seems justified to assume that governance theories of the firm, various strategy viewpoints as 
well as finance literature assume key positions as underpinnings of the M&A discourse, and 
that their scrutiny helps in the reconsideration of certain issues of paradigm, tradition and 
theory in the field of M&A. However, to deepen and refine our understanding about the 
relative significance of the different underpinning paradigms, the most-cited first author 
analysis above needs to be complemented with analyses at the level of single scientific 
articles as well as analyses regarding the year and journals in which the M&A articles and 
their references have been published. Consequently, the focus is now turned to iterating the 
                                                 
31 There is little sense in starting to categorize the articles very precisely to strategy and finance articles, since 
questions regarding whether Jensen is counted as a strategy or finance author would immediately arise. To the 
author, the two disciplines seem nevertheless in balance on a large scale. 
32 This is further elaborated and analyzed in the Chapter 3. 
33 Two reasons can be briefly hypothesized: firstly, the time frame of the study does not emphasize the role of 
the resource based view, even though the M&A articles were published in the 1990s. Articles refer to sources 
that are on average six years older than them, to a time before the flourishing of the competence based strategy 
literature. This point is elaborated below in the discussion of the patterns of time and publication outlet. 
Secondly, the contributors to the competence perspective are many and thus no one author stands out in the 
present first author referencing statistics. A larger elaboration could have revealed a wide front of competence 
contributors on the M&A discourse (cf. end of Appendix 2) 
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referencing profiles further and analyzing M&A related article referencing at the level of the 
most-cited books and articles. 
 
 
Most-cited books and articles 
 
The most-cited first author analysis is complemented with a more acute observation of the 
referencing frequencies of the source books and articles of the 567 M&A articles found in the 
core journals. The results of the most-cited article analysis are presented in Table 5, which 
includes 30 of the most frequently referenced books and articles.  
 
Table 5: 30 most-cited books and articles 
 ARTICLE NUMBER 
OF 
CITATIONS 
1 JENSEN AND RUBACK, 1983, ARTICLE / JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS, V11, P5 98 
2 JENSEN MC, 1986, ARTICLE / AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, V76, P323 70 
3 ROLL R, 1986, ARTICLE / JOURNAL OF BUSINESS, V59, P197 68 
4 MORCK, SHLEIFER AND VISHNY, 1990, ARTICLE / JOURNAL OF FINANCE, V45, P31 59 
5 HASPESLAGH AND JEMISON, 1991, BOOK / MANAGING ACQUISITIONS 56 
6 BRADLEY, DESAI AND KIM, 1988, ARTICLE / JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS, V21, P3 52 
7 JEMISON AND SITKIN, 1986, ARTICLE / ACADEMY OF MANAGE REVIEW, V11, P145 52 
8 RUMELT RP, 1974, BOOK / STRATEGY, STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY 50 
9 PORTER ME, 1987, ARTICLE / HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW, V65, P43 49 
10 WILLIAMSON OE, 1975, BOOK / MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES 48 
11 JENSEN AND MECKLING, 1976, ARTICLE / JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS, V3, P305 47 
12 JARRELL, BRICKLEY AND NETTER, 1988, ARTICLE / JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES, V2, P49 44 
13 CHATTERJEE S, 1986, ARTICLE / STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT JOURNAL, V7, P119 42 
14 TRAVLOS, 1987, ARTICLE / JOURNAL OF  FINANCE, V42, P943 42 
15 SINGH AND MONTGOMERY, 1987, ARTICLE / STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT JOURNAL, V8, P377 41 
16 LUBATKIN M, 1983, ARTICLE / ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT REVIEW, V8, P218 40 
17 WALSH JP, 1988, ARTICLE / STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT JOURNAL, V9, P173 36 
18 LUBATKIN M, 1987, ARTICLE / STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT JOURNAL, V8, P39 35 
19 RAVENSCRAFT AND SCHERER, 1987, BOOK / MERGERS, SELL-OFFS AND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY 35 
20 FAMA EF, 1980, ARTICLE / JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMICS, V88, P288 32 
21 MYERS AND MAJLUF, 1984, ARTICLE / JOURNAL FINANCIAL ECONOMICS, V13, P187 32 
22 BROWN AND WARNER, 1985, ARTICLE / JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS, V14, P3 32 
23 MANNE, 1965, J POLITICAL EC, V73, P110 32 
24 AMIHUD AND LEV, 1981, ARTICLE / BELL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, V12, P605 31 
25 BARNEY JB, 1988, ARTICLE / STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT JOURNAL, V9, P71 30 
26 ECKBO BE, 1983, ARTICLE / JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS, V11, P241 30 
27 WHITE H, 1980, ARTICLE / ECONOMETRICA, V48, P817 30 
28 PENROSE ET, 1959, BOOK / THEORY OF THE GROWTH OF THE FIRM 30 
29 PORTER ME, 1985, BOOK / COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE 29 
30 WILLIAMSON OE, 1985, BOOK / ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 29 
 
At the top of the most-cited articles list are two articles by Michael Jensen (Jensen and 
Ruback 1983, Jensen 1986) with 98 and 70 references respectively, and Jensen also appears 
as the first author of the 11th most-cited article with 47 references (Jensen and Meckling 
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1976). It is somewhat expected that Jensen’s and Richard Ruback’s 1983 article, which 
"reviews much of the scientific literature on the market for corporate control" (Jensen and 
Ruback 1983, p. 5) has received most attention.  The second-most cited article (Jensen 1986), 
then again, is an application of agency theory to a number of domains. Given that Jensen 
(1986) discusses five different issues, namely a) the benefits of debt in reducing agency costs, 
b) the substitutability of dividend with debt, c) loss-generating diversification, d) antecedents 
of takeover activity across industries and e) abnormally good pre-takeover performance, it is 
logical that the article has provided a popular basis for referencing. 
 
Jensen and Meckling’s original 1976 article, which examines and develops agency theory 
and the theory of finance from the perspective of debt/equity ratios, has relatively less 
attention. Nevertheless, the mentioned article can be considered a cornerstone of agency 
theory of the firm and its appearance, despite the fact that it was published 15 years before 
the beginning of the M&A article data period of 1991-2001, so close to the top of the list 
further supports the assertion that agency theory has been a key element in the structuring of 
the M&A discourse. On the whole, referencing to Jensen is frequent34. What is also notable 
about references to Jensen is that the 1978 article, which most importantly investigates the 
role of property rights in the theory of the firm, is nowhere to be seen among the top 74 most-
cited articles35.  
 
Other proponents of the various governance theories of the firm are also well represented 
in the article referencing data. Oliver Williamson’s major books ‘Markets and Hierarchies’ 
(1975) and ‘The Economic Institutions of Capitalism’ (1986) are found as 10th and 30th most 
referenced works with 48 and 29 references respectively. There are also a couple of articles 
that have become known for their operationalization of agency theory in M&A related 
contexts. Randall Morck’s, Andrei Shleifer’s, and Robert Vishny’s (1990a) article discusses 
the low value outcomes of acquisitions and one of his prominent explanations relate to 
managerial motives and thus incentive asymmetries, which play have a central position in 
positivist agency theory36. A well-known article by Amihud and Lev (1981), 24th with 31 
citations, then again, explains unrelated, value decreasing diversification with agency 
problems. Eugene Fama’s (1980) article, which has received equally much attention (20th 
with 32 citations), advocates the nexus of contracts perspective to the theory of the firm, 
arguing that the "separation of security ownership and control can be explained as an efficient 
form of economic organization within the set of contracts perspective" (Fama 1980, p. 289). 
 
                                                 
34 Even though the methodology is not able to extract the number of M&A articles referring to Jensen (thus 
removing the overlap of the ‘many references in one article effect’ present in the first author referencing 
number), it seems probable that at least a third of all 567 M&A articles in the core journals refer to at least one 
of Jensen’s works.  
35 For a longer list of most referenced articles, see Appendix 4. 
36 See Section 7.1.3 in Appendix 2 for a closer elaboration of the two principal research streams, positivist 
research and formal principal-agent research, within the agency theory of the firm. 
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Articles and books discussing M&A directly are better represented in the list of most-cited 
articles than in the most-cited first author analysis. For example, three top-ten articles (Roll 
1986, 3rd with 68 citations, Haspeslagh’s and Jemison’s 1991 book, 5th with 56 citations and 
Jemison and Sitkin 1986, 7th with 52 citations) belong in this category. The article by Roll is 
an answer to Jensen and Ruback (1983) and presents the hubris explanation for overpriced 
takeovers. Thus, even though there is no direct and explicit theoretical treatment of agency 
theory in Roll’s 1986 article, it is still concerned with agency problems and the theory of the 
firm in general. Henry Manne’s 1965 article (20th with 32 citations) is another classic ‘pure’ 
M&A text. It is a classic contribution to the discussion of mergers as a tool for corporate 
control and has had many agency theoretic repercussions in e.g. Jensen’s work. Henry Manne 
is also known as a proponent of interdisciplinary work in the fields of management, finance, 
law and economics. 
 
Jemison and Sitkin (1986) introduce the M&A process and analyze its potential 
impediments in detail37. Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) is a rich volume which, besides 
providing an overview of M&A as a value creation mechanism, also advocates the processual 
perspective to M&A. Even though the book is essentially about the theory and phenomena 
linked to M&A directly, it derives strongly from the intellectual input of the 1980s and early 
1990s resource based theory of the firm. Michael Bradley’s, Anand Desai’s and Han E. 
Kim’s (1988) synergy explanation for corporate acquisitions (ranked 6th with 52 references) 
is another ‘pure’ M&A article, even if it relies heavily on strategy literature. Another classic 
M&A centered contribution is Ravenscraft’s and Scherer’s (1987) book "Mergers, Sell-Offs 
and Economic Efficiency". 
 
In general, the competence-based perspective to the theory of the firm emerges somewhat 
stronger in the list of most-cited articles than in the earlier analysis of referenced first authors. 
Not only do two of the seminal milestone contributions to the intellectual development of the 
resource based view appear in the top 30, namely Richard Rumelt’s 1974 book (ranked 8th 
with 50 citations) and Edith Penrose’s 1959 book (ranked 25th with 30 citations), but the list 
also includes a wealth of later influential contributions by Jay Barney (1988, also ranked 25th 
with 30 citations) on the influence of strategic relatedness on returns for shareholders of 
bidding firms, Harbir Singh and Cynthia Montgomery (1987, ranked 15th with 41 citations) 
on the benefits of relatedness on economic returns and Sayan Chatterjee (1986, ranked 13th 
with 42 citations) on the creation of different types of synergy through specialized resources.  
 
Other strategy authors are equally present as in the author analysis, with Michael E. 
Porter’s contributions to a firm’s business portfolio thinking (1987, ranked 9th with 49 
citations) and his classic book ‘Competitive Advantage’ (1985, ranked 29th with 29 citations), 
                                                 
37 See Section 6.2, and 6.2.4 in particular, in Appendix 1 for a more detailed description of the various M&A 
schools and the role of the process perspective in M&A research. 
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and James Walsh’s 1988 article (ranked 17th with 36 references) on top management turnover 
in acquired companies. 
 
Partly due to Jensen’s two more financially oriented articles (Jensen and Ruback 1983, 
Jensen 1986) topping the list, finance-oriented articles have maintained a strong position in 
the article comparison. Compared to the first author referencing data, however, position of 
the financial perspective to M&A is perhaps slightly less accentuated. While the financial 
theory application of Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1990b, 4th with 59 citations) has 
maintained its position, authors publishing more rigorous quantitative financial analyses have 
slid down the rankings. Among the significant finance articles are e.g. Nickolaos Travlos’ 
article concentrating on the methods of payment (Travlos 1987, 13th with 42 citations) and 
Stewart Myers’ and Nicholas Majluf’s (1984) article on the role of private information in 
corporate financing decisions (both 20th with 32 citations) as well as B. Espen Eckbo’s (1983, 
25th with 30 citations)38 article on positive abnormal returns to shareholders.  
 
What is more, it is notable that methodological articles discussing the research methods 
commonly used in particularly finance-oriented, but also in other M&A literature, are also 
relatively well represented in the list of most cited works. Stephen Brown’s and Jerold 
Warner’s (1985, 20th with 32 citations) methodological article on using daily stock returns in 
M&A event studies and Halbert White’s (1980, 25th with 30 citations) article on non-linear 
regression methodology are found relatively high up on the list.  
 
All things considered, the results of the article-level analysis point to very much the same 
direction as the author analysis. The same governance theories of the firm as in the most-cited 
first author analyses, namely agency theory, transaction cost economics and the nexus of 
contracts perspective, are again seen as important theoretical underpinnings to the M&A 
discourse. Likewise, the governance perspective to the firm still seems to be more influential 
than the competence perspectives, which, however, seems slightly stronger in the light of the 
article data than the author data.  
 
Time is, surely, one factor that influences the balance between the governance and 
competence perspectives. Whereas many of the seminal contributions to the resource-based 
view (e.g. Hamel and Prahalad 1990, Rumelt et al. 1994), and especially the knowledge-
based view (e.g. Teece, Pisano and Shuen 1997) only developed in the 1990s, it is natural that 
the referencing is somewhat lower in the statistics of 1991-2001. Nevertheless, the precursors 
and some theoretically most significant articles (e.g. Penrose 1959, Nelson and Winter 1982, 
Rumelt 1974) for the competence perspectives were already published in the 1970s and 
1980s. Additionally, the temporal referencing profiles of the 1991-2001 data don’t seem to 
                                                 
38 It is worth noticing that Eckbo's 1983 article has received the most attention even though, or perhaps because, 
it is one of the most 'non-financial' in its orientation.  
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discriminate largely against contributions written in the 1990s. The conclusion is that the 
timing span of the articles population should not, by and large, be the overwhelmingly most 
important factor in the determination of the relative importance of the governance and 
competence perspectives. On the whole, it still seems justified to say that the governance 
perspective is dominant and thus, on the basis of the article and author analyses, forms a 
central intellectual basis for the M&A discourse. 
  
Furthermore, the interplay between strategy and finance theory as the two further 
cornerstones of the M&A discussion is equally evident in the article-level citation analysis as 
in the first author citation analysis. Looking at referencing to pure seminal and theoretical 
inputs (e.g. Rumelt 1974, Penrose 1959, Porter 1980), strategy literature is to some extent 
elevated above financial theory in the article analysis. In the 1980s, financial theory was, 
however, applied in many ways (e.g. Jensen 1983, Jensen and Ruback 1986, Morck, Shleifer 
and Vishny 1990 and Bradley, Desai and Kim 1988). The applied articles have again leveled 
referencing to strategy and finance in for the 1990s as a whole.  
 
The above reporting of the most-cited first author and article results accentuates the role of 
timing in bibliometric analysis and necessitates further scrutiny of the temporal profiles of the 
bibliometric material. Thus, they are now investigated together with another important 
bibliometric factor, i.e. the outlets in which the M&A articles were published and referenced.  
 
 
Patterns of time  
 
In the following, the temporal profiles of the 567 M&A related articles as well as their 21 
438 references are investigated. The temporal analysis is supplemented with an analysis of 
the publication outlets, in which the M&A-articles as well as the articles that refer to them 
have been published. Both factors, time and publication outlet, can be considered important 
factors in any bibliometric analysis and thus need to be considered carefully, with the impacts 
of each methodological choice iterated separately39. Thus, the temporal pattern of publication 
and referencing is analyzed first and the outlet pattern next. 
 
The temporal profile of the published articles is shown in Figure 1 and the temporal profile 
of the referencing articles in Figure 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
39 The methodological choice of the time frame and the source journals is elaborated in more detail in Section 
2.2, and thus the focus here is on the possible impacts on the results. 
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Figure 1: The temporal profile of the 567 M&A articles published in the 65 core journals in 1991-2001 
 
 
The temporal distribution of the M&A related articles illustrated in Figure 1 reveals a 
general increase in M&A articles through the 1990s. The mean month of publication for the 
article material is July 1996 and the mode year is 2000. This development is natural given 
that the number of mergers and acquisitions grew by 340% between 1980-1996 (Kim 1998) 
and growth was equally notable between 1995 and 2000, when many Western economies 
were booming at the same time as the opening of international markets and the deregulation 
of many industries continued, spurring both national and cross-border M&A activity (Kim 
1998). The near-stagnation of the world economy in 2001-2002 can also be assumed not 
show in this study. 
 
From the perspective of the bibliometric analysis, Figure 1 would suggest that the data is 
weighed more towards the end of the studied time frame. In terms of the theories, traditions 
and paradigms that have been identified as the intellectual bases and central stepping-stones 
of the structuring of the M&A discourse, this has two outcomes. Firstly, the competence 
perspective to strategy research and the theory of the firm that developed fervently through 
the 1990s can be thought to be better covered the more the data is weighed towards the end of 
the 1990s. This has an impact on both the presence of governance and competence 
perspectives to the theory of the firm and the relative importance of the various corporate 
strategy paradigms. Secondly, the temporal profile of the M&A related articles has an impact 
on the temporal distribution of the references of these articles, which is analyzed in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2: The Temporal profile of the references in the 567 M&A articles 
 
The temporal distribution of the referencing years can be argued to be an important factor 
in the citation analysis performed above, given that it directly influences the nature of the 
material used in the citation analysis above. The mode year of publication for the references 
is 1988, with 1990 being the next most common. What is notable, however, is that a slightly 
larger number of reference articles was published in the 1990s than in the 1980s. This is 
largely due to the fact that the temporal profile of the M&A related articles is weighed 
slightly towards the end of the study period. The average age of a reference in scientific 
research is found to be 6-7 years (see e.g. Garfield 1997, 1998), which is very much in line 
with the results of this study. By and large, nevertheless, the reference years are well 
distributed and a serious bias towards references in the 1980s can be argued to be avoided 
given that referencing to the 1990s is more common than to the 1980s. 
 
What is the impact of this temporal profile on the findings of the most-cited author and 
article analyses? On the basis of the above, it seems safe to say that the publication and 
referencing time spans cover enough of the 1990s to incorporate a good deal of e.g. the early 
contributions on the competence perspective in the results. Furthermore, the temporal profiles 
indicate that the data is not severely skewed in any direction and thus the temporal profiles do 
not cause severe distortion in the structuring of the referencing analysis results. Looking at 
the list of most-cited authors, this seems to hold: only one of the top-eight authors have 
published a significantly referenced book or article (Morck, Schleifer and Vishny 1990) on 
one of the two highest referenced years (1988 and 1990). Firm theorists like Michael Jensen, 
Oliver E. Williamson or Eugene Fama are certainly not favored by the temporal distribution 
of the referencing years.  
 
A look into the article referencing results raises, however, some concerns. Even though 
only four of the top-ten articles are published within the six most common years in the 
temporal article frequency distribution, only four articles out of the top 20 were published in 
1980 or earlier and none of the top 30 articles were published in 1992 or later40.   
                                                 
40 The 31st is, however, Chatterjee (1992) 
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On one hand, it could be argued that the temporal profiles of publication and referencing 
do not matter at all. The picture given here about the structure of the M&A discourse is 
ultimately one which is specifically valid for the selected time period of the bibliometric 
study, 1991-2001. From the viewpoint of general academic discourse analysis, it is only 
natural that the structure of the discourse varies and changes. This does not render 
bibliometric analyses fixed to a certain time frame invalid. Quite the contrary, performing a 
bibliometric analysis of a certain time period allows for the possibility of repeating the same 
study for a later, or even earlier period. The result is that bibliometric studies can offer a 
useful longitudinal perspective analyzing discourses and perform even better the task of 
complementing and providing a backbone for conceptual research and analysis. 
 
On the other hand, even though the direct most-cited author and article results of the 1991-
2001 data cannot be rendered useless, the bias produced by the temporal profile of the 
referencing data can nevertheless be considered somewhat problematic. In order to establish a 
clearer picture of the de facto intellectual roots of the M&A discourse that would be less time 
frame specific, it is necessary to complement the direct most-cited article results with an 
analysis that takes the temporal profile into consideration. The methodology and results of 
this adjusted bibliometric study are outlined next.  
 
 
Most-cited books and articles with temporal profile adjustment 
 
As the 567 M&A related journal articles found in the 65 core journals produced a set of 
population of references, which is somewhat concentrated to certain years around the late 
1980s and early 1990s, a further bibliometric citation analysis is needed. The most-cited 
article data and analysis methodology outline above is used, but it is complemented with an 
adjustment to the temporal profile of the reference articles in order to extract the most 
significant works that M&A related articles in 1991-2001 referred to.   
 
Adjustment weights are consequently given to each year as follows. The time period of 
1970-2001 is chosen to be weighted41. Each year is assigned a temporal profile coefficient 
(TPC), which is calculated as: 
 
 
               [average no. of references per year in 1970-2001]  
 TPCn = _________________________________________________ 
 
                              no. of references in year n 
                                                 
41 The 1970-2001 time frame and articles belonging to it was chosen, because years prior to that didn't have a 
sufficient number of articles to permit statistical manipulation. For example, references to Manne (1965) and 
Penrose (1959) dominated their years so completely that their TPCs would have raised them far above all others, 
distorting the results. 
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Hence, the TPC takes into consideration the total number of references each year and 
compares it with the average number of references (624,3) in all years between 1970 and 
2001. Subsequently, all 74 of the most important reference articles42 were multiplied with the 
TPCs corresponding to their publication years. The most-cited books and articles with the 
temporal profile adjustment are given in Table 6. 
 
Table 6: 30 Most-cited books and articles with temporal profile adjustment 
 AUTHOR(S) 
YEAR OF 
PUBL. 
TYPE OF 
OUTLET 
(B=book, 
J=journal)
YEAR 
ADJUSTED 
NUMBER OF 
CITATIONS
NAME OF  
 OUTLET 
1 WILLIAMSON O.E. 1975 B 166  MARKETS HIERARCHIES 
2 RUMELT R.P. 1974 B 161  STRATEGY STRUCTURE E
3 JENSEN M.C. & MECKLING W. 1976 J 151  J FINANC ECON 
4 PFEFFER J. & SALANCIK, R. 1978 B 74  EXTERNAL CONTROL ORG
5 JENSEN M.C. 1983 J 70  J FINANC ECON 
6 SALTER M.S. & WEINHOLD W.S. 1979 B 56  DIVERSIFICATION ACQU 
7 AMIHUD Y. & LEV B. 1981 J 52  BELL J ECON 
8 JENSEN M.C. 1986 J 40  AM ECON REV 
9 ROLL R. 1986 J 39  J BUS 
10 FAMA E.F. 1980 J 38  J POLITICAL EC 
11 WHITE H. 1980 J 35  ECONOMETRICA 
12 MYERS S.C. & MAJLUF S.  1984 J 31  J FINANC ECON 
13 JEMISON D.B. & SITKIN S. 1986 J 30  ACAD MANAGE REV 
14 LUBATKIN M. 1983 J 29  ACAD MANAGE REV 
15 HASPESLAGH P.C. & JEMISON D. 1991 B 29  MANAGING ACQUISITIONS
16 NELSON R.R. AND WINTER, S.G. 1982 B 28  EVOLUTIONARY THEORY 
17 TEECE D.J. 1982 J 28  J ECON BEHAV ORGAN 
18 PORTER M.E. 1987 J 27  HARVARD BUS REV 
19 DODD P. 1980 J 25  J FINANC ECON 
20 MORCK , SHLEIFER & VISHNY  1990 J 24  J FINANC 
21 CHATTERJEE S. 1986 J 24  STRATEGIC MANAGE J 
22 PORTER M.E. 1980 B 24  COMPETITIVE STRATEGY 
23 TRAVLOS N.G. 1987 J 23  J FINANC 
24 SINGH H. & MONTGOMERY C.A. 1987 J 22  STRATEGIC MANAGE J 
25 ECKBO B.E. 1983 J 22  J FINANC ECON 
26 BRADLEY M., DESAI A. & KIM E.H. 1988 J 21  J FINANC ECON 
27 SALANT S.W. 1983 J 20  Q J ECON 
28 BROWN S.J. & WARNER, J. 1985 J 20  J FINANC ECON 
29 LUBATKIN M. 1987 J 19  STRATEGIC MANAGE J 
30 RAVENSCRAFT D.J. & SCHERER F. 1987 B 19  MERGERS SELL OFFS EC 
 
The results of the most-cited book and article citation analysis change somewhat with the 
temporal profile adjustment. First of all, however, it must be noted that using the 
aforementioned temporal adjustment method seems to be slightly biased towards older 
                                                 
42 All books and articles with 20 or more references in the 567 M&A related were included. As this calculation 
was done manually, it would have been an inencumberable task to calculate all. Thus the content validity of this 
analysis is not perfect.   
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articles, given that 5 out of the top 6 articles are from the 1970s and the first 1990s 
publication is no higher than 15th in the temporally adjusted rankings. 
 
It can be assumed that the number of referenced articles in one year decreases more 
rapidly than referencing to that year in total. This means that the most significant 
contributions continue to be referenced through time and thus their total significance in the 
above analysis is accentuated. It would an interesting, albeit somewhat separate debate, 
which is thus not dealt with extensively in the context of this study, whether this accentuation 
is actually a sign of ever-greater academic significance or merely a statistical curiosity. What 
is more, this effect might have some impact on the non-temporally adjusted most-cited first 
author and most-cited reference article analyses presented above as well. 
 
The significance of three theories of the firm, agency theory (Jensen and Meckling 1976), 
transaction cost economics (Williamson 1975) and early competence based theory of the firm 
(Rumelt 1974) is conspicuous. Even though it seems that the temporal profile adjustment 
weighs older articles too much, these three seminal theory of the firm contributions are 
undisputedly the most significant given that they all have temporally adjusted reference 
scores that are over twice as high as the 4th most cited publication, the seminal 1978 book by 
Pfeffer and Salancik that ordinarily appears close to the top in organization theoretical 
citation analyses. 
 
Indeed, one of the new findings in the temporally adjusted referencing is the emergence of 
some classic books and articles at the top of the list. The Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) book 
"External control of Organizations", one of the cornerstones of behavioral organization 
theory and the resource dependence perspective, is a good example of this. The emergence of 
Amihud’s and Lev’s (1981) article dealing with agency problems as a source of unrelated 
diversification close to the top is yet another indication of the importance of the governance 
theories of the firm as underpinnings to the M&A discussion. Simultaneously, it highlights 
that diversification and diversifying acquisition still had a very central role in M&A literature 
between 1991-2001. Further evidence of this is the emergence of Salter and Weinhold’s 
(1979) classic book "Diversification Through Acquisition", which is a seminal contribution in 
diversification literature, as high as 6th in the temporally adjusted comparison.  
 
Besides these three, there are only four such publications in the temporally adjusted list 
which are not featured as significantly in the earlier article citation results, and even these are 
relatively far down the list. Two of these four publications (Teece 1981, Nelson and Winter 
1982) further emphasize role of the competence thinking as one of the important backbones 
of M&A literatures. The Salant, Switzer and Reynolds’ 1983 article is a influential 
application of game theory to the analysis of horizontal mergers and industry structure.  
Finally, Dodd’s 1980 article represents yet another ‘pure’ M&A article arguing for the 
positive share price outcomes of merger announcements. 
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Patterns of publication outlet 
 
The publication outlet profiles of both the 567 M&A related articles and the 21 438 
articles that refer to them provide further interesting information concerning the nature of the 
M&A discourse. The pattern of the publication outlet regarding the 567 articles is shown in 
Table 7 and the 25 most common journals that these articles refer to in Table 8. 
 
Table 7: Number of M&A related articles in the selected 65 core journals in 1991-2001 
 JOURNAL TITLE No. of M&A articles 
1 JOURNAL OF BANKING & FINANCE 70 
2 STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT JOURNAL 35 
3 ANTITRUST LAW JOURNAL 31 
4 JOURNAL OF FINANCE 31 
5 JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS 29 
6 ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT JOURNAL 27 
7 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 27 
8 JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS 21 
9 HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW 19 
10 AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW 15 
11 JOURNAL OF BUSINESS 15 
12 JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT 15 
13 JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT STUDIES 15 
14 JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL AND QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 12 
15 ADMINISTRATIVE SCIENCE QUARTERLY 11 
16 EUROPEAN ECONOMIC REVIEW 11 
17 ORGANIZATION SCIENCE 11 
18 RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 11 
19 JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION 10 
20 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS STUDIES 10 
21 LONG RANGE PLANNING 10 
22 JOURNAL OF LAW ECONOMICS & ORGANIZATION 9 
23 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW 8 
24 HUMAN RELATIONS 8 
25 ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT REVIEW 7 
26 JOURNAL OF BUSINESS RESEARCH 7 
27 JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS & MANAGEMENT STRATEGY 7 
28 JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS 6 
29 JOURNAL OF MONEY CREDIT AND BANKING 6 
30 REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES 6 
31 ACCOUNTING REVIEW 5 
32 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE-AN INTERNATIONAL REVIEW 5 
33 SMALL BUSINESS ECONOMICS 5 
34 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY 4 
35 JOURNAL OF BUSINESS VENTURING 4 
36 MANAGEMENT SCIENCE 4 
37 ORGANIZATION STUDIES 4 
38 ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS 4 
39 ACCOUNTING ORGANIZATIONS AND SOCIETY 3 
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40 ECONOMICA 3 
41 INDUSTRIAL MARKETING MANAGEMENT 3 
42 JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY 3 
43 CALIFORNIA MANAGEMENT REVIEW 2 
44 JOURNAL OF CORPORATE FINANCE 2 
45 JOURNAL OF MARKETING 2 
46 JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS 2 
47 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 2 
48 REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES 2 
49 AMERICAN BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL 1 
50 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS AND SOCIOLOGY 1 
51 BRITISH JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT 1 
52 ECONOMETRICA 1 
53 INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW 1 
54 JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT INQUIRY 1 
55 MIT SLOAN MANAGEMENT REVIEW 1 
56 SO QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 1 
57 ADVANCES IN STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT 0 
58 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF FINANCE & ECONOMICS 0 
59 JOURNAL OF APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 0 
60 JOURNAL OF EVOLUTIONARY ECONOMICS  0 
61 JOURNAL OF PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 0 
62 MIS QUARTERLY 0 
63 OMEGA-INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT SCIENCE 0 
64 ORGANIZATION 0 
65 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR AND HUMAN DECISION PROCESSES 0 
 
 
Unsurprisingly, the publication outlet profile of the 567 M&A related articles is dominated 
by journals in the financial sector. 70 of the 567 articles appear in the Journal of Banking and 
Finance, over twice as many as in the Strategic Management Journal, which ranks 2nd just 
ahead of the Antitrust Law Journal, the Journal of Finance and the Journal of Financial 
Economics. Despite the strong positions of JBF, JF and JFE, as well as the appearance of the 
International Journal of Industrial Organization and the Journal of Industrial Economics 
among the top 10, a severe skew in one direction of the other has been avoided. The top 20 
journals include a number of business, management, economics, law and finance journals. 
What has to be noted is that organizational behavior and theory journals, despite the 
appearance of Organization Science (with 11 articles, ranked 17th) and the Journal of 
Economic Behavior and Organization (with 10 articles, ranked 19th), have relatively few 
accounts of M&A, given that e.g. Human Relations only has 8 articles, Organisation Studies 
4, Organizational Dynamics 4 and both Organization and Organizational Behavior and 
Human Decision Processes none. This shows that organization theory and behavior journals 
have been included, but they simply do not discuss M&A very often. 
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Table 8: 25 most-cited journals 
 JOURNAL 
NUMBER OF 
REF. 
1 STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT JOURNAL 1440 
2 JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS 1435 
3 JOURNAL OF FINANCE 830 
4 ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT JOURNAL 636 
5 ADMINISTRATIVE SCIENCE QUARTERLY 501 
6 AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW 464 
7 ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT REVIEW 436 
8 JOURNAL OF BANKING AND FINANCE 329 
9 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMICS 325 
10 HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW 312 
11 RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 261 
12 JOURNAL OF BUSINESS 223 
13 JOURNAL OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 223 
14 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 206 
15 JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS 200 
16 ECONOMETRICA 159 
17 ORGANIZATION SCIENCE 159 
18 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW 155 
19 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY 149 
20 ANTITRUST LAW JOURNAL 149 
21 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS STUDIES 142 
22 JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING AND ECONOMICS 140 
23 JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 133 
24 JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT 133 
25 BELL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 132 
 
On the other hand, despite the dominance of economics and finance-oriented journals in 
the publication outlet profile, the citation outlet profile is remarkably well balanced. The top 
25 most cited journals list shows a relatively even distribution of management (Academy of 
Management Journal and Review, Administrative Science Quarterly, Journal of 
Management), business (Harvard Business Review, Journal of Business, Journal of 
International Business Studies), finance (Journal of Finance, Journal of Banking and 
Finance), economics (American Economic Review, Rand Journal of Economics, Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, Journal of Industrial Economics, Bell Journal of Economics), 
sociology (American Sociological Review, American Journal of Sociology), law (Antitrust 
Law Journal), econometrics (Econometrica) and interdisciplinary (Journal of Political 
Economics, Journal of Financial Economics, Journal of Law and Economics, Journal of 
Accounting and Economics, Journal of Economic Perspectives) journals. Again despite the 
appearance of Organization Science in the top 20, organization theory and behavior journals 
are the ones that conspicuously lack attention in the citation outlet profile. It is important to 
note that this is primarily not because organization theory journals were not included in the 
screened journal population, but because there simply were very few M&A related articles in 
those journals. 
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2.3 Identification of key theories and antecedents 
 
This section aims at identifying the key theories employed and the key antecedents 
presented as well as their roles and positions in the network consisting of M&A related 
articles. In doing this, the network centrality analyses outlined in Section 2.2.1 were 
employed. In short, the analysis concentrates on the same data base as above, i.e. the a 
complete population of 567 M&A related articles from 65 selected management, business, 
economics, finance, accounting, psychology, industrial relations, law and other social science 
journals included in the Social Science Citation Index in 1991-2001, with the exception that 
in the network analysis, the full text of the articles, where available, was used. The selection 
method for the articles was outlined in Sections 2.2.2 and 2.2.3.  
 
This body of literature is analyzed from the perspective of two main dimensions 
representing the roots of the M&A discourse, theories and antecedents. These two 
dimensions were selected in the light of the conceptual analyses as well as the results yielded 
by other similar network analyses (cf. Oliver and Ebers 1998). The analysis is based on 28 
theory facets and 25 antecedent facets, which attempt to capture and describe the range of 
concepts that make up each particular dimension.  
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The facets employed in the analysis are as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The purpose of the theory facets is to identify the main theoretical tenets that are used in 
the M&A articles. The theory facets reveal the theoretical areas, which can have explanatory 
power vis-à-vis the structuring of the M&A discourse and thus act as frameworks for 
answering research questions posed for this study. The theory facets, albeit partly 
overlapping, attempt to represent specific, identifiable categories of theoretical thought in 
management research. In the coding, theories which were identified as central or helpful for 
establishing an argument, hypothesis, research question, conclusion or other key part of the 
article have been coded as present in the article. Likewise, theories which lend a central 
conceptual tool, e.g. the concept transaction costs in the treatment of vertical integration or 
the notion of core competences in the analysis of conglomerate M&A, are acknowledged.  
 
Theories 
 
Resource dependence 
Alliances, networks and JVs 
Legal and Institutional frameworks 
Political power 
Culture and HRM theories 
Resource based strategy 
Competitive strategy 
Knowledge based view 
Internationalization 
Exchange 
Contingency 
Communication 
Decision-making 
Organizational and population ecology 
Industrial organization 
Bargaining 
Game theory 
Evolutionary 
Psychology 
Leadership 
Organizational behaviour 
Capital markets 
Corporate finance 
Accounting 
Agency 
Transaction cost 
Property rights  
Neoclassical TOF 
Antecedents 
 
Debt / equity 
Asset valuation and maximization 
Asset transfer 
Insider trading 
Shareholder value 
Hostile takeover protection and resistance
Goal conflict / congruence 
Diversification, conglomerate 
Competitive advantage / synergy 
Productivity / profit / performance 
Hubris / empire-building 
Geographical expansion / entry 
Growth 
Organizational learning 
Industry decline 
Consolidation wave 
Wealth and economic efficiency 
Antitrust, monopoly, cartels 
Uncertainty and change 
Immaterial resources 
R&D, innovation 
Corporate refocusing, demergers 
Functional and product-level integration 
Commitment 
Privatization or deregulation 
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The antecedents that can be identified from an article traditionally represent the 
explanation why the phenomenon in question, i.e. here a merger or an acquisition, occurs. 
What follows from the phenomenon in question is traditionally pegged the outcome of the 
phenomenon. In this study, the word ‘antecedent’ refers to why article writing about M&A, 
not only M&A, occurs. These two are often converging. If an article argues that M&A can to 
arise from e.g. managerial hubris, the hubris explanation is the antecedent to both the 
phenomenon (the presence of hubris is an explanation to the M&A occurring) as well as the 
scientific interest (the presence of hubris as an explanation to M&A spurs the scientific 
interest – and consequently the journal article). In a way, M&A itself is thus always one of 
the antecedents explaining the scientific interest. This means, however, that many issues that 
would traditionally be considered as outcomes to M&A are here considered as antecedents to 
the scientific interest. For example, ‘growth’ is a typical facet, which would have an 
ambiguous position if the phenomenon-centered antecedents and outcomes were to be 
separated. For example, growth demands or aspirations create the need for acquisitions 
(antecedents) and acquisitions lead to further corporate growth (outcome). This approach 
enables us to investigate the presence of a number of antecedents, or ‘motivations’, to M&A 
research without having to cope with the ambiguity of many facets. In any case, many of the 
antecedents in this study are actual phenomenon-oriented antecedents, since the outcomes can 
nevertheless always be seen as potential motivations or dismotivations for performing M&A 
and research is consequently heavily skewed towards studying explanations. 
 
The theory and antecedent facets are defined and are applied to the articles as explained in 
the following43: 
 
THEORIES  
Resource dependence – e.g. Pfeffer and Salancik – focus on the process through which 
organizations reduce their environmental dependencies using various strategies, which enhance 
their power within the inter-organizational system. 
Alliances, Networks and JVs – e.g. Powell, Granovetter – focus on how the positions of 
actors, activities and resources within their network of influence result in the emergence of 
intermediate “hybrid” governance modes (Williamson 1985) to complement market and 
hierarchical forms. 
Legal and Institutional frameworks – e.g. DiMaggio, Meyer, Werden, old Williamson (e.g. 
1968), Fisher, Posner – focus on the institutional or legal environment of economic activity and 
isomorphic processes that lead to conformity in institutional orders and/or similarities among 
organizations. 
Political power – e.g. Hirsch, Palmer – focus on how political power is used within 
organizations and how organizations influence the balance of political power and vice versa. 
                                                 
43 Some of the definitions have been adopted from a similar network centrality study on research on 
interorganizational relationships and networks by Amalya Oliver and Mark Ebers (Oliver and Ebers 1998) 
whose solid use of this methodology was a great inspiration in its application to this study. 
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Culture and HRM theories – e.g. Schein, Becker, Hofstede, Buono, Bastien – focus on the 
human side of organizations, including the interplay between culture and human resource 
management, the soft, human aspects of the organization and theories of human and industrial 
relations. 
Resource based strategy – e.g. Penrose, Rumelt, Hamel, Prahalad, Teece, Wernerfelt, Barney 
– focus on the resources and competencies as the strategic imperatives for the creation and 
sustaining of corporate performance.  
Competitive strategy – e.g. Porter – focuses on the competitive positioning, competitive 
advantage and the strategic fit of the organization to the conditions prevailing in the industry 
and the markets.  
Knowledge based view – e.g. Kogut, Eisenhardt, Nonaka, new Teece (e.g. Teece et. al 1997) – 
focus on knowledge, e.g. learning and innovation, as the major source of competitive advantage 
and as the main determinant of sustained firm performance and profitability. 
Internationalization – e.g. Dunning – focus on the internationalization and international 
competitiveness of firms, focusing strongly on the geographical and location-based aspects of 
economic activity. 
Exchange – e.g. Blau and Emerson – focus on how characteristics of the exchange process or 
relationship are related to the content and structure of inter-organizational relations. 
Contingency – e.g. Thompson – focus on contingent conditions under which various events, 
actions, phenomena will exist, contrasted with conditions under which they will not exist. 
Communication – focus on the exchange of information, information structures as well as 
inter- and intra-organizational and interpersonal communication and signaling.  
Decision-making – e.g. focus on internal organizational decision-making processes and 
managerial decision-making settings as they impact the patterns, policy directions, decision-
making outcomes, political actions etc. 
Organizational and population ecology – e.g. Freeman, Carroll, Hannan, Stinchcombe – 
focus on how environmental and intra-organizational selection results in the extinction of 
certain organizational forms and management practices, or how environmental opportunities 
allow for the birth of new forms and practices. 
Industrial organization – e.g. Porter, Caves, Scherer, Tirole – focus on how market structures 
(e.g. number of buyers and sellers, degree of product differentiation, entry barriers) affect the 
vertical and horizontal agglomeration within industries and between firms, and vice versa. 
Bargaining – focus on the process through which groups and individuals pursue their interests 
in an exchange system in e.g. auctions or other similar contested bidding settings. 
Game theory – e.g. Nash, Von Neumann, Dixit, Nalebuff, Brandenburger – focus on the 
application of both descriptive and analytic game theoretic models to describe corporate 
decision-making situations or explain behavior. 
Evolutionary – e.g. Nelson and Winter, Baum, Singh – focus on the process through which 
patterns of strategies, organizational forms and relationships evolve, are maintained and 
changed. 
Psychology – e.g. Abrams, Brewer, Hogg, Turner, Skinner, Rousseau, Weick – focus on the 
psychological aspects of organizations its influence on organization of economic activity, 
including both socio-psychological process and the cognitive processes of individuals.  
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Leadership – e.g. Grint, Willcocks – focus on the way individual managers guide their 
organizations, the characteristics of good managers, leadership skills and the role they play in 
the achieving of organizational outcomes. 
Organizational behavior – e.g. March, Simon, Cyert, Perrow, Pfeffer – focus on the 
behavioral and organizational aspects of the organization, especially literature focusing on the 
impact of the rules and patterns of organizational behavior on the determination of the state and 
changes of the organization of economic activity within firms.  
Capital markets – focus on the behavior of capital markets and their impact on the 
determination of the boundaries of firms, organization forms and organization of economic 
activity in general. 
Corporate finance – e.g. Myers, Jensen, Fama, Shipper, Servaes, Berger – focus on the 
financing of corporations, their capital structure, financial transactions, corporate reorganization 
from the financial perspective etc. 
Accounting – e.g. Kaplan – focus on the accounting procedures and process of firms and their 
influence on the firm and vice versa. 
Agency – e.g. Jensen, Eisenhardt, Fama – focus on the institutional arrangements that actors 
create for their agency relations in order to pursue their self-interest under information or 
incentive asymmetries, including  e.g. signaling, screening and monitoring solutions to the 
agency problem. 
Transaction cost – e.g. Coase (1937), Williamson – focus on the comparative assessment of 
transaction costs ensuing for transactions in different institutional arrangements and governance 
modes.  
Property rights – e.g. Coase (1960), Alchian and Demsetz, De Alessi, Furubotn and Pejovich, 
Hart, Grossman – focus on the establishment of a legal framework to guarantee property rights 
over assets. Property rights assignments govern value maximization behavior and thereby 
facilitate the allocation of resources to their highest valued uses, influencing the level and 
character of economic activity.  
Neoclassical TOF – e.g. Arrow, Debreu – focus on the firm as a production function, with 
decision-making mechanisms and consequently governance structures being dependent on 
utility maximization in the presence of budget constraints and zero transaction costs. 
 
ANTECEDENTS 
Debt / equity – focus on the influence of the capital structure of the firm, and various issues 
related to the type and amount of debt and equity, on the probability and nature of mergers and 
acquisitions occurring. 
Asset valuation and maximization – focus on M&A as a vehicle of maximizing some or 
various types of assets, and the problematics related to the valuation of assets in the context of 
M&A. 
Asset transfer – focus on M&A as arrangement, which facilitates the transfer of valuable 
assets from one organizational or legal entity to another. 
Insider trading – focus on the role and impact of insider trading possibilities on the probability 
and nature of M&A occurring. 
Shareholder value – an explicit focus on the shareholder value motivations and implications of 
M&A and their impact on the probability and nature of M&A occurring. 
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Hostile takeover protection and resistance – focus on hostile takeover attempts and/or 
takeover defense measures as a source of M&A and a main determinant of the probability and 
nature of M&A occurring. 
Goal conflict / congruence – focus on the alignment of goals, motivations and incentives of 
various stakeholder groups and their impact on the probability and nature of M&A occurring. 
Diversification, conglomerate – focus on the role of M&A as means to diversify the activities 
of firms and the presence of conglomerate corporate organizations as a source or M&A and a 
determinant of the probability and nature of M&A occurring. 
Competitive advantage / synergy – focus on the development and sustaining of competitive 
advantage as a somewhat abstract notion of corporate performance relative to the market, and 
the role of the competitive advantage in determining the probability and nature of M&A 
occurring. 
Productivity / Profit Performance – focus on the productivity, profitability and performance 
goals and measures of firms and their impact on the probability and nature of M&A occurring. 
Hubris / empire-building – focus on the tendency of executives to develop a thirst for ever 
larger organizations and personal achievement, and the impact such motivations can have on 
the probability and nature of M&A occurring. 
Geographical expansion / Entry – focus on the internationalization, international expansion, 
entry to new international markets etc. motives of firms extending their geographical reach 
through the use of M&A. 
Growth – focus on the different sides of corporate growth: e.g. strategies, aspirations and 
limitations, and their interplay with M&A. M&A’s role in the creation of corporate growth and 
M&A’s impact on the growth of areas, nations and industries. 
Organizational learning – focus on the process of corporate knowledge acquisition and the 
learning processes of the employees.  Focus on M&A as a vehicle for organizational learning 
and organizational learning as a motivation M&A. 
Industry decline – focus on the decline of some industries, e.g. mining, steel and 
manufacturing, as an explanation for agglomerating and synergy-seeking M&A. 
Consolidation wave – focus on the wave-like nature of M&A in general as well as the 
consolidation of e.g. retail banking industry and hospital chains. M&A waves acting as a 
antecedent to new M&A occurring and the impact of waves nature of M&A activity in general. 
Wealth and economic efficiency – focus on the possibility and probability of economically 
measured wealth and efficiency impacts of M&A and its role as a motivation to pursue M&A. 
Antitrust, monopoly, cartels – focus on the competitive implications of M&A and the impact 
of abnormal profits and measures by competition authorities on the characteristics and the 
realization of M&A initiatives. 
Uncertainty and change – focus on M&A as a discontinuity in organizational life as well as 
the role of the possible implications it may have for CEO employment, discharging employees, 
downsizing, cost reduction and generally the increased unpredictability of life within the 
organization(s). 
Immaterial resources – focus on the transfer and acquisition of immaterial resources, e.g. 
intellectual property rights, business relationships, brand names or goodwill as a motivation for 
performing M&A, and their influence on the probability and nature of M&A occurring. 
  74 
R&D, Innovation – focus on R&D and/or other innovative activities of firms as a source and 
motivation for M&A projects as well as the interplay between R&D and corporate restructuring 
activity. 
Corporate refocusing, demergers – focus on (especially conglomerate) M&A as a source for 
demergers and corporate refocusing projects and vice versa. 
Functional and Product-level integration – focus on some specific functional or product-
level integration issue as a motivation or outcome of an M&A process.  
Commitment – focus on personal and organizational commitment issues in the context of 
M&A decision-making. 
Privatization or deregulation – focus on privatization and deregulation activities of 
economies, industries and firms and their impact on the probability and nature of M&A 
occurring. 
 
The articles have been analyzed with respect to the presence or absence, and coded 
respectively with 1 or 0, of these altogether 53 facets. This implies that the analysis is entirely 
dichotomous, i.e. only indicates whether the facet is present or absent in each article. Non-
mutual exclusivity of the facets is assumed within each category. This implies that each 
article can have more than one facet within a given category. In order to balance the analysis 
of the articles, some boundaries were, however, set. Each article was attributed 0-8 facets in 
the theories category and 0-8 facets in the antecedents category44.  If none were found, the 
article was rendered as somewhat useless for this analysis and thus effectively excluded from 
the analysis. Altogether 22 articles became insignificant in this way. 
 
  It seems that the list of facets, their explanations and the brief familiarization of the 
performers of the robustness test was good enough to produce similar coding results time and 
again, arguing for completely sufficient reliability in the network centrality analysis (See 
Section 1.3 above). 
 
 
Network analysis 
 
The gathered population of 567 M&A related articles constitute a body of literature that 
can be used to analyze the core theories and antecedents of the M&A discourse. Along the 
lines of Oliver and Ebers (1998, p. 555), "just as parties create a basis for social events in 
which various sets actors gather, articles create a basis for cognitive events in which various 
sets of concepts or variables gather". In this sense, all the articles and facets in the data are 
interconnected. All facets [a], which appear in various articles [b], are connected to other [a] 
variables through the articles [b] in which they appear in common. In order to analyze the 
interlinkages of the various facets and articles, the matrix indicating the presence of every 
                                                 
44 The number of either theory or antecedent facets was originally intended to be limited to eight, but none of the 
articles were actually perceived to contain more than that. 
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facets [a] in every article [b] was built as. This 53x567 matrix directly delivers the facets’ 
frequencies of appearance. This matrix can also be seen in Appendix 4. 
 
For the centrality analyses, the matrix [ab] needs to be multiplied by its transpose [ab]T, 
which results in a 53x53 symmetric square matrix [aa]. This matrix exhibits the sum of the 
times that two variables appear in the same article. Based on the matrix created this way, 
three tests are performed with the data in order to determine the frequency of appearance of 
each facet and their network centrality within the discourse. Firstly, the frequency at which 
the various facets appear are analyzed in order to determine their relative significance in the 
discourse. Secondly, Bonacich eigenvector centrality, which derives on the number of 
linkages every facet has with other facets, is measured to indicate the centrality of a facet in 
the network. Thirdly, betweenness centrality is measured to determine the bridging ability of 
a given facet, indicating its ability to cross-fertilize between different theories and 
phenomenon-oriented antecedents. The centrality analyses were performed using network 
analysis software, UCINET 5 (Windows version) and the matrix was manipulated in 
Microsoft Excel v. 9.0. 
 
 
Theory and antecedent frequencies 
 
In line with the findings of the citation analysis, the Table 9 points out the dominance of 
agency theory in M&A research. After agency theory, the ensuing theories are quite equally 
represented, with theory of corporate finance and the resource-based view of corporate 
strategy as runners-up. What is notable is that in the time frame of this study, 1991-2001, 
resource based strategy literature has generally been seen to gained dominance over 
competitive strategy literature, indicating a paradigm shift in strategic management literature. 
In economics, however, the tradition of industrial organization, operating both on micro- and 
macroeconomic levels of analysis, seems to continue as a fertile breeding ground. 
Additionally, transaction cost economics is relatively somewhat weaker represented than in 
the citation analysis above. In this light, also resource dependence, the knowledge based view 
and internationalization theories have also reduced in relative weight. All in all, the M&A has 
been scrutinized using a wide variety of different theoretical angles. This is manifested by the 
fact that 11% of the articles use four or more theories and 57% more than one theory. What is 
more, it is again rather surprising that agency theory prevails on the top over the theory of 
corporate finance45 despite the fact that a large part of the M&A discourse has taken place in 
finance journals (see Table 8). 
 
                                                 
45 It is, however, rather evident that Jensen's cross-fertilizing research on both agency theory and the theory of 
corporate finance, of which the 1976 article is a good example, is somewhat responsible for the appearance of 
the two theories on the top.  
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Generally, the theories used in M&A research are numerous and manifest not only the 
different perspectives of different disciplines (e.g. strategy, finance, economics and 
organizational behavior), but also competing view within the disciplines (e.g. competitive vs. 
competence based strategy). As will be discussed in Chapter 3, this fragmentation may have 
contributed to the lack any general set of commonly accepted and managerially relevant 
theoretical frameworks of M&A.  
 
Table 9 lists the frequencies of the theories and antecedents used in the 567 M&A related 
articles in 65 core journals in 1991-2001.  
 
Table 9: The number (n) and percentage (%) of presence of the 53 theory and antecedent facets in N = 567 
articles. Note that up to 8 theory and antecedent facets can be present in one article and thus the summed 
percentage therefore exceeds 100%. 
Facet n %  Facet n % 
Theories Antecedents  
Agency 134 23,6 Productivity, profit and performance 135 23,8
Corporate finance 94 16,6 Shareholder value 115 20,3
Resource based strategy 93 16,4 Goal conflict / congruence 93 16,4
Industrial organization 86 15,2 Antitrust, monopoly, cartels 93 16,4
Competitive strategy 76 13,4 Wealth and economic efficiency 80 14,1
Culture and HRM theories 64 11,3 Diversification, conglomerate 75 13,2
Transaction cost 59 10,4 Uncertainty and change 67 11,8
Organizational behavior 56 9,9 Geographical expansion / entry 64 11,3
Capital markets 52 9,2 Consolidation wave 53 9,3 
Legal and institutional frameworks 51 9,0 Competitive advantage / synergy 48 8,5 
Alliances, networks and joint ventures 41 7,2 Hostile takeovers, protection & resistance 45 7,9 
Property rights 39 6,9 R&D, Innovation 34 6,0 
Knowledge based view 31 5,5 Organizational learning 26 4,6 
Internationalization 29 5,1 Privatization, deregulation 24 4,2 
Game theory 20 3,5 Functional and Product-level integration 22 3,9 
Decision-making 18 3,2 Growth 21 3,7 
Leadership 18 3,2 Immaterial resources 21 3,7 
Psychology 14 2,5 Debt / equity 20 3,5 
Accounting 14 2,5 Corporate refocusing, demergers 15 2,6 
Exchange 13 2,3 Asset transfer 14 2,5 
Bargaining 12 2,1 Asset valuation and maximization 12 2,1 
Neoclassical theory of the firm 12 2,1 Hubris / empire-building 12 2,1 
Resource dependence 11 1,9 Commitment 7 1,2 
Political power 11 1,9 Industry decline 5 0,9 
Communication 10 1,8 Insider trading 2 0,4 
Contingency 5 0,9    
Organizational and population ecology 4 0,7    
Evolutionary 2 0,4    
 
The theories employed in M&A research listed in Table 9 converge with the findings of 
the preceding citation analysis to a very large extent. Agency theory clearly holds the highest 
count with 134 mentions covering 23,6% of the articles, and theories of corporate finance and 
resource-based view are up next. Competitive strategy literature is also well represented. The 
only significant deviation to the citation analysis findings among the most frequently used 
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theories is that transaction cost economics, 7th with 59 mentions covering only 10,4% of the 
articles, has not been as frequently identified as a key theory in the articles as the citation 
analysis, highlighting the importance of Oliver Williamson’s output (Williamson 1975, 
1985), would suggest.  
 
Before analyzing the frequencies of the antecedents of M&A research, a methodological 
detail must be emphasized. Investigating the antecedents of performing research, as is done 
here, instead of investigating the antecedents of the phenomenon is rather unconventional. A 
simple look at the list reveals that many of the factors (antecedents) explaining M&A 
research actually represent outcomes or both outcomes and antecedents of mergers and 
acquisitions occurring. For example, the "diversification and conglomerates" facet implies 
that they have been a main motivation of writing a M&A related article. In this article, 
diversification, for example, could have served either as a corporate objective explaining why 
a merger occurs, or as an outcome of the merger occurring. This ambiguity is one reason why 
all of the facets were considered antecedents of M&A research. The second is simply that this 
by a large is a phenomenological and discourse analytical study of M&A, not a fact-empirical 
one. 
 
The antecedents for M&A research listed in Table 9 reveal a finance and economics 
mindset towards M&A. The facet combining the productivity, profitability and performance 
ability of the firm, with 135 mentions covering 23,8% of the material, is at the top of the list. 
The profit motive appeals to a number of audiences and is easily quantifiable and thus can be 
operationalized in quantitative and qualitative studies alike. The next most common 
antecedent is shareholder value, with 115 articles representing 20,3% of the material. Also 
the competition and market structure considerations as well as the economic efficiency issues 
(4th and 5th with 93/16,4% and 80/14,1% respectively) ranked high in the antecedent 
comparison, further reinforcing the position of quantifiable, economics and finance oriented 
objectives for mergers and acquisitions. Goal congruence and conflict, with 93 articles 
equaling 16,4%, is the only antecedent, which is more difficult to operationalize in terms of 
numbers. Competitive advantage and synergy, basic strategy-related motivations for M&A, 
were used seldom (10th with 48 articles and 8,5%) as were pure corporate finance 
considerations like debt/equity ration (20 articles and 3,5%) and asset valuation and value 
maximization issues (12 articles and 2,1%). 
 
Looking at the frequencies of the antecedents, one further interesting pattern emerges. 
Antecedents primarily representing outcomes of M&A, i.e. profit and productivity outcomes, 
shareholder value outcomes, anticompetitive outcomes, efficiency outcomes, diversification 
and the birth of conglomerates as an outcome, uncertainty and change outcomes, 
consolidation waves as outcomes of M&A activity and anti-M&A measures as outcomes to 
takeover attempts, are well also found near the top of the list. Some of the major antecedent 
explanations for why M&A occurs, e.g. industry decline, hubris, corporate refocusing, 
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growth, learning, technology-related issues, privatization and deregulation, then again, have 
received significantly fewer mentions and are found on the lower half of the list.  
 
 
Network centralities of theories 
 
For further analysis on the centrality and bridging ability of the theories, a symmetric 
square matrix including only the 28 theory facets was built. The theories could thus be 
analyzed using two network centrality measures, Bonacich eigenvector centrality (Bonacich 
1972 and 1987, measuring centrality) and Betweenness centrality (Freeman 1979, measuring 
extent of cross-fertilization and bridging ability).  
 
Table 10 displays the three different centrality values for each of the 28 theories, rank-
ordered according to their frequency of appearance. 
 
Table 10: The frequency of appearance, Bonacich eigenvector centralities and betweenness centralities of 
28 theories in the M&A discourse, ranked according to frequency of appearance (N=567) 
Facet n Frequency%
Bonacich
eigenvector
centrality 
Betweenness 
centrality 
Agency 134 23,6 0,609 13,827 
Corporate finance 94 16,6 0,267 4,487 
Resource based strategy 93 16,4 0,454 23,458 
Industrial organization 86 15,2 0,119 7,320 
Competitive strategy 76 13,4 0,334 17,292 
Culture and HRM theories 64 11,3 0,199 7,648 
Transaction cost 59 10,4 0,260 25,547 
Organizational behavior 56 9,9 0,212 13,083 
Capital markets 52 9,2 0,094 2,174 
Legal and Institutional frameworks 51 9,0 0,065 3,874 
Alliances, Networks and JVs 41 7,2 0,135 9,664 
Property rights 39 6,9 0,109 8,937 
Knowledge based view 31 5,5 0,116 6,625 
Internationalization 29 5,1 0,075 2,806 
Game theory 20 3,5 0,025 1,080 
Decision-making 18 3,2 0,038 2,698 
Leadership 18 3,2 0,050 1,485 
Psychology 14 2,5 0,036 0,267 
Accounting 14 2,5 0,011 0,217 
Exchange 13 2,3 0,031 5,001 
Bargaining 12 2,1 0,014 0,125 
Neoclassical TOF 12 2,1 0,019 1,001 
Resource dependence 11 1,9 0,045 3,276 
Political power 11 1,9 0,033 1,354 
Communication 10 1,8 0,031 1,268 
Contingency 5 0,9 0,017 1,143 
Organizational and population ecology 4 0,7 0,009 1,142 
Evolutionary 2 0,4 0,004 0,200 
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Table 10 demonstrates the central roles (in terms of Bonacich centrality) of agency theory, 
the resource-based view, competitive strategy, corporate finance and transaction cost 
economics in M&A literature in the 1990s, thereby by and large converging with the findings 
of the citation analysis above. However, especially competitive strategy, transaction cost 
economics, theories regarding organizational behavior, theories regarding "hybrid 
organization modes" (see Williamson 1985 for definition, e.g. alliances, joint ventures, 
networks and clans) and the knowledge based view, of the relatively more significant 
theories, achieve a ranking higher in terms of their Bonacich centrality than their frequency 
of appearance. This implies that whilst not the most frequent, these theories are nevertheless 
central to the contemporary M&A discourse. On the other hand, particularly industrial 
organization, the capital markets perspective, game theory and accounting (as well as 
corporate finance to some extent) assume lower rankings. This might suggest that the high 
frequency of appearance of finance and accounting oriented articles is due to the large 
number of M&A articles found in a key journals in the area (e.g. Journal of Banking and 
Finance, Journal of Finance and Journal of Financial Economics), and that their centrality in 
the discourse is not quite as high as the frequencies might indicate.  
 
On the other hand, the Bonacich findings can also be interpreted to hint that the industrial 
organization and finance discussions represent more segregated fields of M&A than the rest 
of the lot. This is supported by the results regarding the Betweenness centralities of the 
different theories. Corporate finance, industrial organization and capital markets are the only 
three significant theory facets that have a high frequency of appearance and Bonacich 
centrality, but considerably lower Betweenness centrality (See Table 11). On a more general 
level, corporate finance, capital markets, industrial organization, bargaining and games as 
well as accounting theory, despite being frequent in the M&A literature, remain rather 
peripheral within the M&A discourse and have weak bridging abilities. 
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Table 11: The theories ranked according to their frequency of appearance in the network, together with 
ranking changes (vis-à-vis frequency rankings) when ranked according to Bonacich eigenvector centrality 
and Betweenness centrality (– = lower ranking, + = higher ranking) 
 
 
Ranking in 
frequencies
Ranking change 
--> Bonacich 
Ranking change  
--> Betweenness 
Agency 1 0 -3 
Corporate finance 2 -2 -10 
Resource based strategy 3 +1 +1 
Industrial organization 4 -5 -5 
Competitive strategy 5 +2 +2 
Culture and HRM theories 6 -1 -2 
Transaction cost 7 +2 +6 
Organizational behavior 8 +2 +3 
Capital markets 9 -3 -8 
Legal and Institutional frameworks 10 -4 -3 
Alliances, Networks and JVs 11 +3 +5 
Property rights 12 +1 +5 
Knowledge based view 13 +3 +3 
Internationalization 14 +1 -1 
Game theory 15 -7 -8 
Decision-making 16 -1 +0 
Leadership 17 0 -1 
Psychology 18 0 -7 
Accounting 19 -7 -7 
Exchange 20 0 +9 
Bargaining 21 -4 -7 
Neoclassical TOF 22 -1 -2 
Resource dependence 23 +7 +9 
Political power 24 +5 +5 
Communication 25 +4 +5 
Contingency 26 +2 +5 
Organizational and population ecology 27 0 +5 
Evolutionary 28 0 +1 
 
As Table 11 illustrates, transaction cost economics has the highest Betweenness centrality 
value, with theories of hybrid organization forms, property rights, exchange and resource 
dependence also having respectively higher Betweenness centrality than frequencies. Thus, 
even though some of these theories (especially property rights and exchange) assume a 
relatively peripheral role within the M&A discourse, they all often function as bridging 
theories between other theories that they are not directly connected. This might suggest that 
they could deserve a more central role in M&A research than they do at present. In other 
words, theories with high Betweenness centrality could act as ideologies and frameworks 
guiding future M&A research projects.  
 
 
Network centralities of antecedents 
 
For further analysis on the centrality and bridging ability of the antecedents, a symmetric 
square matrix including only the 25 antecedent facets was built. Also the antecedents were 
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measured using the same two network centrality measures, Bonacich eigenvector centrality 
(Bonacich 1972 and 1987, measuring centrality) and Betweenness centrality (Freeman 1979, 
measuring extent of cross-fertilization and bridging ability).  
 
Table 12 displays the three different centrality values for each of the 25 antecedents, rank-
ordered according to their frequency of appearance. 
 
Table 12: The frequency of appearance, Bonacich eigenvector centralities and betweenness centralities of 
25 antecedents in the M&A discourse, ranked according to frequency of appearance (N=567) 
 
Antecedent Facets N 
Frequency 
% 
Bonacich
eigenvector
centrality 
Betweenness 
centrality 
Antecedent    
Productivity / Profit Performance 135 23,8 0,024 4,208 
Shareholder value 115 20,3 0,028 1,547 
Goal conflict / congruence 93 16,4 0,003 0,141 
Antitrust, monopoly, cartels 93 16,4 0,422 17,022 
Wealth and economic efficiency 80 14,1 0,171 2,168 
Diversification, conglomerate 75 13,2 0,386 2,550 
Uncertainty and change 67 11,8 0,380 5,809 
Geographical expansion / Entry 64 11,3 0,204 4,846 
Consolidation wave 53 9,3 0,489 6,425 
Competitive advantage / synergy 48 8,5 0,138 4,547 
Hostile Takeover protection, resistance 45 7,9 0,158 3,315 
R&D, Innovation 34 6,0 0,076 11,907 
Organizational learning 26 4,6 0,060 1,266 
Privatization, deregulation 24 4,2 0,019 0,277 
Functional and Product-level integration 22 3,9 0,132 3,767 
Growth 21 3,7 0,257 3,095 
Immaterial resources 21 3,7 0,082 1,600 
Debt / equity 20 3,5 0,229 6,015 
Corporate refocusing, demergers 15 2,6 0,051 3,709 
Asset transfer 14 2,5 0,059 1,575 
Asset valuation and maximization 12 2,1 0,074 3,555 
Hubris / empire-building 12 2,1 0,031 0,304 
Commitment 7 1,2 0,025 0,332 
Industry decline 5 0,9 0,051 1,141 
Insider trading 2 0,4 0,072 0,880 
      
 
Table 12 yields somewhat puzzling results. The frequency results seem logical. The most 
frequent antecedents, productivity/profit performance and shareholder value, followed by 
goal conflict/congruence and antitrust/monopoly/cartel reinforce the findings of the citation 
and theory network analyses above. They are evidently interlinked with the leading 
theoretical underpinnings identified, e.g. agency, corporate finance, strategy and industrial 
organization.  
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The Bonacich eigenvector centrality results, however, provide more incongruent evidence. 
Productivity, shareholder value and especially goal conflict and congruence all assume seem 
non-central to the discourse. On the basis of results of the theory facet analysis, it would seem 
logical that variables with high frequencies would also be somewhat central to the discourse. 
One explanation for this could be that all of these explanations are so dominant that very few 
other antecedents were identified in such articles. On the other hand, especially 
antitrust/monopoly/cartel, uncertainty/change and consolidation wave achieve a ranking 
higher in terms of their Bonacich centrality than their frequency of appearance. This might be 
suggested to result from the fact that they all constitute a significant argument by themselves 
and that they are central to a particular M&A research area. There are quite distinct 
conversations regarding the e.g. the anticompetitive effects of mergers46 or the human 
resource outcomes of M&A and industry-specific merger waves47. These discrete discussions 
have most certainly assumed attention in the 1991-2001 M&A discourse, yet it is 
nevertheless surprising that their Bonacich centrality rankings exceed e.g. the frequent 
shareholder value, goal conflict and productivity/profit performance explanations.   
 
Likewise, the betweenness centrality results are somewhat perplexing. Anticompetitive 
concerns and R&D/innovation seem to appear particularly commonly together with others 
explanations and have the best bridging ability. Antitrust explanations most certainly link 
with the other industrial organization minded explanations, e.g. wealth/economic efficiency. 
On the other hand, R&D/innovation is interlinked with organizational learning, synergy and 
competitive advantage. Goal congruence/conflict has extremely low bridging ability, which 
could be suggest that it represents a rather isolated discussion. Somewhat surprisingly, inter-
stakeholder group conflict or congruence explanations seldom take a stance vis-à-vis other, 
e.g. strategic or economic, explanations such as wealth, efficiency, synergy or competitive 
advantage. Some might say that managerial explanations to M&A are superficial and rather 
artificially glued on top of the M&A discourse, but it is not possible to take a stance on that 
here. On the other hand, it is possible that anticompetitive concerns and R&D/innovation 
display high bridging ability because they operate on a less demarcated level of analysis. 
Agency theoretical articles typically operate on at the level of the individual or groups of 
individuals, whereas competition, wealth and efficiency effects, as well as technology-related 
issues can be discussed also at the level of the firm, industry, economy or even higher. 
Surely, mentions of these antecedents come from a wider set of research orientations, which 
would automatically show as an increase in the Betweenness centrality results. 
  
Whether there is any sense at all in measuring the centrality (in terms of Bonacich 
centrality) and linking ability (in terms of Betweenness centrality) of antecedents is an issue 
that needs to be raised in this context. Arguably, antecedents are not used like theories in the 
                                                 
46 Especially in the legal dialogue 
47 e.g. in retail banking and hospital management 
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sense that they would be attempted to be integrated with each other to the same extent. In 
other words, whilst it is often seen as valuable to consider multiple theoretical approaches 
while scrutinizing M&A, M&A researchers typically only need one or two antecedents to 
motivate a study. Intuitively, antecedents are not in similar interplay with each other as 
theories, but research rather focuses on validating one or some antecedents at a time. Looking 
at the figures in the antecedents network results in  
Table 12 indicates that the level of bridging is considerably lower than with theories. This 
shows as a lower average Betweenness centrality among the antecedents. This lack of 
connections between antecedents also questions the relevance of the Bonacich centrality 
results somewhat. If there are fewer connections between antecedents in the first place, the 
antecedent network can have several ostensible nexuses. Several nexuses that consist of few 
interlinkages do not yield very reliable clear Bonacich or Betweenness centrality results since 
these measures are analyze the linkages specifically. The outcome can be that e.g. the 
Bonacich centrality results have little correspondence with the frequency results, as seems to 
be the case here.  
 
 
2.4 Theory and antecedent co-occurrence analysis 
 
In addition the simple frequency, Bonacich eigenvector centrality and Betweenness 
centrality analyses, a co-occurrence analysis of the theory and antecedent facets has been 
performed48. The purpose of this analysis is to reveal which antecedents and theories co-
occur most frequently with each theory and antecedent. Subsequently, it is possible to see 
whether theories and antecedents actually appear in logical clusters or patterns.  
 
The data in the co-occurrence analysis consists of the network centrality analysis result 
matrix K depicted in Appendix 4. In the analysis, a 53 x 53 matrix F consisting of the 53 
facets on both axes (article number i: ai and dichotomous 0-1 variable number j:xj) is built by 
firstly initializing all elements Fij  as zero. Subsequently, every article in matrix K is read for 
the presence of each facet. If variable xj appears on the same row with variable xk, the 
corresponding matrix element Fjk is increased by one. Variable j assumes values 1, 2, .., N 
and variable k values j+1, j+2, …, 53. This procedure is repeated for all articles. The 
resulting matrix F displays the times which each theory and antecedent appear together in the 
data consisting of the 567 analyzed articles. This Table is also found in Appendix 4.  
 
From the table, two of the most common theory and antecedent facets were picked for 
each theory and antecedent in order to see whether the theories and antecedents co-occurred 
together in a logical pattern. In case there was no significant co-occurrence, no facet was 
                                                 
48 The help of Mr. Lauri Ora of Cambridge University, UK, is gratefully acknowledged in designing and 
constructing the co-occurrence analysis. 
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picked. On the other hand, in case there was e.g. one clearly dominant facet and two equally 
commonly co-occurring facets, best discretion was used in whether to include only the one 
most important or all three. The results are tabulated in Table 13. 
 
Table 13: Theory and antecedents co-occurrence analysis results of 28 theories and 25 antecedents used in 
M&A related articles published in core journals between 1991-2001 (N=567). 
Facet 
Most important co-occurring 
theories 
Most important co-occurring 
antecedents 
Resource dependence Resource based view 
Organizational behavior 
Diversification and conglomerates 
Productivity, profit and performance 
Alliances, Networks and JVs Organizational behavior 
Transaction cost economics 
Productivity, profit and performance 
R&D and innovation 
Legal and institutional 
frameworks 
Transaction cost economics 
Property rights 
Antitrust, monopoly and cartels 
Consolidation wave 
Political power Culture and HRM theories Hostile takeover protection and resistance 
Uncertainty and change 
Culture and HRM theories Organizational behavior 
Resource based view and 
competitive strategy 
Uncertainty and change 
Productivity, profit and performance 
Resource based strategy Competitive strategy 
Agency theory 
Productivity, profit and performance 
Diversification and conglomerates 
Competitive strategy Resource based view 
Agency theory 
Productivity, profit and performance 
Competitive advantage and synergy 
Knowledge based view Resource based view 
Competitive strategy 
Organizational learning 
R&D and innovation 
Internationalization Culture and HRM theories 
Resource based view and 
competitive strategy 
Geographical expansion and entry 
Shareholder value 
Exchange Hybrid organization forms 
Organizational behavior 
No antecedent stands out 
Contingency Organizational behavior 
Resource based view 
No antecedent stands out 
Communication Agency theory  Goal conflict and congruence 
Organizational learning 
Decision-making Agency theory 
Culture and HRM theories 
Productivity, profit and performance 
Goal conflict and congruence 
Organizational and Population 
ecology 
Organizational behavior 
Culture and HRM theories 
Uncertainty and change  
Industrial organization Game theory 
Agency, TCE and property rights 
Antitrust, monopoly and cartels 
Wealth and economic efficiency 
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Bargaining Industrial organization 
Game theory 
Antitrust, monopoly and cartels 
Wealth and economic efficiency 
Game theory Industrial organization Antitrust, monopoly and cartels 
Wealth and economic efficiency 
Evolutionary No theory stands out Growth 
Psychology Culture and HRM theories 
Organizational behavior 
Uncertainty and change 
Goal conflict and congruence 
Leadership No theory stands out Uncertainty and change 
Organizational behavior Culture and HRM theories 
Resource based view   
Productivity, profit and performance 
Uncertainty and change 
Capital markets Corporate finance 
Agency theory 
Shareholder value 
Wealth and economic efficiency 
Corporate finance Agency theory  
Capital markets theory 
Shareholder value 
Productivity, profit and performance 
Accounting Corporate finance No antecedent stands out 
Agency Corporate finance 
Resource based view 
Goal conflict and congruence 
Transaction cost Agency theory 
Resource based view 
Diversification and conglomerates 
Productivity, profit and performance 
Property rights Agency theory 
Transaction cost economics 
Antitrust, monopoly and cartels 
Goal conflict and congruence 
Neoclassical TOF Industrial organization 
Property rights 
Antitrust, monopoly and cartels 
Productivity, profit and performance 
   
Facet 
Most important co-occurring 
theories 
Most important co-occurring 
antecedents 
Debt / equity Corporate finance 
Agency theory 
Goal conflict and congruence 
Asset valuation and 
maximization 
Transaction cost economics Shareholder value 
Wealth and economic efficiency 
Asset transfer Resource based view Diversification and conglomerates 
Corporate refocusing and demergers 
Insider trading No theory stands out Shareholder value  
Shareholder value Agency theory 
Corporate finance 
Productivity, profit and performance 
Goal conflict and congruence 
Hostile Takeover protection, 
resistance 
Agency theory 
Corporate finance 
Goal conflict and congruence 
Shareholder value 
Goal conflict / congruence Agency theory Hostile takeover protection and resistance 
Productivity, profit and performance 
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Diversification, conglomerate Agency theory 
Resource based view 
Productivity, profit and performance 
Goal conflict and congruence 
Competitive advantage / 
synergy 
Competitive strategy 
Resource based view 
Productivity, profit and performance 
Shareholder value 
Productivity / Profit 
Performance 
Resource based view 
Agency theory 
Shareholder value 
Diversification and conglomerates 
Hubris / empire-building Agency theory Goal conflict and congruence 
Shareholder value 
Hostile takeover protection and resistance 
Geographical expansion / 
Entry 
Internationalization 
Resource based view 
Productivity, profit and performance 
Shareholder value 
Growth Competitive strategy 
Resource based view 
Productivity, profit and performance 
Geographical expansion and entry 
Organizational learning Knowledge based view 
Resource based view 
Immaterial resources 
Competitive advantage and synergy 
R&D and innovation 
Industry decline No theory stands out No antecedent stands out 
Consolidation wave Corporate finance 
Legal and institutional frameworks
Wealth and economic efficiency 
Diversification and conglomerates 
Wealth and economic 
efficiency 
Industrial organization 
Corporate finance 
Productivity, profit and performance 
Consolidation wave 
Antitrust, monopoly, cartels Industrial organization 
Legal and institutional frameworks
Consolidation wave 
Wealth and economic efficiency 
Uncertainty and change Culture and HRM 
Organizational behavior 
Productivity, profit and performance 
Goal conflict and congruence 
Immaterial resources Resource based view 
Knowledge based view 
Organizational learning 
R&D and innovation 
R&D, Innovation Resource based view 
Competitive strategy 
Diversification and conglomerates 
Organizational learning 
Immaterial resources 
Corporate refocusing, 
demergers 
Resource based view 
Competitive strategy 
Diversification and conglomerates 
Shareholder value 
Functional and Product-level 
integration 
Competitive strategy Productivity, profit and performance 
Uncertainty and change 
Commitment Agency theory Goal conflict and congruence 
Hubris and empire building 
Hostile takeover protection and resistance 
Privatization, deregulation Corporate finance 
Capital markets 
Antitrust, monopoly and cartels 
Productivity, profit and performance 
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Some interesting considerations arise from the co-occurrence analysis. Firstly, 
organization theory and behavior and transaction cost economics theory facets appear much 
more commonly in the context of other theories than antecedents. Then again, resource-based 
strategy, knowledge-based strategy, competitive strategy, agency theory and corporate 
finance occupy an overwhelming majority of the positions as the most-co-occurring theories 
with M&A antecedents. This shows the clear difference between those theories that are 
appealing, useful and familiar for researchers performing empirical research and those 
theories that have assumed wide respect among theory-centered writers. This is another 
dimension where the social dimension of referencing can also be assumed to play a part. 
 
Another particular observation deals with the tendency of some of the antecedents to 
appear in clusters, i.e. to repeatedly appear in the same articles with each other. At least five 
clusters can be pointed out. The first is a cluster of agency theoretic antecedents. The most 
common antecedent for agency theory is goal conflict and congruence and vice versa. The 
most commonly co-occurring antecedent for goal conflict and congruence articles, then 
again, is hostile takeover protection and resistance and vice versa. Hostile takeover protection 
and resistance is also most often featured by agency theory. All three of these are also among 
the most commonly co-occurring facets with the hubris and empire-building facet.  
 
The second cluster consists of three traditional business objective measures, namely 
performance, growth and international expansion. Growth is featured by performance and 
geographical expansion, geographical expansion by performance and so on. Also shareholder 
value is seemingly close to this generic set of business success measures. The third cluster is 
one based on the knowledge-based analyses of M&A. Here, R&D and innovation co-occurs 
with organizational learning and immaterial resources, immaterial resources with the 
knowledge-based view, organizational learning as well as R&D and innovation, and 
organizational learning with the knowledge-based view, immaterial resources and R&D and 
innovation.  
 
Two further somewhat less well-demarcated clusters exist. The first consists of central 
strategy related antecedents (competitive advantage and synergy, productivity, profit and 
performance, diversification and conglomerates and shareholder value). The second consists 
of efficiency- and economics-minded industrial organization antecedents (antitrust, 
monopolies and cartels, wealth and economic efficiency and consolidation wave) exist. Given 
that these clusters clearly represent two of the major disciplinary orientations in the M&A 
discourse (strategy and economics), the fact that they are not as clear in the data relates to the 
final key finding of the co-occurrence analysis. Namely, the co-occurrence analysis is also 
characterized by a lack of surprises. The most common theories and antecedents are 
proliferated across the board. Looking particularly at the antecedents, it seems that there are a 
number of things, e.g. an interest in shareholder value, firm performance, goal conflict and 
congruence that unite many disciplinary streams in M&A research.  
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2.5 Summary 
 
The analysis in Chapter 2 employed bibliometric methodology to discover the de facto 
structuring of the M&A discourse. This kind of analysis is needed to support the findings of 
the conceptual analysis of the M&A literature and provide an objective backbone for this 
study. Bibliometric methodology was employed given its ability to e.g. identify significant 
theoretical underpinnings, discuss the state of academic discourse relating to a real-life 
phenomenon, organize vague information in a rigorous way and study networks, relationships 
and interlinkages between authors, texts, journals and fields. 
 
With a selection of 567 M&A related articles published in 1991-2001 in a wide body of 65 
core management, business, economics, finance, accounting, law, industrial relations, 
sociology, social psychology and accounting journals, the 1990s M&A discourse was 
attempted to be covered. Likewise, by employing dual bibliometric methodology combining 
citation analyses and network analyses, Chapter 2 aimed at identifying not only key 
underlying authors, texts and fora of the M&A discourse, but also analyzing the different 
roles and positions the key theories and antecedents employed in the 567 articles assume.  
 
This bibliometric analysis attempted to answer the first research question of the study, i.e. 
what is the de facto structuring of the M&A discourse? Three dimensions of this question 
were defined in the introduction. Firstly, understanding the de facto structuring of the M&A 
discourse requires an understanding of the important intellectual sources (in the form of 
authors and articles) used in the 567 M&A articles. Secondly, an understanding of the 
theories used as academic backbones in these articles is necessary. Thirdly, the motivations 
or antecedents for writing the 567 articles need to be understood in order to establish a clearer 
picture of the aspects of M&A that have interested authors.  
 
 
Disciplinary research orientations in the M&A discourse 
 
The bibliometric analyses revealed some interesting insights to the disciplinary 
underpinnings of the M&A discourse.  
 
Firstly, the findings of both the most-cited first authors analysis and the most-cited text 
analysis indicated that the M&A discourse has drawn from a rather wide spectrum of 
disciplines, ranging from pure theory of the firm and applications operationalizing theories of 
the firm to various finance oriented perspectives, strategy literature, methodological papers 
and a number of miscellaneous research angles issues dealing directly with M&A. The wide 
disciplinary nature of the M&A literature is also highlighted by the patterns of publication 
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and citation outlet. Even though the publication outlet profile is somewhat dominated by 
seven finance and economics journals (Journal of Banking and Finance, Antitrust Law 
Journal, Journal of Finance, Journal of Financial Economics, International Journal of 
Industrial Organization, Journal of Industrial Economics and American Economic Review) 
among the top 10, this is not the case in the citation outlet pattern. In addition to the fact that 
Strategic Management Journal and Journal of Financial Economics are evenly and clearly the 
two most cited, the most cited journals list shows a relatively even distribution of 
management, business, finance, economics, organizational, sociology, law, econometrics and 
interdisciplinary journals. 
 
Secondly, and compared to existing generic knowledge of the structure of the M&A 
discourse, it seems that authors and texts playing a significant role in the development of 
different governance theories of the firm seem to be well represented as the 
underpinnings of the M&A discourse as well. Especially Michael Jensen’s output in 
general and especially his agency theoretic works (e.g. Jensen 1986, Jensen and Meckling 
1976, Jensen and Ruback 1983) emphasizing importance of the owner-manager relationship 
in corporate restructuring decision-making have received substantial attention. The legacy of 
the complete contracting oriented agency theoretic literature is also seen in the appreciation 
of works first authored by Eugene Fama’s (e.g. Fama 1980, Fama and Jensen 1983). A 
prominent application of agency theory to M&A is Amihud and Lev’s 1981 article. The 
influence of the governance perspective is also manifested in the significant influence of 
Oliver E. Williamson’s works (most importantly Williamson 1975 and 1985). His transaction 
cost economics, which explicitly discusses the boundaries of the firm, a key issue in M&A, 
appeals to an audience with wide disciplinary backgrounds.   
 
Thirdly, in addition to the governance theories of the firm, there seems to be a strong 
tripartite balance of the influence of a) corporate strategy literature, b) corporate 
finance and capital markets literature and c) process literature in the M&A discourse. 
What is notable is that the significant presence of these three converge to a very large extent 
with the metatheoretical findings in Haspeslagh and Jemison’s 1991 book that lists a "capital 
markets school", a "process school" and a "strategic school" to M&A. 
 
In the corporate strategy literature, the prevailing influence of the competitive strategy and 
positioning school dominated by Michael E. Porter’s works (especially Porter 1980, 1985, 
1987) is evident. In contrast, the competence perspective to the theory of the firm has a 
somewhat less dominant position than could be assumed on the basis of the dominance of the 
competence based perspectives to corporate strategy since around 1990 (See e.g. Rumelt et 
al. 1994, Hamel and Prahalad 1990, Barney 1991, Peteraf 1993). Important precursors to the 
resource-based view (namely Penrose 1959, Nelson and Winter 1982 and Rumelt 1974) 
appear high up particularly temporal profile adjusted citation analysis. Even considering the 
effect of time, emerging e.g. from the temporal limitation of this study (1991-2001) and that 
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the references date an average of six years back, the balance of competitive and competence-
based strategy literature or rather the finding that the competence perspective does not 
dominate, is somewhat unexpected. 
 
In the financially oriented literature, which as a whole is equally frequent to the corporate 
strategy literature, a presence of both corporate finance and capital markets oriented literature 
is discovered. Jensen’s overwhelming popularity in the first-author rankings is much due to 
the fact that his key works (e.g. Jensen and Ruback 1983, Jensen 1986) have also contributed 
to the theory of corporate finance. Nickolaos Travlos’ 1987 article concentrating on the 
methods of payment and Stewart Myers’ and Nicholas Majluf’s 1984 article on the role of 
private information in corporate financing decisions are good examples of the type of 
corporate finance literature that M&A literature has drawn from. Then again, there is a strong 
stream of capital markets oriented, financial M&A literature that typically relies on event 
study methodology. Examples of most influential articles from this perspective include 
Morck, Shleifer and Vishny’s 1990 and Eckbo’s 1983 articles. With the capital markets 
school, also related articles discussing related event study and quantitative methodologies 
have received considerable attention (White 1980, Brown and Warner 1985). 
 
The process stream to M&A is also well represented in the citation analysis, even though 
the number of contributors and contributions is somewhat smaller. Seminal texts by Jemison 
and Sitkin (1986) and Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) assume prominent positions. 
Arguably, the process perspective has engulfed some competence perspective ideologies (e.g. 
the importance of acquisition experience and strategic paths) and shares an interest in internal 
organization related gains and an aspiration for value creation, all which have helped to 
maintain the approach in 1990s. The process stream, however, is an example of a ‘pure’ 
M&A school and highlights the fact that also M&A is developing signs of autonomy and 
independence from, most importantly, the strategy and finance discourses through intra-
disciplinary referencing.  
 
The fourth finding deals not with what assumed a central position in the bibliometric 
analyses, but with what did not. A subjective list of the most conspicuously missing or 
poorly represented research perspectives includes e.g.  
 
• Organization and behavioral theory  e.g. Simon 1951, March and  
Simon 1958, Argyris and Schön 1978, 
Perrow 1972  
 
• Resource dependence theory   e.g. Pfeffer and Salancik 1978 
 
• Key RBV contributions    e.g. Hamel and Prahalad 1990,  
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Rumelt, Schendel and Teece 1994, 
Loasby 1990, Walter and Barney 1990 
 
• Neoclassical economics and economics e.g. Arrow 1951, Arrow and  
in general (e.g. rational expectations  Debreu 1954, Stigler 1950, 1951, 
school)     Lucas 1967 
 
• Property rights theory   e.g. Coase 1960 Alchian and  
Demsetz 1972, Hart 1990, Grossman and 
Hart 1986, Hart and Moore 1990.  
 
• Cultural issues     e.g. Hofstede 1980, 1990, Sales and  
Mirvis 1985, Buono, Bowditch and 
Lewis 1985, Buono and Bowditch 1989 
 
• Some pure M&A contributions  e.g. Kitching 1967, 1974, Pablo 1994 
 
• Trust and social capital    e.g. Coleman 1990, Putnam 1993,  
Fukuyama 1995 
 
 
Surely one the most puzzling findings is the relatively small impact of organizational, 
behavioral and cultural perspectives as well as somewhat related perspectives on trust and 
social capital and resource dependence49. What Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) peg as the 
organizational behavior school in M&A seems virtually non-existent, at least in the light of 
citation analyses. A closer inquiry of the theories used in the articles by the network centrality 
analyses, however, signifies a somewhat important role.  
 
Among others, interesting absences in the citation analyses include property rights theory 
on the one hand and neoclassical economics on the other. It could be argued that property 
rights theory could serve as an intellectual underpinning for M&A shareholder value 
rationales, which assume very high priority among the M&A research antecedents. The same 
applies for seminal neoclassical economics contributions, and in fact any economics 
contributions, in the sense that, intuitively, they should underpin many of the articles 
published in the wealth of economics journals close to the top of the publication outlet profile 
list. Additionally, given that the competence perspectives and ‘pure’ M&A articles are at 
least somewhat well represented in the citation analysis, it seems counterintuitive that some 
significant outputs in both fields are missing.  
                                                 
49 Even though Pfeffer and Salancik's seminal 1978 resource dependence theory contribution "External Control 
of Organizations" did rise to 4th place in the temporal profile adjusted comparison of books and articles. 
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Theories utilized in the M&A discourse 
 
The theory frequencies in the network analysis by and large converge with the findings of 
the citation analysis. Agency theory, corporate finance, resource-based strategy, competitive 
strategy, industrial organization, culture and HRM theories and transaction cost economics, 
organizational behavior and capital markets theory assume the highest rankings in that order. 
The major differences to the citation analysis are that theories emphasizing the softer sides of 
the organizations, e.g. culture, HRM and organizational behavior, assume a somewhat more 
prominent role. On the other hand, transaction cost economics is only the seventh most 
common theory, which is remarkably lower than Williamson’s partial dominance of the 
citation results might indicate. Also, political power and resource dependence theories 
assume a very low ranking. These theories appear to be often cited but seldom employed as 
central theoretical constructs in investigating M&A phenomena. 
 
The Bonacich eigenvector analysis, which indicates the relative centrality of a theory in 
the M&A article network, revealed some interesting insights. Some theoretical streams, most 
importantly resource dependence and political power, but also competitive strategy, 
transaction cost economics, organizational behavior, hybrid organization modes and the 
knowledge-based view assume rankings significantly higher in terms of their Bonacich 
centrality than their frequency of appearance. These streams can be argued to deal closely 
with M&A ‘business’50, and therefore attract linkages from numerous theoretical directions, 
increasing their Bonacich values. On the other hand, the Bonacich findings can also be 
explained by indicating that the industrial organization, finance and legal perspectives to 
M&A can be thought to represent distinct fields of inquiry, with few linkages and little appeal 
to researchers outside their domains.  
 
The speculation surrounding the Bonacich centrality results is supported by the results 
regarding the Betweenness centralities of the different theories. Corporate finance, industrial 
organization and capital markets are the only three significant theory facets that have a high 
frequency of appearance and Bonacich centrality, but considerably lower Betweenness 
centrality. At the same time, numerous theories seem to assume a strong bridging and cross-
fertilizing role. Transaction cost economics has the highest Betweenness centrality value, 
which profiles it, together with theories of hybrid organization forms, property rights, 
exchange and most importantly resource dependence, as a linking theory whose ‘task’ in the 
M&A discourse is to attract and link complementary research and thus foster dialogue among 
otherwise unconnected perspectives.  
                                                 
50 In the sense that they deal with competitors, regulation and organizational politics, alternatives to mergers, 
make-or-buy-decisions, knowledge assets, organizational turmoil and post-merger trauma etc. all of which are 
important, tangible, practical and managerial antecedents of M&A 
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Antecedents of the M&A discourse 
 
A similar network analysis performed on a network of antecedents to the M&A discourse 
yielded somewhat confusing results. The frequency results seem logical. The most frequent 
antecedents, i.e. productivity/profit performance and shareholder value, followed by goal 
conflict/congruence and antitrust/monopoly/cartel reinforce the findings of the citation and 
theory network analyses. These antecedents are evidently interlinked with the leading 
theoretical streams identified, e.g. agency, corporate finance, strategy and industrial 
organization. 
 
The Bonacich eigenvector centrality results, however, seem to reveal that very frequent 
antecedents, e.g. productivity, shareholder value and especially goal conflict and congruence, 
assume low centrality values due to the fact that they are so dominant in the articles where 
they appear that few other antecedents are identified in the same contexts. On the other hand, 
antecedents such as antitrust/monopoly/cartel, uncertainty/change and consolidation waves 
seem to attract high network centrality values due to the fact that they are certainly very 
central to a particular M&A research area. 
 
Likewise, the betweenness centrality results are somewhat perplexing. Antitrust 
explanations linking with the other industrial organization minded explanations, and 
R&D/innovation linking with organizational learning, synergy and competitive advantage 
seem to have particularly good bridging abilities. However, it seems that antecedents are not 
used like theories in the sense that they would bring in issues and arguments and integrate 
them with other explanations, or unify several others. In other words, antecedents do not 
seem to be in similar interplay with each other as theories. This is supported by the results 
indicating that the level of bridging is considerably lower with antecedents than with theories. 
 
In any case, the most significant finding above all others is that the governance theories of 
the firm, particularly transaction cost economics and agency theory, seem to hold a frequent 
and central position as intellectual foundations to the M&A discourse. The focus in Chapter 3 
is thus turned to answering the second research question by investigating the contribution of 
the governance theories of the firm to the M&A discourse.  
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3 TOWARDS A GOVERNANCE PERSPECTIVE TO M&A 
 
The motivations of this study have focused it to the scrutiny of the M&A discourse in 
leading academic journals during the 1991-2001 period. The aim has been to investigate the 
intellectual roots of the M&A discourse and reach a metatheoretical depth of academic 
inquiry similar to the governance vs. competence debate (see Williamson 1999). As indicated 
in the Introduction, this study looks primarily at the theories underlying the M&A discourse 
and thus does not even attempt to be an extensive yet superficial analysis of the M&A 
literature itself. The primary aim is to look for the influence of governance theories on the 
M&A discourse, with a secondary aim of restructuring the various ‘schools’ of M&A 
thought. 
 
 
A conceptual analysis of M&A literature 
 
Appendix 1 analyzes the M&A discourse in general and focuses on the conceptual 
interlinkages between the M&A discourse and the theoretical structure of the governance 
approach. The conceptual analysis of the M&A literature begins with a general discussion of 
M&A as a driver of the ‘organization of economic activity’, one of the most profound 
concepts of the governance approach. M&A, as a management discourse, is related to the 
governance approach and references to the governance approach and possible linkages 
between the two fields are made along Appendix 1.  
 
Before moving on to partitioning the content of the discourse, the conceptual analysis is 
set up with an overview of the contemporary motivations for M&A research. There are two 
primary reasons, in addition to increased M&A activity in general, for the notable increase in 
academic M&A inputs. Firstly, there is the parallel development of a number of academic 
research streams including corporate finance, capital markets, corporate strategy, 
organization theory, corporate culture, human resource management. Secondly, and perhaps 
more importantly, a number of interesting M&A ‘sub-phenomena’ have taken place during 
the last few decades. These sub-phenomena, e.g. merger waves, increased M&A related 
corporate governance struggles, sustained demerger activity, disagreement in measuring 
M&A success and counterintuitive behavior of M&A professionals, have aroused 
considerable, particularly empirical research interest.  
 
The core part of Appendix 1 consists of a three-partite approach investigating: 
 
a) The conceptual boundaries of M&A, determined by the various 
definitions provided for M&A in the literature  
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b) The explanations and justifications put forward for the existence of 
M&A in the form of four schools of thought, namely the capital 
markets stream, the strategy stream, the humans and organizations 
stream and the process stream (along the lines of Haspeslagh and 
Jemison 1991)  
 
c) The internal organization of M&A, i.e. the processes that M&A 
creates within the involved organizations.  
 
The first part of the analysis discovers that the conceptual boundaries of M&A represent a 
broad spectrum highlighting e.g. organizational context, corporate identity, the difficulty of 
drawing the boundaries between mergers, acquisitions and takeovers, the disappearing and 
birth of legal entities, the negotiation aspect, learning, process, capital structure and so on. 
Beyond the differences in what the definitions emphasize, however, all of them more or less 
advocate the idea of a sequential change process related to the organization of economic 
activity. 
 
The second part discusses the various justifications and motivations put forth for the 
existence of M&A. The motivations are categorized, close to the lines of Haspeslagh and 
Jemison (1991) under the four headings of capital markets, strategy, humans and 
organizations and process. The capital markets stream is fundamentally represented by 
financial economics work around the key concepts of the creation and allocation of value 
through M&A. The analysis of the capital markets stream concentrates on presenting the key 
references, arguments and criticisms of the financially oriented research on M&A. The 
strategy stream of M&A emphasizes the case of the individual firms in question and thus 
lowers the level of the analysis from the wealth of the economy or financial markets to the 
firm-specific outcomes such as firm performance, value creation, synergy or competitive 
advantage. The development of the M&A theory in this research stream is found to have a 
natural linkage to the evolution and schools of corporate strategy literature. The humans and 
organizations stream focuses on the ‘people’ aspects of M&A, with strong contours reflecting 
human resource management, crisis management and cultural compatibility ideas. Much of 
the literature in this stream bases on seminal organization theory (e.g. Pfeffer and Salancik 
1978, Simon 1951, March and Simon 1958). Finally, the process stream argues that the M&A 
process itself can be an important determinant of the various M&A outcomes. Despite 
resemblance to the strategy stream, which sometimes leads to the process stream being 
subjected under a general strategic approach to M&A research (see e.g. Larsson and 
Finkelstein 1999, Weston et al. 2001), the process stream has its own distinct emphases. In 
brief, the process stream emphasizes the role of change in value creation and active change 
management in order to succeed in the M&A process.  
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The third and final part of Appendix 1 discusses the internal organization of M&A. 
Conceptually, the M&A processes are the ‘content’ of M&A and thus different views on 
what the M&A processes are correspond directly to the internal organization of M&A. 
Subsequently, the third part iterates the more pragmatic aspects of the process stream more 
carefully and overviews three general M&A process models. The literature emphasizing the 
role of post-merger processes in M&A success is also discussed briefly. A number of 
questions vis-à-vis the organization of economic activity arise in the analysis. Ultimately, the 
purpose of the whole conceptual analysis of the M&A literature is to identify relevant 
questions concerning the organization of economic activity and particular attention has been 
paid to identifying ramifications in the direction of the governance theories of the firm. These 
interlinkages are further analyzed and reorganized in Section 3.2.3 in order to make them a 
part of the substance of a general governance perspective to M&A.  
 
 
The theories of the firm from a governance perspective 
 
Appendix 2 approaches the potential relationships of the M&A and the governance theory 
of the firm discourses from another direction by conceptually analyzing the governance 
theories of the firm and their applicability to M&A research. Following a mapping of the 
research field at hand, an overview is given of the following key governance theories of the 
firm: 
 
a) Neoclassical theory of the firm 
b) The nexus of contracts perspective 
c) Agency theory 
d) The early incomplete contracting tradition 
e) Transaction cost economics and  
f) The theory of property rights 
 
The analysis of each theory includes the crystallization of the key message(s), together 
with a discussion of the origins and development paths of the theory. Special interest has 
been awarded to the type of contracting each theory assumes and the assumptions they hold 
about e.g. the contracting environment and the nature of economic actors. In addition to 
overviewing the governance theories in this way, the main aim of each passage is to identify 
ways in which they are associated, employed and linked to various aspects of M&A, together 
with an evaluation of current and further applicability. In other words, the key purpose of 
Appendix 2 is to both find existing contributions from the governance theories of the firm to 
the M&A discourse and evaluate the potential for further such research. These contributions, 
analyzed further in Section 3.2.3 onwards, constitute an integral part of the substance of a 
governance approach to M&A.  
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In addition to analyzing the contribution of each governance theory of the firm, Appendix 
2 also includes an analysis of the shortcomings and criticisms of the governance theories of 
the firm, as well as how these shortcomings reflect to the applicability of each theory to 
M&A discussion. The overview of the criticisms is three-fold. Firstly, generic criticisms that 
apply to the governance approach in general are outlined. Secondly, criticisms towards 
particular assumptions underlying some governance theories, e.g. assumptions regarding 
human nature, the incentives of economic actors and the nature of contracting, are presented. 
Finally, criticisms towards four individual governance theories of the firm51 are overviewed 
together with ramifications vis-à-vis the applicability to M&A in order to sharpen the 
analysis further. The analysis of the criticisms and shortcomings are utilized in Chapters 3 
and 4 to a large extent, given that the shortcomings of the governance theories on a number of 
levels have direct repercussions to the functionality, rigidity and credibility of a general 
governance approach to M&A.  
 
Appendix 2 is rounded off with a discussion of the relationship of the governance and 
competence perspectives to the theory of the firm (see Williamson 1999), orbiting around the 
important speculation of the potential contribution of the competence perspective to a holistic 
perspective to M&A. The discussion is initiated with an overview of the motivations for 
focusing the present study on the governance approach to the theory of the firm and for 
leaving other important management research streams that have provided and could provide 
insights to the analysis of M&A with significantly less regard. The main motivations are 
concluded to be a) the need to integrate governance theories, b) their insufficient application 
to managerial thinking in M&A, c) the perceived potential of the governance approach to be 
able to provide a multi-faceted and holistic approach to M&A as well as d) pragmatic reasons 
related to limited time and space available. 
 
Subsequently, an overview of the competence perspective, represented by most 
importantly by the resource based view of the firm, the knowledge based view of the firm, the 
capability perspective and the information centered approaches, is given. The overview offers 
a brief glance at the roots and fundamentals of the competence perspective, the perspective 
the competence literature presents to the boundaries of the firm discussion and some issues 
on the convergence and departures between the governance and competence perspectives. 
Finally, some attention is paid to the existing and potential inputs of the competence 
perspective to M&A analysis. Valuable inputs vis-à-vis the boundaries, existence as well as 
the internal organization of M&A are discovered. In short, the boundaries of M&A are 
defined, not surprisingly, according to the pattern of resource amalgamation, and M&A is 
                                                 
51 The specific criticisms for neoclassical economics theory of the firm, agency theory, transaction cost 
economics and property rights theory are presented. The nexus of contracts perspective and the incomplete 
contracting tradition are characterized by the nature of contracting to such an extent that a discussion of the 
criticism towards the contracting assumptions (preceding the discussion of criticisms directed at individual 
governance theories of the firm) is perceived to be sufficient. 
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found to imply not only resource amalgamation but also historical path amalgamation (i.e. a 
historical change in the life of legal entities). The primary justifications for the existence of 
M&A put forth by the competence literature deal with relatedness, the creation of synergies, 
resource and knowledge acquisition, organizational learning and innovation. What is more, 
the competence approach is also found to cross-fertilize and dialogue with the process stream 
of M&A research, and by and large have considerable merit in the analysis of the internal 
organization processes of M&A. 
 
Both Appendix 1 and Appendix 2 have summaries that overview what has been done and 
put the conceptual analyses into perspective with the present study. In general, the 
Appendices act as a prelude for both the bibliometric analysis in Chapter 2 and the strive 
towards a governance approach of M&A in this Chapter. A proper analysis of the states of 
the M&A and governance discourses makes the performing of a bibliometric analysis a 
productive exercise, since it facilitates reflecting the results of the bibliometric study to the 
understanding of the M&A discourse identified in the conceptual analyses. This, then again, 
facilitates identifying whether there has been a contribution to the existing body of 
knowledge (See 3.1.4 below). What is more, the conceptual analyses also provide valuable 
content to the holistic governance approach to M&A presented in this Chapter and are 
thereby absolutely vital for this study. 
 
The conceptual analyses yielded interesting insights into the nature of the M&A and 
governance theory of the firm discourses. The first general finding is that M&A literature, 
which is naturally in interplay with the factual M&A occurring in real life52, seems to 
effectively omit direct reference to and mention of the governance theories of the firm. 
Nevertheless, the issues tackled by the different definitions, explanations/justifications/ 
motives and internal processes of M&A raise some acute questions that seek answers from 
the realm of the governance theories of the firm. The second general finding is that even 
though there is a wealth of criticism and evident shortcomings, the governance theory of the 
firm literature has discussed, and on the whole also contributed on broad front, to both 
specific M&A related issues and the M&A discourse in general. There thus seems to be 
something of a disparity between the way governance theories of the firm have ‘offered help’ 
to discussing M&A and the way M&A literature has ‘accepted’ this help. 
 
Moreover, the above bibliometric analyses have produced some striking observations as 
well. It seems that governance theories of the firm, most importantly agency theory, 
transaction cost economics and the nexus of contracts perspective, assume a central role as 
                                                 
52 It could be suggested that the managerial nature of the M&A discourse may be one of the factors underlying 
the fact that M&A literature includes few mentions of any governance theory of the firm, or any theory in 
general. It seems that empirical and phenomenon-centered researchers who concentrate on M&A as are 
somewhat less keen on applying the findings of conceptual researchers than the firm theoretic conceptual 
researchers are on selecting M&A as a research phenomenon. 
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the intellectual underpinnings of the M&A discourse. On the other hand, other governance 
theories, e.g. the incomplete contracting perspective that interlinks with organization theory 
and has also influenced the development of strategic and human resource management 
oriented perspectives of M&A, has received conspicuously little attention. Secondly, and 
perhaps a lot less surprisingly, corporate strategy and corporate finance perspectives are also 
well represented as references to M&A articles. Furthermore, there seem to be clear linkages 
between certain theories and between theories and antecedents, which need to be investigated 
in more detail. The network analysis has indicated that different theories assume different 
roles in the structuring of the discourse, and that some theories that are frequently used to 
discuss M&A do not appear to be central to the discourse at all. 
 
On the basis of the above setting, the focus in Chapter 3 is turned to crystallizing the 
answer to the first research question and tackling the second research question of the present 
study by addressing the contribution of the governance theories of the firm to M&A. This is 
done by investigating the interplay of these two discourses and their intellectual origins in 
more detail and by pulling together and further elaborating the findings of the bibliometric 
and metatheoretical studies. Firstly, the dominant theoretical perspectives underlying the 
M&A discourse are identified and restructured using the results of the bibliometric study, and 
then compared to the conventional perception of the field presented in the conceptual study. 
On the basis of this comparison, a set of propositions insinuating key aspects of the current 
state of the M&A discourse are laid out.  
 
Secondly, the linkages between the two discourses are investigated. Linkages are 
identified at three levels of analysis, namely in the roots and traditions of the discourses, in 
the academic research dialogue and the views they share about practical M&A affairs, 
together with the knowledge gaps and shortcomings identified in literature and in this study. 
The motivation here is to explore whether there is, on the basis of the bibliometric and 
conceptual research performed, sufficient grounds for moving towards an integrative 
approach, i.e. something of a governance perspective to M&A. In other words, this section 
aims at the development of propositions insinuating key reasons for the current state of the 
M&A discourse as laid out before. 
 
Finally, the limitations considered, this Chapter discusses the possible features of such an 
integrative perspective. A bipartite theoretical construct with two interlinked avenues, an 
explanatory avenue and a prescriptive avenue, is proposed. The explanatory avenue operates 
at a deeper social scientific level, tracing back the existence of M&A by exploring the 
antecedents and theories of M&A, and linking them to the peculiarities of the institutional 
environment, social institutions and the characteristics of the contracting setting. It 
concentrates on discussing the paradigmatic linkages, linkages in tradition and linking 
theories. Its implications are propositions for future avenues of explanatory governance 
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research based on the identified knowledge gaps, shortcomings and limitations of the current 
research about M&A.  
 
The prescriptive avenue focuses on how M&A deals are made and managed, on the 
processual nature of pragmatic M&A management and how governance thinking can be 
applied to this setting. This research concentrates on the discussion of governance aspects of 
strategy-making and corporate finance as well as on developing managerial frames of 
reference that utilize the governance point of view. It concentrates on discussing the 
applicability of the theories of the firm, with considerable attention paid to the criticism on 
the lack and limits of applying governance theories of the firm, and their relationship to 
strategy and finance as well as building managerial reference frames and mindsets in general.  
 
As a part of the prescriptive avenue, propositions about potential forums and applications 
based on a ‘governance perspective on M&A’ are made. The forums include pragmatic 
decision-making areas as corporate governance, M&A decision-making, consulting, 
corporate strategy formulation, human resource management and development and 
marketing. The ‘tools’ designed for operating in these forums deal with such rather pragmatic 
issues as board activities, investment banking relationships, corporate communication via 
reference frames, value chain and diversification guidelines, employee share ownership plans 
(ESOPs) as well as distribution channels selection and branding.  
 
 
3.1 Dominant perspectives in M&A research 
 
A major finding of the bibliometric study in Chapter 2 is that even though the study of 
M&A is multidisciplinary to the extent that it could be argued to be fragmented and 
disjointed, a fairly limited number of concepts and theories consistently appear at the core of 
the body of research. Here, the dominant perspectives vis-à-vis key theories, linking theories 
and key antecedents are given, together with references to key contributors and seminal 
publications.  
 
 
3.1.1 Identification, overview and propositions of key theories in M&A research 
 
On the basis of the bibliometric and conceptual research results, M&A seems to prevail 
first and foremost as a management discourse. From this perspective, it is hardly surprising 
that the dominant strategy paradigms of the 1980s and 1990s, i.e. competitive strategy (most 
importantly Porter 1980, 1985, 1987, 1996, Porter and Fuller 1986, Besanko et al. 1990) and 
resource-based strategy (whose antecedents include Penrose 1959, Rumelt 1974, Nelson and 
Winter 1982 and major contributions include e.g. Hamel and Prahalad 1990, 1996, Singh and 
Montgomery 1987, Teece 1982, Barney 1988, Rumelt, Schendel and Teece 1994 and many 
others), play a major role also in the M&A discourse.  
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It seems evident, however, that M&A is not a pure strategy topic. The agglomeration of 
two economic entities, sometimes of ones the size of small countries, is a major driver of the 
organization of economic activity. The size and nature of M&A has made it a fruitful 
phenomenon for academic investigation using a richer array of theoretical perspectives.  
 
The large size and increasing number of M&A transactions has per se pegged it an 
interesting subject for researchers with an industrial economics orientation. M&A is 
quantifiable in terms of both its market agglomeration and price level impacts, thus making it 
an interesting subject for studies focusing on economic efficiency and anticompetitive 
concerns. Few management research topics can be subjected to rigorous micro- as well as 
macroeconomic models in the manner of M&A. The analysis of the wealth and efficiency 
outcomes of mergers, focusing rather naturally on antitrust considerations, is an example of 
such a research area. It is rather illuminating that Gregory Werden tops the most-published 
first author list53, given that his research is concentrated on the quantitative analysis of 
welfare effects and antitrust related issues (See e.g. Werden 1996, Werden and Hay 1993). 
With the rise of the quantitative-empirical methodological orientation in the 1980s, such 
quantifiable research avenues are bound to fare well in bibliometric analyses. 
 
Then again, M&A transactions require extensive financial juggling and involve finance to 
the extent that there seems to be a rather separate field of M&A research performed by 
finance researchers. The finance stream incorporates, partly as separate streams and partly as 
interlinked fields, two perspectives, namely the capital markets perspective and the corporate 
finance perspective. The former, a more traditional perspective, employs capital market 
theory to analyze e.g. M&A success, the role of globalizing capital markets in the formation 
of cross-border M&As, the use of capital markets instruments (e.g. different bonds, medium 
term notes, asset backed securities, commercial papers, certificates of deposit, bankers 
acceptances, repurchase agreements) in performing as well as preventing M&A transactions 
and so on.  
 
The research on anti-M&A maneuvers is specifically where the capital markets school 
most interlinks with the latter perspective, corporate finance. Anti-M&A provisions involve 
both capital markets tools as well as pure corporate finance issues. The corporate finance 
perspective, which, according to the results of this study, actually appears to be the dominant 
of the two, concentrates on the application of corporate finance tools, and related theories like 
option pricing theory or arbitrage pricing theory, that are available for performing the M&A 
transaction and the financial restructuring of the companies. Out of all topics highly related to 
                                                 
53 As stated in the results, there is, however, no clearly dominant M&A author in the 1990s. Gregory Werden, 
who tops the most-published first author list has only six articles and seven authors have four or five first 
authored articles.  
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corporate strategy discourse, M&A is perhaps among the ones involving most finance content 
and, consequently, rigorous quantitative modeling.  
 
A peculiar similarity of both the industrial organization and the financial approaches is 
that, according to the results of the bibliometric study, they do not assume central positions in 
the discourse despite the fact that they appear frequently in journal articles. The quantitative 
nature of the research using either of these perspectives might be an underlying reason. 
Quantitative analysis has two shortcomings, which hinder cross-fertilization between 
theoretical avenues. Firstly, quantitative research usually necessitates a close demarcation of 
the research topic, which hampers the applicability of their results. Paired with tight research 
settings are usually strict sets of assumptions that cannot be applied or accepted in qualitative 
research. Furthermore, quantitative M&A research employing microeconomic or finance 
theories does not necessarily yield, on the one hand, explicable and, on the other hand, 
intellectually tempting results to e.g. organization or strategy researchers. Here, the depth of 
familiarity about finance or industrial organization theories required to understand the 
research results inhibits the possibility of cross-fertilizing research, as does the lack of 
common terminology and shared research foci. 
 
Where cross-fertilizing research between corporate strategy and corporate finance 
literature has most occurred is in the realm of institutional and organizational economics, 
which, in the results of this study, is elevated as a source of key theoretical perspectives in 
M&A in the form of the governance theories of the firm. Most importantly agency theory, but 
also transaction economics, tops most lists in the bibliometric study. Both of these theoretical 
approaches (see e.g. the so-called positivist agency theory, see e.g. Eisenhardt 1989, Fama 
1980, Fama and Jensen 1983 and, on the other hand, Williamson 1985) as well as their 
quantitative applications (see e.g. Servaes and Zenner 1996, Schnitzer 1996 for transaction 
economics applications and Amihud and Lev 1981 for an example of a quantitative study 
using agency theory) incorporate quantitative analyses.  
 
Michael Jensen’s cross-fertilizing research in finance and corporate governance is an 
example of the type of research that receives most attention. This is natural, since not only is 
the potential audience consisting of scholars in various disciplines much broader than for 
intra-disciplinary oriented research, but the findings have also been very fruitful. Arguably, 
M&A is, in general, a fragmented research area (Haspeslagh and Jemison 1991, Schweiger 
and Walsh 1990) and the fragmentation has led to the erection of barriers to the development 
of integrative or cross-disciplinary research (Larsson and Finkelstein 1999). Since Jensen 
(1976), few have really attempted it (most prominent attempts include Haspeslagh and 
Jemison 1991, Buono and Bowditch 1989, Hunt 1990, Jemison 1987, Larsson and Finkelstein 
1999). 
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Despite these integrative efforts, performing research across the disciplinary boundaries of 
management and organizational behavior research is not very popular. As mentioned above, 
some seminal organization theory authors and their works (e.g. March and Simon 1958, 
Argyris and Schön 1978, Perrow 1972) or authors discussing the cultural aspects of M&A 
(e.g. Hofstede 1980, 1991, Sales and Mirvis 1985, Buono, Bowditch and Lewis 1985, Buono 
and Bowditch 1989) do not appear high up in the citation analyses. Interdisciplinary research 
utilizing these theory streams, however, has increased remarkably during the 1990s, to the 
extent that the culture and HRM theories assumes a relatively high position in the theory 
frequency ranking of the network analysis in Chapter 2, and organization theory and behavior 
is located right after them.  
 
The incomplete contracting perspective (e.g. Simon 1951, Coase 1937, 1960) that 
underlies much of organization theory and has influenced the development of strategic and 
human resource management oriented perspectives of M&A, has also received conspicuously 
little attention. Furthermore, property rights theory, either traditional (e.g. Coase 1960, 
Alchian and Demsetz 1972 and the Austrian school, see e.g. Foss 1994) or new (e.g. Hart 
1990, Grossman and Hart 1986, Hart and Moore 1990), does not appear as a very prominent 
theoretical underpinning of M&A in the bibliometric analysis.  
 
If agency theory and transaction cost economics represent such prominent foundations of 
the M&A discourse, why haven’t the incomplete contracting and property rights perspectives, 
or neoclassical economics theory of the firm for that matter, assumed equally important 
positions?  
 
Arguably, neoclassical economics enjoyed a wealth of attention all through the 1970s and 
1980s and the tradition of researching M&A from an economics perspective is by no means 
dead. Evidence of this are the high rankings of economists and industrial organization authors 
in the author and text citation analyses and the appearance of numerous economics journals 
close to the top of the citation outlet pattern. Equally, industrial organization was identified as 
one of the most prominent theories used in the 567 journal articles, which also showed the 
low appreciation of neoclassical economics in the 1990s. Three concerns should be raised. 
Firstly, it seems evident that time has driven past the neoclassical economics of e.g. Arrow 
(Arrow 1951, Arrow and Debreu 1954) and microeconomics-related industrial organization 
research has inherited its position in the monopoly power, market efficiency and wealth 
related discussions. Secondly, the increasing attention on finance research can be argued to 
have provided a further backbone for economics-minded M&A researchers54. Finally, as the 
network centrality analysis findings indicate, economics in general and industrial 
                                                 
54 This has happened to the extent that when asked what their disciplinary background is, many especially US 
finance professors would answer “economics”. I thank professor Henrikki Tikkanen for providing this valuable 
comment on the basis of his dialogue with top MIT, Harvard Business School and Harvard University finance 
professors. 
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organization in particular have, much in the same manner as finance, become segregated due 
to their theoretical narrowness and quantitative empirical research orientations, which hinder 
the possibility for cross-fertilizing research.  
 
The incomplete contracting tradition pioneered by Ronald Coase and Herbert Simon owes 
much of its attention to the concepts of bounded rationality and moral hazard (Simon 1951, 
Cyert and March 1963). Even though bounded rationality was initially systematically applied 
to theorizing, the use of bounded rationality has declined (see Foss 2001a, Foss 2001b, Foss 
2001c). The reasons for this are numerous. One of the most prominent explanations is that 
bounded rationality is an imprecise concept, which has, particularly in later contract theory 
(Hart 1990) been substituted by information asymmetry, which is a precise, quantifiable 
construct. Additionally, as Foss (2001a) mentions, we have actually never been given a 
precise definition of what bounded rationality is. Bounded rationality is most often seen as a 
vague environmental assumption, which sets limits to the contracting situation but which 
cannot be quantified and is thus not operationalizable. Foss (2001a) also mentions that 
bounded rationality is much cited but little used. In M&A, however, it is not even much cited. 
This is surely rooted in the fact that organization theory and behavior literature is poorly 
represented in the M&A articles analyzed in Chapter 2. As the analysis focuses more and 
more tightly on the a specific issue such as M&A or its particular forms, bounded rationality 
is left increasingly as a background assumption that is introduced only to help to explain 
other more central concepts such as contractual incompleteness and organizational routines 
(Foss 2001a, p. 1), if even they are aired.  
 
The theory of property rights consists of a number of strands that are somewhat discrete in 
time and philosophical orientation, which makes it sometimes difficult to analyze them as a 
meaningful whole. At least three strands, namely the Austrian (Hayek 1937, 1945, Kirzner 
1973), the traditional (Coase 1960, Alchian 1965, Demsetz 1964, Alchian and Demsetz 1972, 
for an overview see Furubotn and Pejovich 1972) and the new property rights (Barzel 1997, 
Hart 1995, North 1990, Eggertson 1990, Hart and Moore 1990, Grossman and Hart 1986), 
can be distinguished55. Despite their differences, these strands can be argued to suffer from 
the same limitations, namely an abstract nature, omission of soft sides of human interaction 
and organizational realities such as power and capabilities (Rajan and Zingales 1998), 
cooperation and corporate culture (Kreps 1990) as well as teams and the inalienability of 
human capital (Klein 1988). These limitations might be responsible for the relative lack of 
attention in the M&A discourse.  
 
The peril of the property rights theory is that it offers a simplistic, quasi-economic 
justification theory to back up an ownership-centered approach, which might withdraw high-
level attention away from the organization(s) as such (Foss and Foss 2000). Property rights 
                                                 
55 For a further elaboration, see Appendix 2. 
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theorists unequivocally deny the need for bounded rationality as a primary behavioral 
assumption (Hart 1990) and thereby lose the explanatory power of ex post contractual 
reasoning. In other words, property rights theory still omits the importance of ex post 
opportunistic behavior in contracting. Consequently, new property rights theorists overlook 
the importance of the employment relationship as well as softer aspects of the organization 
like power, capabilities and culture (Rajan and Zingales 1998). Another serious (arguably 
intentional, cf. Hart 1989) omission is the fact that new property rights theory fails to 
incorporate other aspects of the organization beyond ownership, e.g. structure and 
communication as independent determinants of the efficient contracting setting. Property 
rights theory simply mitigates the importance of internal processes, elevating the impact of 
ownership on efficiency far beyond e.g. organizational structures and information channels. 
Considering this, it is hardly surprising that e.g. the resource-based view and the process 
approach in M&A, which explicitly address the details of internal organization in M&A, have 
absorbed much of the attention and left property rights theory as an underlying philosophy. 
Lately, there have been attempts to broaden the theoretical shoulders of the property rights 
approach, addressing e.g. power and capabilities (Rajan and Zingales 1998), cooperation and 
corporate culture (Kreps 1990), learning (Foss and Foss 2000) as well as teams and the 
inalienability of human capital (Klein 1988), but explicit linkages to M&A or its shareholder 
value considerations still seem to be lacking. Furthermore, the inability to tackle ex post 
opportunistic behavior weakens the property rights perspective in analyzing M&A, where e.g. 
target company management have considerable undermining opportunities after the deal has 
been struck. 
  
Beyond the presented reasons for the relatively weak positions of neoclassical economics, 
the incomplete contracting tradition and property rights theory, they seem to have one aspect 
in common that could be seen as a major obstacle to their popularity in M&A, or 
pragmatically oriented management research in general. Namely, all of them have been 
pegged inapplicable. Neoclassical economics suffers from its tight, unrealistic assumptions, 
bounded rationality suffers from vagueness and the lack of a working definition and property 
rights theories are pegged more as an underlying capitalist philosophy than operable theories 
of the firm (Mueller 1995, Williamson 1975, Foss and Foss 2000, cf. Hart 1989). All of these 
reduce their applicability to concrete real-life M&A problems. 
 
Despite the fact that the transaction cost economics of Williamson (see e.g. Williamson 
1975, 1985) has received considerable attention as an underlying theory to the M&A 
discourse, the lack of applicability criticism can be applied to it as well. Moreover, Ghoshal 
and Moran (1996, p. 13) argue that prescriptions drawn from transaction cost economics are 
likely to be not only wrong but also dangerous because of the assumptions and market 
economy logic on which it is grounded. These assumptions include the opportunistic human 
nature, i.e. the Macchiavellian man, and the requirement for efficiency and success (Ghoshal 
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and Moran 1996, p. 14)56.  A similar message about the use of transaction cost economics in 
the academia is provided by the network centrality analysis in Chapter 2, which indicates that 
transaction cost economics, as a theory, is relatively more central to the discourse network 
than its explicit frequency of appearance would designate. The lack of applicability shows in 
the low number of articles, which hold transaction cost economics as a primary theoretical 
reference. Namely, transaction cost economics only ranks 7th in the theory network centrality 
analysis. This is not to say that transaction cost economics is unimportant, but only that it 
assumes a different role as a linking theory. Its centrality, not to mention the bridging ability, 
results (see Section 3.1.2 below) are reinforced by the large number of articles which include 
transaction cost economics as one of many theoretical perspectives.  
 
Arguably, the M&A discourse is a phenomenon-centered discourse. Consequently, much 
of the literature automatically rejects vague, imprecise and inapplicable concepts and 
theories, which cannot be operationalized to the benefit of the analysis. As stated above, the 
more specific the phenomenon under investigation, the more seldom higher-level contractual 
assumptions (e.g. bounded rationality), underlying property rights philosophy or specific 
economic models with tight assumptions and narrow foci are incorporated in the analysis. 
While particularly agency theory and partly also transaction cost economics have succeeded 
at formulating acute points which can be applied to real-life phenomena, departing from the 
‘organizational economic’ and descending to the ’organizational’ level of analysis, other 
governance theories of the firm have remained rather abstract. This is visible in the fact that 
only some relationships between particular forms of M&A and particular governance theories 
can be made (e.g. transaction cost economics vs. vertical integration, agency theory vs. 
hostile takeovers and risk-reducing diversifying M&A).  
 
Propositions related to key theories in M&A 
 
Proposition 1: M&A is still first and foremost a management discourse, where 
competitive and resource based strategy paradigms play a significant role. 
 
Proposition 2: The investigation of M&A incorporates a rich array of disciplinary 
orientations, giving reason to seek for a common denominator between the different 
approaches, i.e. the concept of the organization of economic activity. 
 
Proposition 3a: M&A has received, for a management research topic, exceptional 
amounts of attention in economics, finance and industrial organization research. One major 
explanation for this is that M&A can be subjected to nomothetical and quantitative research 
approaches practiced within these fields. 
                                                 
56 For a further analysis of the criticism on transaction cost economics, as well as other governance theories of 
the firm and their application to M&A, see Section 3.3.3 and Section 7.1.7 in Appendix 2. 
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Proposition 3b: The nomothetic/quantitative methodological orientation in M&A research 
has segregated finance, economics and industrial organization research as research fields 
separate from managerial and organizational approaches.  
 
Proposition 3c: The segregation of research approaches has played a significant part in 
hampering interdisciplinary research. Nevertheless, the interdisciplinary research that has 
been published has received considerable attention and thus performing it more should be 
encouraged. 
 
Proposition 4: Finance oriented M&A research has two distinct streams, corporate finance 
and capital markets, of which the prior actually seems somewhat more dominant.  
 
Proposition 5: The governance theories of the firm, particularly agency theory and 
transaction cost economics, are primary and fundamental theoretical perspectives 
underpinning the M&A discourse. 
 
Proposition 6a: Neoclassical economics, early incomplete contracting literature and 
property rights theory have not been as valuable in the M&A discourse. They seem to share 
the problem of inapplicability and inoperationalizability.   
 
Proposition 6b: Industrial organization research has overtaken neoclassical economics, 
constrained by rigorous assumptions, in the M&A discourse as the primary theoretical basis 
for analyzing efficiency, wealth and market power effects. 
 
Proposition 6c: The incomplete contracting perspective, as such, has not been useful in 
M&A research due to general vagueness and a lack of a precise definition for the key term 
‘bounded rationality’. 
 
Proposition 6d: Property rights literature omits organizational issues, e.g. M&A processes. 
Additionally, the intuitively compelling linkage between property rights ideology and 
shareholder value ideology has not been established in the discourse. Thus, despite apparent 
potential, property rights theory remains an abstract ‘quasi-philosophy’ in M&A.  
 
 
3.1.2 Identification, overview and propositions of linking theories in M&A research 
 
The bibliometric study results presented in Chapter 2 incorporate an analysis of the 
Betweenness centrality of the various theories used in the M&A discourse. In general high 
Betweenness centrality and bridging ability of a member in a theory network indicate high 
cross-fertilizing ability (Wassermann and Faust 1993, Scott 1992). In other studies, high 
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Betweenness centrality has been assimilated especially with a theory’s unleashed potential to 
develop the discourse in which it is able link other theories together (Oliver and Ebers 1998). 
Hence, such theories with high Betweenness are called ‘linking theories’ in the context of this 
study. 
 
The Betweenness centrality results of the network analysis reveal up to five theories, 
which could assume the role of linking theories within the field, most importantly transaction 
cost economics, resource dependence and political power, but also theories of hybrid 
organization forms (alliances, networks, joint ventures, clans) and property rights theory. Of 
these five, resource dependence (e.g. Pfeffer and Salancik 1978) and transaction cost 
economics (e.g. Williamson 1975, 1985) have also been identified as key linking theories in a 
bibliometric analysis of the field of network research (Oliver and Ebers 1998, p. 566). 
 
Transaction cost economics, with its explicit emphasis on discussing the boundaries of the 
firm, is a theoretical stream, which, despite the aforementioned difficulties of applying it to 
managerial reality or decision-making, is appealing to many more theoretical and academic 
exercises and applications. The concept of a (quantifiable) transaction cost (Williamson 
1967), the markets-hierarchies (Williamson 1975) and markets-hybrids-hierarchies 
(Williamson 1985) dicho-/trichotomies, the further elaboration of ex ante and ex post 
governance (Williamson 1975), the formalization of the make-or-buy decision (Williamson 
1975) and the recent comparison and contrasting of the governance and competence 
perspectives (Williamson 1999), to mention a few, are useful for finance, management, 
business, law and economics authors alike.  
 
The linking role of dependence theory is equally understandable. Dependence theory 
explicitly addresses M&A, or the total absorption of a firm through acquisition or merger 
(Pfeffer and Salancik 1978, Chapter 6) as response to interdependence between firms. Pfeffer 
and Salancik (1978) spurred a wealth of literature providing empirical evidence to mergers of 
organizations that had resource interdependence, and thus underpin much of the strategy 
studies on synergies and relatedness. Resource dependence theory, advocating that M&A can 
often be a strategy for stability and not so much for profitability, also provides alternative 
explanations to M&A success studies and is definitely also a source for organizational 
behavior, corporate governance and human resource management-oriented M&A articles. It 
is thus hardly surprising that resource dependency theory, which is very seldom identified as 
a core theory in M&A articles (i.e. it assumed a low ranking in the theory frequencies), 
enjoys high citation statistics (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978 ranks 4th in the temporally adjusted 
most-cited text analysis) and an apparent role as a linking theory. This profile might be 
something resource dependence and transaction cost economics apparently have in common 
in a number of management discourses (cf. Oliver and Ebers 1998). 
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The role of political power as a linking theory is, again, similar. Much of what has been 
said about resource dependence in this context applies to political power as well. Pfeffer’s 
(1992) book "Managing with Power: Power and Influence in Organizations" derives on 
resource dependence and the same human resource management principles. It discusses, 
among other issues, personal networking, language, pragmatic relationships, symbolic action, 
conflict, trust and reliance, which e.g. provide an interesting alternative to agency theory in 
the M&A related corporate governance discussions. The more generic discussions of the role 
of power in organizations (see e.g. Zald 1990a, 1990b) act as linking theories between human 
resource, sociology, management, business, social psychology and organizational behavior 
literature.  
 
It is hardly surprising that theories of hybrid organization forms, e.g. networks, alliances, 
joint ventures and clans, are used as linking theories too. M&A and the hybrid literature share 
a common theme in the reorganization of economic activity in the sense that hybrid 
organization forms can be seen as alternative to M&A57. As with M&A, research on hybrid 
organization forms is often phenomenon, and not theory, centered. Since many of the same 
theoretical analyses that can be employed to analyze M&A can also be employed to analyze 
hybrid organization modes, it is only natural that the theories of hybrids are able to link 
between them. To pick an example, Steensma and Corley (2000) discuss the performance of 
technology-sourcing partnerships and focus on the interaction between partner 
interdependence and technology attributes. Here, the theory of alliance relationships (e.g. 
Contractor & Lorange 1988, Mowery et al 1996, Robertson and Gatignon 1998, Hagedoorn 
and Narula 1996), acts as a comfortable bridge between transaction cost economics 
(Williamson 1985), the resource-based view (e.g. Barney 1991, Grant 1996, Peteraf 1993 and 
Wernerfelt 1984), the knowledge-based view (Kogut & Zander 1992, 1996) and even 
neoclassical theory of the firm (Arrow 1962). Similarly, relationship and network literature 
(see e.g. Håkansson 1989, Håkansson and Snehota 1995) is keen on bridging between 
organization theory, transaction cost economics and so on. Very few articles, then again, take 
the theory of hybrids, if there even is one, as the sole theoretical basis, which partly explains 
a development of roles similar to transaction cost economics, resource dependence and 
political power. 
 
The last, and perhaps the most problematic, is the role of property rights theory of the firm 
as a linking theory in the M&A discourse. One key finding in the bibliometric study is that 
neither traditional property rights literature (Coase 1960, Alchian and Demsetz 1972, Jensen 
and Meckling 1979, Furubotn and Pejovich 1972), the so-called new property rights theory 
(e.g. Hart 1990, Grossman and Hart 1986, Hart and Moore 1990) nor the traditional, abstract 
and very property rights minded Austrian Economics (e.g. Hayek 1937, 1945, Kirzner 1973, 
                                                 
57 This does not imply that they cannot be seen as complementary. M&A can, for example, occur as a natural 
part of a network's evolution.  
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Foss 1997, Foss and Foss 2000) appear as important or central in the bibliometric analysis. 
An intuitive linkage between the key (also M&A related) shareholder value rationales and 
property rights thinking exists, but this has not realized to a significant extent in research. The 
shareholder value linkage, however, might give property rights a number of mentions, not as 
a primary and focal theory, but as a linking theory between management, law, finance and 
some industrial organization-related theories.  
 
The case of property rights theory raises a more general observation related to linking 
theories, i.e. ones with high Betweenness centrality in the network analysis results. High 
betweenness centrality can be interpreted both as a weakness or a strength. On the one hand, 
these theories seemingly attract and link complementary research and can thus foster dialogue 
among otherwise often unconnected perspectives as seen above. On the other hand, it could 
be argued that the theories play a linking role because they are not fully developed to be 
applied directly to the research area at hand but, as a part of the unresolved paradigmatic 
discussions around the many theories attempting to establish a ‘theory of M&A’, are drawn 
in to this arena. The linking theory role can, however, be regarded also as useful for 
developing further the entire discourse and subsequently be interpreted as a sign that M&A 
research using the linking theories as key theoretical foci could possibly have much to offer. 
This should be acknowledged in future research aspirations58.  
 
Propositions related to linking theories in M&A 
 
Proposition 7:Transaction cost economics is a primary linking theory in M&A, primarily 
due to ground-breaking conceptual innovations like the transaction cost, the markets-hybrids-
hierarchies dichotomy, ex ante and ex post governance, the formal make-or-buy setting and 
the governance vs. competence debate. 
 
Proposition 8: Resource dependence theory, with its fundamental intellectual input to the 
study of synergy and relatedness, acts as a key linking theory in M&A discourse, especially 
given the key role of corporate strategy theories. 
 
Proposition 9: Political power, too, is a linking theory in the M&A discourse, most 
importantly because it discusses softer aspects in a way that is accessible to a wide array of 
disciplines. 
 
Proposition 10: M&A literature and hybrid organization literature share much, e.g. the 
common theme of the reorganization of economic activity and the phenomenon, not theory, 
centered research orientations. Since the same theoretical approaches are used to scrutinize 
both, the are many links between hybrid organization form and M&A literatures.  
                                                 
58 For an elaboration of the future research avenues, see Section 3.3.4 below 
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Proposition 11: The role as a linking theory can be interpreted as a sign of either 
weakness, signifying inability to act as a central theoretical focus, or strength, signifying 
potential for developing further the entire M&A discourse. 
 
 
3.1.3 Identification, overview and propositions of antecedents in M&A research 
 
An equally interesting issue as the theories and linking theories of the M&A discourse are 
the research subjects and foci, i.e. the antecedents to performing M&A research in the first 
place. As discussed above, this study analyzes the antecedents for performing M&A research. 
M&A research can just as well be motivated by an actual reason to perform M&A 
(antecedent to M&A occurring) as well as a number of other issues, e.g. the outcome of 
M&A project, a particularly interesting methodology and so on. Attention here is thus turned 
to which antecedents have motivated M&A research most, together with a brief speculation 
of how and why this is the case.  
 
Clearly the most common antecedent in the M&A discourse deals with firm performance 
(the ‘productivity, profit and performance’ antecedent). While this is partly due to the fact 
that this antecedent category is very broad given that it engulfs productivity, profit and other 
performance measures, it is hardly surprising that it is this category that assumes priority. 
One reason is surely that it renders itself to a number of theoretical research angles. 
Productivity, profit and/or performance can be used as a measure just as well in economics 
and finance as it can be used in management and international business research, and 
quantitative measures are readily available from profit and loss statements, company 
databases, internal accounting systems, industry level statistics etc. Furthermore, this 
category can refer to a number of different kinds of performance, e.g. financial performance, 
market share performance, growth performance, product-level performance and industry 
performance just to mention a few. It is important to note that shareholder value performance 
is excluded from this category given that it is dangerous to make an explicit link between 
firm performance and share price performance due to the presence of a number of exogenous 
factors determining the share price of a company. In some sense, it is comforting and 
intuitively reasonable that firm performance still prevails at the top of the antecedents list. 
 
The second most common antecedent is shareholder value, whose role in the M&A 
discourse is thereby somewhat more accentuated than in management research in general. A 
typical M&A shareholder value study deals with an event study measuring the stock market 
reaction to a diversifying merger, the shareholder value effect of M&A in general or the 
impact of cross-border technology-intensive acquisitions on high-tech companies share 
performance. Much like the performance measures, also shareholder value is a common 
measure in various types of management research, and it also renders itself to analyses using 
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nearly any theoretical angle. As an example, there are 13 theoretical angles that include six or 
more studies focusing on shareholder value outcomes in the bibliometric study of the M&A 
articles59. Arguably, shareholder value research has assumed such a principal role in the 
M&A discourse that it has focused M&A research as a whole more to the study of publicly 
listed companies whose share price changes can be observed objectively.  
 
After these two rather generic antecedents of management research, a group of rather 
M&A-specific antecedents emerge. The third most common antecedent, still a rather generic 
one, is goal conflict and congruence. The prominent role of agency theoretic research 
perspectives is obviously partly responsible for its appearance so close to the top. Goal 
conflict and congruence is a major issue in M&A articles dealing with hostile takeovers, CEO 
retention, employee-management relations, corporate governance and board mechanisms as 
well as a remarkable share of the diversification-oriented literature, starting with Amihud and 
Lev’s (1981) seminal article.  
 
Among the next most common antecedents are antitrust, monopoly and cartels, 
diversification and conglomerates, uncertainty and change, geographical expansion and 
market entry as well as consolidation and merger waves. These are apparently M&A related 
topics whose relative dominance over some more generic research antecedents (e.g. 
competitive advantage, organizational learning, growth, R&D and innovation) can be easily 
understood. In short, anticompetitive concerns are central foci of the extensive economics-
oriented M&A literature, M&A is a prime vehicle of conglomeration, post-merger process 
studies often focus on the organizational trauma, uncertainty and change, acquisitions are a 
clear and prominent market entry mechanism and merger and consolidation waves are a 
traditional object of enquiry as such60.  
 
The slightly lower ranking of hostile takeover protection and resistance as an antecedent, 
then again, is partly explained by the exclusion of pure takeover articles, i.e. ones that do not 
mention either mergers or acquisitions, from the M&A article population in the article 
selection phase of this study. However, there are two antecedents whose particularly low 
ranking demand some further attention. Firstly, it seems that despite a significant increase in 
the level of demerger activity in 1980s and 1990s (Kirchmaier 2001) and the resource-based 
view acts as a convenient theoretical backbone for corporate refocusing literature, the 
attention these related perspectives enjoy in the 1990s M&A discourse is rather limited. It 
                                                 
59 This is a diverse list including theories of hybrid organization modes, legal and institutional frameworks, 
culture and HRM theories, resource based and competitive strategy, the knowledge based view, 
internationalisation, organizational behavior, capital markets, corporate finance, agency, transaction cost 
economics and property rights. 
60 One comment about the consolidation and merger wave antecedent has to be made. The articles in the 1990s, 
perhaps surprisingly, deal much more with industry level merger waves and consolidation than with general 
merger waves. Considerable attention has been paid to e.g. the consolidation of the US hospital and retail 
banking industries as well as the industry-specific merger waves caused by European integration. 
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seems that despite speculation, demerger-type of activities are still the exception and have not 
become the rule (Neary and O’Sullivan 1999). Secondly, despite a) the considerable attention 
in trade journals and the media and b) earning a position as one of the established hypotheses 
of especially takeover activity but also M&A in general (Roll 1986), managerial hubris and 
empire-building have not been central to many articles in core academic journals. The 
appearance of Roll’s 1986 seminal article high up in the citation analyses demonstrates that 
the hubris explanation is often-mentioned in M&A literature, but has not enjoyed wide and 
central attention in empirical M&A research. 
 
A further interesting issue about the antecedents and the role they assume in the M&A 
deals with the configurations or clusters in which they appear. As demonstrated in section 
2.3.4, the clusters are pointed out by the theory-antecedent co-occurrence analysis. The most 
obvious cluster consists of agency theoretic issues involving inter-stakeholder group issues 
and differing incentives. The goal conflict and congruence antecedents co-exist often with 
commitment, hubris and empire-building as well as hostile takeover protection and 
resistance. A second cluster consists of business objectives in the sense that it consists of the 
three easily combinable and comprehensible M&A issues of performance (the productivity, 
profit and performance antecedent), growth and geographical expansion and market entry. 
Thirdly, a cluster concentrating on organizational learning in the context of e.g. the 
introduction of new technology exists, given that organizational learning, R&D and 
innovation and immaterial resources combine heavily. Finally, two less well-demarcated 
clusters consisting of a) central strategy related antecedents (competitive advantage and 
synergy, productivity, profit and performance, diversification and conglomerates and 
shareholder value) and b) efficiency- and economic-minded industrial organization 
antecedents (antitrust, monopolies and cartels, wealth and economic efficiency and 
consolidation wave) exist, even though these two are not particularly conspicuous. 
 
Propositions related to key antecedents in M&A 
 
Proposition 12: Productivity, profit and performance is the most common antecedent 
given that it engulfs all studies dealing with basic firm-level success and incorporates a wide 
array of quantitative and qualitative measures. 
 
Proposition 13: Shareholder value is the second most popular antecedent in M&A 
research, because it is easily quantifiable, has been employed from numerous theoretical 
perspectives and M&A research concentrates on publicly listed companies. 
 
Proposition 14: Among the M&A research antecedents, the generic management research 
antecedents such as firm performance, shareholder value and goal congruence outweigh 
antecedents specific to the M&A discourse such as antitrust, market power, 
diversification/conglomeration, takeover resistance and merger waves.  
  114 
 
Proposition 15: Five M&A research antecedents appear in conspicuous clusters, which 
can be characterized as: 
a) ‘Stakeholder incentives’ cluster 
b) ‘Business objectives’ cluster 
c) ‘Organizational learning’ cluster 
d) ‘Strategy antecedent’ cluster (less prominent) 
e) ‘Efficiency and economics’ cluster (less prominent) 
 
 
3.1.4 Towards a new picture of the M&A discourse 
 
As briefly discussed in the summary of the bibliometric findings in Section 2.3.5, the 
research perspectives on M&A identified in the bibliometric analyses of Chapter 2 follow 
rather discrete research streams, which fall reasonably well in line with pre-existing 
categorizations of M&A research into schools of thought, one of which is the division into 
the capital markets school, the strategy stream, the organizational behavior school and the 
process school (Haspeslagh and Jemison 1991). Some research streams, however, seem to be 
surprisingly poorly represented in the bibliometric results and some of the schools proposed 
in earlier studies seem to consist of various separate streams.  
 
In order to determine what potential novelties the bibliometric study is able to reveal 
concerning the structuring of the M&A discourse, the differences between the bibliometric 
findings and the current state of knowledge has to be scrutinized more carefully. Here, the 
analysis concentrates on the comparison of the bibliometric results to the conventional view 
of M&A presented in Appendix B. The aim is to determine what is similar, what is missing, 
what is different and what is more. 
 
The purpose of this investigation is to exploit the findings that Chapter 2 revealed about 
the de facto structuring of the M&A discourse to the purpose of developing a new, 
governance perspective to M&A. Therefore, it can be argued that the discussion should be 
focused increasingly on the differences between the conceptual and bibliometric findings, and 
not so much on which aspects of previous knowledge the bibliometric studies confirm. By 
identifying differences between the bibliometric studies and existing categorizations of M&A 
research, some acute and underdeveloped avenues, mainly in terms of theory but also in 
terms of shared issues (i.e. antecedents), can be pointed out. These aspects then constitute a 
part of the substance of a new perspective to M&A, i.e. they are used as a way into the 
governance perspective of M&A presented in Section 3.3. Hence, a brief overview of the 
similarities between the bibliometric study and the existing M&A categorizations (with 
emphasis on Haspeslagh and Jemison 1991) is given, together with a close investigation of 
the new findings.  
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Not well represented 
in bibliometric study 
 
 
What is similar? 
 
As was preliminarily suggested already above, there is a conspicuous similarity between 
the results of the bibliometric analyses and some particular research avenues presented in 
other overviews of M&A research (e.g. Haspeslagh and Jemison 1991, Weston, Siu and 
Johnson 2001, Larsson and Finkelstein 1999 and Cording, Christmann and Bourgeois 2002).  
 
Namely, there seems to be an agreement over the significant positions of a) strategic 
management, b) finance-oriented, c) economics, d) process and e) culture/HRM research (cf. 
Table 14). The overviews listed in Table 14 have emphasized these views somewhat 
differently. For example, only Larsson and Finkelstein (1999) iterate explicitly between 
economics and finance research, and only two studies (Larsson and Finkelstein 1999, 
Haspeslagh and Jemison 1991) have not listed agency as a separate school. In any case, there 
nevertheless seems to be some general appreciation of the aforementioned research avenues.  
 
Table 14: The representation of M&A research streams and schools of thought identified in recent 
overviews of the field according to the results of the bibliometric study. 
 
 Cording et al. 2002  Larsson and   Finkelstein 1999  Weston et al. 2001
 Haspeslagh and   
 Jemison 1991 
 Overpayment  Strategic   management  Process  Capital markets 
 Agency problems  Economics  Strategy  Strategy 
 CEO hubris  Finance  Finance  Organizational   behavior 
 Top management     
 complementarity 
 Organizational  
 Research  Agency problems  Process 
 Experience  Human resource    management  Hubris   
 Employee distress   Redistribution   
 Conflicting cultures     
 Process       
 
 
What is missing? 
 
Table 14 above also illustrates some of the research streams that are missing from the 
bibliometric results that, judging by the overviews of the recent M&A literature, should be 
present. In addition to entire research streams that are not well represented in the bibliometric 
Well represented in 
bibliometric study 
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analysis, some particular research angles and contributions within the better-represented 
research fields can also be identified to be missing.  
 
Most importantly, it seems that classical organization theory and research, as well as some 
of its tenets to culture research, are lacking. Seminal organization theory authors and their 
works (e.g. March and Simon 1958, Argyris and Schön 1978, Perrow 1972) and authors 
discussing the cultural aspects of M&A (e.g. Sales and Mirvis 1985, Buono, Bowditch and 
Lewis 1988) do not appear high up in the citation analyses. As discussed above, the lack of 
organization theoretical contributions can be at least partly be assigned to the inapplicability 
of central theoretical concepts such as bounded rationality (Simon 1951), but this is not felt to 
be a sufficient explanation. Research focusing on the organizational aspects of M&A 
integration (e.g. Searby 1969, Yunker 1983, Shrivastava 1986 and Pablo 1994) is not well 
represented in the bibliometric analyses either. As is seen in the analysis of theory-antecedent 
pairings and clusters, organization theory, culture and HRM theories and uncertainty and 
change research form a clear research area, which received considerably more attention in the 
1990s. Research in this stream is not, however, cohesive, and it, too, sometimes lacks 
interdisciplinary orientation in that it "does not integrate important notions drawn from the 
strategy and finance literatures" (Larsson and Finkelstein 1999, p. 2, see also Schweiger and 
Walsh 1990). The more general proposition of this study that integrative and interdisciplinary 
research is valuable might apply particularly well here. In other words, research integrating 
the soft sides of M&A with harder finance and/or strategy considerations might be in order.  
 
In order to apply organization theory to the M&A discourse one could, instead of 
highlighting a human resource and/or relations oriented organizational behavior school, 
integrate the key underlying messages regarding e.g. the employment contract (e.g. Simon 
1951) from this discussion to a broader framework that also considers organizational 
economics. A holistic perspective concentrating on the governance theories of the firm could 
integrate these issues and rise to prominence as an equally significant ‘theory’ or ‘school’ of 
M&A as the capital markets, strategy or process streams.  
 
Another conspicuously missing issue is that empire-building and CEO hubris have not 
remained important research foci. Roll’s (1986) seminal article is well cited, yet the ‘hubris 
and empire-building’ antecedent to M&A research falls near the bottom of the network 
analysis antecedent frequency list. Managerial hubris, as such, has not remained a key 
concept, but the ample research on goal conflict and congruence, much of which relates to the 
owner-manager relationship, has certainly been influenced by the hubris discussion. For 
example, much of the currently popular corporate governance literature admits the central 
role of managerial hubris, albeit with varying emphases (Weston, Siu and Johnston 2001, 
Monks and Minow 2002). 
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Furthermore, there are some contributions within the well-represented fields of strategy, 
culture and human resource management, which have not received a significant position in 
the M&A discourse according to the citation analyses even though they, intuitively and 
according to the many overviews, should. It is curious that e.g. some key resource based view 
contributions (e.g. Hamel and Prahalad 1990, Rumelt, Schendel and Teece 1994, Walter and 
Barney 1990) do not appear in the citation analyses. Likewise, Hofstede’s (1980, 1990) much 
cited national culture analyses or M&A related corporate culture articles (e.g. Buono, 
Bowditch and Lewis 1985, Buono and Bowditch 1989, Sales and Mirvis 1985) do not appear 
any higher in the citation analyses than they currently do61. 
 
There are also some strands of research whose rather surprising absence from particularly 
the citation analysis results could be at least partly explained by the fact that they have only 
recently been affixed to M&A research. These include top management complementarity 
(e.g. Shanley and Correa 1992, Datta 1991, Walsh 1988), M&A experience (e.g. Haleblian 
and Finkelstein 1999, Singh and Zollo 1998) and trust and social capital (Coleman 1990, 
Putnam 1993, Fukuyama 1995). These can be argued to be up-and-coming research avenues, 
which have only taken off in the 1990s. This is supported by e.g. the observation that the 
oldest top management complementarity article (Walsh 1988) appears high up in the most-
cited article analysis. 
 
Finally, missing from the bibliometric analyses are also a number of theory of the firm 
related perspectives, namely property rights theory, early incomplete contracting and 
neoclassical theory of the firm as well as the resource dependence perspective. In Section 
3.1.2, property rights and resource dependence theories are proposed to act as linking theories 
much in the same way as much-cited transaction cost economics. Neoclassical theory of the 
firm and early incomplete contracting, then again, can argued to suffer, despite their 
intellectual and intuitive appeal, from their lack of applicability (see Section 3.1.1). 
 
 
What is different? 
 
In addition to the aspects that are somehow perceived missing from the bibliometric 
analysis, there are also multiple theoretical angles and issues within e.g. the strategy, finance 
and process streams that seem to be somewhat more multifaceted or complicated than is 
generally acknowledged.  
 
Firstly, there is a striking bipartite balance between the competitive strategy perspective 
(or ‘positioning school’ as coined by Mintzberg, Ahlstrand and Lampel 1999) and the 
                                                 
61 It must be noted, however, that Anthony Buono appears as 35th on the most cited first author list, the Buono, 
Bowditch and Lewis (1985) article in Human Relations is the 38th and the Buono and Bowditch (1985) book the 
51st most-cited text. This strand of research is thus represented in the analysis, but is not (yet) as high up as one 
might assume. 
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resource-based view (RBV). While the resource-based view can be argued to have dominated 
the strategy landscape through the 1990s, the influence of Michael Porter’s (see e.g. 1980, 
1985, 1987, 1996) competitive literature has been persistent and matches the impact of the 
RBV in the M&A discourse. Both the competitive strategy literature and the RBV have 
particular issues, in addition to their general corporate strategy statements, that appeal to 
M&A writers. For example, Porter (1987) has applied his thinking to build around the 
concept of synergy and argued for the relevance of managing a portfolio of, not only 
products, but also firms and strategic business units. This has apparent strategic implications 
on M&A and particularly diversification. Likewise, the resource-based view discusses 
relatedness as well as competence and resource transfer extensively, both of which are key 
M&A issues. The popularity of both strategy perspectives is manifested by the high rankings 
of the ‘synergy and competitive advantage’ and ‘diversification and conglomerates’ 
antecedents in the network analysis.  
 
Secondly, the role of corporate finance theory seems to match if not exceed the 
significance of capital markets theory in the finance-oriented M&A research. This is 
somewhat contrary to Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991), who emphasize the capital markets 
orientation. Corporate finance authors and economists (e.g. Allen Berger, David Ravenscraft, 
Paul Asquith, Randall Morck and Andrei Schleifer) rank highly in the citation analyses and 
corporate finance theory also seems more frequent in the theory frequency statistics of the 
network centrality analysis. The prominence of shareholder value as a research subject and 
event studies as methodology might be partially responsible for the initial impression of the 
significance of the capital markets perspective. As an intellectual basis for the M&A 
discourse, corporate finance theory seems to hold an equally strong if not superior position. 
 
Additionally, the process stream is not simply about a chain of events preceding and 
following an M&A announcement. The discussion between the traditional and novel types of 
M&A processes (Jemison and Sitkin 1986, Haspeslagh and Jemison 1991) has been 
complemented with a discussion of the strategy process (e.g. Mintzberg, Quinn and Ghoshal 
1998) and the takeover process (e.g. Eckbo 1983, 1985, Weston et. al 2001).  
 
 
What is more? 
 
Despite the many somewhat surprising and subsequently interesting points raised about 
what is similar, missing and different in the bibliometric results compared to the existing 
knowledge about the state of the M&A discourse, the most fruitful inquiry concerns the 
question what is more, i.e. what is there in the bibliometric results that has not been identified 
and acknowledged before.  
 
  119
In essence, the bibliometric analysis raises two major issues, which can be considered 
novel contributions to our understanding of M&A discourse. Firstly, it seems that yet another 
categorization of the schools and streams of the M&A discourse, one that slightly refines and 
adds to the previous ones, is needed. Secondly, it seems that a governance perspective, 
embodied by the governance theories of the firm that play an important part in the M&A 
discourse, could potentially offer a fruitful holistic perspective both to researching and 
performing M&A. The governance theories of the firm, in their various levels of significance 
and different roles they assume, arguably present the most interesting finding of the 
bibliometric analysis.  
 
Even though the recent M&A categorizations by e.g. Cording et al. (2002), Larsson and 
Finkelstein (1999), Weston et al. (2001) and Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) have helped 
understand the various research perspectives to M&A, the bibliometric study raises some 
concerns about the need for yet another, slightly refined categorization of M&A streams. The 
conceptual analysis of the M&A literature, which bases not on the bibliometric analysis but 
on the analysis of the M&A literature and previously written overviews, utilizes a slightly 
altered version of Haspeslagh and Jemison’s (1991) M&A schools62. The bibliometric 
analysis has provided converging results from both the intellectual bases (in the form of the 
citation analysis results) and the theoretical and topic-related cornerstones (in the form of the 
network analysis results) indicating that some further alterations to this categorization need to 
be made.  
 
The expression ‘capital markets school’ implies that capital markets theories and 
literature63 would be dominant among finance oriented M&A research. As identified above, 
corporate finance literature and its viewpoints64 are an equally if not more significant part of 
the M&A discourse. Along the lines of Larsson and Finkelstein (1999), it would arguably be 
more justified to speak of a ‘finance stream’ in M&A research, with possibly two different 
orientations, namely ‘capital markets’ and ‘corporate finance’. Furthermore, it must be 
acknowledged that these areas of corporate finance and capital markets are not totally 
separable and broad-level finance experts can also be coined ‘financial economists’. Here, 
however, the distinction between finance and economics is made. 
 
The existence of a strategic school or a ‘strategy stream’ in M&A research seems self-
evident. As identified in the bibliometric study, this stream is relatively similar in overall 
                                                 
62 i.e a division into the capital markets stream, the strategy stream, the humans and organizations stream and 
the process stream. This is very reminiscent of Haspeslagh and Jemison’s (1991) division into the capital 
markets school, the strategic school, the organizational behavior school and the process school.  
63 Concentrating on primarily on the financing of M&A, the efficient markets hypothesis, stock market 
reactions, free cash flow measures, the capital asset pricing model, the market for corporate control etc., see 
Appendix 1 and Haspeslagh and Jemison 1991, p. 293. 
64 e.g. financial restructuring, debt/equity considerations, investment banking, anti-takeover provisions, non-
cash flow based corporate valuation techniques etc. 
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weight to the finance stream. Given the plentitude of strategy research and the fact that nearly 
everything can be called strategic65, the more interesting question deals with what should be 
included under this heading, what should be placed under some other major heading and what 
deserves a heading of its own. The strategy stream can be perceived to operate at the level of 
the firm and deal mostly with firm-specific outcomes (Haspeslagh and Jemison 1991) with 
some inputs to industry level analysis. If this demarcation is accepted, it sets some acute 
boundaries for the school. It implies that analyses at the level of the global economy, national 
economy and industry level efficiency and wealth effects should be excluded. It would also 
imply that analyses dealing with sub-firm level issues, e.g. organizational change processes 
or M&A ramifications at the level of the individual should be excluded. The strategy stream 
would thus, as seems logical, be focused on core firm-level M&A research antecedents, e.g. 
the creation of synergies, the impact on competitive advantage, the impact on profit, 
productivity and performance using traditional strategy literature dealing with competitive 
strategy, resource based strategy, interorganizational strategy and industry level strategy.  
 
It is evident that the M&A analyses operating on the level of the industry and higher must 
be accounted for. This analysis, to a very large extent, consists of economics and law flavored 
reasoning concentrating on e.g. wealth effects, efficiency, market power, antitrust 
considerations price level impacts and so on. The research capitalizes on traditional 
economics, law and industrial organization theories and can thus be pegged, the ‘economics 
and law stream’. Here, it is crucial to make a distinction between the economics and law 
stream and governance theory. The economics and law stream is perceived to consist of 
efficiency oriented analyses of discrete M&A issues. The theories used in these articles are 
primarily pure neoclassical economics and industrial organization theories, not the 
institutionally and organizationally aware governance theories of the firm. 
 
An overwhelming majority of the legal M&A literature has macroeconomic economic 
efficiency as its main concern. Both disciplines are interested in monopoly, market power and 
antitrust issues and economists are frequently consulted in designing M&A related 
legislation. In the bibliometric analysis, several modern economics and financial economics 
authors appear near the top. The network analyses, then again, indicate that industrial 
organization and legal frameworks, as well as the aforementioned antecedents dealing with 
wealth effects and market power, enjoy considerable attention outside the realm of financial 
M&A research. The economics and law stream seems worthy of a separate heading.  
 
Arguably, a holistic governance perspective to the M&A resembles both the strategic and 
the economics and law streams. The economics background of the governance theories is 
responsible for conceptual overlap with the economics and law stream as it is described 
                                                 
65 Arguably, the strategy paradigm is one of the more scattered ones in management research and exemplifies 
the problems associated with the paradigm proliferation problem (McKelvey 1997). 
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above. The use of the concept of the theory of the firm has, then again, become increasingly 
popular in strategic management discourse. The governance perspective to M&A and the 
strategic literature also have the primary unit of the analysis, the firm, in common.  
 
Given the aforementioned foci on firm-level and macroeconomic issues, the level of the 
individual deserves distinct attention. In the citation analysis, culture, HRM and organization 
theory authors were not very well represented. In the network analysis, however, culture and 
HRM theories and organizational behavior theories, as well as related antecedents, e.g. 
uncertainty and change, goal conflict and congruence and organizational learning enjoyed 
considerable attention. Most notably, culture and HRM theories enjoyed more attention than 
organization theory and behavior literature, whose role in the bibliometric study was 
generally subdued. The general impression from the bibliometric study was that analysis of 
the ‘softer side’ of M&A represents a rather concurring set of literature, in which the level of 
the individual plays an important role. As is indicated in the conceptual analysis of the M&A 
literature, it would thus seem appropriate to peg this M&A literature the ‘humans and 
organizations stream’. 
 
What is left is what Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) highlight in their research, i.e. the 
process stream, which emphasizes the role of pre- and post-merger processes in successful 
M&A management. Both Haspeslagh and Jemison’s 1991 book and Jemison and Sitkin’s 
1986 seminal article are well represented in the bibliometric studies. The process stream has 
deep roots (e.g. Mace and Montgomery 1962) and has recently gathered more weight with 
considerable research attention being paid to the role of a wide array of post-merger 
processes in M&A success (see e.g. Shrivastava 1986, Larsson 1989, Larsson and Finkelstein 
1999, Weber and Pliskin 1996, Robbins and Stylianou 1999, Weber and Ganzach 1995 and 
Olie 1994). The management of the M&A process can be seen to be influenced by financial, 
strategic, human and organizational aspects respectively, and it would thus seem unsuitable to 
include it in any of these research streams. Thus, along the lines of Haspeslagh and Jemison 
(1991), it seems logical to include the ‘process stream’ as a separate conceptual entity.  
 
Figure 3 summarizes the new proposed categorization of M&A research embodied in the 
five distinct research streams, together with some of their key characteristics.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  122 
Figure 3: A new proposed categorization of the M&A discourse into five distinct research streams 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So far, this study has succeeded at highlighting the role of the governance theories of the 
firm in the M&A discourse by: 
a) Identifying the explicit dominance of primarily agency theory but also 
transaction economics in the M&A discourse 
b) Identifying that despite the central role of agency theory, agency theoretic 
research antecedents, i.e. ‘the stakeholder incentives’ antecedents, appear in a 
very segregated cluster 
c) Identifying that transaction cost economics, while it is extremely well cited, is 
not as frequent and central in the M&A discourse as the citation details might 
suggest, but assumes the role of a linking theory, fertilizing interdisciplinary 
research combining multiple theoretical perspectives and research antecedents 
d) Identifying that property rights theory, too, assumes a significant linking 
theory role even though it is not frequently used as a central theoretical focus 
due to its fuzzy and intangible construction as more of a philosophy than a 
rigorous theoretical framework 
e) Identifying that two important backbones against and along which the 
governance perspective to strategy research has developed, namely the early 
incomplete contracting perspective and neoclassical theory of the firm, enjoy 
less and less direct attention in the M&A discourse. This seems to be due to 
inapplicability and a general incompatibility with the empirical-quantitative 
M&A research mindset of the 1980s and 1990s. 
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Even though some texts (e.g. Cording et al. 2002, p. 13-14, Weston et. al 2001, p.146-148) 
have noted the role of agency theory in the M&A discourse, its dominance in the bibliometric 
analysis is overwhelming and can be considered a significant finding. The dominance of 
Jensen’s (1976, 1986, Jensen and Ruback 1983, Fama and Jensen 1983) and Williamson’s 
(1975, 1985, 1996) contributions as intellectual underpinnings to the M&A discourse should 
raise considerable interest in applying and utilizing these apparently closely related 
theoretical frameworks in more empirical M&A research and subsequently, M&A decision-
making.  
 
It is interesting that the literature and authors focusing on takeovers (e.g. Eckbo 1983, 
1985) appear to be somewhat separate from the literature and authors that assume a generic 
M&A perspective such as the one employed in this study (see Introduction and Section 6.1). 
Especially the finance-oriented literature seems to be more interested in takeovers and 
measuring their outcomes. Could it be that the mindset and tools employed by the finance 
contributors necessitates a tighter, more acute demarcation of the phenomenon under 
investigation? Could a governance perspective of M&A, using the governance theories of the 
firm as its tools, engulf both the findings of the finance-oriented literature and a wider 
conceptual definition of M&A in general? In other words, a holistic governance approach 
could possibly utilize strengths of the various governance approaches and their varying 
disciplinary emphases to build a new, stronger picture of the entire M&A research landscape, 
not only a part of it.  
 
It could be argued that, combined and with different roles suiting their nature, the various 
governance theories of the firm could constitute a holistic governance perspective of M&A. 
Using basic transaction cost economics reasoning to answer organizational boundary 
questions, engulfing stakeholder group and incentive related considerations using agency 
theory, employing property rights theory as an underlying philosophy reinforcing a 
shareholder value orientation, acknowledging organizational realities put forward by the 
incomplete contracting literature and its organization theory antecedents, using the simple 
logics of neoclassical economics for acute everyday calculation questions and, perhaps, 
incorporating a resource dependence perspective to relate to the world of resource based 
strategy would make sense.  
 
In essence, this means that a holistic governance perspective would be able to:  
 
a) Substitute for the relative lack of organizational behavior and theory considerations 
when complementing the finance, HRM, strategy and process perspectives to 
M&A, and/or  
 
b) Act as an integrative theory engulfing necessary inputs from the finance, strategy, 
organizational behavior, HRM and process perspectives while concentrating on the 
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essentials of M&A, namely the effect an M&A has on the boundaries, existence 
and internal organization of the firm. 
 
Before any of this, however, is possible, the concrete linkages between the governance 
perspective and various aspects of M&A need to be scrutinized. Without a careful analysis 
and listing of the ways in which the various theories and approaches could potentially be used 
to the benefit of M&A research and decision-making, the governance approach risks being 
left a high-level, abstract paradigm without much meaning or use. Thus the attention is next 
turned to investigating the linkages between the M&A and governance paradigms in general, 
as well as their issues, intellectual traditions and pragmatic business contexts. The new 
categorization of M&A research streams, characterized by the aforementioned refinements 
made to the previous categorizations on the basis of the bibliometric study, is used in this 
investigation. 
 
 
Propositions related to a new picture of the M&A discourse 
 
Proposition 16: There is a general consensus over the significant positions of strategic 
management, financial, economics, process and culture/HRM research in M&A research. 
 
Proposition 17: Classical organization and social psychology theory and many of its 
upshots to M&A, e.g. culture and post-integration management, managerial hubris, social 
capital and experience, enjoy conspicuously little attention. The same applies to certain 
contributions of the resource-based view to corporate strategy. 
 
Proposition 18: There is a conspicuous bipartite balance between competitive and 
competence-based (primarily resource-based) strategy on the one hand, and between 
corporate finance and capital markets literature on the other. Thus the competence 
perspective does not dominate strategic M&A research and the capital markets perspective 
does not dominate financial M&A research.  
 
Proposition 19: It seems that yet another categorization of the M&A discourse, consisting 
of the strategy stream, the process stream, the finance stream and the economics and law 
stream, is needed.  
 
Proposition 20: The governance theories of the firm, in their various levels of significance 
and different roles they assume, present the single most significant finding of the bibliometric 
analysis. 
 
Proposition 21: The governance theories of the firm could potentially offer a fruitful 
holistic perspective to the analysis of M&A. This perspective could engulf necessary inputs 
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from the finance, strategy, organizational behavior, HRM and process perspectives while 
concentrating on the effect an M&A has on the essential questions of the boundaries, 
existence and internal organization of the firm. 
 
 
 
3.2 Linkages between M&A and governance paradigms 
 
In order to be able to gather substance for a holistic governance approach to M&A, the 
linkages between these two concepts, i.e. ‘M&A’ and ‘governance’, the latter of which refers 
to the holistic use of the ideas of the governance theories of the firm, need to be analyzed 
further. ‘M&A’ and ‘governance’ can be argued to resemble more paradigms or sub-
paradigms in management research than e.g. theories or models. Therefore, this section 
attempts at tackling the paradigmatic linkages between these two approaches at three levels. 
This is done firstly by shortly outlining predominantly Kuhnian (Kuhn 1962) paradigm 
thinking and its application to the categorization and discussion of linkages between M&A 
and governance. Secondly, the linkages are analyzed and discussed at three levels, i.e. the 
level of traditions and intellectual foundations, the level of academic cross-fertilization and 
the level of factual managerial and pragmatic issues. Finally, the criticisms and shortcomings 
of the governance perspective in M&A are outlined, together with the impacts they have on 
the making of a stronger linkage between the two. 
 
 
3.2.1 About paradigmatic linkages 
 
The aim of this section is to clarify the epistemological shaping of the present attempt to 
restructure the M&A discourse by introducing a governance approach. In other words, the 
research performed in this study attempts to integrate, in many ways, a holistic governance 
approach to management research and the M&A discourse. The general notion of ‘a 
paradigm’, although often sloppily or simply wrongly used, is a useful concept when 
exploring the interlinkages of two such social scientific avenues as "M&A" and "the 
governance theories of the firm". The M&A paradigm and the governance paradigm can be 
argued to converge on a number of levels of analysis, evidence of which is presented in 
Sections 3.2.2-3.2.4. 
 
But first, it is necessary to explore the notion of a paradigm in order to avoid the very 
sloppy and incorrect use that is criticized above. The paradigm discussion in the study is 
based on two different views of scientific paradigms, a Kuhnian (Kuhn 1962, 1970) 
perspective and Burrell and Morgan’s (1979) groundbreaking organizational sociology 
perspective (Jackson and Carter 1991). 
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What is a paradigm? Kuhn (1962) has provided a seminal definition and analysis of the 
nature of a paradigm. According to Kuhn, a paradigm is an approach to inquiry in which: 
 
“Accepted examples of actual scientific practice--examples 
which include law, theory, application and instrumentation 
together--provide models from which spring particular 
coherent traditions of scientific research” (Kuhn 1962, p. 
10) 
 
Paradigms seem to share two characteristics, namely that: 
 
“Their achievement was sufficiently unprecedented to attract 
an enduring group of adherents away from competing modes 
of scientific activity. Simultaneously, it was sufficiently 
open-ended to leave all sorts of problems for the redefined 
group of practitioners to resolve.” (Kuhn 1962, p. 10) 
 
Kuhn’s major contention was that scientific communities and their research are influenced 
by the beliefs, values and attitudes of the researchers. He also argued that all well-established 
scientific research areas, i.e. so-called ‘mature sciences’ consist of some or several 
recognized paradigms (Kuhn 1970, pp. 49-50). Paradigms exist in competition with each 
other, and there is a constant paradigmatic struggle over dominance in the contemporary 
scientific dialogue in field. The strongest paradigm, i.e. Kuhn’s ‘normal science’, which may 
change and shift over the course of time, dominates the psycho-sociological landscape within 
that research field, which, thus, is also influenced by the values, attitudes and beliefs of the 
proponents of that particular paradigm (Kuhn 1970, p. 23-27).  
 
Furthermore, paradigms have been argued to be incommensurable in the sense that 
dialogue between different paradigms would be somewhat impossible (Kuhn 1970, p. 149, 
Stegmüller 1976). The paradigm inconsummerability approach thus argues that different 
paradigms, while they establish themselves in the course of time, grow separate to the extent 
that they are only able to interact on a rhetorical level without genuine, scientifically neutral 
conversations (Stegmüller 1976, p. 147).   
 
Karl Popper (1970) has argued against the incompatibility of scientific paradigms. To 
Popper, rationality and rational truth are objective scientific conditions, which direct all 
scientific research through a pure philosophical metalanguage. Researchers advocating 
different paradigms have the same goal, namely rationality-seeking, and share certain 
scientific principles as well as a generic scientific world view. 
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Also Burrell and Morgan (1979) have advocated the Kuhnian perspective, adding that the 
notion of a sociological paradigm relies on number of assumptions about the nature of social 
scientific enquiry. Thus both Popper’s (1970) and Burrell and Morgan’s (1979) extensions to 
Kuhnian thinking discuss, among others, the assumptions and demarcations of research. Most 
importantly, Burrell and Morgan advocate that there can be a dialectical relationship between 
researchers within two or more simultaneously existing paradigms contributing to the 
development of all of these.   
 
From the viewpoint of this study, these insights into the nature of paradigms are important. 
The governance paradigm has a clear influence on the structuring of the M&A discourse. A 
bureaucratic and mechanistic view of M&A, represented by and large by the finance and 
economics orientations is complemented with more psychologically and sociologically 
oriented approaches discussing human interaction, societal impacts as well as stakeholder 
group dynamics (see Appendix 1 and Section 3.1.4). In M&A research, it is precisely these 
types of ‘disciplinary orientations’ or  ‘sub-paradigms’, rather than theories, which have 
battled each other out, manifesting the incompatibility or paradigm inconsummerability 
approach. Interdisciplinary research is thus, despite the interdisciplinary nature of the 
research area, i.e. M&A, itself, relatively scarce.   
 
The governance paradigm, then again, could potentially act as an integrative element in 
the M&A discourse. A purer metalanguage and the more conceptual inclination of the 
governance paradigm could provide a bridge to what Popper (1968, 1970) describes as the 
common scientific rational truths and a conceptual shared world view. Burrell and Morgan’s 
(1979) assumptions and functionalist paradigm of inquiry, then again, can be seen to engulf 
both the M&A and the governance sub-paradigms or approaches comfortably. This reinforces 
the intuitive impression that arose during the conceptual study that these worlds are actually 
metatheoretically and paradigmatically very close to each other. This study adopts the view 
of Burrell and Morgan (1979) that multiple incommensurable paradigms can exist both 
simultaneously and in perpetuity, and that, there is, indeed, possibility for mutual 
development through dialectical interaction between the two paradigms of ‘M&A’ and 
‘governance’ 
 
The investigation of the M&A and governance TOF paradigms is essentially interested in 
discovering the metatheoretical characteristics of these research areas. A research approach, 
which aims at understanding paradigm thinking and working at a paradigmatic level thus 
seems a appropriate for the research aims of this study. The implication is that this study 
attempts to discuss the linkages between the two paradigms at varying depths of analysis, 
including deep paradigmatic thinking. 
 
How can paradigms be linked? Popper’s (1970) arguments about metatheoretical level 
linkages, e.g. rationality and language, are a definite foundation for such linkages to exist. 
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Intuitively speaking, there are, at least three other levels, where paradigms are, if not linked, 
at least co-existing and interacting through their influence on people. Firstly, there are 
linkages in shared traditions and intellectual sources. Different paradigms and approaches can 
share a history, a tradition or an intellectual literal cornerstone. Secondly, paradigms can be 
linked through their use cross-fertilizing use in the academia. These first two types of 
linkages can often be revealed using bibliometric analyses. The third category is linkages that 
take the form of shared views on factual affairs. This is the realm closer to organizational 
reality in which e.g. empirical research and management consulting operate.  
 
In this study, all the aforementioned levels of linkages are utilized. The linkages in 
tradition and intellectual underpinnings, linkages through academic cross-fertilization and 
linkages through shared views on factual matters between the M&A and governance 
paradigms are explored. Firstly, the shared roots of the two paradigms in the analysis of the 
concept of the organization of economic activity are investigated (see e.g. Williamson 1985, 
Madhok 2002). Secondly, the ways in which the governance and M&A discourses have 
cross-fertilized in academic arenas are explored. The focus is on identifying both general 
level disciplinary interaction and discussion as well as on identifying specific contributions, 
questions and other linkages between specific governance theories of the firm and the M&A 
discourse. Thirdly, linkages in the way M&A and governance theory approach factual M&A 
business and management affairs are outlined.  
 
All this is done with the aim of attempting to reduce much of the M&A discourse to a 
simple cognitive framework, in which governance insights play a major role. Accomplishing 
this can be argued to have potentially great value to M&A research, given that it directly 
serves the need to control the number of paradigms for purposes of scientific cohesion and 
clarity. It has been argued that there are far too many scientific paradigms and that their 
division is artificial, given that they even both social and natural sciences can be seen to share 
the same microstate idiosyncrasy assumptions (McKelvey 1997). In other words, there is a 
need for more holistic research approaches, an example of which is the ‘political science’ or 
‘social science’ approach to economics, management, sociology and finance that prevailed in 
the first part of the 20th century66. Conceptualizing a common paradigm for all of governance 
theory of the firm related literature serves as an antidote for the argued proliferation of 
scientific paradigms.  
 
The underlying theoretical paradigms are, at least, undoubtedly the same. The 
concentration of different theoretical perspectives on one research domain brings ample 
opportunity for cross-fertilizing dialogue and learning. The broad forum of M&A research we 
are facing provides an opportunity for tackling and testing phenomenon-oriented predictions 
                                                 
66 Arguably, the Journal of Political Economics, with its considerable historical traditions and sustained 
popularity, is the flagbearer of this wide paradigmatic approach to economic social sciences.  
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from multiple research angles. The M&A discourse, in this respect, has mirrored well the 
multi-paradigm problem presented by McKelvey (1997). Accordingly, as outlined above, 
there is a need for consolidation of, or at least bridging between, the paradigms. A 
governance perspective to M&A would seem promisingly able to do precisely this. 
 
The same also applies to unifying our conception of the tradition of writing about and 
performing M&A as well. M&A decision-making involves nearly all aspects of managerial 
decision-making, ranging from corporate strategy formulation and corporate governance to 
accounting, information systems and administrative issues. A holistic governance perspective 
could potentially yield insights to numerous different M&A decision-making and researching 
problems dealing with very different parts and issues of the organization, which is something 
the narrowly, yet acutely, applicable strategy and finance paradigms, for example, are unable 
to do.  
 
In the elaboration of the aforementioned linkages between the governance theories of the 
firm and M&A discourses, a novel approach is assumed. The three instances of the M&A 
identified above and in Appendix 2, i.e. the definitional boundaries, the justification for their 
existence and the internal organization processes, are used in the analyses. In practice, this 
means that whenever possible, the linkages identified between M&A and the governance 
theories of the firm are categorized according to these dimensions. The logic behind this is 
that in this way, the linkages, which essentially constitute the core substance of the 
governance approaches to M&A presented in Section 3.3, are organized cohesively. At the 
same time, the purpose is to bring forward the boundaries/justifications/processes-notion, 
which is arguably hitherto overlooked in management literature. 
 
 
Propositions concerning paradigmatic linkages 
 
Proposition 22: There are three levels at which the interlinkages between the M&A and 
governance theory discourses should be sought: a) shared traditions and intellectual roots, b) 
cross-fertilization in academic discourse and c) shared views on factual M&A decision-
making affairs.   
 
Proposition 23: A holistic governance perspective could reduce the multi-paradigm 
problem and interdisciplinary turf wars apparent in the M&A discourse at present. 
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3.2.2 Linkages in shared traditions and intellectual sources  
 
This section discusses linkages between the M&A and governance paradigms in the light 
of their intellectual traditions and conceptual foundations. Essentially, the aim is to argue that 
there has been a sustained historical coexistence between the governance perspective to the 
firm and M&A research, and that whilst traditional contracting literature acts as an important 
intellectual foundation, modern governance research has assumed a more active role in the 
phenomenon-centered and conceptual dialogue with contemporary M&A research.  
Furthermore, the argument is that while this dialogue has undoubtedly enriched the M&A 
discourse, it has also had some methodologically constraining effects that could be perceived 
as undesirable.  
 
In the conceptual and bibliometric studies, as well as the interpretation and analysis of 
their results in Section 3.1, it seems evident that particularly the governance theories of the 
firm, but also the competence theories of the firm, underpin the M&A discourse. The 
‘organization of economic activity’ seems to be a conceptual cornerstone for all 
institutionally oriented research, including both the various different notions of the theory of 
the firm (Madhok 2002) as well as more phenomenon-centered management research, such 
as M&A. The organization of economic activity is thus a rare example of a concept, which 
assumes central importance in both theory- and phenomenon-centered research67.  
 
The notion of the organization of economic activity relates strongly to research in the 
institutional and organizational economics (IOE) traditions emphasizing the institutional 
structure of production. The IOE tradition arose partially as upshots and partially as 
disagreements and criticisms of neoclassical economics. Chronologically, they date back to 
Austrian/Schumpeterian (e.g. Hayek 1937, 1945, Schumpeter 1942) economics as well as the 
reasoning of Ronald Coase (1937).  
 
In the times of early IE and OE, the research was far from being compartmentalized into 
segregated research fields with little disciplinary boundary-crossing and –spanning like 
today. Even though schools of thought existed and were rapidly emerging, all economics 
related research still belonged to the generic category of ‘political’ or ‘social’ science. M&A 
                                                 
67 It seems evident to the author that there are essentially two types of management research. Firstly, there is 
research that starts of with the researcher’s knowledge and/or interest in a particular theoretical construct or 
area, which leads to the seeking of potential application areas that would operationalize the theoretical 
knowledge. Secondly, there is research that starts with either a deep understanding about the fact-empirical 
environment or extraordinary ability to (often nomothetically/quantitatively) scrutinize the fact-empirical 
environment, which leads to the seeking of potential theoretical areas in which this fact-empirical setting would 
seem suitable. The author’s subjective contention is that the governance perspective represents by and large the 
prior, where as the competence perspective represents the latter. The organization of economic activity seems to 
be an exceptional concept in the sense that it suits both worlds. There is a fact-empirical state of the current 
organization of economic activity that can be measured, and the organization of economic activity is also a rich 
tool in conceptual and theoretical research. 
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research was not a segregated area, but was rather researched through issues that can these 
days be found as motivations and themes of M&A research, e.g. diversification, growth, 
managerial influence, corporate reorganization and so on.  
 
Before the early specialized M&A literature emerging in the 1960s (e.g. Kitching 1964, 
1967, Newbold 1970, Lev and Mandelker 1972), M&A issues (including e.g. the 
contemporary analysis of the two first merger waves of 1897-1904 and 1916-1929) were 
dealt with by economic history literature that can be argued to have been very knowledgeable 
of both neoclassical economics theories and its early IOE departures. The development of 
literature addressing the key questions of the organization of economic activity at the level of 
the firm can thus be argued to have influenced the M&A dialogue of the times. Even though 
these connections are often implicit, major research findings, particularly acknowledged 
and/or otherwise successful departures from classical ‘teachings’, such as the seminal IOE 
contributions, were filtered actively and relatively quickly to many aspects of social scientific 
research, e.g. research orientations and methodology, but particularly the conceptual arsenal 
it used. 
 
A peculiar feature of the dialogue between the seminal underpinnings of governance 
literature (e.g. Coase 1937, Simon 1951, March and Simon 1958, Alchian and Demetz 1972, 
Hayek 1937, 1945) and the M&A discourse is that the influence has prevailed for decades. 
For example Hayekian property rights ideology, Simonian bounded rationality and 
Schumpeterian creative destruction continue to inspire management researchers in a number 
of areas including M&A (See e.g. Foss 2001, Thompson 1996, Norton 1992). It can be 
argued that modern M&A literature is conceptually dependent on seminal governance 
literature, especially when it comes to the conceptualization of the contracting setting. As the 
results of the citation analysis reveal, however, influential authors of early governance 
literature have been surpassed by more recent governance theoretical inputs in particularly 
agency theory (e.g. Jensen and Meckling 1976, Jensen and Ruback 1983, Fama and Jensen 
1983, Fama 1980) and transaction cost economics (e.g. Williamson 1975, 1985). Thus while 
the classic contributions are still present in the referencing statistics, the relatively scarce 
referencing to them suggest that they have assumed an indirect role as intellectual bases to 
the contemporary M&A discourse.  
 
The research material of this study, i.e. M&A literature published in the 1990s, refers most 
to early 1980s firm theoretical findings. The gap between the average year of a 1990s 
publication and the age of the theoretical references at the time is thus considerably wider 
than in management or social scientific research in general68, which suggests that a) the 
tendency is to wait and see which theories ‘pull through’ before applications are made and/or 
                                                 
68 The average age of a reference in scientific research is found to be 6-7 years (see e.g. Garfield 1997, 1998), 
which is very much in line with the general temporal referencing pattern results of this study. The theoretical 
inputs of the 1990s M&A articles, however, are on average, roughly estimated, about 15 years old.  
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b) it takes some time for theories to diffuse and mature, and consequently for semi-theory 
building oriented applied research to be published, before phenomenon-centered research is 
performed. While the prior option seems intuitively appealing, this study also presents some 
evidence for the latter as significant articles that are somewhat, but not clearly or entirely, 
related to both governance theory and M&A (e.g. Jensen 1986, Amihud and Lev 1981, 
Morck, Shleifer and Vishny 1990) are also highly ranked in the most-cited text analysis.  
 
Through M&A research of the 1990s, the interplay with (1980s and 1990s) governance 
theory development has continued, but is still to reach explicit acknowledgement. General 
governance theoretical reasoning and specific governance theories of the firm have 
increasingly been applied to numerous different M&A research settings during the past five 
years. Table 15 gives some examples of the type of governance theoretic research performed 
during the past couple of years. The author(s) and year or publication, the M&A research 
stream(s) they are perceived to belong to, the topic of the research and the governance 
theoretical perspective they employ are disclosed in the Table. 
 
 
Table 15: Examples of governance theoretical M&A research published in 2000-2003 
 
Author(s) and year(s) M&A Stream 
(disciplinary 
orientation 
Research topic Governance theory 
employed 
Holmström and 
Kaplan 2001 
Strategy Influence of corporate governance 
on US merger activity 
General 
Lins and Servaes 2002 Strategy Diversifying M&A in emerging 
markets 
Agency theory 
Matsusaka and Nanda 
2002 
Finance, strategy Internal capital markets and 
corporate refocusing 
Agency theory, 
transaction cost 
economics 
Hyland and Diltz 2002 Strategy Motives for diversifying M&A Agency theory 
Klein 2002 Economics and law  Efficiency of acquisitive 
conglomerates 
Agency theory 
Kohers and Kohers 
2001 
Finance Takeovers of technology firms Agency theory 
Schlossberg and 
Robins 2001 
Economics and law Safeguarding business secrets Agency theory 
Matsusaka 2001 Strategy Corporate diversification, value 
maximization, and organizational 
capabilities 
Agency theory 
 
Palmer and Barber 
2001 
Humans and 
organizations 
Social class theory of corporate 
acquisitions 
Agency theory 
 
Palich, Cardinal and 
Miller 2000 
Strategy The diversification-performance 
linkage 
Agency theory 
Schilling and 
Steensma 2002 
Strategy Motivation underlying firm 
boundaries 
Transaction cost 
economics 
Lu 2002 Strategy Acquisitions as an entry mode 
choice 
Transaction cost 
economics 
Meyer and Estrin 2001 Strategy Acquisitions in brownfield entry Transaction cost 
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to emerging markets economics 
Chi 2000 Strategy Acquisition vs. Divestment of 
joint ventures 
Transaction cost 
economics 
Brouthers and 
Brouthers 2000 
Strategy, humans and 
organizations 
Institutional, cultural and 
transaction cost influences in 
acquisition start-up 
Early incomplete 
contracting, transaction 
cost economics 
Pagano 2000 Economics and law Public markets, private orderings 
and corporate governance 
(New) Property rights 
theory 
 
 
Table 15 manifests the explanatory power of agency theoretic and transaction cost 
economic explanations in recent governance theory applications to M&A research. However, 
these studies represent a significant fraction of the total population of articles implicitly 
employing governance theories to M&A. Explicit M&A applications of governance theories 
are still an undeveloped area of study despite the coexistence of the two discourses during the 
past decades. On the whole, it can be argued that, with the development of governance 
theories and a resurging interest in them around the turn of the millennium, a resurgence of 
phenomenon-centered and conceptual dialogue between the two fields can be expected, as 
more and more of both conceptual and applied governance theoretical have started appearing 
in first-tier journals such as Strategic Management Journal and The Academy of Management 
Journal and Review. 
 
This recollection of the parallel and intertwined coexistence of the M&A and governance 
discourses highlights contribution of the latter to the prior and reinforces the need to aim for 
the construction of a holistic governance perspective able to tackle the many sides of 
contemporary M&A research. The coexistence has, however, not only contributed to the 
contents of M&A research but also confined it to certain methodological orientations. Even 
though the methodologies used in the 567 identified M&A related studies were not 
systematically investigated in the network analysis, the citation analysis results indicate that 
M&A research is highly appreciative of quantitative, event study and non-linear regression 
methodologies (Brown and Warner 1985, White 1980). On the basis of the conceptual 
analysis, it seems that at least three M&A research streams, i.e. the economics, strategy and 
finance streams, are, perhaps even increasingly, confined to this methodological tradition. It 
could even be argued that there is a general lack of methodological breadth in M&A research 
across the different disciplinary research traditions. An arguable conclusion from this is that 
triangulative research orientations and conceptual research might deserve more attention in 
M&A research than they do at present.  
 
One explanation that could be provided for this is the heritage of neoclassical economics. 
Largely a quantitative science, neoclassical microeconomics research has lent many of its 
research traditions to modern M&A research. For example, a strong philosophy of 
comparative statics prevails (Foss 2000). The habit of M&A research to concentrate on the 
analysis of discrete structural alternatives is nearly a praxeological exercise that is apparently 
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influenced by the (neo)classical economics tradition. Examples are plenty (see e.g. the output 
of currently active financial economist writers such as Gregory Werden, Allen Berger, Atul 
Gupta, John Matsusaka and Marcia Millon Cornett, Kenneth Carow, William Schwert and 
Joel Houston who dominated the most-published first author analysis in Chapter 2). Also 
most (if not all) transaction cost economic based research essentially deals with the analysis 
of discrete boundary options along the market-hybrid-hierarchy trichotomy (Williamson 
1975)69. Diversification literature most often analyzes diversification vs. no diversification 
and entry mode studies peg fixed notions of e.g. an acquisition, a joint venture and a 
greenfield against each other. Types of diversification or unconventional combinations of 
operation or governance modes are seldom researched.  
 
Similarly, ‘number-crunching’ is an equally distinctive feature of M&A. Event study 
methodology, hypothesis testing, regression analysis and structural equation modeling are 
dominant methodologies that derive from an economic-analytical mindset. Even though case 
study methodology is widely used in the strategy and humans and organizations streams, 
quantitative studies comprise an overwhelming majority of M&A research on the whole. In 
the spirit of Veblen (1904), one could argue that some modern management research, and 
M&A research in particular, has drifted to excesses of calculativeness and certain statistical 
methodologies have become more an end in itself than means to an end. Arguably, the 
different streams of M&A research could benefit enormously from not only conceptual and 
issue related dialogue, but from widening their methodological orientations. 
 
Propositions about the shared traditions and intellectual sources of the governance and 
M&A discourses  
 
Proposition 24: The deepest unifying concept between the governance discourse and the 
M&A discourse is the organization of economic activity. 
 
Proposition 25a: The IOE and governance theoretical literature have acted as sustained 
intellectual stepping-stones for the development of M&A literature.  
 
Proposition 25b: The governance perspective and M&A have coexistence and been 
conceptually intertwined for some 70 years but integrated research in the form of 
applications of the governance theories into M&A is a much newer research effort and still in 
its cradle. 
 
                                                 
69 The analysis of dynamic transaction costs (e.g. Langlois and Foss 1999) is a notable departure from this 
tradition. 
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Proposition 21: The narrow-mindedness of neoclassical and institutional economics is 
reflected to M&A research as a lack of methodological breadth and a certain fixation to the 
economic and statistics-minded analysis of discrete structural alternatives. 
  
 
 
3.2.3 Linkages through cross-fertilization in academic discourse 
 
 
As mentioned in the introduction, a governance approach to M&A should be able to 
answer the primary governance theoretic questions, dealing with the boundaries, existence 
and internal organization, from the perspective of M&A. In M&A, these questions 
correspond to the conceptual definitions of M&A, justifications and motivations for M&A 
and pre- and post-merger processes respectively. However, it is hardly enough to imply that 
there are paradigmatic linkages between the M&A discourse and the governance perspective 
to the theory of the firm. It is also necessary to have a closer look at the linkages and focus 
particularly on categorizing them in a meaningful way.  
 
Thus, this section reorganizes the findings of the conceptual analyses presented in 
Appendices 1 and 2 according into a format that respects the basic questions of the 
governance approach. More specifically, the questions addressing governance theoretical 
issues that have been identified in the conceptual analysis of the M&A literature in Appendix 
1 are now organized vis-à-vis the existence, boundaries and internal organization of M&A. 
Similarly, the contribution of the governance theories of the firm to M&A, as identified in the 
conceptual analysis of the governance theories of the firm in Appendix 2, is organized in 
according to the same framework. 
 
The aim of crystallizing the questions put forward by M&A literature, the contribution of 
the governance theories of the firm and the shortcomings of the governance approach in 
M&A is to lay the foundation for a holistic governance perspective to M&A. Particularly the 
more academic approach within this perspective would logically consist of an understanding 
concerning the key questions, hitherto contribution, current shortcomings and subsequent 
future research challenges in combining the governance approach with M&A. This is 
attempted in Section 3.3.1. 
 
This section is organized in three parts. Firstly, the most interesting linkages found in the 
bibliometric study between governance theories of the firm and M&A are investigated70. 
Special attention is paid to governance theory – M&A antecedent linkages and the 
                                                 
70 It is important to note that only some linkages are discussed here. During the analyses, a plethora of smaller 
and larger links between the worlds of the governance theories of the firm and M&A emerged. Of these, only 
the most significant ones are discussed here.  
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coexistence of the governance theories of the firm in M&A literature. Secondly, some key 
governance related questions emerging from the conceptual analysis of M&A are outlined. 
Thirdly, the contributions of the governance theories of the firm, as identified in the 
conceptual analysis in Appendix 2, are organized according to the key questions of the 
boundaries, existence and internal organization of M&A.  
 
 
Linkages between governance theories and M&A antecedents 
 
In the network analysis results presented in Sections 2.3.3-2.3.4, the governance theories 
of the firm seem to link extensively with a number of M&A research antecedents, implying a 
cross-fertilizing connection between the two discourses. According to the co-occurrence 
results, agency theory has been used extensively, unsurprisingly, in M&A goal conflict and 
congruence articles. Actually, agency theoretic M&A articles appear in a cluster of 
antecedents that also includes hostile takeover protection and resistance, commitment, 
managerial hubris and empire-building as well as risk-reducing (diversifying) M&A. Agency 
theory also appears as an important theoretical tenet in articles discussing M&A related 
shareholder value issues as well as debt/equity ratios. Moreover, M&A articles utilizing 
agency theoretic perspectives seem to often link with corporate finance theory and issues. 
The coexistence of agency theory, corporate finance, managerial incentives, hostile takeover 
issues and shareholder value seems logical. On the one hand, agency theoretic literature is 
financially oriented and deals with outcomes, financing decisions and risk reduction (Klein 
2002, Matsusaka and Nanda 2002). On the other hand, it can also be managerial, discussing 
in depth the incentives and actions of various stakeholder groups, especially owners and 
managers, often in the context of hostile takeover attempts and often with shareholder value 
outcomes as measures.  
 
Transaction cost economics, then again, plays an important role, arguably as a cross-
fertilizing linking theory as indicated in Section 3.1, in articles discussing diversifying and 
conglomerate M&A. The input of transaction cost thinking in vertical M&A, which is not 
included as an antecedent by itself, is known. The fact that transaction cost economics is also 
used in articles discussing horizontal M&A, even as a linking theory, might suggest that there 
is future potential for research incorporating transaction cost logic to a wider field of M&A 
studies. What is more, transaction cost economics appears frequently in articles concentrating 
on the performance outcomes of M&A, which intuitively stems from and is facilitated by its 
quasi-analytical nature. Correspondingly, transaction cost economics appears as the most 
important theoretical perspective in articles discussing asset value maximization, most 
probably in the context of in/outsourcing decisions. 
 
Also property rights theory has been utilized in M&A. The property rights perspective 
offers a valuable theoretical cornerstone to literature discussing market power issues, e.g. 
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monopolies, cartels and antitrust measures. With goal conflict and congruence being the 
second most common antecedent in articles using property rights theory, there might be 
reason to believe that the allocation of property rights could play a significant role in M&A 
articles focusing on stakeholder group incentives.  
 
Neoclassical economics, then again, is naturally applied most frequently in articles 
discussing market power issues, and both micro- and macroeconomics theories are used. The 
calculativeness of the neoclassical theory of the firm is shown in the fact that 
(micro)economics theory is also applied extensively in firm performance related articles. It 
could be argued that neoclassical economics, even though withering as a source of direct 
academic referencing as proposed in Section 3.1, still provides M&A literature with the basic 
notions of calculativeness and maximizing behavior. The difference between contemporary 
M&A literature and that of the 1950s-60s is that the limits, effects and conditions of 
modeling and performing M&A are now better understood and calculation and maximizing, 
i.e. traditional neoclassical economic behavior, can only take place after these limits, effects 
and conditions have been understood and met.  
 
Looking at the co-occurrence of the governance theories and M&A antecedents, it could 
be proposed that the governance theoretic issues seem to coexist in the same articles and 
discuss a wide yet commonly shared range of M&A topics. While agency theory is the most 
commonly coexisting theory in articles using transaction cost economics and property rights 
theory as central theoretical tenets, transaction cost economics and property rights on the one 
hand, and neoclassical theory of the firm and property rights on the other also coexist in the 
same articles. This gives reason to believe that, properly investigated, a integrative 
governance perspective to M&A is not an impossible thought, but a rather logical attempt to 
provide a unified, holistic approach.  
 
There are, however, some concerns about these rather simplistic conclusions that were just 
drawn from the bibliometric statistics. Contrary to the anticipations of the conceptual study, 
there seems not to be a de facto connection between shareholder value and property rights 
theory, nor capital markets theory and property rights theory. Despite the intuitive appeal of 
the idea that shareholder value studies and literature, not to speak of capital markets theory, 
would be somehow grounded in the philosophy of the property rights perspective, which 
content-wise supports them somewhat perfectly, this is simply not the case.  
 
A further concern deals with the possibly limited breadth of the governance theories of the 
firm. Regardless of the fact that there are several governance theories with different 
emphases, some of the antecedents, or even prominent clusters of antecedents (see 
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Proposition 1571), identified among the M&A articles are not covered by the governance 
theories. Most importantly the antecedents that are more or less clustered around the notion 
of ‘organizational learning’, but also ‘strategy antecedents’, have so far been somewhat left 
outside the foci of articles using the governance perspective. An interesting question deals 
with whether this is because the governance approach is unable to research these M&A 
antecedents or whether this kind of research has simply not been done. The subjective 
contention here is that there is potential for governance based research in these areas but 
complementation from other firm theoretical perspectives (e.g. the competence perspective) 
is needed. 
 
 
M&A questions about governance issues 
 
Paradigmatic linkages between the two discourses are also materialized in the 
investigation of essential questions in the M&A discourse that address issues close to the 
governance theories of the firm. Some of these questions are raised in the conceptual analysis 
of the M&A literature in Appendix 2, while others emerge here.  
 
The analysis operates with three different dimensions. Most importantly, the questions 
emerging from the M&A discourse are organized according to whether they deal with the 
definitional boundaries, justification for the existence or the internal organization processes 
of M&A. The questions are categorized according to the novel categorization of M&A 
research streams proposed in this study, i.e. the finance stream, the strategy stream, the 
economics and law stream, the humans and organizations stream and the process stream. 
The questions that are included in the analysis are ones, which might present possible 
paradigmatic linkages to the governance perspective. Therefore, the analysis of Table 16 
below is complemented with an attempt to identify which theories of the firm, in general or 
particular, the question areas directly or indirectly refer to.  
 
 
Table 16: A collection of M&A questions regarding the definitional boundaries, existence and internal 
organization processes of M&A and the governance theories of the firm (GTOFs) they address 
 
Questions Regarding the Definitional boundaries of M&A GTOF Addressed 
Finance 
Stream 
To what extent is M&A defined by a change in financial 
structure and ownership vs. change in the organizational 
structure and functioning of the organization? 
Property rights 
 Can authority, information and incentive mechanisms 
define M&A? 
Agency theory, transaction 
cost economics 
                                                 
71 Proposition 15 states that Five M&A research antecedents appear in conspicuous clusters, which can be 
characterized as: the ‘stakeholder incentives’ cluster, the ‘business objectives’ cluster, the  ‘organizational 
learning’ cluster, the ‘strategy antecedent’ cluster (less prominent) and the ‘efficiency and economics’ cluster 
(less prominent) 
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Strategy 
Stream 
Can a change in the transaction cost balance define M&A 
or the type of M&A? 
Transaction cost economics 
Economics and 
Law Stream 
Is the simplistic economic definition of M&A as a 
combining of factors of production too simplistic and, if 
so, how could it be amended? 
All governance theories 
Humans and 
Organizations 
Stream 
What is the role of organizational and interpersonal 
considerations in redefining M&A? 
Agency theory, Incomplete 
contracting 
 Does the notion of incomplete contracting render all 
definitions of M&A incomplete? 
Incomplete contracting 
 
 
 
Questions Regarding the Justifications for the Existence of M&A GTOF Addressed 
Finance 
Stream 
Does allocative efficiency override property rights in 
justifying M&A as an asset transfer (especially in hostile 
takeovers)? 
Property rights 
 Can authority, information and incentive mechanisms 
justify M&A? 
Agency theory, transaction 
cost economics 
 Is the creation of shareholder value the primary 
motivation for M&A? 
Property rights 
Strategy 
Stream 
Does an ex ante indication of potential value creation 
suffice in justifying the performing of M&A? 
Transaction cost economics 
 What is the role of a change in the transaction cost 
balance in justifying (particularly horizontal) M&A? 
Transaction cost economics 
 What justifies industry level vertical integration? Transaction cost economics 
Economics and 
Law Stream 
How could transaction cost rationales be better and further 
applied in the measurement of market power and antitrust 
issues? 
Transaction cost economics 
 How are the wealth and economic efficiency outcomes of 
M&A distributed across different stakeholder groups?  
Agency theory 
 To what extent can market failure considerations override 
an economic actor’s right to freely reallocate resources 
through M&A? 
Property rights 
Humans and 
Organizations 
Stream 
What is the relationship between financial justifications 
and organizational realities in performing M&A? 
Agency theory, incomplete 
contracting, transaction cost 
economics 
 What are the conceptual linkages between an 
organizational perspective to M&A and incomplete 
contracting? 
Incomplete contracting 
Process Stream What is the influence of potential post-merger process 
problems on M&A justifications? 
Agency theory, incomplete 
contracting 
 What are the incentives of professional services providers 
in the justifications presented for M&A? 
Agency theory, (property 
rights) 
 
Questions Regarding the Internal Organization Processes of M&A GTOF Addressed 
Finance 
Stream 
What are the implications of incentive and information 
asymmetries to due diligence processes? 
Agency theory 
Strategy 
Stream 
What are the implications of incentive and information 
asymmetries to the setting of strategic objectives and the 
strategic evaluation of potential M&A partners? 
Agency theory 
 What is the influence of an ex ante indication of potential 
value creation in pre-M&A decision-making phases? 
Transaction cost economics 
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 What is the influence of transaction frictions to M&A 
processes? 
Transaction cost economics 
Economics and 
Law Stream 
Which M&A processes create market failure and how? Transaction cost economics 
 What determines the efficiency and wealth outcomes of 
the various M&A processes? 
All governance theories 
Humans and 
Organizations 
Stream 
What kinds of boundaries and realities do organizational 
and individualistic considerations set for M&A 
contracting processes? 
Incomplete contracting 
Process Stream What is the general influence of different M&A processes 
on the determination of governance structures? 
All governance theories 
 Which key inter-stakeholder group problems emerge in 
different phases of the M&A process? 
Agency theory 
 What is the impact of the use of professional services 
providers on M&A processes? 
Agency theory 
 What are the limitations of the contribution of governance 
insights on the internal organization processes of M&A? 
All governance theories 
 What are the similarities and differences of the contracting 
dynamics of pre- and post-merger processes? 
Incomplete contracting, 
transaction cost economics 
 
 
Table 16 illustrates how diverse the possible interlinkages between M&A and theories of 
the firm are. M&A literature poses numerous questions to the majority of theories of the firm. 
The questions, which are admittedly very subjective and identified by the author’s own 
judgment, seem to suggest some patterns in how the M&A schools are linked to governance 
theory.  
 
The finance stream seems to pose questions to and derive intellectual input vis-à-vis the 
organization of economic activity from agency theory, property rights theory as well as, to a 
slightly lesser extent, transaction cost economics. Questions regarding the role of ownership 
and shareholder value can be argued present an intuitively interesting theme for research 
using property rights theory as an ideological starting point. On the other hand, cross-
fertilization between agency theory and the theory of finance seems to continue as an avenue 
for research on incentives, information and authority in the study of M&A.  
 
The strategy stream can be suggested to be more linked to transaction cost economics. 
This interlinkage is apparent in how e.g. the relatedness/synergy arguments can be used in the 
transaction cost economic vertical integration/make-or-buy question. As argued by 
Williamson (1999), transaction cost economics can potentially provide useful tools for 
strategy research and analysis. Questions regarding the use of transaction cost economics in 
e.g. the analysis of horizontal M&A and the influence of ex ante indications of value creation 
opportunities on strategic M&A behavior. The issue of the boundaries of the firm seems to be 
closest to strategic M&A thinking. Examples of strategic boundary decisions include, in 
addition to pure yes-or-no-to-M&A decisions, the sourcing of supplies and inputs, supplier 
relations, the ability to mediate knowledge from best practices in the market as well as the 
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appropriation of rents in a negotiation situation. “Virtually all issues of corporate strategy, 
and many of business strategy, involve the boundaries of the firm” (Foss 2000, xlix). 
 
Much of the literature in the economics and law stream has its roots in neoclassical 
economics reasoning and is embodied in the modern industrial organization analysis whose 
core M&A related research areas are antitrust, monopolies, cartels, market power, wealth, 
economic efficiency and price-level impacts of M&A. Economics based M&A research has, 
however, potentially fruitful streams in e.g. more socio-economical debates (discussing e.g. 
the demarcation of ownership rights in the face of economic efficiency) and the distribution 
of M&A wealth outcomes across sub-economy level units of analysis. 
 
The humans and organizations stream, given its emphasis of human aspects and 
employment, derives from the same Simonian and Coasian principles that spurred early 
incomplete literature. Emergent questions from the M&A literature deal with the types of 
limitations that the incomplete contracting notion poses for the performing of M&A. Also 
individualistic and group behavior and organizational issues that involve several stakeholder 
groups and thus potential information and incentive asymmetry problems between them can 
provide a fruitful avenue. Agency theoretic insights can be speculated to be useful here.  
 
The process stream, then again, has an unsurprising emphasis on the internal organization 
of M&A. The various steps in the M&A process incorporate numerous different aspects 
regarding humans, organizations, industries, relationships as well quantitative evaluation. 
This suggests that input could be derived from various theories of the firm. The listing of 
M&A questions at the end of Table 16 can be perceived have a considerable weakness in the 
sense that it might mislead to believe that all questions dealing with the internal organization 
of M&A arise from the process school. This is, however, not the case. As is seen in Table 16, 
there are numerous questions dealing with process issues that can be argued to arise from the 
other M&A schools. The correct way to interpret the Table 16 is that potential answers to the 
questions, should they arise with the help of agency theory, transaction cost economics, 
incomplete contracting or all of the governance theories of the firm, would belong more or 
less to the process school. This whole issue highlights the interdisciplinary nature of M&A 
and the potential for cross-fertilizing research between M&A research streams and the 
governance theories. Besides this, it must be noted that property rights theory, which 
arguably assumes more the role of an ideological background or philosophy than a directly 
applicable theory, is conspicuously absent from the last third of Table 16 that lists more 
pragmatic issues dealing with M&A processes.  
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Contribution of the governance theories to M&A  
 
Yet another instance in which cross-fertilization between the governance perspective and 
M&A emerges are the contributions of the governance theories of the firm to the M&A 
discourse identified in the conceptual analysis in Appendix 2. These are two-fold. On the one 
hand, there are general level contributions between the two discourses, much of which have 
to do with their shared intellectual history and parallel development paths. These 
contributions follow along the lines identified in Section 3.2.1. On the other hand, there are a 
number of contributions from specific governance theories, often to specific M&A issues. 
 
When discussing the general contribution of the governance theories to the firm, criticism 
concerning the differences between the governance theories emerges. It can be argued that 
literature discussing the governance approach as a whole (e.g. Williamson 1999, Madhok 
2002) has a tendency to elevate key findings of specific governance theories of the firm as 
generic contributions of the entire governance perspective. After the analyses presented in 
this study, it seems increasingly likely that what is known as ‘the governance approach’ is not 
a single approach, but rather a holistic perspective consisting of a collection of intertwined 
governance approaches acting at different levels. This is also precisely where the strength of 
the governance perspective lies: it combines the strengths of a number of theories yet remains 
united by the focusing on three shared key questions dealing with the boundaries, existence 
and internal organization of firms.  
 
Given this position, it is logical that the ‘general level’ contributions of the governance 
approach to M&A are limited to the nature of scientific thinking (discussed in Section 3.2.2.), 
key questions advocated (the boundaries, existence and internal organization of firms) and an 
arsenal of conceptual tools. Appendix 3 scrutinizes briefly a number of concepts that have 
arisen from organizational and institutional economics and have subsequently become routine 
terminology also in M&A. Concepts like the organization of economic activity, stakeholder 
groups, asymmetric information, incomplete contracting, incentive asymmetry, risk 
preferences, opportunism, asset specificity and bounded rationality are examples of such 
concepts. 
 
Besides these rather abstract general contributions of the governance perspective to M&A, 
a number of inputs from specific theories of the firm can be identified. Here, an overview of 
these specific contributions is given by organizing them according to the key questions of the 
boundaries, existence and internal organization of M&A.  
 
Table 17 illustrates the various instances in which governance theory of the firm can help 
us understand the justifications, definitions and processes present in the M&A discourse.  
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Table 17: Contribution of specific governance theories of the firm on M&A 
 
Contribution to the Definitional Boundaries of M&A 
 
M&A Research 
Streams Most Likely 
to Benefit 
Neoclassical economics Amalgamation of two production functions Economics, Strategy 
Nexus of contracts Outcome-based thinking renders it unnecessary to define M&A as 
anything else than just another contract 
Finance, Economics 
Agency theories Inter-actor group aspects of M&A definitions highlighted Humans and 
organizations, 
Strategy, Process 
Early incomplete 
contracting 
M&A introduced as a way to extend of the boundaries of the firm Strategy, Humans 
and organizations  
Transaction cost 
economics 
M&A as an efficiency seeking mechanism 
 
M&A defined in terms of the availability of information regarding 
different authority structures 
Economics 
Traditional and new 
property rights 
M&A as resource allocation mechanism  
 
M&A as a mechanism for the transfer of control authority 
Strategy, Finance 
 
Contribution to the Justification for the Existence of M&A 
M&A Research 
Stream Most Likely 
to Benefit 
Neoclassical economics Abnormal profits through monopoly power Economics, Finance 
Nexus of contracts Through M&A, desired capital structure outcomes, implying a 
certain organization of economic activity, are reached 
Finance 
Agency theory Owner-manager & conglomerate M&A explained by risk and 
incentives  
 
‘Boards as monitoring mechanisms’ and other corporate governance 
explanations 
 
Information structure and communication related explanations 
 
 
M&A activity is a manifestation of the agency problems of 
inefficient external investments by managers (“managerialism”) 
Strategy, Humans 
and organizations 
 
Strategy 
 
 
Strategy, Humans 
and organizations 
 
Humans and 
organizations 
Early incomplete 
contracting 
M&A provides a solution for the coordination problem Humans and 
organizations 
Transaction cost 
economics 
M&A leads to an efficient72 governance structure under incomplete 
contracting and ex post governance 
 
M&A establishes authority to mitigate transaction costs 
Economics, Strategy 
 
 
Economics, Strategy 
Traditional and new 
property rights 
M&A leads to efficiency gains through the resource allocation 
mechanism of property rights  
 
The market for the transferability and competitiveness of ownership 
Economics, Finance, 
Strategy 
 
Finance, Strategy 
                                                 
72 In terms of both pure economic costs and transaction costs 
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creates M&A 
 
M&A drives towards more efficient corporate governance structures 
 
 
Economics, Strategy 
 
 
Contribution to the Internal Organization of the M&A process 
M&A Research 
Stream Most Likely 
to Benefit 
Neoclassical economics None None 
Nexus of contracts A mere contracting process Economics (?) 
Agency theories Multiple incentive and information asymmetry arguments all through 
the M&A process 
Strategy, Humans 
and organizations, 
Process 
Early incomplete 
contracting 
The coordination problem in the selection of M&A candidates, 
modes, methods and the resulting organization structure 
Process, strategy 
Transaction cost 
economics 
Numerous tools for analyzing internal transaction costs of M&A 
processes 
 
Human elements important in determining transaction costs in 
especially post-merger processes 
Process 
 
 
Process, Humans and 
organizations 
Traditional and new 
property rights 
Attempts to discuss in terms of authority, suffers from the 
disregarding of behavioral assumptions and mitigation of internal 
issues such as structure and culture 
None ? 
 
Other contribution 
M&A Research 
Stream Most Likely 
to Benefit 
Neoclassical economics Merger waves and M&A as an vehicle of agglomeration  Economics 
Agency theories Tool for modeling M&A problems at a number of levels of analysis 
 
 
Strategy 
Early incomplete 
contracting 
Introduction of basic semantics for the discussion of incomplete 
contracts 
All 
Transaction cost 
economics 
Introduction of a set of conceptual tools to analyze the markets and 
hierarchies and the boundaries of the firm: particularly vertical 
integration and horizontal and vertical relationships 
All 
 
As is seen above, particularly agency theory, transaction cost economics and property 
rights theory, but also the incomplete contracting tradition to some extent, seem to provide a 
number of significant contributions to the field of M&A. There are particularly many insights 
to justifications of the existence M&A.  
 
The issue of the definitional boundaries of M&A, given the rather mechanistic definitions 
put forth by the governance theories, is not an equally interesting ferment from the 
governance theories’ point of view, but the relatively thin contribution vis-à-vis the internal 
organization of M&A needs some analysis. The governance theories of the firm seem to 
complement the definitional boundaries of M&A with their own rather metaphoric semantics, 
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but still the outcome is surely a better understanding of what M&A really is (cf. Appendix 3). 
This is yet another example of the general contribution of the governance theories in 
enriching the language and conceptual arsenal of M&A research. 
 
Ironically, it seems that the governance theories of the firm are somewhat weaker when it 
comes to firm level analyses of M&A processes. Regardless of the fact that one of the key 
foci of the governance theories of the firm is particularly the internal organization of firms, 
the insights on particular processes, such as the M&A process, can remain relatively thin. 
Especially property rights theory is particularly weak in analyzing the specifics of internal 
processes. What is more surprising, however, is that also transaction cost economics has 
narrow contributions to the internal organization of M&A. Among the five exemplary TCE 
general contributions vis-à-vis the internal organization of firms presented in Appendix 273, 
for example, there are only minor parallels to M&A thinking. Agency theory, despite its 
merits in helping to predict the influence of incentive and information asymmetries on M&A 
process outcomes, is rather limited in the scope of its analysis. It seems that the governance 
theories of the firm, as a whole, are not at their strongest in the analysis of the internal 
organization of M&A. It is here that the governance perspective arguably needs most support 
from the competence-based theory of the firm and its different, partially overlapping 
resource-, capability and knowledge-based approaches. 
 
Propositions about cross-fertilization in academic discourse 
 
Proposition 27: The governance theories of the firm are clearly interlinked with various 
M&A antecedents and clusters of antecedents. 
 
Proposition 27a: Agency theory is deeply interlinked with both financially and 
managerially oriented M&A antecedents.  
 
Proposition 27b: Transaction cost economics plays an important cross-fertilizing linking 
theory role particularly in articles dealing with diversifying and conglomerate M&A. 
 
Proposition 27c: The property rights perspective offers a valuable theoretical cornerstone 
to literature discussing market power issues, e.g. monopolies, cartels and antitrust measures. 
 
Proposition 27d: Neoclassical economics is interlinked with M&A articles discussing 
market power issues, and the traditional neoclassical notions of maximization and 
calculativeness are still visible in firm performance related M&A literature.  
                                                 
73 The contribution areas being, namely, a) the formation of teams, b) the degree of decentralization, c) head 
office size and functions, d) number of management layers and the e) measurement of administrability (see 
Williamson 1975, 1985, 1993, Besanko et al. 1996, Barnard 1938, Simon 1951, Morgan 1986, Pugh 1997, 
Richter 1999) 
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Proposition 28: There is a plethora of M&A related questions that address governance 
issues. Patterns between particular M&A research streams and the governance theories seem 
to emerge.  
 
Proposition 29: The governance perspective is, rather than a single approach, a holistic 
collection of individual approaches unified by common key interests and terminology.  
 
Proposition 30: The specific contributions of the individual governance theories of the 
firm suggest that the governance perspective is at its strongest in the analysis of the existence 
of M&A and weakest in the analysis of the internal organization of M&A.  
 
 
3.2.4 Linkages through shared views on real-life M&A situations 
 
In addition to the converging intellectual and historical foundations and apparent academic 
cross-fertilization between the M&A discourse and the governance approach, there is a third 
way of linking the two. In essence, the aim of this Section is to show that the governance 
approach is also useful in a number of M&A decision-making settings, business contexts and 
pragmatic M&A management settings, particularly in the light of some contemporarily 
interesting M&A management issues.  
 
In this section, a collection of examples of the usefulness of the governance approach in 
pragmatic business contexts is presented. These examples of practical governance insights to 
M&A have arisen during the entire research process starting from the conceptual studies, 
continuing with the bibliometric analyses and ending with the interpretation of the results. 
This is also why e.g. some of the mentioned examples resemble the interesting contemporary 
M&A sub-phenomena in Appendix 1. Even though they are somewhat unstructured and 
randomly selected, they succeed in illustrating the types of real-life M&A issues in which a 
governance perspective could be useful. 
 
Timing and time pacing 
 
The first relevant issue in M&A management deals with the general novel strategy 
imperative of timing and time pacing, which has direct implications for practitioners’ 
decision-making (see especially Eisenhardt and Brown 1998, also Brown and Eisenhardt 
1997). One of the very core ideas in time pacing involves the management of corporate 
transitions, the largest of which can be argued to be M&A. Particularly important for 
companies in fast-changing industries, the time pacing techniques help companies learn to 
complete M&A transitions more quickly and effectively. Timing and time pacing literature, 
which can be argued to also derive from the governance approach, presents an important 
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dynamic element in corporate strategy research and thus has to be incorporated in any novel, 
holistic approach to M&A. The design of governance mechanisms nimble enough to cope 
with high-velocity environments is an interesting avenue for future research aiming at 
introducing governance into the analysis of M&A. 
 
Riding the merger wave, avoiding merger mania 
 
Merger waves were a recurring phenomenon during the 20th century. A special timing and 
time pacing related M&A management talent has thus for a considerable amount of time been 
the skill to time M&A activities. In essence, this means catching the early bird by entering 
e.g. industry wide consolidation activity early on, riding the merger wave when the financial 
markets presents lucrative opportunities and avoiding merger mania when wave has reached 
the point of inanity. The governance perspective, with its broad approach combining a 
number of logics and levels of analysis could provide a more dependable check-list for 
decision-making in such times than, for example, simply staring at shareholder value 
rationales.  
 
Demergers and divestiture 
 
Another interesting phenomenon of the 1990s M&A ‘market’ is the significant role of 
divesting and de-merging as a part of M&A activity74. It is obvious that the M&A literature 
arguing for the significance of relatedness, which primarily communicates with the 
contributions of the resource-based theory of the firm, has foremost importance in the 
analysis of these demerger activities. However, it is evident that demergers, quite like all 
other M&A activity, present a transfer of the ownership and control of corporate assets (see 
e.g. Gadad and Thomas 1999). Divestiture decision-making is also an exercise explicitly 
involving the boundaries of the firm e.g. thus the transaction costs of in- and outsourcing 
different functions is an essential exercise. One of the primary motivations for management 
buy-outs (MBOs), then again, is the differing incentives and superior information of 
managers vis-à-vis owners. These kind of situations should thus be analyzed and interpreted 
with agency theoretic viewpoints in real-life MBO decision-making situations. On the whole, 
demergers and divestitures, as a whole, present a significant departure from the general M&A 
logic arguing for the benefits of establishing larger hierarchies. 
 
Corporate governance and M&A 
 
Corporate governance, as a management research topic, has enjoyed increasing 
practitioner and academic attention during the past few years. At the very basic level, 
                                                 
74 For example, Gadad (1998) shows that demerger activity in the UK escalated significantly in the 1990s and 
the total value of transactions in the divestiture market equalled about 40% of the total M&A market during the 
period from 1985 to 1994. 
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corporate governance literature is interested in the power and control of organizations. 
Increasingly, it is admitted that the board of directors should not be under direct control of 
any particular stakeholder group, including shareholders, but should instead be trustees of the 
corporation itself (Blair and Stout 1999). The traditional agency setting concentrating on 
shareholder monitoring and aligning interests with managers is undoubtedly still valid, but 
has been complemented with multiple agency settings and a need to more generally 
understand the incentives, information and monitoring mechanisms of various stakeholder 
groups. M&A decision-making situations evoke the differing incentives and information of 
stakeholder groups in a drastic manner, and thus particularly hostile M&A and related 
corporate governance issues are an increasingly interesting application area for agency 
theoretic and governance-based approaches. 
 
Silent institutional investors and shareholder value ideology 
 
Yet another hot M&A management topic deals with the complexity of understanding the 
will and voice of a stakeholder group called ‘shareholders’. The behavior of different 
shareholder types is increasingly understood. Particularly silent institutional investors, who 
vote with their feet and do not use voice even in M&A situations, are assuming a growing 
role in the M&A market. Shareholder value ideology can be argued to be sliding in the 
direction of ever-purer exercise of ownership or property rights and shareholders can be 
argued to be able or willing to act as a group with a single incentive to an ever-lesser degree. 
The governance approach, especially with property rights and agency theoretic viewpoints, 
should be able to contribute to the practitioner understanding of this changing landscape.  
 
Measuring the success of M&A 
 
In the management, and analysis, of M&A, a need to be able to measure the success of 
performed M&A and the need to iterate the reasons for M&A outcomes more closely 
prevails. Much of M&A success measurement research has resorted to event studies 
analyzing share price changes within a fixed time frame. However, a traditional metaphor 
argues that M&A projects create a cloud of dust around the organization and that it takes so 
long for the dust to settle that iterating between changes from M&A and changes all other 
dynamic factors is difficult if not impossible. There is a plethora of criticism on the relevance 
of particularly conditional event studies (see e.g. Stallworthy and Kharbanda 1988, Acharya 
1988, 1993, Eckbo, Maksimovic and Williams 1990). The governance approach could be 
used to develop measurement mechanisms focusing on non-event study methodology or at 
least non-shareholder value based measures. As advocated by Ivo Welch in the provoking 
article "The Top Achievements, Challenges and Failures of Finance"75, transaction cost based 
measures hold potential not only for qualitative M&A analysis but also rigorous quantitative 
                                                 
75 Yale School of Management, 2001 
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use of the transaction cost equation (Welch 2001, p. 9). Other governance concepts, too, 
could most probably cross-fertilize into the development of alternative M&A success 
measurement mechanisms.  
 
The non-prescribeability of post-merger processes 
 
One of the major arguments in the process stream of M&A research is that there is a 
profound difference between pre- and post-merger processes in the significance and amount 
of attention they deserve. In short, it is argued that pre-merger processes are less unique case-
to-case, are easier to manage and thus bear less risk. This, in turn, implies that post-merger 
processes are more significant vis-à-vis the success of the M&A and deserve much more 
attention. One of the core reasons for the non-prescribeability of post-merger processes is that 
integration projects and problems are multifaceted, can operate at different levels and involve 
complex tasks related to unpredictable incentive and information settings between people and 
groups. (See e.g. Haspeslagh and Jemison 1991, Shrivastava 1986, Habeck et al. 2000).  
 
In post-merger settings, the analysis of incentives of different groups within the merged 
organization and the information available to these groups is vital. Decisions concerning 
monitoring, rewarding and boundary setting (e.g. in- and outsourcing) are a key part of post-
merger planning and integration. Understanding the relationship between what is written in 
the contract and what the post-merger process is like is important. The omission of post-
merger process considerations in the drafting of a financially oriented M&A contract is a 
typical example of incomplete contracting. Post-merger processes must most often be carried 
out within the boundaries defined by pre-merger processes, and conceptual and financial 
tools to facilitate calculativeness and benefit maximization under incomplete contracting are 
needed. The utilization of the governance approach thus needs to be mapped as a process, as 
is attempted in Section 3.3.2. 
 
Post-merger organizational trauma 
 
Post-merger trauma is another familiar managerial challenge in post-merger management. 
M&A acts as a shock and breaks the routines and conventions of everyday work. From the 
perspective of the governance approach, post-merger organizational trauma is a natural 
outcome of incomplete contracting processes that can and should be foreseen. Aligning 
incentives and writing contracts more carefully can thus reduce post-merger trauma. 
Alternatively, the cost incurred from post-merger trauma can be estimated and taken into 
consideration in boundary decisions related to e.g. in- and outsourcing and divestment 
activity. 
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Reasons for synergy capture failures 
 
A well-known managerial phenomenon deals with the inability of merging firms to 
capture the anticipated synergies in the context of M&A integration. There are a few reasons 
for this. Firstly, synergies can be inflated to compensate for an escalation in the acquisitions 
price or to convince decision-makers about the potential behind the acquisition. Such 
behavior is related to incentive asymmetries between investment bankers and managers (see 
e.g. Sharma 1997, Kesner, Shapiro and Sharma 1994) or between managers and owners of 
the company. Investment bankers, with their percentage compensation of the total value of 
the deal, always have a principal incentive to increase the price (and thus the total value) of 
the deal. Managers, then again, can have incentive drivers such as turnover-related bonuses, 
share price related options or simply empire-building, which make them overestimate the 
potential synergies. Understanding the incentive asymmetries through the governance 
approach can help us understand and predict the overestimation of synergies in M&A. 
 
Increased role of acquisitions in corporate strategies 
 
Similar reasoning can be applied to whether and how many M&A projects are initiated in 
the first place. Managers see acquisitions as a potential empire-building exercise and are 
caught in acquisition hubris (see e.g. Roll 1986). Moreover, managers often become ‘owners’ 
of M&A projects, giving them a personal interest of performing them. As personified M&A 
experience amounts, companies can be hypothesized to be ever more prone to acquisitive 
behavior vs. organic growth. Likewise, without M&A, there is little work for M&A lawyers, 
consultants and investment bankers, who have a general incentive to make M&A deals 
happen. Again, understanding incentives through the governance approach is essential to 
explain why M&A happens in particular business settings.  
 
Acquisition price escalation 
 
There are several reasons for acquisition price escalation that relate to the governance 
theories of the firm. Skilled target company negotiators always have a feel for the transaction 
cost of the bidder in case the deal falls through or not. The transaction costs of participating 
in M&A negotiations and/or making a hostile bid instead of a friendly one are high to the 
extent that potential acquirers can be threatened with withdrawal from the negotiation. 
Similarly, also the aforementioned investment banker price escalation incentives and the 
managers becoming emotionally attached to M&A projects make way for price escalation. 
Then again, incentive related and game theoretic viewpoints could be utilized in the analysis 
of multi-bidder situations and situations involving several alternatives. All in all, acquisition 
price escalation avoidance is a fruitful application area for governance theoretic research.  
 
  151
Anti-takeover measures – which ones and why 
 
What has just been argued for acquisition price escalation also applies to anti-takeover 
measures. The principal incentive for the employment of anti-takeover measures is the fear or 
realization of target company management that their incentives would not be aligned with the 
managers and owners of the acquiring company. Also the selection of specific anti-takeover 
instruments can be speculated to be influenced e.g. by the types of incentive asymmetry 
between the managers of the target company. It is evident that e.g. personally oriented 
corporate governance measures such as golden parachutes or bungee cords have a different 
incentive asymmetry behind them than organizationally oriented ones like greenmail, poison 
pills, antidilution provisions and so on.  
 
Motivations of stakeholder groups in M&A negotiations 
 
The final exemplary incentive related pragmatic repercussion of the governance approach 
relates to the understanding of stakeholder group motivations during M&A negotiations. 
Primary stakeholder groups, e.g. acquiring company owners, target company owners, 
acquiring company directors, target company directors, employees, professional service 
providers, suppliers, customers and governments all have different incentive structures and 
are likely to take different starting points in negotiations. Generally, acquiring company 
owners want to see the deal happen provided that the price stays reasonable. Target company 
owners, then again, want as high a price as possible. Employees are generally M&A resistant 
since they fear for the loss of their jobs and are generally change resistant. Acquiring 
company directors are generally in favor of the deal, while target directors have a skeptical 
starting point since they fear for their position. Professional service providers generally have 
an incentive to make things happen as much as possible, since that implies work and 
compensation. Suppliers see the possibility of a larger customer, but fear increased 
bargaining power and switching. Customers see a larger product mix but fear for problems in 
delivery reliability and other everyday routines as well as increased bargaining power. 
Finally, governments hope for increased investment, but fear for job cuts and increased 
market power. On the whole, going through and making a plan for aligning these incentives 
is a good idea in preparation for M&A negotiations, yet another piece of evidence about the 
prescriptive power of the governance approach.  
 
The above issues provide examples of and evidence for the claim that governance 
thinking, embodied in the content of property rights ideology, transaction cost related 
boundary drawing exercises, neoclassical calculativeness and maximizing behavior, agency 
theoretic incentive, information and monitoring practices as well as issues related to 
incomplete and complete contracting, has significant application possibilities, managerially 
oriented research streams and general pragmatic relevance for decision-making.  
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With the aid of these exemplary contributions, six basic M&A decision-making areas can 
be refined.  
 
Table 18: Six governance-related M&A decision-making areas and their key questions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
From a more managerial decision-making point of view, there is an acute need to organize 
M&A frameworks as a process. As pointed out by proponents of the process stream (e.g. 
Haspeslagh and Jemison 1991, Jemison and Sitkin 1986, Shrivastava 1986), the 
chronological and sequential nature of the M&A decision-making process needs to be 
considered. For a closer elaboration of the process perspective to M&A research, see 
Appendix 1. 
 
Out of the lessons presented by the M&A research streams about the existence, boundaries 
and internal organization of M&A, the processual models are perhaps closest to managerial 
decision-making. This is an important insight and should be considered in the formation of 
any novel M&A framework. In other words, the management of M&A in general has 
increasingly been focused around the management of the various steps of the M&A process. 
Thus, any managerial aspect of a holistic governance perspective to M&A should be 
organized to respect the processual view of M&A. This is attempted in Section 3.3. below. 
 
Propositions about the use of governance insights in a building a managerial M&A 
decision-making framework: 
 
Proposition 31: The governance perspective has some considerable contributions to 
practical M&A management and decision-making settings. Perhaps more importantly, future 
research could extend this contribution significantly. 
 
Proposition 32: The contribution of the governance perspective can be seen in six M&A 
decision-making areas ranging from the underlying philosophy for performing M&A to the 
practicalities of establishing the new legal entity. 
 
1. Basic philosophy for performing M&A  What are the fundamental goals of M&A? 
2. Understanding the limits of M&A operations What can be done? 
3. The influence of M&A on stakeholder groups Who influences / is influenced and why/how? 
4. Economizing the boundaries of the firm  How and where can we gain from M&A? 
5. Maximizing the M&A outcome   What needs to be calculated? 
6. Establishing the new corporate entity  What are the necessary (legal) operations? 
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Proposition 33: Given that the processual view of M&A has received the most managerial 
attention, any new framework attempting to tackle real-life M&A decision-making should 
organized so that it is compatible with the view of M&A as a process. 
 
Proposition 34: Assuming that the governance approach is theoretically not a single, 
monolithic approach but rather a perspective consisting of partially overlapping and 
contradictory approaches, managerial decision-making can potentially offer ‘the governance 
perspective’, as a whole, an equally important application area as academic research.  
 
 
3.2.5 Shortcomings of governance theories of the firm in M&A 
 
The issues discussed here are multifaceted and even complex to some extent. This is why 
the critical judgments and shortcomings, which are accounted for in other parts of the study, 
especially the conclusion, have not been presented amidst the arguments, but collected here. 
This section aims at summarizing the findings of the analysis in Appendix 2 regarding the 
shortcomings of the governance theories of the firm in understanding and analyzing M&A. 
Key attention is paid to crystallizing the relationship between the general level criticism, 
criticism regarding some key assumptions and criticism on specific governance theories of 
the firm. On the other hand, the perceived shortcomings are briefly mirrored against the 
perceived strengths and contributions emerging from the linkages in Section 3.2.3. This 
section is thus a compilation of critical judgments concerning the contribution of the 
governance theories of the firm on M&A. In a nutshell, this section briefly reiteratires the 
criticism presented against the governance theories of the firm and attempts to investigate 
what the repercussion on their applicability to the M&A discourse is. 
 
 
General shortcomings and repercussions 
 
As explained in Appendix 2, the governance perspective in general can be perceived to 
suffer from a) the limited scope it has in organizational analysis resulting from the omission 
of inter-organizational, industry level and, to some extent, macro-level considerations, b) the 
fixation to an economics mindset and methodology, c) the omission of the social and human 
perspective to M&A making the governance approach “bad for practice”76 and d) the lack of 
decomposing and systematically analyzing specifics of the internal workings of the firm, 
particularly through empirical research. 
 
There are four repercussions to the applicability of the governance perspective to M&A in 
general. Firstly, a governance perspective based on theories of the firm cannot exhaustively 
                                                 
76 Ghoshal and Moran 1996: p. 1 
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deal with M&A but needs support from economics of organization that incorporates inter- 
inter-organizational, industry level and, to some extent, macro-level considerations. 
Secondly, the governance perspective is severely limited in tackling of managerial, 
psychological and organizational aspects of M&A (Mueller 1995). Thirdly, the governance 
perspective must be used with caution, given that it can be “dangerous” if used 
inappropriately (Ghoshal and Moran 1996). Finally, the governance perspective might not be 
able to give satisfactory answers regarding the internal organization of M&A. Thus 
complementation with lessons from the competence perspective and/or a great deal of related 
empirical research is needed.  
 
 
Shortcomings and repercussions of particular assumptions 
 
The following fundamental assumptions shared by some of the governance theories have 
been heavily criticized. Firstly, there is considerable criticism towards the simplified model 
of an opportunistically behaving human who does not collaborate and has no moral restraints 
(Yli-Renko 1999, Ghoshal and Moran 1996). Secondly, the emphasis of efficiency as a 
dominant measure of success for all economic actors can be criticized (Ghoshal and Moran 
1996). Thirdly, the criticism of perfectly complete contracting has been abundant and the 
notion of incomplete contracting is in this day and age widely accepted.  
 
The repercussions to the use of governance approaches in M&A are also three-fold. As 
analyzed in Appendix 2, the criticism on the assumptions implies a current inability of the 
governance approach to understand, and consequently a need to study, a) collaborative 
human action in M&A, b) managerial and other non-efficiency minded M&A motivations 
and success criteria77 and c) the role of non-contractible (ex post) bargaining in M&A deals 
more carefully. Table 19 summarizes the general and assumption-specific criticisms as well 
as their repercussions to the use of the governance perspective in M&A research 
 
Table 19: Summary of general and assumption-specific criticism of the governance perspective and the 
repercussions to the use of the governance perspective in M&A research 
 
Issue under 
criticism Criticism / shortcoming argument 
Possible/argued implication for the compatibility of 
the governance perspective to M&A 
Governance 
perspective in 
general 
Limited scope in organizational analysis 
resulting from the omission of inter-
organizational, industry level and macro-level 
considerations  
Cannot exhaustively deal with M&A but needs 
support from economics of organization that 
incorporates inter- inter-organizational, industry 
level and, to some extent, macro-level 
considerations  
                                                 
77 Starting with e.g. Roll 1986 and Becovich and Narayan 1993, such research already exists 
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 Fixation to an economics mindset and 
methodology Severely and irreversible limited in tackling of some managerial, psychological and organisational 
aspects of M&A. 
 Omission of the social and human perspective to 
organizational restructuring 
Must be used with caution, given that can be 
dangerous if used ignorantly. 
 Lack of particularly empirical analysis 
concerning the internal workings of the firm 
Limited contribution regarding the internal 
organization of M&A. Help from competence 
perspective and/or more empirical research needed. 
Assumptions 
behind some 
governance 
theories 
The opportunistic human as an economic actor 
with no collaborative intent or moral is a 
simplistic and unrealistic assumption 
Inability to understand and need to study 
collaborative human action in M&A.  
 Efficiency as the sole measure of success is a 
simplistic and unrealistic assumption 
Inability to understand and need to study 
managerial and other non-efficiency minded M&A 
motivations and success criteria 
 Complete contracting is a simplistic and 
unrealistic assumption 
Inability to understand and need to study the role of 
non-contractible (ex post) bargaining in M&A deals 
 
 
 
Shortcomings and repercussions of specific theories 
 
During the research performed for this study, a plethora of critical judgments concerning 
specific governance theories of the firm were identified. Table 20 summarizes the 
shortcomings of specific theories of the firm together with a note on the implications this 
criticism suggests on their application to M&A (See Appendix 2). 
 
Table 20: A collection of criticisms on governance theories of the firm and repercussions to their use in 
M&A research 
 
Governance 
theory under 
criticism 
Criticism / shortcoming argument Possible/argued implication for the compatibility of the governance perspective to M&A 
Neoclassical 
economics 
Neoclassical TOF is confined by strict 
assumptions concerning e.g. complete 
contracting, perfect information, utility 
maximization and the constraints of the 
production function. 
Neoclassical TOF is deoperationalized vis-à-vis 
M&A. 
 In neoclassical economics definitions, a merger 
is considered a mere amalgamation of two 
production functions78. 
Applicability to the discussion concerning 
definitional boundaries of M&A is limited. 
                                                 
78 On the level of the industry and the level of the economy, the neoclassical literature is more interested in what 
the merging firms are like, since this might be significant from the point of view of monopoly power and 
macroeconomic stability respectively. 
  156 
 Omission of other justification for the existence 
of M&A than the maximization of abnormal 
profit through monopoly power. 
Applicability to the discussion concerning the 
justification for the existence of M&A is limited. 
 Neoclassical economics assumes the firm as a 
‘black box’ and is thus not interested in the 
managerial, psychological, legal or 
organizational internal processes of M&A. 
Applicability to the discussion concerning the 
internal organisation of M&A processes is limited. 
Agency 
theories 
Are epistemologically not complete theories as 
such, but rather a collection of models and 
frameworks (Eisenhardt 1989)  
Limited appreciation in academia reducing 
applicability to M&A literature 
 Is particularly prone to assuming without 
exception that managers are involved in 
continuous utility maximization (Kaplan 1983) 
Agency theory is a valid, but not a sufficiently 
generalizable method for analyzing complex 
organizational realities in the context of M&A 
 Omits opportunistic behavior by principals 
(Perrow 1986) 
Agency theory is a valid, but not a sufficiently 
generalizable method for analyzing complex 
organizational realities in the context of M&A 
 Underestimates the importance of authority 
(Perrow 1986) 
Agency theory is a valid, but not a sufficiently 
generalizable method for analyzing complex 
organizational realities in the context of M&A 
 Fails to account for organizational slack and 
promotion policies which reduce the effects of 
adverse selection and moral hazard (Perrow 
1986, Foss 2001) 
Exceptions to the key findings of agency theory 
reduce the credibility of any attempt to apply it to 
e.g. M&A 
 Omits a number of sources of outcome 
uncertainty within the organization and lacks 
consideration for the dynamics of incomplete 
knowledge (Nilakant and Rao 1994) 
Reduces the applicability to particularly M&A 
involving immaterial resources and less developed 
organizations 
 Positivist agency theory is abstract and 
minimalist, and formal P-A work has a 
constrained mathematical nature (Hirsch et al 
1987, Perrow 1986) 
Neither stream of agency theory has established 
sufficient merit to be seriously applied to M&A. 
Implies also inaccessibility to organizational 
theorists and other M&A related audiences. 
 Agency theory is not interested in 
organizational boundaries. Given certain P-A 
conditions, agency theory doesn’t care whether 
the change in governance structure involves the 
amalgamation of organizations or not. 
Even though agency theory can be applied to 
analyze numerous M&A related issues, it does not 
address M&A per se. 
Transaction 
cost 
economics79 
TCE is crude: the models are primitive, the 
trade-offs between governance structures are 
underdeveloped and there are severe 
measurement problems (Williamson 1985). 
The application of transaction cost economics 
theory to real life scenarios, e.g. M&A, is difficult 
 TCE is instrumentalist: humans are 
unrealistically calculative and the theory omits 
irrationality (Williamson 1985, Ghoshal and 
Moran 1996). 
TCE fails to accurately analyze the human side of 
M&A processes80. 
 TCE is incomplete (Williamson 1985) Hinders the application of the theory to non-ceteris 
paribus situations, which real-life M&A surely 
represents. 
 Lack of application of TCE into M&A issues 
beyond the simplified make-or-buy setting 
(R l d S 1992 Ri h 1999)
TCE thinking could be applied to a number of 
issues close to a) the diversification and b) the 
i l i i f fi hi h
                                                 
79 Williamson 1985, p. 390-393 
80 e.g. the triggering of M&A ideas, selection of M&A strategy, initiation of the M&A dialogue as well as 
negotiation, contract writing and various post-merger processes. 
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(Rumelt and Steven 1992, Richter 1999). internal organization of firms, which are 
dramatically changed as a result of M&A decisions. 
Traditional 
and new 
property 
rights 
Offers a simplistic, quasi-economic justification 
theory to back up an ownership-centered 
approach to the boundaries of the firm 
discussion81 Many concepts sacrificed ‘on the 
altar of formalization’ (Kreps 1996) 
Focuses M&A analysis to mechanistic numerical 
exercises e.g. consolidated balance sheet valuations, 
share price estimates and market share analyses, 
withdrawing high-level attention away from the 
organizations as a key concern 
 Ownership-centered property rights mindset 
omits softer sides of the organization (Rajan and 
Zingales 1998, Kreps 1990, Klein 1988)  
The theory needs to develop to address e.g. power 
and capabilities, cooperation and corporate culture 
as well as teams and the inalienability of human 
capital to be able to relate to M&A 
 Neglect of bounded rationality as a primary 
behavioral assumption leads to lack of 
assessment of ex post issues of ownership 
changes (Hart 1990) 
Fails to consider the governance outcomes of 
ownership changes involving ex post anomalies, 
limiting application to real-life M&A. 
 Elevation of the impact of ownership on 
efficiency far beyond that of e.g. organizational 
structures and information channels. 
Mitigates the importance of internal processes in 
analyzing M&A.  
 Fails to acknowledge that economizing on the 
organizational structure and information 
channels may have welfare consequences 
Fails to understand the ‘synergy’ arguments in 
M&A and generally leads to an incomplete 
understanding of M&A 
 
 
Generally, Table 20 echoes the general shortcomings of the governance theories of the 
firm in M&A. The most common criticism deals with the formality of the theories of the firm 
and the difficulty of applying them to M&A thinking and decision-making. The assumptions 
that the governance theories present regarding the perfectness of contracting, the contracting 
environment and the nature of human incentive formation are key targets for such criticisms. 
These assumptions rise from the economics background of the governance theories and are 
fundamental prerequisites to their rigorous model-like generalizability. However, their key 
ideas are valid for analyzing M&A from managerial, organizational and psychological 
perspectives that do not need or are not even familiar with the rigorous modeling needs, and 
this criticism thus raises a question about the need to use the governance theories in 
conceptualizing, not modeling, M&A settings. As economic theories, governance theories of 
the firm are weak at analyzing the managerial, organizational and psychological perspectives 
of M&A, but there is great potential in developing governance-based conceptual frameworks 
that suit these arenas.  
 
Secondly, the sphere to which any specific governance theory of the firm can be applied 
seems to be limited, emphasizing the usefulness of a wider understanding. This produces the 
general implication that single governance theories are not able to cope with complex 
organizational realities alone and analysis based on them is inherently partial. Support can be 
seen to emerge from two directions. On the one hand, the insights of the governance theories 
need to be integrated, as together they offer a much wider set of perspectives. Given the many 
similarities of the theories (which are also reflected in the criticisms), this does not seem an 
                                                 
81 For further discussion see e.g. Lloyd 1997 and Baker and Smith 1998 
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implausible exercise. On the other hand, the governance perspective can contribute to a wider 
firm theoretical framework of M&A, and strategy research in general, in which other 
perspectives, most importantly the competence perspective to strategy research (cf. 
Williamson 1999, Madhok 2002), covers the areas in which governance theory is weak.   
 
Thirdly, some of criticism is “positive” and directed at identifying knowledge gaps in the 
theories and developing their applicability. These issues are highlighted in the discussion of 
the study, where conclusions are drawn concerning which and how theories of the firm could 
be applied to M&A rationales and future research avenues are identified. 
 
Propositions about the shortcomings of the governance theories of the firm in M&A 
 
Proposition 30: The governance theories of the firm are focused on firm-level analysis to 
be able to exhaustively deal with M&A. Support from economics of organization that 
incorporates inter- inter-organizational, industry level and, to some extent, macro-level 
considerations is needed. 
 
Proposition 31: The governance perspective is severely limited in tackling of some 
managerial, psychological and organizational aspects of M&A, which are often most acute 
when analyzing the internal organization processes of M&A. Support from the competence 
perspective and/or a great deal of related empirical research is needed.  
 
Proposition 32: There are numerous knowledge gaps in how governance theories are 
applicable and have been applied to M&A analysis. These diminish the credibility of the 
governance theories of the firm but simultaneously present potentially fruitful future research 
avenues. 
 
Proposition 33: The sphere of M&A research to which any specific governance theory of 
the firm can be applied is limited. This emphasizes the need and usefulness of a wider, 
holistic governance perspective to M&A. 
 
 
 
3.3 A governance approach to M&A 
 
On the basis of the findings in the conceptual studies in Appendices 1-2 and the 
bibliometric studies in Chapter 2, as well as the interpretation of all of these studies in 
Sections 3.1-3.2, a holistic governance perspective to M&A is necessary and has considerable 
potential for future development. Here, a governance perspective is understood to comprise 
all theoretical approaches that study the firm-level institutional mechanisms by which M&A 
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are initiated, negotiated, designed, coordinated, monitored, adapted and terminated (cf. Heide 
1994).  
 
The findings of the bibliometric and conceptual studies indicate that a governance 
perspective to M&A consists of interlinkages between the governance discourse and the 
M&A discourse on levels ranging from deep intellectual roots to shared views on factual 
affairs. These paradigmatic linkages between the two discourses constitute the substance of 
the conceptual interaction between governance theories of the firm and M&A. While the 
governance theories of the firm answer the questions dealing with the boundaries, existence 
and internal organization of firms, a governance theory to M&A should be able to answer the 
questions dealing with the boundaries, existence and internal organization of M&A. Striving 
towards a governance approach to M&A thus requires an understanding about the nature of 
governance oriented theorizing in order to be able to organize conceptual research findings 
into appropriate categories dictated by the ‘governance questions’. 
 
Equally importantly, the cross-fertilization between the two discourses has two variants. 
On one hand, the governance perspective is seemingly able to explain why the M&A 
landscape and the research that has investigated it looks the way it does. On the other hand, 
the governance perspective seems to be able to yield some tools to managerial decision-
making situations and definitely draws attention to the future development of such tools. The 
bibliometric and conceptual results can hence be suggested to indirectly propose an 
explanatory approach and a prescriptive approach, thus incorporating both why and how 
questions, should be combined in order to appropriately understand and restructure a 
paradigm from a governance perspective. Oliver and Ebers (1998) have manifested the value 
of bibliometric research in restructuring paradigms using a two-partite governance approach 
to analyzing the discourse interested in inter-organizational relationships. In a sense, the same 
is attempted here, albeit with somewhat more profound aims and deeper research material, 
for M&A.  
 
Thus, Section 3.3 aims at proposing a novel, holistic and bi-partite governance-based 
perspective to the study of M&A. The first part of the perspective, an explanatory 
governance approach to M&A, attempts to explain why the M&A landscape looks the way it 
does by tracing back the fundamental institutional questions regarding the conceptual 
boundaries, justifications for existence and internal organization processes of M&A. It also 
attempts to summarize and clarify the answers governance theory has provided to these 
questions, together with speculation of why these particular answers have been given. The 
role of a) the disciplinary traditions of M&A research and b) the institutional environment in 
which M&A occurs are highlighted in these answers. Thirdly, the shortcomings in the 
governance-based M&A research landscape, ensuing from both the limitations, shortcomings 
and inabilities of the governance approach and simply the lack of particular types of research, 
are analyzed with an explanatory focus. Finally, the explanatory governance approach to 
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M&A attempts to point out acute research avenues arising from the outlined questions, 
answers and shortcomings. Again, the focus is to develop the cross-fertilization between 
governance theory and M&A research further.  
 
The second part of the governance perspective consists of a prescriptive governance 
approach to M&A. The focus here is on how the governance approach can be used in making 
M&A related decisions, understanding the practical repercussions of institutional 
arrangements to areas of the organization’s functioning and generally performing M&A 
better. In this analysis, the different roles of specific governance theories of the firm in 
managerial thinking, the use of governance thinking in particular fora and the development of 
a process model of the governance perspective, in order to match the managerial models of 
M&A processes, are highlighted. Some future research avenues in the prescriptive 
governance approach to M&A are also pointed out.  
 
On the whole, Sections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 constitute the M&A-specific grand proposal of 
how the governance perspective can be operationalized in the analysis of M&A. The 
explanatory and prescriptive governance approaches constitute the M&A-specific application 
of a holistic framework, ‘a governance perspective’, which can conceptually be seen to 
correspond to what has become known as the governance perspective to strategy or 
management research in recent dialogue (see e.g. Williamson 1999, Madhok 2002, Foss 
1999, Langlois and Foss 1999). The attention is now turned to suggestions regarding the 
content of the explanatory and prescriptive approaches before the discussion of the overall 
contribution and shortcomings of this study as well as the general future of the governance 
perspective as a research paradigm in the future in Chapter 4.  
 
 
 
3.3.1 Explanatory governance approach to M&A 
 
This section describes the first part of the governance perspective, an explanatory 
governance approach to M&A, by attempting to explain why the M&A landscape looks the 
way it does. For academic purposes, the introduction of a new conceptual tool requires an 
overview of its central features and an account on how the proposed new concept relates to 
existing research. 
 
More specifically, explanatory governance approach to M&A concentrates on:  
 
a) Outlining the structuring of the governance approach to M&A vis-à-vis other 
key concepts such the governance perspective to management research and the 
governance theories of the firm 
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b) Explaining the state and nature of governance-based M&A research vis-à-vis 
its key questions, answers, shortcomings and implications.  
 
c) Discussing ways in which the governance perspective can contribute to our 
understanding of disciplinary traditions and institutional environments in 
M&A research. 
 
The explanatory governance approach to M&A is a collection of governance theoretical 
issues that answers questions regarding the basic questions of the conceptual boundaries, 
justifications for existence and internal organization processes of M&A. An important part of 
the explanatory governance approach is the acknowledgement of knowledge gaps and 
shortcomings in the governance-based M&A research landscape, ensuing from both the 
limitations, shortcomings and inabilities of the governance approach and simply the lack of 
particular types of research. Furthermore, implications on the future development of the 
explanations, many of which arise from the identified knowledge gaps are given. In this 
sense, the explanatory approach represents the past, present and future of governance related 
M&A research and is such a valuable tool for academics performing research in this area. 
Again, the primary focus is thus on developing the cross-fertilization between institutional 
governance theory and M&A research further. 
 
Besides mapping the M&A questions, answers, shortcomings and implications of the 
different governance theories of the firm, a holistic framework will attempt to find common 
denominators for the different approaches. Special emphasis is paid on two common 
denominators, namely the disciplinary traditions of M&A research and the institutional 
environment in which M&A occurs.  
 
 
The structuring of the governance perspective in M&A 
 
The first task is to examine the relationship between the structuring of the governance 
perspective and M&A research. This also makes clear the difference between the prescriptive 
and explanatory approaches within the governance perspective. A fundamental starting point 
in governance theoretical constructs are their contracting assumptions. Contracting has 
assumed a central position in organizational and institutional economics and the many 
assumptions regarding e.g. the perfectness of contracting (incomplete vs. complete) and the 
contracting environment (e.g. asset specificity, bounded rationality, imperfect information 
etc.) are the heritage of the economics background.  
 
These assumptions, in their different combinations, underlie the governance theories of the 
firm, as indicated in Appendix 2. There are various categorizations of the governance theories 
of the firm (see e.g. Foss 2000) that vary in e.g. whether the rather minimalist neoclassical 
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theory is included as a theory of the firm or not and whether the early complete and 
incomplete contracting perspectives are merited for being theories themselves. Even so, the 
four principal governance theories of the firm employed in this study, namely neoclassical 
TOF, agency theory, transaction cost economics and property rights theory, are widely 
considered as the major governance theories of the firm.  
 
By iterating the insights of the governance theories to major questions regarding the 
boundaries, existence and internal organization of firms (see Appendix 2), this study builds 
an understanding of what the content of a holistic governance theoretical perspective to 
management research is. Out of this holistic perspective, phenomenon-specific approaches 
can be drawn. M&A is an example of such a phenomenon. The governance perspective, 
which essentially refers to the collection of insights from the governance theories of the firm, 
can be applied the phenomenon from different angles. Here, the explanatory and prescriptive 
approaches are examples of such angles. It seems logical to choose these approaches 
according to the audience of the argument, and in M&A the two principal audiences are the 
academic and professional communities respectively. 
 
In essence, this means that all academically relevant governance theoretical insights fall 
into the explanatory governance approach to M&A and all managerially relevant insights into 
the prescriptive approach. Naturally, this implies that the two are overlapping and, in absolute 
terms, one could argue that they are the same; everything is relevant to everybody. However, 
the degree of relevance varies significantly, as does the way in which the insights should be 
presented, and there thus is a clear motivation for distinguishing between the two.  
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Figure 4 illustrates this interpretation of the linkages between the concepts.  
 
Figure 4: A conceptual map of the governance perspective and its applications 
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The research questions, answers, knowledge gaps and implications are arguably the most 
interesting content of the governance perspective to M&A for research-oriented academic 
practitioners. That is, academics can be argued to be interested not only (or perhaps at all) in 
the M&A-the-phenomenon but also (or perhaps only) M&A-the-research-subject. In the 
following, the past, present and future of governance based M&A research is thus analyzed. 
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Three are three primary question areas about M&A that can be formulated (in a tone 
reminiscent of the governance perspective) as a) the definitional boundaries, b) the 
justifications for the existence and c) the internal organization processes of M&A. Figure 5 
depicts the explanatory governance perspective to M&A in the light of these main questions, 
the answers provided by the governance theories of the firm, shortcomings and existing 
knowledge gaps as well as implications and avenues for future research. 
 
The definitions that the governance theories of the firm provide for M&A concentrate on 
various different issues but all reflect the economics-oriented view of the world. While 
neoclassical economics holds the firm as a mere production function, the nexus of contracts 
perspective sees M&A as just another contract, or rather a set of complex contracts. In 
transaction cost economics, M&A is seen as an efficiency seeking mechanism, as market 
transactions are transferred under a common hierarchy by extending the boundaries of the 
firm. The boundary extension is also key to the definition provided by the incomplete 
contracting perspective. Traditional property rights theory, then again, concentrates on M&A 
as a resource allocation mechanism that assigns factors of production into a governance form 
that endorses their most efficient use, while newer strands of the same theory emphasize the 
transfer of authority. Altogether, the governance perspective consists of economics-minded, 
outcome-centered, mechanistic and simplistic conceptions of M&A. While the definitions 
shed light on the various efficiency mechanisms, there is altogether a shortage of 
organizational and human elements. Furthermore, the definitions omit hybrid organizational 
forms and other non-M&A contractual alternatives. Thus, the governance perspective does 
provide multiple definitions for M&A but is insufficient in determining the definitional 
boundaries of the concept. There are some clear implications. Obviously, the governance-
based definitions do not provide a sufficient definition of M&A. More detailed definitions of 
e.g. the different types of M&A and the relationship of M&A vis-à-vis other contractual 
arrangements with similar outcomes are needed. This discussion could emerge from the 
transaction cost economic comparison of hybrids and hierarchies (Williamson 1985). On the 
other hand, the governance definitions, which bear much resemblance to each other, should 
be integrated to support the governance perspective as a holistic framework.  
 
The governance perspective is perhaps at its strongest in the analysis of the motivations 
and justifications for the existence of M&A. Here, the disciplinary input is much broader and 
the governance perspective, despite its roots in fundamental economic theory, can be 
perceived to cover a much larger share and link better with the M&A reality. While the 
neoclassical explanation of the generation of abnormal profits via monopoly power addresses 
the competitive strategy of companies, the nexus of contracts perspective argues for the 
establishment of a certain, context-specific capital structure (Alchian and Demsetz 1972). 
The risk, information and incentive related agency theoretical justifications argue for the 
occurrence of risk-diversifying owner-manager and conglomerate M&A. M&A arising from 
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corporate governance related justifications is also within the sphere of agency theory. Lately, 
agency theory has also addressed information structure and communication related 
explanations to establishing hierarchies through M&A. The incomplete contracting tradition’s 
idea of the coordination problem is very applicable to M&A in conceptualizing the 
unpredictability of post-merger processes, and transaction cost economics has refined this 
thought by manifesting how M&A removes transaction costs by establishing authority, 
removing difficulties arising from incomplete contracting and mitigating the possibility of 
asset specificity-based hold-up and resulting rent appropriation. Property rights theory, which 
is perhaps one of the strongest in defining M&A, argues that the market for the transferability 
and competitiveness of ownership justifies M&A through efficiency seeking and the 
establishment of authority. Contrary to agency theory, however, this ‘market’ is entirely 
motivated by efficiency gains and other mechanisms affecting the incentive structure, such as 
the unavailability of information, empire-building or ‘taste’ are left without concern.  
 
Despite many merits, a number of shortcomings and knowledge gaps prevail in the 
governance perspective’s justification for the existence of M&A. Firstly, there are few 
insights into the firm-internal organization related motivations of M&A, most importantly 
various synergy arguments (Chatterjee 1986, Lubatkin 1983). The governance explanation is 
also absolute in the sense that it leaves no room for chance or seemingly irrational behavior82. 
Similarly, the justifications put forth are, albeit the fact that they represent a wider 
understanding of the situation, still efficiency-minded and lack an appreciation for human and 
organizational motivations and explanations. Thus, much complementarity between the 
humans and organizations approach to M&A and the governance perspective is perceived.  
 
The research implications regarding the justifications for the existence of M&A are broad. 
One severe issue is the generalizability of the governance perspective to M&A cases. Are 
M&A settings so unique that a holistic governance perspective is nearly always partially 
wrong? Ignorantly applied, the governance perspective can indeed be dangerous (cf. Ghoshal 
and Moran’s 1996 criticism of TCE) given that it is inherently partial. As such, the 
governance perspective operates as a meta-theory and is thus only theoretical frame of 
reference that directs thinking to certain key questions at the level of the firm. In order to 
develop the credibility of the governance approach, more applied research, empirical 
validation and, most probably, support from the competence perspective on issues related to 
the internal organization or firms, learning and knowledge. Organizationally, managerially 
and psychologically oriented discussions of M&A are needed. For example, extensions 
discussing the codification of knowledge and the iteration between tacit and explicit 
knowledge as well as the relationship between information and knowledge (e.g. Steinmueller 
2000; Ancori, Bureth and Cohendet 2000) and organizational learning (cf. Loasby 1983; 
                                                 
82 Though uncommon, there are examples of chance being incorporated in frameworks, even ones emerging 
from a microeconomics background. Porter's (1990) diamond model of international competitiveness depicts 
chance as one of the major determinants.  
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1999) in the context of M&A could be useful.  Similarly, an account of social capital (E.g. 
Coleman 1990, Putnam 1993, Fukuyama 1995, Yli-Renko 1999) is lacking from the 
governance perspective even though it can act as an incentive alignment instrument 
contracting settings. Similarly, applied game theory could provide the governance perspective 
to M&A a tool for analyzing competitive M&A. In any case, increasing operationalization 
and a refreshing and updating of some of the governance theoretical perspectives to account 
for certain theoretical extensions is needed. Such updating is constantly underway (cf. the 
birth of new property rights theory admitting to incomplete contracting (e.g. Hart 1990), 
dynamic transaction costs (Langlois 1992), multiple agency settings (Holmström and 
Milgrom 1991) and so on). Nevertheless, knowledge gaps vis-à-vis e.g. the role of dynamics 
in contracting and stewardship theory, prevail and new ones emerge with novel conceptual 
research. 
 
Finally, this study has found that the governance perspective’s account of the M&A 
processes is generally weak. There are some promising avenues, e.g. the agency theoretic 
scrutiny of incentive and information asymmetries along the M&A process (e.g. Kesner, 
Shapiro and Sharma 1994, Parvinen and Tikkanen 2002), the apparent coordination problem 
in the selection of M&A candidates and organization modes as well as the tools transaction 
cost economics provides for certain M&A related firm-internal organization issues (see e.g. 
Richter 1999). In any case, governance theory is still undeveloped in this aspect of M&A 
analysis. The implications are already familiar. There is an increased need for real-life based 
analysis of M&A processes that employs governance theory or tools developed from it. 
Again, support is needed from the competence perspectives. Altogether, there is an increased 
need to increase the appreciation of M&A processes in governance literature, which can be 
done through a systematic selection of M&A process related topics for governance theory 
based research.  
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Figure 5: The explanatory governance approach to M&A. A map of the main M&A questions, answers 
provided by the governance theories of the firm, existing knowledge gaps and implications and avenues 
for future research (Neoclassical Economics = NEO, Nexus of Contracts = NoC, Agency Theory = AT, 
Incomplete Contracting = IC, Transaction Cost Economics = TCE, Property Rights = PR) 
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Contributions, disciplinary traditions and institutional environments  
 
Besides a collection of research questions, answers, knowledge gaps and implications, the 
explanatory governance approach to M&A also aims at clarifying the role of a governance 
approach to management research. Arguably, the governance approach can be predicted to 
succeed in constructing considerable academic contributions. In the following, the way in 
which a holistic governance perspective can produce social scientific contributions is 
analyzed according to a contribution process identified in the literature, namely the process of 
constructing intertextual coherence (Locke and Golden-Biddle 1997). 
 
The governance perspective manifests considerable potential to construct intertextual 
coherence. Locke and Golden-Biddle (1997) argue that literature making a contribution crafts 
networks of existing studies and each such network is conceptualized as an intertextual field. 
Here, the governance perspective assumes two forms. Firstly, the governance perspective to 
M&A is a thought construction that represents so-called synthesized coherence. Being a 
phenomenon-specific application of a more general governance perspective, the governance 
perspective to M&A demonstrates typical synthesized coherence as it "cites and draws 
connections between works and investigative streams not typically cited together to suggest 
the existence of undeveloped research areas" (Locke and Golden-Biddle 1997, p. 1030).  By 
remapping the structuring of the M&A discourse from the perspective of the governance 
theories of the firm, identifying the paradigmatic linkages between the two discourses on 
three levels and identifying the potential shortcomings of applying governance theories to 
M&A, the governance perspective thus manifests synthesized coherence.  
 
Secondly, there are features of non-coherence in the governance perspective, not as a 
perspective to M&A, but as a management research perspective as a whole.  
 
"In noncoherent intertextual fields, we find referenced works that 
are presented as belonging to a common research program but as 
linked by disagreement. In contrast to the previous two intertextual 
fields, in which the construction of consensus is figural, here the 
key textual action is the construction of discord, albeit among 
researchers who agree on the importance of a research domain" 
(Locke and Golden-Biddle 1997, p. 1038). 
 
The different governance theories of the firm can be argued to represent exactly such an 
area. They all agree on the importance of governance in the analysis of organizations and the 
organization of economic activity and at least somehow address the key questions regarding 
the existence, boundaries and internal organization of firms (Foss 2000). Nevertheless, the 
emphases of the various governance theories are different and the assumptions (e.g. 
incomplete vs. complete contracting) and outcomes vis-à-vis the organization of economic 
  169
activity can be different. In other words, even though the governance theories are interested 
in similar issues, the answer they provide for a given problem can be conflicting83. The task 
of integrating the governance theories of the firm as one holistic perspective is a step in the 
direction of accepting these differences. In terms of the type of scientific tradition it 
represents, the governance perspective thus resembles more a general social scientific 
approach than an economics approach, which is arguably where it originates.  
 
The way the governance perspective exhibits intertextual coherence is thus a sign of its 
ability to contribute to scientific thinking. It essentially draws together different pieces of a 
number of hitherto dispersed pieces of a puzzle. Typically, once the pieces have been set in 
place, anyone can see that there is a clear linkage as if one would be looking at a puzzle 
whose pieces fit. The difference between a puzzle and the governance perspective in M&A 
and management research in general is that governance theory operates in a field, which is 
academically featured by somewhat irreconcilable disciplinary orientations and de facto 
featured by the institutional environment in which the M&A, or any other phenomenon, takes 
place.  
 
The disciplinary orientations have received a lot of attention in this study and it is easy to 
see why an interdisciplinary approach, such as the governance perspective to M&A attempts 
to be, would not be accepted from any single disciplinary angle. It is characteristic of 
discourses engaged in disciplinary turf wars to reject interdisciplinary research (cf. Frye 
1999, Armstrong 1998). The concept of the organization of economic activity, with its 
various levels of analysis (individual, firm, interorganizational, industry, etc.) is a promising 
concept that can be operationalized from practically any disciplinary angle, finance as well as 
sociology. Yet, it seems evident in any case that the acceptance of the governance perspective 
requires the acknowledgement of a rather desperate need for interdisciplinary research. The 
governance perspective is not rigorous enough in any of its aspects to be otherwise accepted. 
 
As for the institutional environment, it seems obvious that an explanatory governance 
perspective to M&A cannot explain all aspects of all M&A in all institutional environments. 
It is evident that e.g. the legislative and political environment determines whether the 
                                                 
83 A good example of the conflicting predictions and prescriptions between governance theories of the firm in 
M&A is the treatment of post-merger processes. Transaction cost economics assumes that contractual 
incompleteness (i.e. the fact that not everything can be agreed upon in the M&A contract and that much is left to 
post-merger management) emerges from the bounded rationality of the human actors involved. Problems from 
bounded rationality can be alleviated by changes in organization structure and information channels 
(Williamson 1970). Property rights theorists, on the other hand, argue that it is simply impossible to contract the 
use of the assets in a relation and that organization structure and information channel changes are not likely to 
be able to have any effect on overall welfare (Hart 1990, Foss 2000). The implication is that transaction cost 
economics believes that active and radical post-merger management can yield considerable benefits, whereas 
property rights theory contends that the merging parties are more or less stuck with the level of non-
contractibility resulting from integration. 
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governance theoretical insights to authority and contracting apply. The presence of ‘capital 
market authority’ or ‘capital market governance’ is a typical difference even between 
Western Anglo-Saxon and Central European economies (Kirchmaier 2000). The numerous 
social institutions influencing M&A, e.g. family ownership, investment banking inner circles 
as well as values and norms that can either act implicitly or disseminate all the way to 
national antitrust legislation. The governance perspective is, with its focus on contracting and 
the institutional environment, strong at discussing the effects of institutions and institutional 
differences to M&A settings. For example, the use of such key governance concepts as 
incompleteness of contracting, property rights and authority can are useful for e.g. analyzing 
the institutional environment in the context of M&A projects in developing countries.  
 
The nature of the contribution by the exploratory governance perspective, the pressure 
from the dispersed disciplinary nature of M&A research and the significant role of the 
institutional environment in M&A are examples of factors that render the governance 
perspective to M&A a cognitive framework. As with the prescriptive governance approach to 
M&A presented in the following Section, also the exploratory framework operates through 
the minds of individuals, i.e. it works primarily through the influence it has on the cognitive 
frameworks of academics. This necessitates both an overview of the conceptual linkages 
between governance and M&A, as well as a discussion of their relationship and ability to 
contribute to scientific enquiry. Both have briefly been attempted in this Section. 
 
 
 
3.3.2 Prescriptive governance approach to M&A 
 
In order to be able to call the governance perspective a holistic way of researching, 
analyzing and conducting M&A, operationalization and reflection to managerial decision-
making situations are arguably as necessary as the understanding of the state and nature of 
academic discourse established above.  
 
The prescriptive governance approach to M&A focuses on how M&A decisions are made, 
how M&A processes are managed, and how governance thinking can be applied to this 
setting. There seem to be at least three different paths linking the general governance 
perspective to real-life M&A management, namely a) through the influence on managers’ 
cognitive mindsets, b) through the respect of the process orientation in M&A research that 
has proven popular among managers, c) indirectly through the impact on corporate strategy 
thinking and more directly through lessons to specific functional areas of M&A management.  
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More specifically, this part of the research concentrates on:  
 
a) Outlining the different roles of the governance theories of the firm in M&A 
decision-making, focusing particularly on the cognitive mechanism through which 
managers assume them 
 
b) Arguing for the necessity of understanding the processual nature of M&A 
decision-making and proposing a processual model of the governance 
perspective to support managerial application 
 
c) Understanding the practical repercussions of governance thinking to corporate 
strategy-making on the one hand and various functional areas within the 
company in the context of M&A on the other. 
 
The more elevated aim of the prescriptive approach is to make the basic questions of the 
governance theories of the firm, i.e. the existence, boundaries and internal organization of the 
firm, a part of a manager’s semantic arsenal and thereby contribute towards a general 
acceptance of an idea of a ‘governance perspective to M&A’. 
 
 
The roles of governance theories in managerial cognition and M&A decision-making 
 
The investigation of some key managerial M&A issues in Section 3.2.4 raises two major 
concerns. Firstly, six governance related M&A decision-making areas, together with their key 
questions were identified from the topical M&A issues. Secondly, the central role of time and 
dynamic decision-making among the real-life M&A issues raises the need to incorporate a 
processual element to any novel M&A decision-making framework. Since both are 
prescriptive elements of the governance perspective to M&A, the prior is attempted here and 
the latter in the next section.  
 
Arguably, the strength behind the governance perspective is the relative heterogeneity of 
how the various governance theories of the firm can contribute to decision-making situations. 
In the context of M&A, this is well illustrated in the different roles the governance theories 
can be argued to assume in answering key M&A related questions (Table 21).  
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Table 21: Governance theories of the firm and their roles in a prescriptive governance approach to M&A  
 
      Governance theory  Role in governance approach  Primary question(s)  
to M&A     answered 
   
1. Property rights theory  Basic philosophy for performing M&A  What is the fundamental goal of  
performing M&A in the first place?  
 
2. Incomplete contracting tradition Understanding the limits of M&A operations What can be done? 
 
3. Agency theory   The influence of M&A on stakeholder groups Who influences / is influenced and  
why/how? 
 
4. Transaction cost economics Economizing the boundaries of the firm How and where can we gain from  
M&A? 
 
5. Neoclassical economics  Maximizing the M&A outcome  What needs to be calculated? 
 
6. Complete contracting tradition Establishing the new corporate entity  What are the necessary (legal)  
operations? 
 
 
 
As outlined earlier, property rights theory can be perceived more as a economic 
philosophical and ideological orientation to the organization of economic activity than an 
applicable and operationalizable theory of firm activity, which has attracted a fair amount of 
criticism (see e.g. Rajan and Zingales 1998, Foss and Foss 2000, Kreps 1990, Klein 1988). 
This is much due to the fact that particularly Austrian (Hayek 1937, 1945, Kirzner 1973) and 
traditional (Coase 1960, Alchian 1965, Demsetz 1964, Alchian and Demsetz 1972, for an 
overview see Furubotn and Pejovich 1972) but also new (Barzel 1997, Hart 1995, North 
1990, Eggertson 1990, Hart and Moore 1990, Grossman and Hart 1986) property rights 
literature operates at a higher level of abstraction, dealing with the basic rights of the owner 
of an asset, resource or a factor of production to appropriate the rents from its use. Intuitively, 
this line of thought has direct answers to the first set of questions concerning the basic 
philosophy of performing M&A. Namely, from a property rights perspective, the 
fundamental goal of performing M&A is the securing and/or maximization of shareholders’ 
rights and value. Again, it must be noted that even though this line of thought has strong 
philosophical roots dating back to at least John Locke (1772), the bibliometric results did not 
find very significant co-existence of property rights theory and shareholder value ideology. 
The relevant conclusion from that this linkage should be sought.  
 
Another relevant M&A decision-making issue deals with the limits of M&A operations, 
i.e. realizing what the relevant alternatives for M&A are and which factors limit these 
alternatives. Arguably, literature based on the tradition of incomplete contracting and the 
coordination problem (Coase 1937, 1960) introduce a number of contractual limitations that 
can be applied to how M&A operations can be performed. These limitations operate on a 
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number of different levels and relate to different specifics (e.g. comprehensibility of legal 
documents, uncertainty regarding contingencies, bounded rationality of involved parties, 
available information etc.) of the contracting setting. A couple of examples are in order. 
Firstly, the incomplete contracting tradition has introduced the effect of cognitive limitations 
of humans into the contracting setting (Simon 1951, March and Simon 1958). In an M&A 
decision-making setting, for example, the bounded rationality of involved contracting parties 
limits the extent to which all possible due diligence scenarios, post-merger processes and 
legal contingency details can be included in the deal agreement, embodied by the legal deal 
document. On the other hand, managers or directors may suffer from information overload 
that limits their ability to take all available information into consideration while negotiating 
and contracting an M&A transaction.  
 
Secondly, M&A presents such a complex setting that contracts are very seldom even close 
to complete. Ayres and Gertner (1989) have identified reasons for this. To start with, 
"contracts may be incomplete because the transaction costs of explicitly contracting for a 
given contingency are greater than the benefits. These transaction costs may include legal 
fees, negotiation costs, drafting and printing costs, the costs of researching the effects and 
probability of a contingency, and the costs to the parties and the courts of verifying whether a 
contingency occurred" (Ayres and Gertner 1989, p. 87-88). An outgrowth is that lawmakers 
have the tendency to attempt to minimize the costs of contracting by introducing ‘default 
solutions’ that are somewhat satisfactory to both parties. Sometimes companies leave 
disputable issues unresolved in M&A transactions even if they know they are likely to end up 
in court with the issue: contracting ex ante is simply perceived too costly.  
 
Furthermore, Ayres and Gertner (1989) also present a second source of contractual 
incompleteness, namely strategic incompleteness. In essence, this refers to opportunistic 
behavior in the context of the contracting setting, e.g. the target company managers 
strategically withholding information in the negotiating and/or contracting phase of an M&A 
process in order to maximize the cost of an acquisition or takeover. Even more generally 
speaking, there is always an extent of asymmetric information, intentional or unintentional, in 
the contracting setting that renders contracts incomplete. Finally, the general uncertainty 
prevailing about the future contingencies and events of the negotiated contract often make it 
more appealing to leave issues unresolved rather than contract them and face the risk of 
costly discharge and renegotiation. In essence, all of these limits to contracting set the 
boundaries to what can be contracted about an M&A in the first place, which naturally has 
major repercussions to what can be done in M&A in the first place. 
 
Another important M&A decision-making issue is concerned with the dynamic influence 
of M&A and different stakeholder groups on each other. As identified earlier, the related key 
questions deal with which stakeholder groups influence the processes and outcomes of M&A, 
which stakeholder groups are influenced by M&A as well as why and how this happens. 
  174 
Agency theory literature and related M&A contributions (e.g. Jensen and Ruback 1983, 
Jensen 1986, Roll 1986, Kesner, Shapiro and Sharma 1994, Sharma 1997 and many others) 
provide a rich insight into the incentives of different stakeholder groups (owners and 
directors of merging, acquiring and target companies, the government, employees, middle 
managers, professional services providers, etc.). Incentive structures, then again, govern the 
M&A behavior of different actors groups and the influence on M&A outcomes can be 
mapped at least conceptually (see Parvinen and Tikkanen 2002). While the ability of agency 
theory to consider the human and organizational aspects of stakeholder group dynamics is 
admittedly limited, an incentive-based analysis can be seen as a useful tool for understanding 
and predicting the behavior of different stakeholder groups in M&A decision-making 
situations.   
 
In M&A decision-making, it is also important to iterate on the details of the possible 
opportunities for creating gains through M&A. The situations in which gains can be created 
fall in roughly two categories that coincide with the notions of the boundaries and internal 
organization of firms. Transaction cost economics is at its strongest in analyzing decisions 
regarding the economizing of the boundaries of the firm, e.g. selecting between M&A modes 
(e.g. extent of integration), alternatives to M&A (e.g. hybrid organization modes such as joint 
ventures, alliances, etc.) as well as in- and outsourcing and divestment decisions (that often 
follow M&A decisions). Different boundary solutions can be explicitly compared by pegging 
them against each other by their respective transaction costs over time. On the other hand, 
gains from M&A through the better internal organization needs to be considered. Agency 
theory and the incomplete contracting tradition focus partly on internal organization 
processes, but their view can be argued to be mechanistic, efficiency-minded and confined to 
the analysis of the contracting settings within the internal organization processes of M&A, 
and not the very instances where M&A can create gains.  
 
The analysis of ‘gains from M&A’ has orbited around the different notions, types and 
sources of synergy (Larsson and Lubatkin 1999), including operational synergies in 
production, R&D and administration (Bain 1959, Lloyd 1976) and economies of scope (Seth 
1990), collusive synergies from market and purchasing power (Caves and Porter 1977, 
Chatterjee 1986, Scherer 1980), synergies from complementary managerial competencies and 
management turnover (Davis and Stout 1992, Lorsch and Allen 1973), synergies from 
sharing activities (Porter 1987), knowledge synergies (e.g. Lord and Ranft 2000) and 
financial synergies (Nielsen and Melicher 1973, Nickell 1978, Weston et. al 2001). Here, the 
governance approach is clearly weaker, given that none of the governance theories of the firm 
is specialized on, or even particularly strong at analyzing the internal synergy mechanisms. 
Clearly, complementing inputs from e.g. the direction of strategy literature concentrating on 
the competitive effects as well as resource, competence and knowledge aspects of M&A are 
needed to build a patchless approach to M&A.  
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Besides establishing a basic philosophy for performing M&A, understanding the limits of 
M&A operations, analyzing the effects on and of stakeholder groups and iterating the 
instances where the gains from M&A are created, there are two more mechanistic exercises 
closely related to M&A decision-making situations. Firstly, M&A is, despite its complexity 
and significant role as a re-organizer of the organization of economic activity, also a deal that 
needs to be calculated. Here, the neoclassical economics tradition of calculativeness and 
maximization of the estimated numerical outcome is useful. The calculation of marginal 
return inflexion points, maximization of investment yield, risk-adjusted valuation scenario 
building, acquisition premia and so on are pure economic exercises that need to be performed 
despite the fact that the deal is embedded in a certain philosophical, contracting and social 
environment and bound to a somewhat defined number of discrete structural alternatives. 
Secondly, the complete contracting tradition, i.e. view of the firm as a nexus of contracts, 
offers a number of useful tools and alternatives for performing the necessary legal operations 
in order to establish the new corporate entity. Despite the contracting limitations outlined 
above, there is still much room for legal maneuvering and the majority of the lessons in this 
stream come from literature integrating financial M&A management decisions and the legal 
aspects of M&A deal making (see e.g. Gilson and Black 1995).  
 
These different roles that the governance theories of the firm can assume as elements of a 
M&A decision-making situation exemplify the fragmented nature of the contribution from 
the realm of governance theory to the realm of M&A in practice. As called for by Larsson 
and Finkelstein (1999), as well as the results of this study, it seems necessary to attempt to 
integrate dispersed research results into a more holistic framework. The core of the argument 
here is that while the different governance theories of the firm, however they are categorized 
or classified represent somewhat discrete ‘governance approaches’ to the firm, together they 
represent a holistic, even through not exhaustive, ‘governance perspective to M&A’.  
 
The distinction between fragmented lessons from individual governance theories of the 
firm and a holistic governance perspective to M&A is subtle but not meaningless. It is 
essential to understand the difference particularly in the context of the formation of a more 
decision-making oriented prescriptive side of a holistic M&A framework. The messages of 
managerial and decision-making oriented frameworks are conveyed to real-life M&A 
situations primarily through involved managers’, but also owners’ and professional service 
providers’, cognitive mechanisms. Using Scott’s (1995) classification, the governance 
approach can be perceived to have been rather successful at understanding, even prescribing, 
the ‘coercive’ and ‘normative’ institutions of decision-making and contracting settings, but 
has lacked understanding of the ‘cognitive’ institutions. While it would seem logical to seek 
for complementing advice from e.g. neo-institutional organization theory and sociology 
literature (e.g. Scott 1997, Perrow 1961, 1986, Mayer and Rowan 1977, DiMaggio and 
Powell 1983, Granovetter 1985) that is strong in its analysis of cognitive mechanisms, even 
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speaking of a holistic governance perspective would advance the cognitive value of the 
governance theories a great deal. 
 
The expression ‘a holistic perspective’ is used intentionally here. The question might 
emerge: what is the ‘governance perspective to M&A’ if it is not a mere collection of 
fragmented lessons from individual governance theoretical approaches? Like in much of 
management research, it is yet another framework united by common theoretical cornerstones 
and, perhaps more importantly, it is a cognitive model characterized by the language, 
concepts and semantics it uses. Content-wise, it is nothing more than the collection lessons 
from the governance theoretical approaches to M&A, but establishing the expression 
‘governance perspective to M&A’ already establishes it as a single cognitive institution. 
Integrating the M&A related lessons from the governance theories of the firm under a 
common conceptual heading already establishes a cognitive institution.  
 
This discussion relates closely to analysis of rhetorics in economics discourse (Klamer, 
McCloskey and Solow 1988). Arguably, traditional economics does not acknowledge the role 
of rhetorics as an independent element of the body of knowledge, but thinks of the economic 
theories as conclusive truths that can be used to make objective predictions, given certain 
assumptions, of course. Especially the neoclassical economics tradition’s blindness for the 
social dimension has received massive criticism, to the extent that it is "becoming tedious" 
(Klamer 2002). As a result, integrative research in economics and sociology84 has emerged, 
extending the findings of organizational and institutional economics, which themselves 
represent organizationally and institutionally aware alterations of the economics tradition, in 
a more socially aware dimension. By acknowledging the key role of language and rhetorics in 
the existence of a governance perspective to M&A, this study attempts to follow the same 
lines.  
 
Figure 6 and Figure 7 attempt to depict the relationship established between the M&A 
lessons of the governance theories, the governance perspective as a holistic cognitive 
framework and a manager in an M&A decision-making situation. Figure 6 represents the 
situation before the establishment of a holistic governance perspective to M&A and Figure 7 
after. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
84 Or alternatively socioeconomics, sociological economics, economic sociology or cultural economics  
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Figure 6: The relationship between M&A insights from governance theories and a manager in an M&A 
decision-making situation without a holistic cognitive framework 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: The relationship between M&A insights from governance theories and a manager in an M&A 
decision-making situation with a holistic cognitive framework 
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Attempting to unify the M&A insights from the governance theories of the firm under a 
common expression would not be a logical exercise if the lessons from the governance 
theories of the firm did not have a great deal in common. There are, however, a number of 
common determinants that justify the submission of the insights under one heading. Firstly, 
they ultimately derive from the same economics-minded meta-research tradition. The 
consistent use of such terms and measures as efficiency, wealth and market power provides 
evidence of this (cf. the glossary in Appendix 3).  
 
Secondly, all of the governance theories of the firm have also developed as departures 
from or at least critical extension to neoclassical economics literature. As mentioned above, 
institutional and organizational economics was born as a response to the oversimplifying 
world-view and impracticable assumptions of the neoclassical tradition. Remnants of 
neoclassical methodology and world-view prevail to the extent that much of the criticism on 
the governance theories of the firm is still directed at these issues.  
 
Thirdly, the criticism, as such, acts as a unifying factor. Besides oversimplification and 
unrealistic assumptions, all of the governance theories have been argued to suffer from a 
shortage of historical, longitudinal and empirical research (Foss 1997). Furthermore, they 
have been argued to be fixed to US capitalist modes of organization and production (Rose 
and Casson 1997). 
 
The governance theories are also similar in methodological orientation. They most often 
rely on the analysis of comparative statics and discuss the relevant choice between few, 
discrete structural alternatives. With the recent resurging interest in the theories of the firm, 
varieties acknowledging the role of dynamic development, processes, plurality of outcome 
possibilities, multiplicity of actors and so on have emerged. Examples of such research 
developments include multiple principal-agent settings (e.g. Gupta and Romano 1998, Al-
Najjar 1997, Tsoulouhas 1999) and dynamic transaction costs (e.g. Langlois 1992, Langlois 
and Robertson 1995).  
 
Finally, the governance theories of the firm share a peculiar half-economics, half-
organization theory language that allows them access to a common set of conceptual tools. 
For example, concepts such as ‘the organization of economic activity’, ‘risk preferences’, 
‘institutions’, ‘governance’, various contracting terms, ‘moral hazard’, ‘incentive’, 
‘asymmetry’, ‘firm boundaries’, ‘signaling’, ‘bounded rationality’, ‘opportunism’, 
‘calculativeness’, ‘asset specificity’, ‘rent appropriation’ and ‘hold-up’ are, though not 
endemic, characteristically economics rather than management minded concepts of the 
governance discourse.  
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To conclude, the governance theories of the firm can be perceived to be sufficiently 
consistent with each other to justify submitting their M&A insights under a common heading. 
This heading is the ‘governance perspective to M&A’, which can be seen, among other 
things, as a cognitive institution, strengthening the governance M&A insights by mediating 
them to managerial decision-making situations through the use of a single rhetoric. Through 
this mechanism, the insights of the various governance theories can be mediated to M&A 
decision-making situations. These insights include:  
 
a) Establishing a shareholder rights centered philosophy for performing M&A 
b) Establishing the boundaries to what can be done via M&A by helping decision-
makers understand contractual, cognitive and complexity limitations 
c) Providing a framework for understanding the M&A influence of and on different 
stakeholder groups 
d) Economizing between relevant M&A alternatives and alternatives to M&A 
e) Advocating the necessity of calculativeness and maximizing behavior after the 
conditions and limits for M&A activity have been understood, and finally  
f) Providing useful tools for performing the necessary legal operations in order to 
establish the new corporate entity. 
 
 
A processual model of governance rationales in M&A 
 
From the perspective of M&A decision-making, understanding M&A as a process (see 
e.g. Haspeslagh and Jemison 1991, Jemison and Sitkin 1986) and managing the M&A 
process actively seems to have gained increasing attention (already since Mace and 
Montgomery 1962), with particular managerially oriented research attention being paid to 
post-merger integration issues (Hunt 1990, Searby 1969, Yunker 1983, Shrivastava 1986 and 
Pablo 1994).  Essentially, the process stream in M&A argues that the M&A process, or a set 
of processes, is an underlying mechanism, which, if skillfully managed, can potentially help 
create value through corporate renewal (Haspeslagh and Jemison 1991). Despite the evident 
need for M&A process management paradigms, post-merger processes have been found to be 
somewhat non-prescribeable and need to be led with themes and mindsets rather than fixed 
frameworks (Habeck et al. 2001). 
 
On the other hand, time and dynamic decision-making issues seem to attract considerable 
attention among the M&A topic outlined above. Furthermore, as this study has scrutinized 
the interdisciplinary nature of the M&A discourse and the rather different roles and insights 
of the governance theories of the firm in M&A, the question has emerged: is there any 
dynamic order or sequentiality between the governance rationales and how are they 
interlinked with each other? 
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Given this setting, this section argues for the necessity of understanding the processual 
nature of M&A decision-making and incorporating a processual element to any novel M&A 
decision-making framework. The following processual model of the governance perspective 
that supports managerial application and highlights the sequential interdependency between 
the governance insights, is proposed (see Figure 8). 
 
Figure 8: A processual model of the governance perspective in M&A decision-making (Neoclassical 
Economics = NEO, Nexus of Contracts = NoC, Agency Theory = AT, Incomplete Contracting, 
Transaction Cost Economics = TCE, Property Rights = PR) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The pragmatic and managerial value of the conventional processual view of M&A (see 
Jemison and Sitkin 1986, Haspeslagh and Jemison 1991 and Appendix 1), usually consisting 
of 7-9 phases (e.g. the setting of strategic objectives, search and screening, strategic 
evaluation, financial evaluation, negotiation, contracting, designing the integration strategy, 
designing an integration plan and executing the integration plan) has been validated time and 
again in consulting and research. The governance process model can be related to this model. 
 
Intuitively, the philosophical and ideological foundation for the M&A project that can be 
proposed to be influenced by property rights (PR) thinking comes first. In the M&A process, 
this corresponds to setting a firm’s strategic objectives. Despite the fact that there is no 
explicit linkage in the literature between property rights theory and shareholder value studies, 
the property rights ideology can intuitively be thought to advocate shareholder value 
maximization, rather than any other key M&A motivation. Thus the governance perspective 
to M&A starts with shareholder value maximizing ideology in the setting of strategic 
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objectives for a company. The key decision-making issue deals with whether M&A serves 
this purpose. 
 
Subsequently, the conventional M&A process sets to the tasks of searching and screening 
for potential M&A candidates, as well as evaluating the strategic fit between the merging 
companies. This exercise is essentially about determining the conditions and limits for the 
potential for M&A activity. In terms of the governance process, the conditions and limits for 
M&A activity are set firstly by the contracting realities, i.e. what can be done in the first 
place. The incomplete contracting (IC) thinking, with its aforementioned lessons to M&A 
decision-making, is useful here. Secondly, two further governance exercises need to be 
performed in order to understand the conditions and limits for M&A activity. The 
socioeconomic environment needs to be mapped and the economic aspects of different 
boundary alternatives need to be considered. Agency theory is useful for patterning e.g. the 
incentives and influence of different stakeholder groups, which is a central, though not 
exhaustive, element of the prior. Transaction cost evaluation of different boundary 
alternatives, then again, point out the efficiency aspects and highlight the potential gains from 
shifting the boundaries of the firm.  
 
Having done this, i.e. defined the conditions and limits for the proposed M&A operations 
by understanding the contracting realities, analyzing the socioeconomic / stakeholder group 
environment and comparing gains from relevant boundary alternatives, the next step is to 
engage in calculative exercises that set the targets (e.g. price) for M&A negotiations. This 
phase corresponds to the financial evaluation and the negotiation phase of the conventional 
M&A process. By pegging them ‘calculative exercises’ does not imply that activities in this 
phase would be only numerical. Once the target has been set on the basis of a certain set of 
realities, calculativeness and maximizing behavior can be exercised in any form. Thus, the 
neoclassical economics (NEO) tradition of calculativeness and maximizing behavior is used 
in this phase of the M&A process. Obviously, its presence is more explicit in the numerical 
exercises and more implicit in negotiations and other interaction that, ultimately, still aim at 
closing the best possible deal.  
 
The maximizing and calculative exercises do not directly lead to the desired outcome, but 
the actual decisions are made in the negotiation phase of the M&A process. M&A 
negotiations typically involve multiple risk, information and incentive asymmetries even 
amongst the parties involved in the negotiations (Parvinen and Tikkanen 2002). Furthermore, 
even though this is often not explicitly considered and has generally been left for little 
attention in the M&A process literature, the M&A negotiations are often hurried. Given the 
heterogeneity and complexity of the repercussions of different M&A negotiation outcomes, 
the urgency of the negotiations often accentuates the cognitive limitations of the individuals 
involved in the negotiations. This can be argued to lead to increasing existing information 
overload. Agency theory and the incomplete contracting tradition, with their treatment of 
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incentives, risk preferences, information, bounded rationality and opportunism provide 
valuable insights for understanding the half-psychological dynamics and tensions between the 
individuals and groups involved in the negotiation process. As discussed above, the outcome 
is that inter-stakeholder group tensions and contracting limitations effectively remove a 
number of issues from the negotiations and the legal documents because some things cannot 
or are not desired to be contracted ex ante. 
 
The final step in the proposed processual view of the governance perspective to M&A is 
the contracting phase, which corresponds directly to the contracting phase of the conventional 
view of the M&A process. The complete contracting perspective is useful here, given that it 
views firms as a nexus of contracts (NoC). Legal contracting literature offers numerous 
insights to the formation of M&A contracts. However, it is felt that their details fall beyond 
the scope of this study. Simply put, the governance view emphasizes that there is also a time 
and place for pure legal dialogue during the M&A process but only after the aforementioned 
considerations have been undergone.  
 
Literature as well as many practical experiences from real-life M&A have manifested the 
necessity of beginning to consider essential post-merger integration issues already during the 
pre-merger processes (Shrivastava 1986): Planning and preparing for potential post-merger 
problems seems to be one of the only ways to prevent and foresee them. This is precisely 
what the processual view of the governance perspective to M&A helps managers do. The 
strength of this approach lies in that is starts from an ideologically sound basis, considers the 
governance realities of M&A (e.g. stakeholder groups, contracting realities and relevant 
boundary alternatives) and advocates maximizing behavior only within these limits.  
 
In sum, the processual model of the governance perspective to M&A is built to 
acknowledge the importance of time and dynamic decision-making. The model presents a 
somewhat simplified pattern of sequentiality between establishing the philosophical 
foundation for the M&A project, understanding the conditions and limits for M&A activity, 
engaging in calculative maximizing behavior regarding the deal and establishing the new 
corporate entity through legal means. Relating the governance process model of M&A to the 
conventional pre-merger model of the M&A process is hoped to make the application of the 
model to decision-making situations somewhat easier.  
 
 
Governance thinking in strategy and functional decision-making areas in M&A 
 
Beyond defining the roles of different governance theories and building processual 
models, familiarity with the key messages of the governance perspective can be argued to be 
useful in understanding corporate strategy-making as well as some practical M&A 
repercussions to various functional decision-making areas. It would be impossible to list all 
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of the potential ways to utilize governance thinking in strategy-making and functional M&A 
management, but this section aims at providing some examples to support the prescriptive 
element of the governance perspective to M&A. 
 
Among the many M&A related areas of corporate strategy (see Appendix 1), the 
governance perspective to M&A is particularly useful in analyzing three, namely a) 
efficiency gains, b) risk and diversification and c) redistributive realignment. Firstly, 
efficiency, a central concept in economics literature, is well considered by the governance 
theories of the firm. The governance perspective can help to analyze M&A efficiency gains 
in terms of e.g. the allocation of factors of production into the hands of owners who can put it 
to the best use, the elimination of agency problems arising from information or incentive 
asymmetries or simply the reduction of transaction costs. Secondly, risk is incorporated into 
both agency theoretic and transaction cost thinking as a central element. Agency theory 
distinguishes between the influence of risk on the incentives and actions of different 
stakeholder groups. Transaction cost reasoning, then again, has valuable insights into 
comparing structural alternatives related to M&A and diversification decisions, e.g. 
divestment as well in- and outsourcing decisions. Finally, particularly neoclassical economics 
but also other governance approaches are good at analyzing gains from increasing market 
power, with practical repercussions to e.g. value chain integrating M&A decisions. 
 
Besides some areas of corporate-level strategic decision-making, the lessons of the 
governance perspective can be useful in decision-making situations involving functional 
issues in the context of M&A. Firstly, the governance approach is particularly useful for 
corporate governance decision-making. Agency theoretic analyses of stakeholder group 
information and incentives, transaction cost economics flavored analysis of discrete structural 
alternatives and property rights thinking defending the rights of shareholders on the one hand 
and of employees on the other85 are all useful conceptual tools for the activities of e.g. Boards 
of Governors, shareholder-manager negotiations or other corporate governance forums. 
 
Secondly, the governance approach is useful for the management of professional services 
provider relationships during the M&A process (see e.g. Sharma 1997, Kesner, Shapiro and 
Sharma 1994). For example investment banker, consultant and lawyer relationships during 
the various phases of the M&A process can be characterized by incentive and information 
asymmetries that require either rectification or monitoring (Parvinen and Tikkanen 2002). 
 
Thirdly, the governance theories of the firm have direct application areas in various 
marketing related M&A decision-making situations. The most apparent deals with post-
                                                 
85 Indeed, one fundamental element of property rights literature, starting with John Locke in 1772, is that each 
person has the right to the fruits of his or her labor. Naturally, employment contracts are designed to shift the 
appropriation right to the employer, but the right to reallocate one's labor through the renegotiation of 
employment contracts (e.g. shifting jobs, promotions etc.) is a still considered the fundamental right of a worker.  
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merger decision-making relating to existing brands of an acquired company. Here, a 
transaction cost flavored analysis of whether to exercise ‘brand divestment’, ‘brand 
destruction’ or ‘brand preservation’ is in order. Other relevant application areas for the 
governance perspective that capitalize strongly on key concepts developed in transaction cost 
economics, agency theory and property rights theory include market-oriented organizational 
routines (e.g. marketing communication), conflict resolution, and the development of reward 
systems (Tikkanen and Parvinen 2002a). Transaction cost and agency theoretical analyses 
have also been popular in examining marketing channel relationships (e.g. Brown, Dev and 
Lee 2000). The governance perspective has also been found in justifying continual 
relationship investments (Axelsson and Easton 1992) 
 
Fourthly, the governance perspective can also be useful in the design of post-merger 
human integration practices from both a ‘hard’ and a ‘soft’ HRM perspective (see e.g. Legge 
1995). ‘Hard’ HRM application areas involve the development of incentive, reward, 
monitoring and retribution mechanisms, the in- and outsourcing of human assets, the HRM 
aspects of divestment decisions and so on. On the ‘soft’ HRM side, then again, application 
areas relate to the incompleteness of employment contracts, tacit information and information 
asymmetries as well as establishing employee (property) rights. 
 
Finally, and some might argue most importantly, the governance perspective has 
numerous applications to the realm of corporate finance that relate close to the notion of 
contracting. Examples of applications include e.g. anti-takeover provisions, financial 
synergy-seeking, firm-internal capital markets, the market for corporate control, reward 
systems and financial restructuring (e.g. debt leveraging) in the context of M&A. While these 
insights can be perceived to emerge from the governance theoretical research in general, the 
principal-agent setting is the most common single theoretical stepping-stone, as it has been 
used to conceptualize the market for corporate control (e.g. Manne 1965, Jensen and Ruback 
1983), free cash flow allocation (Jensen 1987) and numerous anti-takeover battles.  
 
In sum, the governance perspective offers valuable insight to M&A related decision-
making situations that deal with issues beneath the high-level corporate strategy dialogue. 
Typically, these include a wide range of functional activities. Beyond the aforementioned 
exemplary application areas of corporate governance, professional service provider 
relationship management, marketing, human resource management and corporate finance, the 
governance perspective can thought to act as a cognitive framework for managers in any 
decision-making situations. It must be mentioned, though, that the relevance of governance 
insights is bound to vary substantially (given e.g. the weak contribution vis-à-vis the internal 
processes of both the firm and M&A) and that M&A related decisions, given that they often 
deal with substantial changes in the organization of economic activity, can be proposed to 
offer a key phenomenon-oriented application area. 
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4 CONCLUSIONS 
 
This study has attempted to conceptualize the relationship between the governance 
theories of the firm and the M&A discourse. In doing so, it belongs to the institutional and 
organizational economic research tradition. Lately, the firm theoretical research traditions 
have increasingly been perceived to deal with the common conceptual question, namely the 
organization of economic activity (Madhok 2002, Tikkanen and Parvinen 2002b, cf. also 
Castells 1996). The dichotomizing of strategic management into ‘governance and 
competence’ perspectives, with this study belonging to the prior, has preceded this 
development (Williamson 1999, Foss 1997).  
 
 
4.1 Research problem 
 
The aim of this study has been to participate in this conceptual discussion by attempting to 
put the governance perspective into better use in the analysis of M&A. This is not, however, 
neither a concept historical nor a discourse analytical study, but rather an inquiry aiming at:  
 
a) Establishing an understanding of the current state of affairs in a research field by 
performing a detailed analysis of what has been written about it 
b) Establishing an understanding of why this is the case, which  
c) Facilitates proposing how the field should be looked at in order to make better 
decisions about what should be done in the future 
 
This study has also been interested in finding out what the relationship between these three 
things is, and daringly pushing the limits of what can be done with this type of an approach. 
In other words, this study aims at opening up an integrative, holistic research perspective that 
is based on the significant positions and different roles of the governance theories of the firm 
in the M&A discourse. If successful, there are two major benefits to this aim. On the one 
hand, it participates in fixing the fragmented and segregated nature of the current M&A 
discourse, which is largely due to its interdisciplinary nature. On the other hand, it reinforces 
the governance perspective to management (and other social scientific research) and 
identifies both its shortcomings and strengths, which is vital for sustained development. 
 
To fulfill these aims, two primary research questions were posed. Firstly, this study has 
been interested in identifying the de facto structuring of the M&A discourse. More 
specifically, the structuring has been analyzed vis-à-vis the disciplinary orientations in M&A 
research, theories used in M&A articles and antecedents of writing M&A articles. Secondly, 
this study has been interested in the contribution of the governance theories of the firm to 
M&A? The contribution has been analyzed in terms of how their intellectual roots and 
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traditions are interlinked, how they cross-fertilize academically and what the potential for a 
governance-based framework for M&A decision-making is.  
 
 
4.2 Research strategy and methodology 
 
The research questions engulf a wealth of literature and cross disciplinary boundaries. The 
basic dilemma is the one of gathering the wealth of information in these domains, harnessing 
it in a plausible way, investigating what is relevant in it and processing it into a 
communicable format. A bipartite methodology consisting of the conceptual analyses of the 
M&A and governance theory of the firm discourses as well as a set of precise bibliometric 
analyses of the M&A literature has been used to tackle this dilemma. The conceptual analysis 
of the M&A literature, consisting of an elaboration of the motivations for performing M&A, 
an analysis of the various M&A research streams as well as an overview of the internal 
organization processes of M&A gave a preliminary understanding of the structuring of the 
M&A discourse and served the purpose of preparing for the bibliometric analysis in many 
ways. 
 
The conceptual analysis of the governance theories of the firm consisting of an elaboration 
and categorization of various seminal governance theoretical contributions and highlighting 
the key messages each theory and its contribution to M&A thinking served the purpose of 
establishing a solid understanding concerning the qualities, strengths and shortcomings of 
each specific theory in an attempt to engage in endeavor to construct intertextual coherence 
between the two discourses (see e.g. Locke and Golden-Biddle 1997). It also gave an 
indication of some of the possible avenues through which M&A and the governance theories 
of the firm could be linked. As a result, the conceptualization of a holistic governance 
perspective, consisting of complementary strengths of the insights from the governance 
theories of the firm, began to emerge. 
 
The bibliometric study, consisting of citation analyses86 and network analyses87, identified 
the theoretical and thematic cornerstones of the M&A discourse, highlighted the significance 
and different roles of the governance theories of the firm in the discourse, helped introduce 
and explain the content of a new categorization of the research streams within the M&A 
discourse and generally confirmed many of the suggestions made in the conceptual analyses. 
By establishing the de facto structuring of the M&A discourse, the bibliometric study also 
laid the foundation for building a novel conceptualization of the governance perspective to 
                                                 
86 Namely analyses of the most-published first author, most-cited first author, most-cited book/article, temporal 
pattern of articles published, temporal pattern of articles cited, outlet pattern of articles published and outlet 
pattern of articles cited. 
87 Using the frequencies of theories employed, frequencies of antecedents present, Bonacich eigenvector 
centrality and Betweenness centrality as well as facet co-occurrence frequencies as measures 
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M&A in Chapter 3. As encouraged by Eden (2002), this study thus engages in meta-
analytical exploration in the realm of management research, with the general benefits of 
indicating future research avenues, pointing out the direction for new theory development and 
shedding light on how and why certain relationships between issues (embodied in this study 
by the facets of the network analysis) exist. 
 
It is no coincidence that the methodologies used here were presented in this order. The 
analyses were chronologically performed in the same order, which, as in any research process 
involving conceptual work, has an impact on the incremental development of the precise 
selected discussants, presented propositions and advocated research avenues. It seems 
justified to say that this has seemed the right order to undertake a serious conceptual 
framework-building exercise. The conceptual analyses involved familiarizing with a wealth 
of seminal literature, which increased awareness concerning the potential cross-fertilization 
between the two discourses. Here, the idea of strong yet largely implicit linkages on multiple 
levels emerged. The bibliometric study, then again, confirmed the existence of such linkages 
and especially the most-cited article and network analyses gave the objective information 
about the structure of a potential holistic perspective. The resulting assertions made in the 
form of a) a number of propositions vis-à-vis the nature of the M&A discourse, b) the new 
categorization of M&A research streams, c) the identified linkages between the M&A and 
governance theory discourses and d) a holistic governance perspective to M&A research, 
consisting of both exploratory and prescriptive elements, were the result of an incremental 
process involving two specific phases of conceptualizing and theory building.  
 
By engaging in such broad ‘discourse diagnostic’ methodology, the aim was also to adopt 
an interpretative and conceptual approach to M&A research. Framework-building, not to 
mention theory-building, is not acceptable only through the use of extensive quantitative 
methodology as profound phenomenon-centered dilemmas cannot be satisfactorily answered 
by providing narrow parcels of research. The perspective assumed here is that a very 
confined research topic, operating on a confined research setting, often employing 
sophisticated quantitative analyses, has little if any ontological value and needs to be 
supported by strong conceptual understanding in order to be able to create new reference 
frames in management research. 
 
Chapter 3 interpreted and translated the results of the conceptual and bibliometric analyses 
firstly by identifying the dominant perspectives, theories and linking theories as well as 
antecedents and research streams, of the M&A discourse. Secondly, it discussed paradigmatic 
linkages between the governance theoretical and M&A discourses at three levels of analysis; 
shared traditions, academic cross-fertilization and factual M&A affairs, complementing the 
discussion with an analysis of the shortcomings of the governance theories of the firm in and 
their compatibility to M&A analysis. Finally, Chapter 3 presented a novel, governance-based 
perspective, with explanatory (academic) and prescriptive (managerial) avenues to thinking 
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about M&A. Here, major emphasis was placed on taking the institutional differences or 
M&A settings into account and acknowledging the functioning of the governance perspective 
primarily as a cognitive mechanism. 
 
This section aims at finalizing the discussion of a governance perspective to M&A and 
preliminarily evaluating the contribution of this study to the existing body of knowledge.  
The discussion is structured as follows. Firstly, the contributions of the study are extracted by 
reviewing the 34 propositions made along the way and comparing them to the research 
questions laid out for this study. Secondly, the shortcomings of a governance perspective to 
M&A, under which heading this whole research effort belongs, are evaluated. Thirdly, the 
potentially fruitful research avenues emerging from this study are discussed. They advocate 
research dealing with both the M&A discourse as well as governance perspective in general. 
 
 
4.3 Contributions of the study 
 
4.3.1 Propositions 
 
One of the key ideas of this study has been to make direct propositions in a rather 
provoking manner. The propositions are perceived as too daring, generic and taken too far to 
be called ‘the results’ of this study. They are, however, based on the results of the conceptual 
and bibliometric studies.  
 
The initial aim of making a wide array of propositions was primarily to demonstrate the 
potential power of the governance approach and stimulate future research. The propositions 
have been attempted to be formulated in a way that allows for them to be converted into 
research hypotheses in related future studies. Simultaneously, however, the propositions can 
also be seen to provide answers to the research questions of this study. Figure 9 depicts the 
relationship between the two primary research questions, their subquestions and the total of 
34 propositions made during the course of this study. 
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The main conclusion of Figure 9 is that the study has managed to discover insights in all 
of the areas defined by the sub-research questions. A minimum of four propositions has been 
made about each part of each research problem. While the propositions cannot be argued to 
be able to answer every research question exhaustively, it seems that they do form a logical 
pattern. The propositions cannot be perceived to be in serious conflict with each other, nor do 
they merely state the obvious, albeit the depth which each analysis reaches varies 
significantly.  
 
 
4.3.2 Theoretical implications 
 
The propositions tackling the de facto structuring of the M&A discourse generally 
advocate the need for a holistic governance perspective, engulfing elements of the various 
carefully analyzed disciplinary inputs as is crystallized in Proposition 21.  
 
The analysis of disciplinary research orientations (Research question 1a) in the M&A 
discourse revealed a wide array of findings. Firstly, resource based and competitive strategy 
literature was identified as a dominant stream in M&A research, which indicates that M&A 
research does belong to a group of more or less generic strategic management topics. This is 
despite the fact that M&A is often seen as somewhat separate from more routine strategic 
management issues due to its ‘grand’ nature, i.e. that it involves enormous transactions that 
make it interesting from a market power, financial, legal etc. perspectives as well. Secondly, 
the organization of economic activity was identified as a common denominator in much of 
the M&A articles in general. Despite the plethora of disciplines analyzing M&A, M&A is 
first and foremost seen as a driver of the reorganization of economic activity, e.g. a shaper of 
industries and economies, a change catalyst, an opportunity for change and a redefiner of 
organizational boundaries, inter-organizational relationships, intra-organizational structures, 
job specifications, everyday working environments and so on. Thirdly, economics, finance 
and industrial organization research traditions, all of which have a significant role in the 
M&A discourse, were perceived to be both symptoms and origins of a strong quantitative 
methodological tradition. This tradition can be perceived to have segregated these research 
streams from managerially and organizationally oriented approaches. Another upshot of 
methodological fixations and differences of opinion is that interdisciplinary research, which 
history has proven valuable (cf. e.g. Jensen and Meckling 1976), is unfortunately rare. 
Fourthly, finance-oriented research, contrary to earlier analyses (e.g. Haspeslagh and Jemison 
1991) has a conspicuously bipartite balance between corporate finance and capital markets 
literature. The situation is similar in strategy research, where the competence-based views 
(including resource-, knowledge- and capability-based approaches) do not appear as 
dominant over other types of strategy literature, e.g. the competitive literature of Michael E. 
Porter. Thus, the competence and capital markets orientations, both of which have an intimate 
linkage to shareholder value as a research antecedent, do not dominate the M&A discourse as 
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could be intuitively anticipated and as has been suggested by earlier studies of the M&A 
discourse (e.g. Haspeslagh and Jemison 1991, Larsson and Finkelstein 1999). With the results 
of the bibliometric study, there is, however, a growing consensus about the key positions of 
strategic, financial, process and culture/HRM oriented M&A literature, while the role of 
organization theory and social psychology as well as some elements of the resource-based 
view (particularly the capabilities perspective) seem less significant. In any case, yet another 
categorization of the disciplinary traditions in M&A research has been identified, the five 
major research streams being strategy, process, economic and law, finance as well as humans 
and organizations.  
 
The various analyses of the theories used in the 1990s M&A articles (research question 
1b) yielded by and large unsurprising results that converge with the analysis of the 
disciplinary traditions above. The most surprising and noteworthy finding was that the 
governance theories of the firm a) are fundamental theoretical stepping-stones of the M&A 
and b) assume active roles in the M&A that differ vis-à-vis their content as well as depth of 
impact. All of the governance theories of the firm were present in both the bibliometric 
analysis and were perceived to have valuable insights to M&A in the conceptual analysis. 
However, while certain governance theories of the firm have been argued to be difficult to 
operationalize and subsequently suffer from a shortness of e.g. empirical application into 
M&A contexts, others assume evident key positions within the M&A discourse. Among the 
ones enjoying less direct attention are neoclassical economics, whose formerly dominant 
position in once-primarily-monopoly-oriented M&A literature has been diluted not least 
because of the emergence of applied industrial organization literature, the incomplete 
contracting tradition, whose application has been hampered by the lack of precise definitions 
for key concepts such as bounded rationality, and partly also property rights theory, which 
has remained an abstract quasi-philosophical ideology without serious operationalization 
attempts. The more central and acknowledged governance conceptions have been agency 
theory, which seems to be not only important, but the most important theoretical framework 
for M&A analysis, and transaction cost economics, which, like some other theories to a lesser 
extent, has assumed the role as the primary linking theory in the M&A discourse due to its 
central conceptual innovations such as the transaction cost, the markets-hybrids-hierarchies 
dichotomy, ex ante and ex post governance, the formal make-or-buy setting and the 
governance vs. competence debate. 
 
A respective analysis of the antecedents for performing M&A research in the 1990s 
(research question 1c) yielded equally significant findings. Firm performance effects of M&A 
(e.g. productivity and profitability) were identified as the most common antecedent for 
performing M&A research. Shareholder value is also a popular M&A research antecedent, 
due to its compliance with quantitative research methodologies, accessibility to various 
disciplinary perspectives and the tendency of M&A research to concentrate on publicly listed 
companies. On the whole, M&A research seems to be motivated more by general 
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management antecedents than typical M&A-specific research antecedents (e.g. antitakeover 
provisions, antitrust issues, diversification through acquisition and conglomerate-building), 
which per se reinforces the aforementioned impression of M&A as yet another topic 
belonging to the common genre of strategic management research. What was more 
interesting in the antecedent analysis, however, was that the antecedents could be identified 
to operate in distinctive, well-defined groups or clusters.  Five antecedent clusters emerge. 
The first three being more clearly defined and two latter less so, namely the ‘stakeholder 
incentives cluster’, the ‘business objectives cluster’, the ‘organizational learning’ cluster, the 
‘strategy cluster’ and the ‘economic efficiency’ cluster. While the last two are quite generic 
and unsurprising, the first three can be argued to present the current focal points of M&A 
research. On one hand, there is organizationally aware and decision-making oriented 
literature, with an agency theoretical backbone, dealing with such issues as top management 
commitment, compliance and hubris, corporate governance, risk asymmetries and so on. 
From a managerial point of view, this line of research is interested in explaining inter-
stakeholder group dynamics of M&A situations, which managers can relate to. There is also a 
numerically oriented literature, which is highly empirical (to the extent that very little 
grounded theory is sometimes incorporated in the articles) and still attempts to see which 
(financial) business objectives M&A serves a purpose in realizing. The managerial lessons, 
which are supposedly always there, are reduced to tested associations between variables and 
simplistic logical prescriptive conclusions drawn from these results. Finally, there is modern 
and contemporary M&A research that derives from the knowledge based view of the firm and 
argues for various types of organizational learning and knowledge creation benefits from 
M&A by focusing on e.g. technology transfer, innovation, R&D, immaterial resources and 
tacit knowledge. Despite this line of research also being highly empirical, there is as yet no 
sign of a fixation to over-emphasis of quantitative methodologies given that case study 
methodology and conceptual models are not rare.  
 
The propositions tackling the contribution of the governance theories of the firm to M&A 
(research question 2), reveal three levels of paradigmatic linkages between the two 
discourses, as is crystallized in Proposition 22. The two discourses are found to interlink in 
their intellectual roots and traditions, engage in academic cross-fertilization and share many 
views on factual affairs dealing with M&A decision-making, suggesting the possibility for a 
governance based holistic framework engulfing both academic and managerial insights. A 
holistic research perspective can be seen to be able to reduce multi-paradigm problem that the 
dispersed, segregated and multidisciplinary M&A discourse can be argued to suffer from 
(Proposition 23). 
 
The analysis of the intellectual roots and traditions of the M&A discourse (Research 
question 2a) identified that the organization of economic activity is a unifying concept that 
underlies both M&A research and the theories of the firm fundamentally. As is quite 
characteristic of the interplay between governance and M&A literature, the organization of 
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economic activity, a concept that originates from the governance tradition, has diffused into 
the analysis of M&A in the course of time. It is equally typical that the concept of economic 
organization, like many of the other key concepts, has emerged from the governance theories 
of the firm to wider use in management research (See Appendix 3). It is more characteristic 
of M&A research to use the same concepts implicitly and the conceptual dependence on 
governance literature is seldom acknowledged. Despite the fact that governance theory has 
seemingly acted as an intellectual underpinning to many strands of M&A literature for a 
number of decades, integrated and applied research is still very rare. During the past few 
years, however, there have been numerous studies that indicate a surge in cross-fertilizing 
research attention. On the other hand, the linkages in deep-rooted intellectual issues have also 
had an effect, which could be perceived to be adverse rather than beneficial. Namely, the 
economics-oriented tradition of institutional and organizational analyses has fixated M&A 
research to certain methodological tracts, the most dominant of which seems to be the 
quantitative analysis of discrete structural alternatives via database-inspired hypothesis 
testing, regression analysis and structural equation modeling.  
 
The second area of investigation deals with the types of academic cross-fertilization 
between the governance theories of the firm and M&A (research question 2b). It firstly seems 
that there are apparent linkages between the governance theories of the firm and the M&A 
research antecedent clusters identified above. Agency theory has been a central developer of 
both managerial and financial analyses of M&A situations as was described in the context of 
the ‘stakeholder group incentives cluster’ above. Transaction cost economics, then again, has 
also played an active role in linking conglomerate and diversifying M&A to other theories 
and phenomena in the 1990s M&A articles. Property rights theory is an ideological 
cornerstone of market power literature engulfing primarily economics-minded (industry 
concentration, monopoly/oligopoly, wealth effects etc.), but also more strategically oriented 
(price maintenance, cartel building, market dominance) literature. Furthermore, neoclassical 
calculativeness and maximization ideology is still evident in performance-focused M&A 
analysis, represented e.g. by the ‘business objectives’ style research. On the whole, it thus 
seems fair to suggest that especially with increasing cross-fertilizing research attention during 
the past few years, meaningful patterns between certain areas of M&A analysis and the 
governance theories of the firm are beginning to emerge. A feature of this pattern is that the 
governance perspective, which can be said to be a conceptually holistic collection of various 
mutually complementing insights from different governance theories of the firm, is able to 
strongly contribute to the analysis of the existence of M&A, i.e. the evaluation of 
justifications and motivations put forth for performing M&A in both theory and practice. On 
the other hand, the shortcomings of the governance-centered approach are admitted and 
further analyzed in below. 
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4.3.3 Decision-making implications 
 
The potential for a governance-based framework for managerial M&A decision-making 
was also analyzed (research question 2c). Here, the propositions were based on an analysis of 
a number of M&A decision-making settings, in which governance perspective flavored 
insights were perceived to have a potentially fruitful role. A real-life fact is that governance 
insights are in their current form difficult, albeit not impossible, to apply to managerial 
settings. Pondering e.g. the effect of property rights on an M&A related investment decision 
or measuring the real-life transaction costs between a parent company and a subsidiary in 
different ownership alternatives requires careful thinking and deep theoretical understanding. 
The truth is that the application of governance to managerial decision-settings is extremely 
rare. The analysis in Section 3.2.4 is nevertheless successful at indicating why the governance 
perspective could have considerable contributions to M&A decision-making settings and 
goes as far as proposing that M&A decision-making can potentially offer an equally fertile 
area of application for the governance perspective like academic research already does to an 
increasing extent.  
 
Six key M&A decision-making areas, which the governance perspective is poised to serve, 
were identified. The governance perspective could offer insights to establishing a basic 
philosophy for M&A, understanding the limits of M&A operations, appreciating the 
influence and incentives of different stakeholder groups, making decisions regarding firm 
boundaries (e.g. divestment. in- and outsourcing), maximizing the calculated outcome and 
establishing a new legal entity. Each governance theory has a distinct realm within M&A 
decision-making.  
 
Furthermore, the analysis of governance insights to the factual M&A decision-making 
environments concluded that any managerial M&A framework should respect the idea of 
M&A as a process, given that this approach has proven enormously appealing to managers. A 
processual model of the M&A should organize the governance insights to M&A management 
in a way which respects current conceptualizations of the M&A process. The processual view 
of M&A is perceived to be a vehicle, which could potentially be used operationalize 
academic research findings to decision-making situations through an influence on managerial 
cognition. The M&A decision-making arenas that governance insights could serve were 
identified to be numerous. They include not only corporate strategy, but also functional areas 
such as marketing, HRM, finance and the management of professional services providers. 
 
As a whole, the scrutiny of potential application areas of the governance perspective in 
M&A decision-making revealed that the managerial relevance of the perspective could in the 
future be extended remarkably. This could potentially be done to extent that deriving 
decision-making implications would grow into an equally important application area as the 
advancement of academic M&A research. This would, however, necessitate a profound 
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understanding of the cognitive mechanisms through which the governance insights could 
actually influence managers’ and other actor groups’ decisions. Undoubtedly, developing the 
decision-making implications of the governance perspective further would thus require 
integrative research with managerial psychology and ultimately viability testing in 
managerial education. 
 
 
4.3.4 Elaboration of contributions  
 
The insights presented in the form of propositions to the two primary research questions 
evoked two concerns. Firstly, given that this study has identified the central position of the 
governance theories of the firm in the M&A discourse, the need to formulate frameworks, 
which expose these theories to wider academic and professional use in the context of M&A, 
emerges.  Secondly, the propositions have identified remarkable potential for performing 
M&A research based on the governance perspective and even suggested some academic and 
managerial contours along which such research could take place.  
 
Thus whereas the main purpose of Sections 3.1 and 3.2 was to make propositions that 
concentrate on directly tackling the research questions, the key aim of the entire Chapter 3 
was to take these propositions further and present two conceptual frameworks in which 
governance theoretical insights play a key role. The first is the explanatory governance 
approach to M&A presented in Section 3.3, which deals with the current and potential future 
interplay of M&A research questions, answers, shortcomings and avenues with the 
governance perspective. In essence, this framework maps the most promising integrative 
research avenues (e.g. governance theoretical analysis of the M&A process, integration of 
tacit and codified knowledge as well as learning into the governance perspective), identifies 
knowledge gaps that need acute filling (e.g. the need to distinguish between governance 
insights to ‘hybrid’ organization modes and M&A), argues for the need to acknowledge 
differences in the institutional environments in which M&A is being performed and generally 
advocates interdisciplinary research between academics who represent different views of the 
world and whose different skills should be viewed as complementary, not incompatible. 
 
The second is the prescriptive governance approach to M&A, also presented in Section 
3.3, which aims at shedding light on the different roles that the governance theories of the 
firm can assume. Combining ideas from different governance theories into one ‘governance 
perspective’ can give business professionals a new cognitive mechanism and a conceptual 
tool. The prescriptive approach also includes a processual model for the use of governance 
theoretical insights in M&A. Whether it is seen as an alternative or as complementary to the 
conventional process models of M&A is up to the managers, the primary aim of the 
framework is only to somewhat enrich the current idea of the M&A process with governance 
insights. Finally, the prescriptive approach attempts to touch upon managerial reality by 
  196 
showing the practical repercussions of governance thinking to corporate strategy-making on 
the one hand and various functional areas (corporate governance, professional services 
procurement, marketing, HRM and finance) in the context of M&A. 
 
The propositions relate to these explanatory and prescriptive frameworks directly; they are 
crystallizations of the content of these frameworks. The propositions tackling the first 
research question, which deals with the de facto structuring of the M&A discourse, motivate 
the building of the frameworks in the first place and yield valuable content regarding e.g. the 
strengths of each theory. The propositions tackling the second research question, which deals 
with the contribution of the governance theories to the M&A discourse, then again, have 
given the governance perspective its form, i.e. motivated the division in to an explanatory 
and a prescriptive avenue, in addition to being primarily responsible for the content of both 
insights. Naturally, the propositions relating to the interlinkages in intellectual roots and 
traditions as well as academic cross-fertilization fall more into the sphere of the explanatory 
approach, whereas propositions 31-34 lay ground for the prescriptive approach. What is 
more, propositions 21-23 deal with the general need for a holistic governance perspective.  
 
Altogether, answering the research questions (propositions) and taking their 
conceptualization one step further (building the explanatory and prescriptive governance 
perspectives) can be suggested to constitute the results of this study. In order to be a 
meaningful academic exercise, the results should contribute to the body of knowledge. Even 
though the contributions of any research effort are only realized in time, it seems necessary to 
subjectively suggest what the contributions of this study could be. Table 22 summarizes the 
key contributions of this study, as outlined above, together with the primary reasons why they 
could be contributions to the existing body of knowledge in the first place.  
 
 
Table 22: The perceived contributions of the study together with their justifications 
CONTRIBUTION WHY IS IT A CONTRIBUTION? 
1. The mapping of the de facto 
structuring of the 1991-2001 M&A 
discourse bibliometrically 
Despite relatively many literature overviews (e.g. Haspeslagh and 
Jemison 1991, Larsson and Finkelstein 1999, Cording et al. 2001, 
Weston et al. 2001, Gammelgaard 1999, Kim 1999), there has not 
been a rigorous effort to map the structuring of the discourse 
systematically. This has now been performed. 
2. Restructuring the M&A research 
streams on the basis of the bibliometric 
and conceptual results 
The proposed new categorization of M&A research streams is more 
comprehensive than previous ones and does arguably more justice to 
the different disciplinary orientations present in the literature. 
3. Identifying the significance and 
different roles of governance theories 
in the M&A discourse 
The governance perspective as a whole has not been explicitly related 
to the M&A discourse before and explicit integrations of even 
individual governance theories are rare. Their dominance as theoretical 
cornerstones of the M&A discourse, as well as their different roles, 
have simply not been known or at least acknowledged. 
4. Linking M&A with the governance 
perspective through history/tradition, 
language, joint academic research foci 
and convergence in business settings 
The various levels of analysis on which the interplay between the 
governance theories of the firm and the M&A discourse occurs have 
not been analyzed or even mentioned in the same text. 
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5. Identifying theory-antecedent 
clusters in M&A research using the 
facet co-occurrence analysis  
The ‘stakeholder group incentives’, ‘business objectives’ and 
‘organizational learning’ clusters shed light on the types of M&A 
research that are popular and thus symptomatic of the structuring of 
the current M&A discourse  
6. Proposing a holistic governance 
perspective to M&A research and 
decision-making 
The governance perspective, as set of meaningful holistic cognitive 
frameworks incorporating both academic and decision-making 
oriented insights, has not been applied to M&A as a whole before 
7. Advocating research avenues 
relating to the use of the governance 
perspective in both M&A and other 
research streams 
One of the biggest contribution of this study is that it hopefully 
stimulates a new way of thinking about both the governance theories 
of the firm and M&A, thus opening up new discussions and research 
streams 
8. Facilitating the development of 
governance-based decision-making 
frameworks 
By identifying the relevance of the governance perspective to M&A 
decision-making,  
 
 
 
4.4 Shortcomings of the study 
 
Given that this research effort represents a) a new attempt engage in significant theory-
centered work that is motivated by b) the refinement of two academic discourses and that is 
simultaneously c) an attempt to initiate a new type of integrative research, it is apparent that 
the arguable strengths and merits of this study are matched by weaknesses. While the 
identification of the contributions of this study above outlined the major strengths, this 
Section sets to the task of identifying the key shortcomings of the governance perspective to 
M&A. This has two aims. Firstly, the aim is to evaluate this research effort and its primary 
product, the idea of a governance perspective to M&A. Secondly, both the strengths and the 
shortcomings can be perceived as potential targets for future research as they often assume 
the form of strong theoretical insights or knowledge gaps. In the following, the shortcomings 
of the governance perspective are analyzed, with direct attention being paid to the research 
avenues in Section 4.5. 
 
The shortcomings of applying the governance perspective to M&A emerge from a number 
of sources. Firstly, there are shortcomings that relate to the way this study has been 
conducted. Given that the governance perspective built in Chapter 3 relies on the conceptual 
and bibliometric research findings, their reliability and validity have a direct effect on the 
credibility of the entire framework. Secondly, there are a number of criticisms towards the 
governance theories of the firm and subsequently arguable shortcomings in the way the they 
can be related to M&A as was identified in Section 3.2.5. Here, these shortcomings are 
summarized.  Finally, the governance perspective also suffers from the nature of M&A as a 
discourse and a practical exercise. Although the governance perspective attempts to act 
largely as cognitive framework, the realities of M&A present some limitations to how much 
can be generalized on its basis. 
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Shortcomings related to the materials and methods of the study 
 
There are clear and admitted methodological shortcomings in this study, as is discussed in 
Section 1.3. Many of the shortcomings have, however, been tackled with successfully. For 
example, the most of the concerns about error in the author citation analyses emerging from 
the fact that only the first authors are considered are removed by the fact that the results are 
converging with those of e.g. the most-cited text analysis, the most-cited text analysis with 
temporal profile adjustment and the theory and antecedent frequency analyses in the network 
analysis. A similar concern deals with the subjective nature of the identification of the 
presence of facets in the network analysis. The robustness test yielding an average reliability 
of 93% indicates that the test is reliably repeatable. Likewise, the weakness emerging from 
the fact that the location of the citation is not considered in the citation analysis is tackled by 
the complementation of the citation analysis with the network analysis, which ensures that 
e.g. theories are not selected only based on a random reference to an author but they are de 
facto present and central to the article. 
 
The concerns that do prevail deal firstly with the selection of journals. It is never possible 
to make a selection of journals to cover in a bibliometric analysis that would satisfy all 
advocates of all disciplinary orientations. As can be seen in the analysis of the publication 
outlet pattern in the Introduction, finance, management and economics journals have the most 
articles. Naturally, the selection of journals leads to the selection of articles from those 
journals and consequently the results are weighed in their thematic direction. One could, for 
example, argue that there are not enough organizational and human behavior related journals 
in the journal list. The counterarguments to this are that a) all disciplinary traditions were 
attempted to be included, b) organizational behavior and theory journals did yield a total of 
37 articles and that c) the inclusion of more and more of these journals would not have had a 
huge impact on the results given that no M&A related articles were found even in core 
journals such as Organization and Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes. 
Organization theory and behavior journals were thus included, but they simply do not discuss 
M&A very often, at least not in the semantic tradition employed in this study. 
 
Another shortcoming is that there is not, as yet, a comparable study that would indicate 
which ones of the authors, texts, theories and antecedents are actually the kind that is 
generally widely used in all scientific research involving same disciplinary areas as M&A. 
For example, which authors and articles do appear at the top in pretty much any citation 
analysis, and does this dilute the arguments presented about the important and exceptional 
position in the M&A discourse? Would the fact that e.g. some governance theoretical articles 
appear frequently in a number of forums mean that their relative impact is not very 
significant? Should they actually be more significantly well represented in the M&A 
discourse than the other forums to justify the conclusions made in this study about their 
centrality in the M&A discourse? This is a serious issue given that the motivation for the 
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entire governance perspective building exercise is that the governance theories are perceived 
to ‘uniquely’ underlie the M&A discourse. 
 
 
Shortcomings emerging from the nature of the governance theories of the firm 
 
A second set of shortcomings emerges from the shortcomings in the nature of the theories 
of the firm and the repercussions these shortcomings have on their applicability to M&A 
analysis. There are some five general shortcomings in the nature of the governance theories 
of the firm. Firstly, the governance theories of the firm are weak at decomposing and 
systematically analyzing specifics of the internal workings of the firm, particularly through 
empirical research. Transaction cost economics, which is supposedly the governance theory 
most able to compare internal arrangements and thus point out synergistic gain instances, 
only covers certain issues like team formation, head office size, number of management 
layers and even these analyses are heavily criticized (Ghoshal and Moran 1996). There are 
significant gains from internal organization related issues in M&A e.g. activity sharing, 
functional integration, knowledge management, resource pooling and so on, which the 
competence perspective to strategy research is somewhat specialized at investigating. The 
governance perspective to M&A also inherits this weakness; the proposed avenues deal little 
with internal organization related gains from M&A.  
 
Secondly, a governance perspective based on the governance theories of the firm is bound 
to have a limited scope in inter-organizational, industry level and, to some extent, macro-
level analysis. M&A is very much an issue, which needs to be tackled not only from the 
perspective of a single firm, but also from the perspective of all the other levels of analysis it 
has a major impact on. The current governance perspective operates at the level of the firm, 
even though M&A has significant impacts on e.g. inter-organizational networks and 
relationships, industry structure, market power and even nation-level wealth issues (e.g. 
through employment). However, institutional and organizational economics can be perceived 
to also have merits in analyzing the organization of economic activity at higher levels of 
analysis. Thus, this shortcoming should be able to be rectified with future governance 
theoretic research. 
 
Thirdly, the governance theories of the firm, and subsequently the findings that underlie 
the proposed governance perspective, are generally grounded in economics and its mindsets 
and methodologies. A typical problem here is that the governance theories contain varying 
economics-flavored assumptions (e.g. complete contracting, perfect information, economic 
efficiency or utility as the primary incentive determinant, opportunistically behaving humans) 
that cannot always be accepted from the perspective of other disciplinary traditions as well as 
real-life M&A situations. It is difficult to accept the proposed governance perspective if one 
does not recognize the usefulness of governance theories of the firm despite their apparent 
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shortcomings. This standpoint has, however, been addressed particularly in the prescriptive, 
more managerially oriented stream of the governance perspective. On one hand, the 
prescriptive avenue is built as a cognitive mechanism that, as such, is not trapped in the 
narrow economics mindset. On the other hand, the different governance theories are allocated 
specific roles within narrower areas of application than the whole M&A process, which can 
be argued to improve the acceptability of their application despite some apparent unrealistic 
features. For example, even though all the sides of M&A are certainly not appreciated from 
the perspective of neoclassical economics, the maximization and calculativeness exercises 
can be argued to be extremely useful at a certain point of the M&A process. 
 
Fourthly, a related argument deals with the habit of the governance perspective to omit 
social and human aspects of M&A, which is what Ghoshal and Moran (1996, p. 1) argue 
make particularly transaction cost economics but also the governance perspective as a whole 
“bad for practice”. While some of this omission is surely also incorporated in the proposed 
governance perspective, the incomplete contracting tradition and agency theory are able to 
engage in some kind of analysis of human and organizational issues. The incomplete 
contracting tradition is able to introduce the limits of attempting to manage M&A in a 
organizational reality characterized by humane actions, while agency theory sheds light to 
how individuals and groups perceive an M&A situation in the light of e.g. their incentives, 
information and risk preferences.  
 
Finally, some of the shortcomings of the specific governance theories of the firm as well 
as their underlying assumptions carry on to burden the governance perspective in general. All 
of the criticisms about the specific theories outlined in Table 19 can be seen to gnaw into the 
credibility of the governance perspective. However, it is important to notice that the 
perceived implications about the compatibility of the governance theories of the firm to 
M&A, emerging from the argued shortcomings, most often say that the applicability to the 
M&A discussion is limited or that the theories are valid but not sufficient to deal with M&A 
in general. The different roles assigned to the theories in the holistic governance perspective 
thus tackle this problem directly.  
 
The extent to which the aforementioned shortcomings related to the nature of the 
governance theories of the firm can be helped by future research varies significantly. Some of 
the issues are such that cannot be rectified. For example, new versions of the governance 
theories that would not be bound by any of the underlying and limiting assumptions, would 
be extremely difficult to introduce and would perhaps not receive the amount of attention 
they would need to gain a significant theoretical foothold.  On the other hand, there is clear 
evidence of shortcomings that can be rectified. The criticism relating to the static nature of 
transaction cost economic thinking has already been ousted out by dynamic transaction costs 
economics literature that integrates dynamic elements of competence-thinking in 
Williamson’s basic ideas (Langlois 1992, Langlois and Foss 1999, Langlois and Robertson 
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1995). A fixation to an economics mindset and methodology can be helped simply by 
beginning to research governance theoretic issues with qualitative methodologies (e.g. case 
study methodology), incorporate missing conceptual tools from the world of organization 
theory and behavior (the introduction of dynamics into the analysis of transaction costs is a 
good example) and start publishing them in non-economics, -law or –finance journals. 
Arguably, an evolutionary economics mindset (Nelson and Winter 1982) might be a useful 
starting point in broadening the disciplinary tradition of the governance perspective, given 
that it carries considerable respect in e.g. contemporary strategic management research.  
 
Nevertheless, from the perspective of this study, there is no clear bipartite division into 
those issues which cannot be helped by future research and those that can even though the 
degree of ease and the acceptance that somehow divergent articles receive can surely vary 
substantially. The potential research avenues are investigated in more detail in the next 
section.  
 
 
Shortcomings emerging from the nature of M&A 
 
The proposed governance perspective to M&A suffers from not only the weaknesses of 
the governance theories of the firm but also from the nature of M&A as a business 
phenomenon and as an academic discourse. Firstly, M&A, particularly post-merger process 
management, can be perceived to be a case-by-case exercise with little room for all-
engulfing, in-flexible prescriptions. Both academic and consulting oriented post-merger 
management frameworks have been criticized for being either too generic or unreliable (cf. 
Shrivastava 1986). This whole issue is why even the prescriptive half of the governance 
perspective in this study has been formulated as a cognitive framework that is meant to 
stimulate managerial mindsets, and not as a checklist or a normative protocol. 
 
Secondly, academic M&A discourse is, as argued above, segregated by disciplinary 
orientations and interdisciplinary research is rare due to a lack of commonly acceptable 
theoretical cornerstones, research problems and foci within M&A. One shortcoming of the 
proposed perspective can be that M&A researchers will not necessarily accept an approach 
that does not clearly belong to any disciplinary orientation and will peg this study as vague, 
loosely integrative theorizing. In a way this is understandable, since the research streams 
have drifted apart in the course decades and thus correcting the turf wars would be too much 
to ask from this study. Nevertheless, this study does attempt to act as an opener to a new type 
of M&A research that is not bound by discipline or fixated to worshipping a narrow segment 
of the M&A discourse. Without doubt, this might prove out to be extremely difficult. M&A is 
not an interdisciplinary discourse by chance; it is a hugely versatile research area.  
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Finally, a more general point about the nature of M&A deals with the dangers of building 
M&A frameworks that might be misinterpreted, particularly based on governance theories 
that have been argued to be “not only wrong, but also dangerous” (Ghoshal and Moran 1996: 
1).  M&A transactions often involve the lives of thousands, can influence at least regional but 
also national wealth and can shape entire industries, which again has massive repercussions. 
At the level of the firm, a failed M&A project can destroy years and years of hard work and 
success.  
 
 
Ramifications to the relevance of the governance perspective  
 
On the whole, the perceived shortcomings of the governance perspective emerging from 
the methodological weaknesses of this study, the nature of the governance theories of the 
firm and the nature of M&A in general can be argued to be more inclined to encouraging 
future research (see next section) than invalidate the entire governance proposition made in 
this study.  
 
The methodological weaknesses are not severe. On the contrary, the bibliometric 
methodology can be seen to be work particularly well in this type of exercise, as it combines 
methods based on objective (citation analysis) and subjective (network analysis) selection. 
The results are convergent and reliable, and the conceptual analysis both laid a good 
stepping-stone for the bibliometric analysis and generally supports and enriches its results. 
There is nothing in the methodology that could either render it a futile exercise or indicate 
that the results are erroneous. It seems somewhat indisputable that the way the structuring of 
the M&A discourse is identified merits at least some theorizing and framework building.  
 
It is a whole different discussion whether the ‘theory building exercise’ has been executed 
satisfactorily. The intention has been to avoid profound theory building, as the used 
methodologies are not based on first hand empirical research and the whole idea of a 
governance perspective in M&A is very new. Nevertheless, the idea has been to provoke 
thinking about governance as one holistic paradigm and start theorizing about the ways in 
which it could be useful in the analysis of M&A. Two issues emerge: the propositions are 
admittedly daring (to the extent that someone could argue that they are not well founded) and 
the theorizing that takes the form of the governance perspective is limited by what has 
already been said about the weaknesses of the theories of the firm and M&A. 
 
What are then the ramifications of these shortcomings to the specific parts of the 
governance perspective? The first issue deals with the suggested conceptual structuring of the 
governance perspective and its applications. One can obviously question the relevance of a 
holistic governance perspective in general by arguing that the governance theories of the firm 
do not constitute a meaningful whole and disagree vis-à-vis e.g. basic contracting 
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assumptions. In essence, the governance perspective is however needed as a conceptual tool. 
So far, the notion of a ‘governance perspective to strategy research’, as analyzed by 
Williamson (1999), has not represented the entire arsenal of the governance theories of the 
firm. Furthermore, what has been introduced here as the explanatory and prescriptive avenues 
of the governance perspective would lack a conceptual foundation if the idea of a holistic 
governance perspective had not been introduced. The whole conceptualization is more robust 
given that the explanatory and prescriptive governance approaches rely on a general idea of 
governance and not just insights from individual theories of the firm. This is also a defensive 
tactic; anyone set to unravel the entire construction must attack the entire concept of a 
governance perspective and will not get away with arguing e.g. that the shortcomings of a 
specific particular governance theory of firm are well known and thus the whole conceptual 
construction is implausible. 
 
The explanatory governance approach is prone to the criticisms concerning the theoretical 
structuring of the governance theories. One might be tempted to ask whether it is a 
meaningful exercise to advocate research that requires altering the fundamental 
characteristics of basic theories of the firm or whether it is worth building on theories that are 
already under severe criticism. The answer is yes. The governance theories of the firm have 
already manifested an ability to develop through time, as is evident in the case of dynamic 
transaction costs (Langlois 1992, Langlois and Foss 1999, Langlois and Robertson 1995), 
multiple principal-agent problems (e.g. Gupta and Romano 1998, Al-Najjar 1997, Tsoulouhas 
1999) and new property rights theory (Barzel 1997, Hart 1995, North 1990, Eggertson 1990, 
Hart and Moore 1990, Grossman and Hart 1986). What is more, research applying 
governance theoretical insights in to various social phenomena have begun to emerge, which 
makes the striving for better theoretical insights and M&A-applied research a very 
meaningful exercise.  
 
The prescriptive governance approach to M&A is admittedly very limited in its focus. The 
different roles of the governance theories in M&A decision-making, the processual model of 
the use of governance perspectives in M&A and the practical repercussions of governance 
thinking in strategic and functional decision-making areas all operate at the level of the firm, 
not paying enough attention to the firm-internal and firm-external aspects of M&A. This is 
something that surely needs rectification through future research. 
 
Finally, the suggestions made in the form of the two governance avenues are preliminary 
and need support. Yes, they suffer from a lack of iteration concerning the internal 
organization of firms and, yes, they are rather mechanistic in their treatment of softer human 
and organizational issues. This is typical for a new conceptual construction. As will be seen 
in the following Section, complementary research from e.g. the competence theories of the 
firm and further development of key incomplete contracting concepts are, however, already 
poised to help the governance perspective with these pediatric diseases. 
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4.5 Emerging research avenues  
 
The final task of this study is to identify research avenues that arise as a result of the 
executed research. Research avenues emerge about governance based M&A research as well 
as the use of the governance perspective as a social scientific research ‘tool’ in general. The 
suggested potential future research avenues are based on not only the shortcomings but also 
the results and strengths of the current study and its conceptual innovations. In essence, all of 
the advocated research avenues represent varying mixtures of the governance perspective and 
M&A. While the governance perspective is present in all of the proposed avenues, the extent 
to which the proposed research deals with M&A varies significantly, as does the extent to 
which they use particular governance theories or the governance perspective in general. As a 
result, the proposed future research avenues can be summarized in a four-field, categorized 
according to the general/specific use of governance theories and whether the research deals 
with M&A or not (see Figure 10). 
 
 
 
Figure 10: Summary of the governance based research avenues proposed in this study 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This study has touched upon a plethora of research avenues dealing with the specific 
governance theories of the firm in M&A. The four most acute issues are illustrated in Figure 
10. Firstly, there is a need to strengthen the human and organizational sides of M&A. This is 
possible through a more careful analysis and operationalization of the central concepts of the 
incomplete contracting tradition, e.g. bounded rationality (cf. Foss 2000), and the 
Governance in general Specific GTOFs 
M&A  
related 
Non-M&A 
related 
• Research in the tradition of incomplete 
contracting to strengthen the governance 
perspective vis-à-vis human and organizational 
issues in M&A 
• Relating transaction cost economics to the 
analysis of horizontal integration  
• More careful analysis of agency problems and 
incentive-fomation along the M&A process 
• More careful iteration of the mergers of 
production functions 
• Integrative research on the governance and 
competence perspectives to better tackle internal 
organization insights to M&A. 
• Extending the governance perspective to M&A 
to involve inter-organizational and possible 
industry level considerations 
• Deepening the understanding of cognitive 
frameworks in M&A decision-making 
• Further conceptual development and updating the
individual governance theories of the firm, e.g. 
 Opportunistic behavior by principals and 
soft incentive determinants  
 Development of the property rights – 
shareholder value linkage  
 Further development of dynamic transaction 
cost economics  
• Combining the strengths of the governance and 
competence perspectives through integrative 
research 
• A more accurate conceptualization of the 
organization of economic activity at various levels 
of analysis 
• Using the methodological and governance 
theoretical stances of this study to research other 
phenomena similar to M&A 
• Empirical testing of the governance perspective 
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introduction such soft aspects as chance, authority, information, social capital, 
communication and commitment into the governance based analysis of M&A. Secondly, a 
welcome contribution would also be the application of transaction cost economics to 
horizontal integration conceptually and/or empirically. As Rindfleisch and Heide (1997) 
point out, transaction cost economics has already been applied (arguably successfully) to 
vertical integration, vertical interorganizational relationships and horizontal 
interorganizational relationships. At least attempting to tackle horizontal integration, whether 
that is diversifying or focused in nature, with transaction cost economics logic could 
potentially shed some of the inapplicability criticisms and build the governance theory of 
M&A on one of its weaker sides. Thirdly, the agency problems between stakeholder groups 
along the M&A process should be researched. With a growing understanding of the necessary 
tasks in both post- and pre-merger process management, attention should also be paid to e.g. 
the incentives, information and risk preferences of actor groups whose involvement create 
much of the dynamics, unpredictability and subsequent non-prescribeability of the M&A 
processes. Especially the incentives of finance professionals provide an extremely interesting 
and compelling avenue as has already been indicated by some ground-breaking studies 
(Sharma 1997, Kesner, Shapiro and Sharma 1994). Finally, it seems viable to suggest that 
there is also room for more mechanistic analysis of M&A. Advances in the ability to map 
production functions more realistically can be suggested to open avenues for analyzing the 
combining of production functions, too. This could shed light on some of the de facto 
mechanisms through which internal organization related gains are actually created in M&A.  
 
Besides encouraging for example the above avenues for applying specific governance 
theories of the firm to M&A, the further development of the theories per se is encouraged in 
this study. This study has manifested the fundamental value of governance theoretical 
insights, but also identified some serious limitations. Many of these limitations have 
developed as new research has discovered issues that the traditional conceptualizations of the 
governance theories do not take into consideration. Consequently, research refreshing and 
updating the governance theories is needed. There are a number of successful examples of 
this kind of research, for example the aforementioned examples of dynamic transaction cost 
economics dynamic transaction costs (Langlois 1992, Langlois and Foss 1999, Langlois and 
Robertson 1995), multiple principal-agent problems (e.g. Gupta and Romano 1998, Al-Najjar 
1997, Tsoulouhas 1999) and new property rights theory (Barzel 1997, Hart 1995, North 1990, 
Eggertson 1990, Hart and Moore 1990, Grossman and Hart 1986). Arguably, the conceptual 
extensions in most acute need of verification deal with relaxing some of the 
oversimplifications of agency settings (e.g. allowing for opportunistic behavior by principals 
and understanding softer incentive determinants of agents, e.g. commitment, trust and 
authority) and establishing conceptually the intuitively compelling linkage between property 
rights theory and shareholder value ideology. 
 
  206 
Numerous research avenues dealing with the use of the governance perspective, in 
general, for further analysis of M&A have emerged. The most significant shortcoming of the 
current governance perspective is that it is if not unable then at least weak at analyzing the 
internal organization of firms. Since extending the governance theories of the firm to discuss 
internal organization related issues to a much greater extent seems a somewhat hopeless 
exercise, integrative research with competence (resource-, knowledge- and capability-based) 
perspectives, which are somewhat specialized in the analysis of the internal workings of the 
firm, is needed to build a better framework of M&A. Madhok (2002) raises interesting points 
about the convergence of Coasian and resource-based thoughts, which could act as one 
starting point for this type of research. Secondly, as was discussed in the shortcomings, 
extending the governance perspective to M&A to involve at least inter-organizational, but 
possibly also industry-, and economy-level considerations, is needed. Confinement to the 
level of the firm can be rectified with future research given that organizational economic is 
able to tackle issues at higher levels of analysis too. Additionally, a deeper understanding of 
the operation and nature of cognitive frameworks, including the study of semantics (cf. Vaara 
2000), in M&A would improve the proposed governance perspective and motivation its 
further development. Finally, governance-based M&A research should rid itself of its 
disciplinary fixation to economics, law and finance methodologies, research problems and 
settings and publication outlets. Qualitative and conceptual research publishable also (albeit 
certainly not only) in organizationally, sociologically and managerially oriented journals is 
needed. This study has played a part in demonstrating the usefulness of a wide disciplinary 
basis in the analysis of M&A, and this should be reflected in the how research is performed 
and where it is published, too.  
 
Finally, there are some issues dealing with the development of general governance 
thinking that have little to do with M&A. This study has identified a clear need for 
performing governance-based research in other research areas or real-life phenomena than 
M&A. There are two reasons for this. Firstly, the contribution of this study is only revealed 
after a similar bibliometric analysis and a governance-based interpretation of its results is 
performed on a discourse reminiscent of M&A. Repeating the study would show how 
important the governance theories are to other discourses and validate or question the rather 
daring interpretation of their exceptionally dominant position in M&A research suggested in 
this study. The second reason is that using the governance perspective to analyze different 
areas of interest would take us towards an understanding about the true picture of the role of 
governance theories in e.g. management or corporate strategy research. Lately, the theories of 
the firm have again enjoyed resurging research attention (cf. Madhok 2002, Sanchez 2003 
forthcoming, Williamson 1999 and Coase’s Nobel Prize). Could governance be the next 
significant strategic management paradigm?  
 
If the governance perspective ‘won’t make it alone’, or even if it does, the combining of 
the strengths of the governance and competence perspectives is another important research 
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avenue. This study has demonstrated the need for integrative research not only across 
governance theories in M&A but across all theories of the firm in all management areas. As 
suggested by Eden (2002), this piece meta-analytical research has thus somewhat succeeded 
at pointing out a new direction for theory development and pointing out future research 
avenues. Turf wars could be a thing of the past. Conceptually integrative notions, most 
importantly the ‘organization of economic activity’, that are acceptable to an overwhelming 
majority of research traditions are emerging. It is these concepts and their more accurate 
conceptualization, as well as the continuous empirical testing of propositions emerging in the 
course of such work, that research needs to focus on. 
  208 
 
5 REFERENCES 
 
 
Acharya, S. 1988. A generalized econometric model and tests of a signalling hypothesis with 
two discrete signals. Journal of Finance 43 (2): 413-429.  
 
Acharya, S.1993. Value of latent information alternative event study methods. Journal of 
Finance 48: 363-85.  
 
Alchian, A.A. 1965. The basis of some recent advances in the theory of management of the 
firm. Journal of Industrial Economics 14: 30-41.  
 
Alchian, A.A. & H. Demsetz. 1972. Production, information costs and economic 
organization. American Economic Review 62 (5): 772-795.  
 
AlNajjar, N.I. 1997. Incentive contracts in two-sided moral hazards with multiple agents. 
Journal of Economic Theory 74 (1): 174-195. 
 
Amihud, Y. & B. Lev. 1981. Risk reduction as a managerial motive for conglomerate 
mergers: a transaction cost analysis. Bell Journal of Economics 12: 605-616. 
 
Amsterdamska, O. & L. Leydesdorff. 1989. Citations: indicators of significance. 
Scientometrics 15: 449-471. 
 
Ancori, B., A. Bureth & P. Cohendet. 2000 The economics of knowledge: the debate about 
codification and tacit knowledge. Industrial and Corporate Change 9 (2): 255-288. 
 
Anderson, R.C., T.W. Bates, J.M. Bizjak, et al. 2000. Corporate governance and firm 
diversification. Financial  Management 29 (1): 5-22. 
  
Andrews, K. R. 1971. The Concept Of Corporate Strategy Homewood. Ill: Dow Jones-Irwin.  
 
Ansoff, I. 1965. Corporate Strategy. New York: McGraw Hill. 
 
Aoki, M. 1986. Horizontal vs. vertical information structure of the firm. American Economic 
Review 76: 971-983. 
 
Argyris, C. & D. A. Schön. 1978. Organizational Learning: A Theory Of Action Perspective. 
New York: McGraw-Hill. 
  209
 
Armstrong, P. 1998. interdisciplinary discipline: postmodern academics, course conception 
trends and the situation of brazilian studies. Fagulha 6 (1): 1-33.  
 
Arrow, K. 1951. Social Choice and Individual Values. New York: Wiley. 
 
Arrow, K. 1962. Studies in Applied Probability and Management Science. New York: Wiley 
 
Arrow, K.J.& G. Debreu. 1954. Existence of an equilibrium for a competitive economy. 
Econometrica 22: 265-290. 
 
Ayres, I. & R. Gertner. 1989. Filling gaps in incomplete contracts: an economic theory of 
default rules. Yale Law Journal 99: 87-130. 
 
Axelsson, B. & G. Easton. 1992. Industrial Networks:  A New View of Reality. London: 
Routledge.  
 
Bain, J.S. 1959. Industrial Organization. New York: Wiley. 
 
Baker, G.P. & G.D. Smith. 1998. The New Financial Capitalists: Kohlberg Kravis Roberts 
and the Creation of Corporate Value. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
 
Bamber, L. S., T. E. Christensen & K. M. Gaver. 2000. Do we really ‘know’ what we think 
we know? A case study of seminal research and its subsequent overgeneralozation. 
Accounting, Organizations and Society 25 (2): 103-129. 
 
Barnard, C. 1938. The Functions of the Executive. MA: Harvard University Press. 
 
Barney, J. 1988. Returns to bidding firms in mergers and acquisitions: reconsidering the 
relatedness hypothesis. Strategic Management Journal 9, Special Issue: 71-78. 
 
Barney, J. 1991. Firm resources and sustained competitive advantage. Journal of 
Management 17 (1): 99-120. 
 
Barzel, Y. 1989. Economic Analysis of Property Rights. Cambridge University Press. 
 
Barzel, Y. 1997 Economic Theory of Property Rights. 2nd edition. New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
  210 
Bastien, D.T. & A.H. Van de Ven. 1986. Managerial and Organizational Dynamics of 
Mergers and Acquisitions. Discussion Paper no. 46, Strategic Management Research Center, 
University of Minnesota. 
 
Berkovitch, E. & M.P. Narayanan. 1993. Motives for takeovers: an empirical investigation. 
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 28: 347-362 
 
Berle, A.A.& G.C. Means. 1932 The Modern Corporation and Private Property. New York: 
Macmillan. 
 
Besanko, D, M.K. Perry & R. Spady. 1990.  The logit model of monopolistic competition: 
brand diversity. Journal of Industrial Economics 38 (4): 397-416. 
 
Besanko, D., D. Dranove & M. Shanley. 1996. Economics of Strategy. New York: John 
Wiley & Sons.  
 
Birkinshaw, J., H. Bresman & L. Hakanson. 2000. Managing the post-acquisition integration 
process: how the human integration and task integration processes interact to foster value 
creation. Journal Of Management Studies 37 (3): 395-425.  
 
Blair, M. & L.A. Stout. 1997. A Theory of Corporation Law as a Response to Contracting 
Problems in Team Production. mimeo. The Brookings Institution. 
 
Blair, M. & L.A. Stout. 1999. A team production theory of corporate law. Virginia Law 
Review 85 (2): 247-328. 
 
Bonacich, P. 1972. Factoring and weighting approaches to status scores and clique 
identification. Journal of Mathematical Sociology 2: 113-120.  
 
Bonacich, P. 1987. Power and centrality: a family of measures. American Journal of 
Sociology 92: 1170-1182. 
 
Bradley, M., A.S. Desai & E.H. Kim. 1988. Synergistic gains from corporate acquisitions and 
their division between the stockholders of target and acquiring firms. Journal of Financial 
Economics 21: 3-40. 
 
Broadus, R.N. 1987. Some notes on research in bibliometrics. Journal of Education for 
Library and Information Science 28 (2): 152-153. 
 
Brouthers, K.D. & L.E. Brouthers. 2000. Acquisition or greenfield start-up? Institutional, 
cultural and transaction cost influences. Strategic Management Journal 21 (1): 89-97. 
  211
  
Brown, S.L. & K.M. Eisenhardt. 1997. The art of continuous change: linking complexity 
theory and time-paced evolution in relentlessly shifting organizations. Administrative Science 
Quarterly 42 (3): 1-34. 
 
Brown, S.L. & K.M. Eisenhardt. 1998. Competing on the Edge: Strategy as Structured 
Chaos. Boston: Harvard Business School Press. 
 
Brown, S.J. & J.B.Warner. 1985. Measuring security price performance. Journal of Financial 
Economics 8: 205-257. 
 
Brown, J.R., C.S. Dev & D.-J. Lee. 2000. Managing marketing channel opportunism: the 
efficacy of alternative governance mechanisms. Journal of Marketing 64 (April): 51-65. 
 
Bruner, R.F. 1999. An analysis of value destruction and recovery in the alliance and proposed 
merger of Volvo and Renault. Journal of Financial Economics 51 (1): 125-166. 
 
Buchholtz, A.K. & B.A. Ribbens. 1994. The role of the CEO in takeover resistance: an 
empirical analysis of the effects of CEO incentives and individual characteristics. Academy of 
Management Journal 37: 554-579. 
 
Budd, J. & D. Raber. 1996. Discourse analysis: method and application in the study of 
information. Information Processing & Management 32: 217-226. 
 
Buono, A.F. & J.L. Bowditch. 1989. The Human Side of Mergers and Acquisitions: 
Managing Collisions Between People, Cultures, and Acquisitions. San Francisco, CA.: 
Jossey-Bass Inc.  
 
Buono, A.F. & J.L. Bowditch & J.W. Lewis III. 1985. When cultures collide: the anatomy of 
a merger. Human Relations 38: 477-500. 
 
Buono, A.F. & J.L. Bowditch & J.W. Lewis III. 1988. The cultural dynamics of 
transformation: the case of a bank merger. In Kilmann, Ralph H. et al. (eds). Corporate 
Transformation: Revitalizing Organizations for a Competitive World. San Francisco: Jossey-
Bass Inc. 
 
Burrell, G. & G. Morgan. 1979. Sociological Paradigms and Organizational Analysis. 
London: Gower. 
 
  212 
Campling, J.T. & G. Michelson. 1998. A strategic choice-resource dependence analysis of 
union mergers in the British and Australian broadcasting and film industries. Journal of 
Management Studies 35 (5): 579-600. 
 
Cartwright, S. & C.L. Cooper. 1993. The role of culture compatibility in successful 
organizational marriage. Academy of Management Executive 7 (2): 57-70. 
 
Castells, M. 1996. The Rise of the Network Society. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. 
 
Caves, R. & M. Porter. 1977. From entry barriers to mobility barriers: conjectural decisions 
and contrived deterrence to new competition. Quarterly Journal of Economics 91: 241-261.  
 
Chandler, A.D. 1962.  Strategy and Structure. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
 
Chatterjee, S. 1986. Types of synergy and economic value - the impact of acquisitions on 
merging and rival firms. Strategick Management Journal 2: 119-139.  
  
Chatterjee, S. 1992. Sources of value in takeovers - synergy or restructuring implications for 
target and bidder firms. Strategic Management Journal 13 (4): 267-286.  
 
Cheung, S.S.N. 1983. The contractual nature of the firm. Journal of Law and Economics 26: 
1-22. 
 
Chi, T.L. 2000. Option to acquire or divest a joint venture. Strategic Management Journal 21 
(6): 665-687. 
 
Cliffe, S. 1999. Can this merger be saved? Harvard Business Review 77 (1): 28-30. 
  
Coase, R.H. 1937. The nature of the firm. Economica 4: 386-405. 
 
Coase, R.H. 1960. The problem of social cost. Journal of Law and Economics 3: 1-44. 
 
Coe, R. & I. Weinstock. 1984. Evaluating the management journals: a second look. Academy 
of Management Journal  27 (3): 660-666. 
 
Cohen, W.M. & D.A. Levinthal. 1990. Absorptive capacity: a new perspective on learning 
and innovation. Administrative Science Quarterly 35: 128-152. 
 
Cole, J.R. & S. Cole. 1973. Social Stratification in Science. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press. 
 
  213
Coleman, J.S. 1990. Foundations of Social Theory. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press. 
 
Collin, S-O, U. Johansson, K. Svensson & P-O. Ulvenblad. 1996. Market segmentation in 
scientific publications: research patterns in American vs. European management journals. 
British Journal of Management  7: 141-154. 
 
Combs, J.G. & D.J. Ketchen. 1999. Explaining interfirm cooperation and performance: 
toward a reconciliation of predictions from the resource-based view and organizational 
economics. Strategic Management Journal 20 (9): 867-888. 
 
Contractor, F. & P. Lorange. 1988. Competition vs. cooperation: a benefit/cost framework for 
choosing between fully-owned investments and cooperative relationships. Management 
International Review 28 (special issue): 5-18. 
 
Cook, T. (ed.). 1992. Meta-analysis for explanation: a casebook. New York: Russell Sage 
Foundation. 
 
Cooper, H. M. & Hedges, L.V. (eds.). 1994. The handbook of research synthesis.  New York: 
Russell Sage Foundation. 
 
Cording, M., P. Christmann & L.J. Bourgeois III. 2002. A Focus on Resources in M&A 
Success: A Literature Review and Research Agenda to Resolve Two Paradoxes. Working 
Paper WP0017 (2002). The Batten Institute. 
 
Cremer, J. 1990. Common knowledge and the coordination of economic activities. In 
Masahiko Aoki, Oliver E. Williamson & Bo Gustafsson (eds.). 1990. The Firm as a Nexus of 
Treaties. London: Sage. 
 
Cyert, R.M. & J.G.March. 1963. A Behavioral Theory of the Firm. NJ, Englewood Cliffs: 
Prentice-Hall. 
  
Danell, R. 2000. Stratification among journals in management research: a bibliometric study 
of interaction between European and American journals. Scientometrics 49 (1): 23-38. 
 
Datta, D.K. 1991. Organizational fit and acquisition performance: effects of post-acquisition 
integration. Strategic Management Journal 12 (4): 281-298. 
 
Davis, G.F. & S.K. Stout. 1992. Organization theory and the market for corporate control: a 
dynamic analysis of the characteristics of large takeover targets, 1980-1990. Administrative 
Science Quarterly 37: 605-633.  
  214 
 
Davis, R. & I.M. Duhaime. 1992. Diversification, vertical integration, and industry analysis - 
new perspectives and measurement. Strategic Manage Journal 13 (7): 511-524.  
 
Deakin, S. & G. Slinger. 1997. Hostile takeovers, corporate law, and the theory of the firm. 
Journal Of Law And Society 24 (1): 124-151. 
  
Deal, T.E. & A.A. Kennedy. 1982. Corporate Culture. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. 
 
De Alessi, L. 1983. Property rights, transaction costs, and X-efficiency: an essay in economic 
theory. The American Economic Review 73 (1): 64-81. 
 
Debreu, G. 1959. Theory of Value: An Axiomatic Analysis of Economic Equilibrium. New 
York: Wiley. 
 
Demsetz, H. 1964. The exchange and enforcement of property rights. Journal of Law and 
Economics 7: 11-26.  
 
Demsetz, H. 1993. The Economics of the Firm: Seven Critical Commentaries. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Derby, R. & J.M. Toulouse. 1996. Social structuration of the field of entrepreneurship: a case 
study. Canadian Journal Of Administrative Sciences 13 (4): 285-305. 
 
DiFonzo, N. & P. Bordia. 1998. A tale of two corporations: managing uncertainty during 
organizational change. Human Resource Management  37 (3-4): 295-304. 
 
DiMaggio, P. & W. Powell. 1983. The iron cage revisited: institutional isomorphism and 
collective rationality in organizational fields. American Sociological Review 48: 147-160. 
 
Dodd. P.  1980. Merger proposals, Management discretion and Stockholder Wealth. Journal 
of Financial Economics 8 (2): 105 138. 
 
Donaldson, G. & J.W. Lorsch. 1983. Decision Making at the Top. New York: Basic Books. 
 
Douglass C. 1990. North, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Doyle, J.R. & A.J. Arthurs. 1995. Judging the quality of research in business schools: the UK 
as a case study. Omega International Journal of Management Science 23: 257-270. 
 
  215
Eckbo, B.E. 1983. Horizontal mergers, collusion and stockholder wealth. Journal of 
Financial Economics 11: 241-273. 
 
Eckbo, B.E. 1985. Mergers and the market concentration doctrine: evidence from the capital 
market. Journal of Business 58: 325-349. 
 
Eckbo, B.E & P. Wier. 1985. The Hart-Scott-Rodino Act: a re-examination of the 
market power hypothesis. Journal of Law and Economics 28: 119-149. 
 
Eckbo, B.E., V. Maksimovic & J. Williams. 1990. Consistent estimation of cross-sectional 
models in event studies. Review of Financial Studies 3: 343-365. 
 
Eden, D. 2002. Replication, meta-analysis, scientific progress, and AMJ’s publication policy. 
Academy of Management Journal 45 (5): 841-846. 
 
Eggertson, T.. 1990. Economic Behavior and Institutions. New York: Cambridge University 
Press. 
 
Eisenhardt, K.M. 1989. Agency theory: an assessment and review. Academy of Management 
Review 14: 57-74. 
 
Eisenhardt, K.M. & S.L. Brown. 1998. Time pacing: competing in markets that won’t stand 
still. Harvard Business Review 76 (2): 59-69. 
 
Eisenhardt, K.M. & J.A. Martin. 2000. Dynamic capabilities: what are they? Strategic 
Management Journal 21: 1105-112. 
 
Eisenhardt, K.M. & F. Santos. 2000. Knowledge-based view: a new theory of strategy? In 
Pettigrew, A., H. Thomas & R. Whittington (eds.). Handbook of Strategy and Management. 
London: Sage. pp. 139-164. 
 
Extejt, M. & J.E. Smith. 1990. The behavioral sciences and management: an evaluation of 
relevant journals. Journal of Management 16: 539-551. 
 
Fama, E.F. 1980. Agency problems and the theory of the firm. Journal of Political Economy 
88: 288-307. 
 
Fama, E.F. 1983. Financial Intermediation and price level control. Journal of Monetary 
Economics 12 (1): 7-32. 
 
  216 
Fama, E.F. & M.C. Jensen. 1983. Agency problems and residual claims. Journal of Law and 
Economics 26: 327-49. 
 
Fama, E.F. & M.C. Jensen. 1985. Organization forms and investment decisions. Journal of 
Financial Economics 14: 101-119. 
 
Foss, K. & N.J. Foss. 2000. Learning in Firms: Knowledge-Based and Property Rights 
Perspectives. Working paper, Copenhagen Business School, Dept. of Industrial Economics 
and Strategy. 
 
Foss, N.J.  1997. Austrian insights and the theory of the firm.  Advances in Austrian 
Economics  4: 175-198.  
 
Foss, N.J. 1999. Research in the strategic theory of the firm: ‘Isolationism’ and 
‘integrationism’. Journal of  Management  Studies 36 (6): 725-755.  
 
Foss, N.J. (ed.). 2000. The Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectives on Business and 
Management. Parts I-IV. London: Routledge. 
 
Foss, N.J. 2001a. Simon’s grand theme and the economics of organization. A note for a 
roundtable on cognition, rationality and governance, dedicated to the memory of Herbert A. 
Simon. Journal of Management and Governance 5 (3): 216-223.  
 
Foss, N.J. 2001b. Bounded Rationality in the Economics of Organization: Present Use and 
(Some)Future Possibilities. DRUID Working paper no. 01-13. 
 
Foss, N.J. 2001c. The Problem With Bounded Rationality: On Behavioral Assumptions in the 
Theory of the Firm. DRUID Working paper no. 01-15. 
 
Fowler, K.L. & D.R. Schmidt. 1989. Determinants of tender offer post-acquisition 
performance. Strategic Management Journal 10: 339-350. 
 
Franke, R.H., T.W. Edlund &  F. Oster III. 1990. The development of strategic management: 
journal quality and article impact. Strategic Management Journal 11: 243-253. 
 
Freeman, L.C. 1979. Centrality in social networks: conceptual clarification. Social Networks 
1: 215-239. 
 
Frye, B.E. 1999. The Humanities and The Sciences. American Council of Learned Societies 
Occasional Paper No. 47. 
 
  217
Fukuyama, F. 1995. Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity. NY: Free Press. 
 
Furubotn, E.G. &  S. Pejovich. 1972. Property rights and economic theory: a survey of recent 
literature. Journal of Economic Literature 10 (4): 1137-1162. 
 
Gadad, A.-M. 1998. The Effect of Divestitures on Firms Operating Performance and 
Shareholders’  Wealth: UK Evidence. Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Essex. 
 
Gadad, A.-M. & H.M. Thomas. 1999. The Effects of Divestiture on Seller Operating 
Performance and Shareholder’s Wealth: UK Evidence. Financial Management Association 
International Conference, August 1999.  
 
Gammelgaard, J. 1999. A New Motive for Acquisitions – A Search for Excellence. Working 
Paper, Department of International Economics and Management, Copenhagen Business 
School. 
 
Garfield, E. 1997. Dispelling a few common myths about journal citation impacts. The 
Scientist 11 (3): 11. 
 
Garfield, E. 1998. Random thoughts on citationology: its theory and practice (comments on 
theories of citation). Scientometrics 43 (1): 69. 
 
Garfield, E. & A.Welljams-Doroff. 1992. Citation data: their use as quantitative indicators for 
science and technology evaluation and policy-making. Science and Public Policy, 19 (5): 
321-327.   
  
Gaved, M. 1997. Closing the Communications Gap: Disclosure and Institutional 
Shareholders. London: Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales.  
 
Ghoshal, S. & P. Moran. 1996. Bad for practice: a critique of transaction cost theory. 
Academy Management Review 21: 13-47. 
 
Gilson, R.& B.S. Black. 1995. The Law of Corporate Acquisitions. 2nd ed. Westbury, NY: 
Foundation Press. 
 
Gioia,  D.A. & E.  Pitre. 1990. Multiparadigm perspectives on theory building. Academy Of  
Management Review 15 (4): 584-602. 
 
Glass, G.V. 1976. Primary, secondary and meta-analysis. EducationalResearcher 5 (10): 3-8. 
 
Glass, G.V. 1981. Meta-analysis in social research. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. 
  218 
 
Glick, W., W. McKelvey, M. Cooper, G. Huber & W. Zmud. 1997. Survey feedback from 
surveys of journal reputations. Report of the 1997 INFORMS Committee Review of 
Organization Science.  
 
Gomez-Mejia, L.R. & D.B. Balkin. 1992. The determinants of faculty pay: an agency theory 
perspective. Academy of Management Journal 35: 921-955. 
 
Gordon, M.E. & J.E. Purvis. 1991. Journal publication records as a measure of research 
performance in industrial relations. Industrial and Labor Relations Review 45: 194-201. 
 
Granovetter, M. 1985. Economic action and social structure: the problem of embeddedness. 
American Journal of Sociology 91: 481-510. 
 
Granovetter, M. 1992. Problems of explanation in economic sociology. In Nohria, N. & R.G. 
Eccles (eds.). Networks and Organizations: Structure, Form, and Action. Boston, 
Massachusettes: Harvard Business School Press. pp. 25-56. 
 
Grant, R.M. 1996. Prospering in dynamically competitive environments: organizational 
capability as knowledge integration. Organizational Science 7 (4): 375-387. 
 
Grossman, S. & O. Hart. 1986. The costs and benefits of ownership: a theory of vertical 
integration. Journal of Political Economy 94: 691-719. 
 
Gupta, S. & R.E. Romano. 1998. Monitoring the principal with multiple agents. Rand 
Journal of  Economics 29 (2): 427-442. 
 
Habeck, M.M., F. Kröger. & M.R. Träm. 2000. After the Merger: Seven Rules for Successful 
Post-Merger Integration. London: A.T.Kearney. 
 
Hadlock C, J. Houston & M. Ryngaert. 1999. The role of managerial incentives in bank 
acquisitions. Journal Of Banking & Finance 23 (2-4): 221-249. 
 
Hagedoorn, J., & R. Narula. 1996. Choosing organizational modes of strategic technology 
partnering: international and sectoral differences. Journal of International Business Studies 
27: 265-284. 
 
Haleblian, J. & S. Finkelstein. 1999. The influence of organizational acquisition experience 
on acquisition performance: a behavioral learning perspective. Administrative Science 
Quarterly 44: 29-56. 
 
  219
Hamel, G. & C.K. Prahalad. 1990. The core competence of the corporation. Harvard 
Business Review (May-June): 79-91. 
 
Hamel, G. & C.K. Prahalad. 1994. Competing for the Future. Boston, Mass.: Harvard 
Business School Press. 
 
Harris, M. & A. Raviv. 1978. Some results on incentive contracts with application to 
education and employment, health insurance, and law enforcement. American Economic 
Review 68: 20-30. 
 
Hart, O. 1986. The costs and benefits of ownership: a theory of vertical and lateral 
integration. Journal of Political Economy 94: 691-719. 
 
Hart, O. 1989. An economist’s perspective on the theory of the firm. Columbia Law Review  
89 (7): 1757-1774. 
 
Hart, O. 1990. Is “bounded rationality” an important element of a theory of institutions? 
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics  16: 696-702. 
 
Hart, O. 1995. Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure. London: Oxford University Press.  
 
Hart, O. & B. Holmström. 1987. The theory of contracts. In Truman & F. Bewley.  Advances 
in Economic Theory: Fifth World Congress. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 71-
155. 
 
Hart, O. & J. Moore. 1990. Property rights and the nature of the firm. Journal of Political 
Economy 98: 1119-1158. 
 
Haspeslagh, P.C. & D.B. Jemison. 1991. Managing Acquisitions: Creating Value through 
Corporate Renewal. New York: The Free Press. 
 
Hayek, F. A. 1937. Economics and knowledge. Economica N.S. 4: 33-54.  
 
Hayek, F.A. 1945. The use of knowledge in society. American Economic Review 35 
(September): 519-30. Reprinted in Hayek, F.A. 1948. Individualism and Economic Order. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. pp. 77-91. 
 
Hedges, L.V. & Olkin, I. 1985. Statistical methods for meta-analysis. Orlando, Academic 
Press. 
 
  220 
Henderson, G.V., G.K.Ganesh & P.R.Chandy. 1990. Across-discipline journal awareness and 
evaluation: implications for the promotion and tenure process. Journal of Economics & 
Business 42 (4): 325-351. 
 
Henry, W.R. & E.E. Burch 1974. Institutional contributions to scholarly journals of business. 
Journal of Business 47: 56-66. 
 
Hirsch, P., S. Michaels & R. Friedman. 1987. “Dirty hands" versus "clean models": is 
sociology in danger of being seduced by economics? Theory and Society16 (3): 317-336. 
 
Hitt, M.A., J. Harrison, R.D. Ireland & A.D. Best. 1993. Lifting the Veil of Success in 
Mergers and Acquisitions. Paper presented at Annual Meeting of the Strategic Management 
Society, Chicago, IL. 
 
Hofstede, G.H. 1980. Culture’s Consequences: International Differences in Work-Related 
Values. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications. 
 
Hofstede, G.H. 1990. Nationale waarden in verband met medezeggensschap (National culture 
in relation to co-determination). Mens en Organisatie 44: 459-473.  
 
Hofstede, G.H. 1991. Culture and Organization: the Software of the Mind. New York: 
McGraw-Hill.  
 
Hodgson, G.M. 1998. Competence and contract in the theory of the firm. Journal of 
Economic Behavior & Organization 35 (2): 179-201. 
 
Holmström, B. 1979. Moral hazard and observability. Bell Journal of Economics 10: 74-91.  
 
Holmström, B. & S.N. Kaplan. 2001. Corporate governance and merger activity in the United 
States: making sense of the 1980s and 1990s. Journal of Economic Perspectives 15 (2): 121-
144. 
 
Hoskisson, R.E., M.A. Hitt, W.P. Wan, et al. 1999. Theory and research in strategic 
management: swings of a pendulum. Journal of Management 25 (3): 417-456. 
 
Hubbard, R. & D. E. Vetter. 1996. An empirical comparison of published replication research 
in accounting, economics, finance, management, and marketing. Journal of Business 
Research 35: 153-164. 
 
Hugunin, P.A., S. Thomas & D. Wilemon. 1992. Science and technology information and 
corporate planning processes: a synthesis. Technology in Society 14: 245-270. 
  221
 
Hunt, J.W. 1990. Changing pattern of acquisition behaviour in takeovers and the 
consequences for acquisition process. Strategic Management Journal 11: 69-77. 
 
Hunter, J.E., F.L. Schmidt & G.B. Jackson. 1982. Meta-analysis: Cumulating research 
findings across studies. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.  
 
Hunter, J.E. & F.L. Schmidt. 1990. Methods of meta-analysis: Correcting error and bias in 
research findings. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.  
 
Hyland, D.C. & J.D. Diltz. 2002. Why firms diversify: an empirical examination. Financial  
Management 31 (1): 51-81. 
 
Håkansson, H. 1989. Corporate Technological Behaviour: Co-Operation and Networks. 
London: Routledge.  
 
Håkansson, H. & I. Snehota. 1992. Analysing business relationships. In Håkansson, H. & I. 
Snehota (eds.). Developing Relationships in Business Networks. London: Routledge. pp. 24-
49. 
 
Jackson, N. & P. Carter. 1991. In defence of paradigm incommensurability. Organization 
Studies 12 (1): 109-127. 
 
Jarrell, G.A., J.A. Brickley & J.M. Netter. 1988. The market for corporate control: the 
empirical evidence since 1980. Journal of Economic Perspectives (2): 21-48. 
 
Jemison, D.B. 1987. Risk and the relationship among strategy, organizational processes, and 
performance. Management Science 33 (9): 1087-1101. 
 
Jemison, D.B. 1988. Value creation in acquisition integration: the role of strategic capability 
transfer. In Liebcap, G. (ed.). Corporate Restructuring Through Mergers, Acquisition and 
Leveraged Buyouts. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press. pp. 191-218. 
 
Jemison, D.B. & S.B. Sitkin. 1986. Corporate acquisitions: a process perspective. Academy of 
Management Review 11 (1): 145-163. 
 
Jensen, M.C. 1976. A theory of the firm: governance, residual claims and organizational 
forms. Journal of Financial Economics 3(4): 305-360.  
  
Jensen, M.C. 1978. Some anomalous evidence regarding market efficiency. Journal of 
Financial Economics  6 (2/3): 95-101. 
  222 
  
Jensen, M.C. 1983. Organization theory and methodology. The Accounting Review (April): 
319-339. 
 
Jensen, M.C. 1985. Takeovers – folklore and science. Harvard Business Review 62: 109-121. 
 
Jensen, M.C. 1986. The agency costs of free cash flow: corporate finance and takeovers. 
American Economic Review  76 (2): 323-29. 
 
Jensen, M.C. 1989. Eclipse of the public corporation. Harvard Business Review 89: 61-74. 
 
Jensen, M.C. & W. Meckling. 1976. The theory of the firm: managerial behaviour, agency 
costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3: 305-360. 
 
Jensen, M.C. & W. Meckling. 1979. Rights and production functions: an application to labor 
managed firms and codetermination. Journal of Business  52 (4): 469-506. 
 
Jensen, M.C. & W. Meckling. 1992. Specific and general knowledge, and organisational 
structure. In Werin, L. & H. Wijkander (eds.). Contract Economics. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
pp. 251-291. 
 
Jensen, M.C. & R.S. Ruback. 1983. The market for corporate control. Journal of Financial 
Economics 11: 5-50.  
 
Jensen, M.C. & C.W. Smith, Jr. 1984. The theory of corporate finance: a historical overview. 
In Jensen, M.C.  & C.W. Smith, Jr. (eds.). The Modem Theory of Corporate Finance. New 
York: McGraw-Hill. pp. 2-20. 
 
Johnson, R.A., R.E. Hoskisson & M.A. Hitt. 1993. Board of director involvement in 
restructuring: the effects of board versus managerial controls and characteristics. Strategic 
Management Journal 14 (special issue): 33-50. 
 
Johnson, J. & P.M. Podsakoff. 1994. Journal influence in the field of management: an 
analysis using Salancik’s index in a dependency network. Academy of Management Journal 
37 (5): 1392-1407. 
 
Jones, I.W. & M.G.  Pollitt. 1999. From promise to compliance: the development of 'integrity' 
at SmithKline Beecham. Long Range Planning 32 (2): 190-198. 
 
Kaplan, R. 1983. Measuring manufacturing performance: a new challenge for management 
accounting research. Accounting Review (October): 686-705. 
  223
 
Kesner, I.F, D.L. Shapiro & A. Sharma 1994. Brokering mergers: an agency theory 
perspective on the role of representatives. Academy of Management Journal  37 (3): 703-721. 
 
Kim, K.-H. 1998. Determinants of Successful Acquisition Management: A Process 
Perspective in the Lodging Industry. Dissertation Submitted to the Virginia Polytechnic 
Institute and State University. Blacksburg, Virginia [online]. Available: 
http://scholar.lib.vt.edu/theses/available/etd-72098-16051/unrestricted/ (29 August 2002). 
 
Kirchmaier, T. 2001. Corporate Demergers: Or Is Divorce More Attractive than Marriage. 
Unpublished PhD Thesis. London: The London School of Economics. 
 
Kirkpatrick, S.A. & E.A. Locke. 1992. The development of measures of faculty scholarship. 
Group & Organizational Management 17: 5-23. 
 
Kirzner, I.M. 1973. Competition and Entrepreneurship. Chicago; London: University of 
Chicago Press. 
 
Kitching, J. 1967. Why do mergers miscarry? Harvard Business Review (November-
December): 84-101. 
 
Kitching, J. 1974. Winning and losing with European acquisitions. Harvard Business Review  
(March-April): 124-136. 
 
Klamer, A. 2002. Aiming high. Economic Sociology Editorial Series. [online]. Available: 
http://www.gsm.uci.edu/econsoc/Klamer.html (10 September 2002). 
 
Klamer, A, D. McCloskey & R. Solow (eds.). 1988. The Consequences of Economic 
Rhetoric. Cambridge: Cambridge University. 
 
Klein, B. 1988. Vertical integration as organization ownership. Journal of Law, Economics 
and Organization  21 (2): 297-326. 
 
Klein, B., R.G. Crawford & A.A. Alchian. 1978. Vertical integration, appropriable rents and 
the competitive contracting process. Journal of Law and Economics 21 (2): 297-326. 
 
Klein, P.G. 2001. Were the acquisitive conglomerates inefficient? Rand Journal of  
Economics 32 (4): 745-761. 
 
Kogut, B. & U. Zander. 1992. Knowledge of the firm, combinative capabilities and the 
replication of technology. Organization Science  3 (3): 383-97. 
  224 
 
Kogut, B. & U. Zander. 1996. What firms do? Coordination, identity and learning. 
Organisation Science  7 (5): 502-518. 
 
Kohers, N. & T. Kohers. 2001. Takeovers of technology firms: expectations vs. reality. 
Financial Management 30 (3): 35-54. 
 
Kostoff, R.N. & R.R. Schaller. 2001. Science and technology roadmaps. IEEE Transactions 
on Engineering Management  48 (2): 132-143. 
 
Kotler, P. 1967. Marketing Management: Analysis, Planning, Implementation and Control.  
New Jersey: Prentice Hall. 
 
Kreps, D.M. 1990. Corporate culture and economic theory. In Alt, J.E. & K. Shepsle (eds.). 
Perspectives on Positive Political Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 90-
143. 
 
Kreps, D.M. 1996. Markets and hierarchies and (mathematical) economic theory. Industrial 
and Corporate Change  5: 561-596. 
 
Kuhn, T.S. 1962. The Structure of Scientific Revolution. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press. 
 
Kuhn, T.S. 1970. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 
2nd edition. 
 
Langlois, R.N. 1992 Transaction-cost economics in real time. Industrial and Corporate 
Change 1 (1): 99-127. 
  
Langlois, R.N. & N.J. Foss. 1999. Capabilities and governance: the rebirth of production in 
the theory of the firm. KYKLOS   52: 201-218. 
 
Langlois, R.N. & P.L. Robertson. 1995. Firms, Markets, and Economic Change: A Dynamic 
Theory of Business Institutions. London: Routledge. 
 
Larsson, R. 1989. Organizational Integration of Mergers and Acquisitions: A Case Survey of 
Realization of Synergy Potentials. Doctoral dissertation at University of California, reprinted 
in Lund Studies in Economics and Management, 7. Lund: Lund University Press. 
 
  225
Larsson, R. & S. Finkelstein. 1999. Integrating strategic, organizational and human resource 
perspectives on mergers and acquisitions: a case survey of synergy realization. Organization 
4: 187-209. 
 
Larsson, R. & M. Lubatkin. 1991. Achieving acculturation in mergers and acquisitions: an 
international case survey. Human Relations 54 (12): 1573-1612. 
 
Legge, K. 1995. Human Resource Management: Rhetorics and Realities. Basingstoke: 
Macmillan. 
 
Leroy, F. & B.  Ramanantsoa. 1997. The cognitive and behavioural dimensions of 
organizational learning in a merger: an empirical study. Journal of Management Studies 34 
(6): 871-894. 
 
Lev, B. & G. Mandelker. 1972. The microeconomic consequences of corporate mergers. 
Journal of Business 45 (1): 85-104. 
 
Lindblom, Charles E. 1959. The ‘Science’ of Muddling Through. Prentice-Hall: NY. 
 
Lins K.V. & H. Servaes. 2002. Is corporate diversification beneficial in emerging markets? 
Financial Management 31 (2): 5-31. 
 
Lloyd, B. 1997. Creating Value Through Acquisitions, Demergers, Buyouts and Alliances. 
Pergamon Press: London.   
 
Loasby, B.J. 1983. Knowledge, learning and enterprise. In Wiseman, J. (ed.) Beyond Positive 
Economics. New York: St. Martin. pp. 54-85.  
 
Loasby, B.J. 1990. Organisational capabilities and interfirm relations. Microeconomica 45: 
248-265. 
 
Locke, J. ca. 1772. Two Treatises of Government.  
 
Lockett, A. & S. Thompson. 2001. The resource-based view and economics. Journal of 
Management 27 (6): 723-754. 
 
Lord, M.D. & A.L. Ranft. 2000.  Acquiring new knowledge: the role of retaining human 
capital in acquisitions of high-tech firms. Journal of High Technology Management Research  
11 (2): 295-319. 
 
  226 
Lorsch, J.W. & S. Allen. 1973. Managing diversity and interdependence. Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press. 
 
Lu, J.W. 2002. Intra- and inter-organizational imitative behavior: institutional influences on 
Japanese firms’ entry mode choice. Journal of International Business Studies 33 (1): 19-37. 
 
Lubatkin, M. 1983. Mergers and the performance of the acquiring firm. Academy of 
Management Review 8: 218-225. 
 
Lubatkin, M. 1987. Merger strategies and stockholder value. Strategic Management Journal 
8: 39- 53. 
 
Lucas, R.E. 1967. Adjustment costs and the theory of supply. Journal of Political Economy  
75 (4): 321-334. 
 
Mace, M. & G. Montgomery. 1962. Management Problems of Corporate Acquisitions. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press.  
 
MacMillan, I.C. 1989. Delineating a forum for business policy scholars. Strategic 
Management Journal 10: 391-395. 
 
Madhok, A. 2002. Reassessing the fundamentals and beyond: Ronald Coase, the transaction 
cost and resource-based theories of the firm and the institutional structure of production.  
Strategic Management Journal 23: 535-550. 
  
Malmgren, H.B. 1961. Information, expectations and the theory of the firm. Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 75: 391-421. 
 
Mangaliso, M.P. & S.M. Nkomo. 2001. HerdBuoys McCann-Erickson’s chairman Peter 
Vundla on black entrepreneurs and economic empowerment. Academy of Management 
Exececutive 15 (3): 16-22.  
 
Manne, H.G. 1965. Mergers and the market for corporate control. Journal of Political 
Economy 73 (April): 11020. 
 
Manne, H.G. 1975. The Economics of Legal Relationships. St. Paul: West Publishing Co. 
 
March, J. & H.A. Simon. 1958. Organizations. New York: Wiley.  
 
Marchildon, G.P. (ed.). 1991. Mergers and Acquisitions. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
  227
 
Margolis, J.D. & J.P. Walsh. 2001. People and Profits: The Search Between a Company’s 
Social and Financial Performance. Mahwah (NJ): Lawrence Erlbaum. 
 
Matsusaka, J.G. 2001. Corporate diversification, value maximization, and organizational 
capabilities Journal of  Business 74 (3): 409-431.  
 
Matsusaka, J.G. & V. Nanda. 2002. Internal capital markets and corporate refocusing. 
Journal of  Financial Intermedetion 11 (2): 176-211. 
 
McGuckin, R.H. & S.V. Nguyen. 2000. The Impact of Ownership Changes: A View from 
Labor Markets. Economic Studies, US Census.  
 
McKelvey, B. 1997. Quasi-natural organisation science. Organization Science 8: 352-380. 
 
Meindl, J.R., C. Stubbart & J.F.A. Porac. 1996. Cognition within and Between Organizations. 
Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications. 
  
Meyer, K.E. & S. Estrin. 2001. Brownfield entry in emerging markets. Journal of 
International Business Studies 32 (3): 575-584. 
 
Meyer, J.W. & B. Rowan. 1977. Institutionalized organizations: formal structure as myth and 
ceremony. American Journal of Sociology 83: 340-363.  
 
Mill, J.S. 1861. Utilitarianism. Fraser’s Magazine.  
 
Mintzberg, H., B. Ahlstrand & J. Lampel. 1999. Strategy Safari:A Guided Tour Through the 
Wilds of Strategic Management. London: Prentice Hall.  
 
Mintzberg, H., J.B. Quinn & S. Ghoshal. 1998. The Strategy Process: Concepts, Context and 
Cases. Revised European edition. London: Prentice Hall. 
 
Moed, M.C. 1989. The Organizer: Planning Tasks with an Emergent Connection/Symbolic 
System. Tech. Rep. 42, RPI, NY. 
 
Monks, R. & N. Minow (eds.). 2002. Corporate Governance. Blackwell Publishers 
 
Moravcsik, M. J. & P. Murugesan. 1975. Some results on the function and quality of 
citations.  Social Studies of Science 5: 86-92. 
 
  228 
Morck, R. & G. Barone-Adesi. 1990. A test of rational expectation in the index option 
market. Advances in Futures and Options Research 45 (1): 6-29. 
 
Morck, R., A. Kaul & V. Mehrotra. 2000. Demand curves for stocks do slope down. Journal 
of Finance 55 (2) April: 893-912.   
 
Morck, R., A. Shleifer & R.W. Vishny. 1990a. The stock market and investment: is the 
market a sideshow? Brookings Papers on Economic Activity: 157- 215. 
 
Morck, R., A. Shleifer & R.W. Vishny. 1990b. Do managerial objectives drive bad 
acquisitions? Journal of Finance 45: 31-48. 
 
Morgan, G. 1986. Images of Organization. Beverly Hills: Sage. 
 
Mowery, D.C., J.E. Oxley & B.S. Silverman. 1996. Strategic alliances and interfirm 
knowledge transfer. Strategic Management Journal 17: 77-91. 
 
Myers, S.C. & N.S. Majluf. 1984. Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms 
have information that investors do not have. Journal of Financial Economics 13: 187-221. 
 
Neary, P. & P. O’Sullivan. 1999. Beat ‘em or join ‘em?: Export subsidies versus international 
research joint ventures in oligopolistic markets. Scandinavian Journal of Economics 
(December): 4577-596.  
 
Nelson, R.R. & S.G. Winter. 1982. An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
 
Newbold, G.D. 1970. Management and Merger Activity. Liverpool: Guthsted. 
 
Nickell, S.J. 1978. The Investment Decisions of Firms. Oxford, England: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Nielsen, J.F. & R.W. Melicher. 1973. A financial analysis of acquisition and merger 
premiums. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 8: 139-162. 
 
Niemi, A.W. 1988. Research productivity of American business schools, 1975-85. Review of 
Business and Economic Research  (Spring): 1-17.  
 
Nilakant, V &  H. Rao. 1994. Agency theory and uncertainty: an evaluation. Organization 
Studies 15 (5) 649-672. 
 
  229
North, D.C. 1990. Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Norton, E 1992. Evidence of creative destruction in the united-states-economy. Small 
Business Economics 4 (2): 113-123. 
  
Olie, R. 1994. Shades of culture and institutions in international mergers. Organization 
Studies 15 (3): 381-405. 
 
Oliver, A. & M. Ebers. 1998. Networking network studies. An analysis of conceptual 
configurations in the study of inter-organizational relationships. Organisation Studies 19 (4): 
549-583.  
 
Pablo, A.L. 1994. Determinants of acquisition integration level. Academy of Management 
Journal 37: 803-836.  
 
Pagano, U. 2000. Public markets, private orderings and corporate governance. International 
Review of Law & Economics 20 (4): 453-477. 
 
Palmer, D. & B.M. Barber. 2001. Challengers, elites, and owning families: a social class 
theory of corporate acquisitions in the 1960s. Administrative Science Quarterly 46 (1): 87-
120. 
  
Park, S.H. & M.E. Gordon. 1996. Publication records and tenure decisions in the field of 
strategic management. Strategic Management Journal 17 (2): 109-128. 
 
Parker, I. 1992. Discourse Dynamics: Critical Analysis for Social and Individual Psychology. 
London: Routledge. 
 
Parvinen, P.M.T. 2001. Theories of the firm in understanding mergers and acquisitions. 
Unpublished M.Sc. Thesis. London School of Economics and Political Science. 
 
Parvinen, P.M.T. & T.H. Tikkanen. 2002. Agency Problems in the M&A Process: An 
Incentive Asymmetry Perspective. Working Paper, Helsinki University of Technology, 
Executive School of Business, Espoo. 
 
Penrose, E.T. 1959. The Theory of the Growth of the Firm. Oxford: OUP.  
 
Pera, M. 1994. The Discourses of Science. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 
 
  230 
Perrow, C. 1961. The analysis of goals in complex organizations. American Sociological 
Review 26: 854-866. 
 
Perrow, C. 1972. Complex Organizations: A Critical Essay. Glenview, Illinois: Scott, 
Foresman and Company. 
 
Perrow, C. 1986. Complex Organisations. New York: Random House. 
 
Peteraf, M.A. 1993. The cornerstone of competitive advantage: a resource-based view. 
Strategic Management Journal  14: 179-191. 
 
Pfeffer, J. 1992. Managing with Power: Politics and Influence in Organizations. Boston: 
Harvard Business School Press. 
 
Pfeffer, J. & R. Salancik. 1978. The External Control of Organizations: A Resource 
Dependence Perspective. New York: Harper and Row. 
 
Pilkington, A. & C. Liston-Heyes. 1999. Is production and operations management a 
discipline?: a citation/co-citation study. International Journal of Operations & Production 
Management  19 (1): 7-20. 
 
Popper, K. 1968. The Logic of Scientific Discovery. New York: Harper and Row.  
 
Popper, K. 1970. The Logic of Scientific Discovery. 2nd ed.  Basic Books, New York. 
 
Poppo, L. & T.  Zenger. 1998. Testing alternative theories of the firm: transaction cost, 
knowledge-based, and measurement explanations for make-or-buy decisions in information 
services. Strategic Manage Journal 19 (9): 853-877. 
 
Porter, M.E. 1980. Competitive Strategy: Techniques for Analysing Industries and 
Competitors. New York: The Free Press. 
 
Porter, M.E. 1985. Competitive Advantage: Creating and Sustaining Superior Performance. 
New York: Free Press. 
 
Porter, M.E. 1987. From competitive advantage to corporate strategy. Harvard Business 
Review  65: 43-59. 
 
Porter, M.E. 1990. The Competitive Advantage of Nations. New York: The Free Press. 
 
Porter, M.E. 1996. What is strategy? Harvard Business Review  74 (6): 61-78.  
  231
 
Porter, M.E. & M.B. Fuller. 1986. Coalitions and global strategy . In Porter, M.E. (ed.). 
Competitive in Global Industries. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press. pp.315-343. 
 
Posner, R. 1979. Public Enterprise In The Market Place. London: Nationalised Industries’ 
Chairmen’s Group.  
 
Price, D.D. 1986. Little Science, Big Science and Beyond. New York, Columbia University 
Press. 
 
Pritchard, A. 1969. Statistical bibliography or bibliometrics? Journal of Documentation 25 
(4): 348-349. 
 
Pugh, S.D. 1997. Organisation Theory. Selected Readings. London: Penguin Books. 
 
Puro, J.-P. 1996. Towards a Phenomenological Theory of Interpersonal Communication. 
Helsinki: Gaudeamus. 
 
Putnam, R. 1993. The prosperous community: social capital and public life. The American 
Prospect 13 (Spring): 65-78.   
 
Rajan, R.L. & L. Zingales. 1998. Power in a theory of the firm. Quarterly Journal of 
Economics: 387-432. 
 
Ratnatunga, J. & C. Romano. 1997. A "Citation Classics" analysis of articles in contemporary 
small enterprise research.  Journal of Business Venturing  12 (3): 197-212. 
 
Ravenscraft, D.J. & F.M. Scherer. 1987. Mergers, Sell-offs and Economic Efficiency. 
Washington DC: Brookings Institution. 
 
Ricardo, D. 1815. Essay on Profits.  
 
Richardson, G.B. 1972. The organisation of industry. Economic Journal  82: 883-896. 
 
Richter, A. 1999. Corporate Restructuring in the United Kingdom and West Germany: 
Recent Developments in Large Non-Financial Companies. London: London School of 
Economics and Political Science. 
 
Rindfleisch, A. & J.B. Heide. 1997. Transaction cost analysis: past, present and future 
applications. Journal of Marketing  61: 30-54. 
 
  232 
Robbins, S.S. & A.C. Stylianou. 1999. Post-merger systems integration: the impact on IS 
capabilities. Information & Management 36 (4): 205-212. 
 
Robertson, T.S. & H. Gatignon. 1998. Technology development mode: a transaction cost 
conceptualization. Strategic Manage Journal 19 (6): 515-531. 
 
Roll, R. 1986. The hubris hypothesis of corporate takeovers. Journal of Business 59 (2): 197-
216. 
 
Rose, M.B. & Casson, M. 1997. Institutions and the evolution of modern business. Business 
History 39 (4): 1-6.  
 
Rosenthal, R. 1991. Meta-analytic procedures for social research (rev. ed). Newbury Park: 
Sage. 
 
Ross, S. 1973. The economic theory of agency: the principal’s problem. American Economic 
Review 63: 134-139. 
 
Rumelt, R.P. 1974. Strategy, Structure and Economic Performance. Boston: Division of 
research, Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard University. 
 
Rumelt, R.P. & P. Steven. 1992. Incentives, routines, and self-command. Industrial and 
Corporate Change 1 (3): 397-425.  
 
Rumelt, R.P., D.E. Schendel & D.J. Teece (eds.). 1994. Fundamental Issues in Strategy. 
Boston: Harvard Business School Press. 
 
Salancik, G. 1986. An index of subgroup influence in dependency networks.  Administrative 
Science Quarterly  31: 194-211. 
 
Salant, S.W., S. Switzerand & R.J. Reynolds. 1983. Losses from horizontal merger: the 
effects of an exogenous change in industry structure on Cournot-Nash Equilibrium. The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 98 (2): 185-199. 
 
Sales, A. & P.H. Mirvis. 1985. When cultures collide: issues in acquisitions. In Kimberly, 
J.R. & R.E. Quinn (eds.). The Challenge of Managing Corporate Transitions. Homewood, 
Il.: Dow Jones-Irwin. pp. 107-133. 
 
Salter, M.S. & W.S. Weinhold. 1979. Diversification Through Acquisition. New York: Free 
Press. 
 
  233
Sanchez, R. (ed.). Forthcoming 2003. Beyond the Boundaries: Integrating Theories of the 
Firm and Markets.  
 
Sanchez, R. & A. Heene. 1997. Reinventing strategic management: new theory and practice 
for competence-based competition. European Management Journal 15 (3): 303-317. 
 
Scherer, A.G. 1998. Pluralism and incommensurability in strategic management and 
organization theory: a problem in search of a solution. Organization 5 (2): 147-168. 
 
Scherer, F. 1980. Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance. Chicago: Rand-
McNally. 
 
Schilling, M.A. & H.K. Steensma. 2002. Disentangling the theories of firm boundaries: a 
path model and empirical test. Organization Science 13 (4): 387-401. 
 
Schlossberg R.S. & H.T. Robins. Hart-Scott-Rodino merger investigations: a guide for 
safeguarding business secrets. Business Lawyer 56 (3): 943. 
 
Schnitzer, M. 1996. Hostile versus friendly takeovers. Economica  63: 37-55. 
 
Schultz, M. & M.J. Hatch. 1996. Living with multiple paradigms: the case of paradigm 
interplay in organizational culture studies. Academy Of  Management Review 21 (2): 529-
557. 
 
Schumpeter, J.A. 1942. Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy. New York: Harper. 
 
Schweiger, D.M. & J.P. Walsh. 1990. Mergers and acquisitions: an interdisciplinary view. In 
Ferris, G.R. & K.M. Rowland (eds.). Research in Personnel and Human Resources 
Management 8: 42-108. 
 
Scott, J. 1992. Social Network Analysis: a Handbook. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage 
Publications.  
 
Scott, J. 1997. Corporate Business and Capitalist Classes. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
 
Scott, W. R. 1995. Institutions and Organisations. Thousand Oaks, California: Sage.  
 
Searby, F.W. 1969. Control postmerger change. Harvard Business Review 47 (5): 69-86. 
 
  234 
Selznick, P. 1957. Leadership in Administration: A Sociological Interpretation. New York: 
Harper & Row. 
 
Servaes H. & M. Zenner. 1996. Role of investment banks in acquisitions. Review of 
Financial Studies  9: 787-815. 
 
Seth, A. 1990. Sources of value creation in acquisitions: an empirical investigation. Strategic 
Management Journa, 11: 431-446.  
 
Shanley, M.T. & M.E. Correa. 1992. Agreement between top management teams and 
expectations for post acquisition performance. Strategic Management Journal 13 (4): 245-
266. 
 
Sharma, A. 1997. Professional as agent: knowledge asymmetry in agency exchange. 
Academy of Management Review 22 (3): 748-798. 
 
Sharplin, A.D. & R.H. Mabry. 1985. The relative importance of journals used in management 
research: an alternative ranking. Human Relations  38: 139-148. 
 
Shrivastava, P. 1986. Postmerger integration. The Journal of Business Strategy  7 (1): 65-76. 
 
Siggelkow, N. 2001. Who Reads My Paper Anyways? A Survey of Journal Readership and 
Reputation. Reginald Jones Center for Management Strategy, Policy and Organization 
Seminar Series, Wharton. 
 
Simon, H.A. 1945. Administrative Behavior. New York: Macmillan. 
 
Simon, H.A. 1951. A formal theory of the employment relationship. Econometrica 19: 293-
305. 
 
Singh, H. & C.A. Montgomery. 1987. Corporate acquisition strategies and economic 
performance. Strategic Management Journal 8: 377-386. 
 
Singh, H. & M. Zollo. 1998. The Impact of Knowledge Codification, Experience Trajectories 
and Integration Strategies on the Performance of Corporate Acquisitions. Wharton Financial 
Institutions Center Working Paper 98-124.  
 
Small, H. 1982. Citation context analysis. In Dervin, B. & M.J. Voigt (eds.). Progress in 
Communication Science, 3. Norwood, IL: Ablex. pp. 287-310.  
 
  235
So, C. 1988. Citation patterns of core communication journal: An assessment of the 
development status of communication. Human Communication Research 15 (2), 236-255. 
  
Solow, Robert. 1963. Capital Theory And The Rate of Return. Amsterdam: North-Holland 
Publishing Co.  
 
Stallworthy, E.A. & O.P. Kharbanda. 1985. Corporate Failure: Prediction, Panacea And 
Prevention. London: McGraw-Hill.  
 
Steensma, H.K. & K.G. Corley. 2000. On the performance of technology-sourcing 
partnerships: the interaction between partner interdependence and technology attributes. 
Academy of Management Journal 44 (2): 271-291. 
 
Stegmüller, W. 1976. The Structure and Dynamics of Theories. New York, Springer. 
 
Steiner, G.A. 1979. Strategic Planning: What Every Manager Must Know. New York: The 
Free Press. 
 
Steinmueller, W. Edward. 2000. Will new information and communication technologies 
improve the codification of knowledge? Industrial and Corporate Change 9 (2): 361-376. 
 
Stigler, G.J. 1950. Monopoly and oligopoly by merger. American Economic Review 40: 23-
34. 
 
Stigler, G.J. 1951. The economists and the monopoly problem. American Economic Review 
72: 1-11. 
 
Teece, D.J. 1981. Towards an economic theory of the multiproduct firm. Journal of 
Economic Behavior and Organization 3: 39-64. 
 
Teece, D.J. 1982. Towards an economic theory of the multiproduct firm. Journal of 
Economic Behaviour and Organisation 3: 39-63. 
 
Teece, D.J., G. Pisano & A. Shuen. 1997. Firm Capabilities, Resources and Strategy. 
Consortium on Competitiveness and Cooperation, Working Paper 908, Centre for Research 
in Management, University of California at Berkeley. 
 
Thomas, P.R. & D.S. Watkins. 1998. Institutional research rankings via bibliometric analysis 
and direct peer review: a comparative case study with policy implications. Scientometrics 
41:335-355. 
 
  236 
Thompson, S. 1996. Mergers without equity markets: a study of the acquisitions process 
among financial mutuals. Journal Of Institutional And Theoretical Economics-Zeitschrift Fur 
Die Gesamte Staatswissenschaft 152 (2): 342-359. 
 
Tijssen, R.J.W. & A.F.J. Van Raan. 1994. Mapping changes in science and technology: 
bibliometric co-occurrence analysis of the R&D literature. Evaluation Review 18: 98-115. 
 
Tikkanen, Henrikki & P.M.T. Parvinen. 2002a. Theories of the Firm and Marketing 
Research. Working Paper, Helsinki University of Technology, Executive School of Business, 
Espoo. Forthcoming in Sanchez, Ron (ed.). Beyond the Boundaries: Integrating Theories of 
the Firm and Markets. 
 
Tikkanen, Henrikki & P.M.T. Parvinen. 2002b. Planned and Spontaneous Orders in the 
Emerging Network Society. Working Paper, Helsinki University of Technology, Executive 
School of Business, Espoo. 
 
Toonen, T.A.J. 1998. Networks, management and institutions: public administration as 
‘normal science’. Public Administration (Oxford/Blackwell)  76 (summer): 229-252. 
 
Travlos, N. 1987. Corporate takeover bids, method of payment, and bidding firms’ stock 
returns. The Journal of Finance 42(4): 943-963. 
 
Tsoulouhas, T. 1999. Do tournaments solve the two-sided moral hazard problem? Journal of 
Economic Behavior & Organization 40 (3): 275-294. 
 
Usdiken, B. & Y. Pasadeos. 1995. Organizational analysis in North America and Europe: a 
comparison of co-citation networks. Organization Studies  16 (3): 503-526. 
 
Yli-Renko, H. 1999. Dependence, Social Capital, and Learning in Key Customer 
Relationships: Effects on the Performance of Technology-Based New Firms. 
ActaPolytechnica Scandinavia. Industrial Management and Business Administration Series 
No. 5. Espoo. 
 
Vaara, E. 2000. Constructions of cultural differences in post-merger change process: a 
sensemaking perspective on Finnish-Swedish cases. M@n@gement  3 (3): 81-100. 
 
Vaara, E. 2002. On the discursive construction of success/failure in narratives of post-merger 
integration. Organisation Studies 23 (2): 211-248. 
 
van Fleet, D. 1995. Journal Lists. Personal correspondence. 
 
  237
Veblen, T.B. 1904. The Theory of Business Enterprise. London: Thoemmes Press. 
 
Vita, M.G. & S. Sacher. 2001. The competitive effects of not-for-profit hospital mergers: a 
case study. Journal of  Industrial Economics 49 (1): 63-84. 
 
Vos, E & B. Kelleher. 2001. Mergers and takeovers: a memetic approach. Journal of 
Memetics - Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission, 5 [online]. Available: 
http://jom-emit.cfpm.org/2001/vol5/vos_e&kelleher_b.html (10 September 2002).  
 
Walsh, J.P. 1988. Top management turnover following mergers and acquisitions. Strategic 
Management Journal 9 (2): 173-183. 
 
Walsh, J.P. 1989. Doing a deal: merger and acquisition negotiations and their impact upon 
target company top management turnover. Strategic Management Journal 10 (4): 307-322.
  
Walter, G. & J. Barney.  1990. Management objectives in mergers and acquisitions. Strategic 
Management Journal 11 (1): 79-86.  
 
Wasserman, S. & K. Faust. 1993. Social Network Analysis: Methods and Applications. New 
York: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Wasserman, S. & K. Faust. 1994. Social Network Analysis. New York: Cambridge University 
Press. 
 
Weber, Y. & M. Ganzach. 1995. Integrating and preserving a different culture after 
acquisition. International Journal Of Conflict Management 6 (2): 192-210. 
 
Weber Y. & N. Pliskin. 1996. The effects of information systems integration and 
organizational culture on a firm’s effectiveness. Information & Management. 30 (2): 81-90. 
 
Weick, K.E. 1989. Theory construction as disciplined imagination. Academy of Management 
Review 14 (4): 516-531. 
 
Weiss, A. 1994. Vertical mergers and firm-specific physical capital - 3 case-studies and some 
evidence on timing. Journal of Industrial Economics 42 (4): 395-417.  
 
Welch, I. 2001. The Top Achievements, Challenges and Failures of Finance. Yale School of 
Management, Yale ICF Working Paper No. 00-67. 
 
Werden, G. 1996. A robust test for consumer welfare enhancing mergers among sellers of 
differentiated products. 44 Journal of Industrial Economics 409: 85-107.  
  238 
 
Werden, G. & R. Hay. 1993. Horizontal mergers: law, policy, and economics. American 
Economic Review 83: 173-177.  
 
Wernerfelt, B. 1984. A resource-based view of the firm. Strategic Management Journal 5: 
171–180. 
 
Weston, J.F., J.A. Siu & B.A. Johnson. 2001. Takeovers,Restructuring, and Corporate 
Governance, 3rd ed. Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice Hall. 
 
White, H. 1980. A heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator and a direct test 
for heteroskedasticity. Econometrica 48: 817-838. 
 
Williamson, O.E. 1967. Hierarchical control and optimum firm size. Journal of Political 
Economy 75: 123-138. 
 
Williamson, O.E. 1968. Economics as an anti-trust defence: the welfare trade-offs. American 
Economic Review 58: 18-36. 
 
Williamson, O.E. 1971. The vertical integration of production: market failure considerations. 
American Economic Review 61: 112-123. 
 
Williamson, O.E. 1975. Markets and Hierarchies. New York: Free Press. 
 
Williamson, O.E. 1977. Economics as an antitrust defence revisited. University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review 125: 699-736.  
 
Williamson, O.E. 1985. The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. New York: Free Press. 
 
Williamson, O.E. 1986. Economic Organization: Firms, Markets and Policy Control. 
Brighton: Wheatsleaf. 
 
Williamson, O.E. 1991a. Comparative economic organization: the analysis of discrete 
structural alternatives. Administrative Science Quarterly 36: 269-296. 
 
Williamson, O.E. 1991b. Strategizing, economizing, and economic-organization. Strategic 
Manage Journal 12 (special issue winter): 75-94.  
 
Williamson, O.E. 1993. The Economic Analysis of Institutions and Organisations-In General 
and with Respect to Country Studies. Paris: OECD. 
 
  239
Williamson, O.E. 1996. The Mechanisms of Governance. New York: OUP. 
 
Williamson, O.E. 1999. Strategy Research: Governance and Competence Perspectives. 
Strategic Management Journal  20: 1087-1108. 
 
Yunker J. A. 1983. Integrating Acquisitions: Making Corporate Marriages Work. New 
York: Praeger. 
 
Zald, M.N. 1990a. History, theory and the sociology of organizations. In Jackson, J.E. (ed.). 
Institutions in American Society: Essays in Market, Political and Social Organizations. Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan Press.  
 
Zald, M.N. 1990b. Organizations and Nation-States: New Perspectives on Conflict and 
Cooperation. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass. 
 
 
 
 
  240 
6 APPENDIX 1:  A CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS OF THE M&A 
LITERATURE  
 
 
Research on M&A has received increased attention and grown in popularity during the last 
two decades of the 20th century. There seem to be two sets of reasons for this, one relating to 
the state and changes of the global economy and the other relating to the development of a 
number of interesting academic and theoretical research avenues which have prompted 
interesting contributions relating in the field of M&A. This appendix aims at providing a 
conceptual overview of the body of research performed on M&A topics since the 1980s.  
 
There are several questions that need to be tackled in order to be able to provide a 
conceptual overview of such a diverse and interdisciplinary discourse as M&A. The foci of 
attention are the theoretical foundations of the M&A discourse, with particular emphasis 
placed on how M&A topics, issues and findings approach the world of the governance 
theories of the firm (Williamson 1999). M&A has been identified as a tool and driver of the 
organization of economic activity (Williamson 1996), which mirror the rationales of multiple 
groups of corporate stakeholders, most importantly management, shareholders, institutions 
providing M&A related financial and other professional services as well as lawyers and 
courts of justice. This Appendix is thus tied to the more general aim of this research effort of 
discovering what the governance theories of the firm have to offer to the discussion of M&A 
and the organization of economic activity. 
 
The various governance theories of the firm discuss the existence, boundaries and internal 
organization of a firm (Foss 2000) and can thus essentially be considered to discuss how the 
organization of economic activity is governed. As Kenneth Arrow has described the 
economist, he is "the guardian of rationality, the ascriber of rationality to others, and the 
prescriber of rationality to the social world" (Arrow 1974, p.17). Thus the economics-minded 
insights of the governance theories of the firm, together with the plentitude of noneconomist 
engagement in the theory of the firm and rationality dialogue (Simon 1978), can be argued to 
bestow an undeniable influence on the kinds of rationales formed by stakeholders when 
making decisions about M&A, and a new organization of economic activity.  
 
Given the second general aim of constructing an integrated governance approach to M&A, 
this Appendix is organized to respect the basic governance questions of the boundaries, 
existence and internal organization of a firm. Firstly, an investigation of the motivations 
behind the increasing popularity of M&A research is provided. Here, the analysis is two-fold, 
with academic issues and real-life events being presented side-by-side. Secondly, the 
boundaries of M&A, i.e. the various definitions provided for M&A are outlined. Special 
emphasis is paid to why M&A can be considered as a one distinct research area and not, for 
example, as three separate research areas (mergers, acquisitions and takeovers). Thirdly, the 
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justifications for the existence of M&A, as presented by a number of research streams, 
representing a plurality of disciplinary research orientations, are outlined. In doing this, the 
categorizations presented in earlier influential M&A literature88 are used to a great extent. 
Table 23 presents some of these M&A school categorizations: 
 
Table 23: M&A research streams as identified in recent overviews of the field. 
 
Cording et al. 2002 Larsson and Finkelstein 1999 Weston et al. 2001 
Haspeslagh and 
Jemison 1991 
Overpayment Strategic   management Process Capital markets 
Agency problems Economics Strategy Strategy 
CEO hubris Finance Finance Organizational behavior 
Top management 
complementarity 
Organizational 
research Agency problems Process 
Experience Human resource management Hubris  
Employee distress  Redistribution  
Conflicting cultures    
Process    
 
 
Finally, perspectives on the internal organization of M&A, i.e. views on pre- and post-
merger processes, are outlined. This section is, however, left intentionally somewhat shorter 
given that the processual approach to M&A is already discussed in the context of the 
previous section focusing on the existence of M&A.  
 
 
 
6.1 Contemporary Motivations for M&A Research 
 
The purpose of this section is to outline why studying and researching M&A is interesting 
in the first place, with specific attention paid to the increasing research attention on M&A 
since the 1980s.  As mentioned in the introduction, there are generally two sets of reasons for 
increasing academic attention on M&A.  
 
                                                 
88 For example and most importantly Appendix B of Haspeslagh and Jemison 1991, Part II of Weston, Siu and 
Johnston 2001, Larsson and Finkelstein 1999 and Cording, Christmann and Bourgeois 2002. 
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Firstly, a number of interesting M&A 'sub-phenomena' have taken place in the business 
world during the last few decades. These sub-phenomena include a) merger waves, b) the 
increasing role of corporate governance struggles in M&A, c) sustained demerger activity, d) 
the prevalence of difficulty and disagreement in measuring the success of M&A, e) the 
counterintuitive unsuccessfulness of M&A, f) attitudes and behavior of M&A professional 
service providers and h) the non-prescribeability of post-merger processes.   Particularly 
empirical management research has taken an interest in studying these M&A sub-phenomena, 
some to a greater extent than others. Many if not all of these sub-phenomena are relevant, 
interesting topics of both academic and managerial discussion.  
 
Secondly, social scientific research streams that are interlinked, overlapping and parallel to 
M&A research have developed remarkably during the past few decades. These relate and are 
strongly reflected to the various disciplinary orientations from which M&A has been 
researched during the last few decades. Some particularly advanced management research 
areas, e.g. corporate finance, capital markets, strategy, organization theory, corporate culture 
and human resource management can be said to have spurred research in M&A. 
 
Some of the advances in these fields are naturally related to the M&A sub-phenomena and 
they are subsequently analyzed in their context below. More importantly, however, some of 
the advances in these orientations are particularly reflected in the types of motivations and 
justification presented for the existence of M&A. M&A is typically a phenomenon-oriented 
research topic, which can be approached from basically any research angle. Naturally, the 
prominent and advancing theoretical approaches are thus most likely to present new 
viewpoints to M&A and reveal the most interesting research findings.  
 
On the same note, it can be suggested that M&A is per se a fruitful topic for conceptual 
analysis from both an academic/theoretical and a pragmatic/managerial point of view. 
Whereas literature on the existence and boundaries of M&A, especially when considered as a 
tool and driver of the organization of economic activity, provides theoretical linkages to other 
academic discourses and disciplines89, the internal organization of M&A, referring to the 
multitudinous managerial, financial, psychological and organizational processes involved in 
M&A decision-making, offers insights to a more pragmatic scrutiny of M&A as one, distinct, 
phenomenon. But first, some of the factual changes in the global M&A landscape that have 
contributed to the increase in research attention need to be outlined. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
89 Perhaps most importantly to various theories of the firm 
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6.1.1 M&A Sub-phenomena as Motivations for Increased Research Attention 
 
Arguably, M&A has proven to be a fascinating research subject due to its versatileness 
and turbulence. A number of interesting sub-phenomena, resurging research attention on 
M&A time and again, have emerged. In the following, some of these sub-phenomena are 
revealed in order to establish an understanding about the types of real-life events and other 
dynamics that M&A research has derived inspiration from. Table 24 introduces these 
exemplary M&A sub-phenomena together with their key messages and the key reason(s) why 
they currently attract attention. 
 
Table 24: Contemporary and interesting M&A sub-phenomena 
 
M&A SUB-
PHENOMENON 
KEY MESSAGE WHY INTERESTING 
AND CONTEMPORARY? 
M&A waves Cyclical nature of M&A activity. Five waves in 
the 20th century (Stallworthy and Kharbanda 
1985, p.71-72, Weston et al. 2001) 
Horizontal mergers 1895-1904 
Vertical mergers 1922-1929 
Conglomerate mergers of the 1960s 
The deal decade of the 1980s 
Strategic mergers 1992-1999 
Currently little activity. How long 
will the slump in M&A last or is it 
a slump in the first place? 
Corporate governance in 
M&A 
Ever since the managerial revolution, the 
interests of managers and owners have not been 
aligned. The active involvement of stakeholders 
in the management of the company is 
increasingly encouraged. 
The 1990s demonstrated the 
relative inconsistency of many 
corporate governance tools such as 
golden handcuffs, handshakes and 
parachutes. 
Demergers Shareholder value considerations have 
introduced a reverse pattern in the changes to 
the boundaries of firms in the form of 
divestitures, demergers and contracting-out 
(Jensen 1985, Porter 1987). 
Is there another demerger wave on 
the way after the 1990s ‘strategic’ 
merger wave?  
The lack of M&A success 
and the acute difficulty in 
measuring it.  
“Despite the merger mania and megamergers, 
the record indicated that some half to two thirds 
don’t work” (Stallworthy and Kharbanda 1985, 
p.180). It is also extremely difficult to iterate 
the outcomes of M&A decisions from other, 
simultaneous change processes. 
Continuously interesting in the 
search for better M&A outcomes 
The overpowering influence 
of ‘shareholder value 
propositions’ on M&A  
Shareholder value / property rights 
considerations have been the dominant 
justification for M&A activity in corporations, 
investment banks and consultancies alike.  
Increasing application of our 
knowledge concerning other 
theories of the firm is 
enriching the ‘boundaries of the 
firm’ discussion. 
Non-prescribeability of post-
merger processes 
Unlike the pre-merger, step-by-step textbook 
processes, post-merger processes are often 
unique and their management, one of the keys 
to M&A success, requires a different mindset 
(Habeck et al. 2000, Haspeslagh and Jemison 
1991).  
Will increasing awareness of the 
need for post-merger management 
increase M&A success? Who 
succeeds in this market? 
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Sub-phenomenon 1: M&A Waves  
 
Considering the fundamental assumption of this study, i.e. that the fundamental rationales 
of M&A activity lie deep in the strategic and organizational processes of firms, it is perhaps 
surprising that M&A activity in this century has occurred in distinct, nearly fad-like waves. 
Numerous authors (e.g. Stallworthy and Kharbanda 1985, Kim 1998, Gaughan 1996, Goold 
and Luchs 1993) have studied M&A waves, and consequently identified roughly four broad 
merger waves90: 
 
1882-1902 The creation of monopolies in the US 
1925-1929  Acquisition of related firms often leading to vertical integration 
1966-1968  Large conglomerates built up of unrelated businesses 
1974- onwards Dramatic increase in the number of megamergers, driven on to some 
extent by the activities of raiders 
 
What is also worth noticing is that the waves have taken place in times of economic and 
enterprise growth and prosperity, thus implying that M&A activity is by no means confined 
to the traditional conception of ‘a firm in decline meeting the crisis’ (Stallworthy and 
Kharbanda 1988, 4) in absolute terms. It is also strongly associated with phenomena related 
to a booming enterprise horizon. Oftentimes, it is not the bad performance of a company as 
such that makes is susceptible to M&A rumors91, but its performance relative to other 
companies. Likewise, it seems that top management tendency towards “empire building” and 
“the making of a billion-dollar company” (Stallworthy and Kharbanda 1988, 105-106) 
escalates in good times.  
 
In any case, cyclical and conjuncture-dependent M&A activity seems to prevail. After the 
1980s merger wave that has been argued to be motivated by e.g. the opportunistic behavior 
by various finance professionals (Sikora 2000), excess capacity (Jensen 1993), agency 
problems (Jensen 1988, Lichtenberg 1992), market failure (Shleifer and Vishny 1991) and tax 
and antitrust changes (Bhagat, Shleifer and Vishny 1990), the 1990s have been marked by 
M&A motivated by refocusing and strategic fit, industry consolidation, efficiency claims and 
the information and communication technology hype of 1996-2000. New reasons for M&A 
waves thus seem to emerge, and there is no reason to believe that the turbulent nature of the 
M&A market wouldn’t continue to attract considerable research attention from various 
disciplinary perspectives.  
 
 
                                                 
90 Town (1992) succeeds at mathematically verifying the existence of three 'actual' merger waves: 1898-1902, 
1925-1932 and 1967-1969. After that M&A activity has increased substantially but has come in less distinct 
waves. 
91 The rumours themselves being one of the phenomena whose occurrence increases dramatically in boom times. 
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Sub-phenomenon 2: Corporate Governance in M&A 
 
Ever since the 'managerial revolution', i.e. the separation of the ownership and the 
management of companies, right after the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries, the interests of 
managers and owners have not been aligned (Berle and Means 1932). With the growing 
plurality of different types of stakeholders (e.g. increasing power of institutional investors 
and venture capitalists), corporate governance has become an important part of firm activity.  
 
Given that M&A is frequently characterized by changes not only in ownership but also top 
management, boards of governors and directors as well as share prices, M&A activity is one 
of the most attention-grabbing issues in corporate governance. Growing evidence of value 
destroying M&A resulting from incentive and risk asymmetries between top management, 
owners and professional service providers has forced shareholders and their representatives to 
become actively involved in the management of companies. There has also been considerable 
development in the use of different corporate governance tools and practices (e.g. golden 
handcuffs, handshakes and parachutes, poison pills, white knights, scorched earth, greenmail) 
to prevent and bring about different hostile and friendly varieties of merger, acquisition and 
takeover activity. On the whole, corporate governance issues in M&A have contributed to the 
increased research attention. 
 
 
Sub-phenomenon 3: Demergers 
 
In the 1980s, many authors followed Jensen’s arguments (Jensen and Ruback 1983, Jensen 
1986) about a new shareholder value based rationale behind corporate restructuring. The core 
of the rationale was that the right to appropriate the free cash flow of the company should be 
returned from professional managers to the shareholders of the company. Shareholder value 
considerations have introduced a reverse pattern in the changes to the boundaries of firms in 
the form of divestitures, demergers and contracting-out. Porter (1987), while theoretically 
incorporating the general notion of portfolio investment in his realm of competitive corporate 
strategy, researched just short of 2000 acquisitions by 33 prestigious US companies in the 
1980s. By and large, he found that half of these acquisitions were later divested because of 
problems emerging from diversification. Similarly, Bowman and Singh (1990: 12-15) find 
that, for the 1979-1988 period in the US, divestitures by large companies outnumbered their 
acquisitions. Looking at European evidence, Richter (1999) supports this claim, yet arguing 
that demerger and divestiture activity has been more suppressed in Germany and in the UK 
largely because of a slower and less indecisive development of corporate governance 
mechanisms such as non-executive director-driven divestment and refocusing. Kirchmaier 
(2000) reports that in 1996, 80% of British firms indicated that they reduced the degree of 
diversification. Gadad and Thomas (1999) find evidence that divestitures, on average, 
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improve the operating performance and, at least short-term, share price performance of 
divesting firms.  
 
This is not to say that divestitures, demergers and contracting-out have emerged only due 
to the strengthening of shareholder value considerations. Increased awareness of core 
competence thinking and the disassembly of mergers performed during the 1960s-70s 
conglomerate merger wave have, among other issues, simultaneously acted in the same 
direction. In any case, it seems that the abundant demerger activity has contributed to the 
increased amount and versatileness of M&A research.  
 
 
Sub-phenomenon 4: Difficulty and Disagreement in Measuring M&A Success  
 
Subphenomena 4, 5 and 6 are highly interconnected issues, but they are nevertheless 
investigated here as separate reasons for the increase in M&A research. Firstly, there is 
considerable difficulty, leading to continuous disagreement, in measuring the success of 
different types of M&A as well as M&A in general. Numerous different post-M&A 
evaluation criteria have been proposed, including various types of accounting profit, stock 
returns, operations cash flow, operating efficiency, growth and market share, with no clear 
agreement over how to even measure the success of M&A (Kim 1998). Kim (1998, p. 107-
113) has researched the evaluation methods and concludes that there is no real consensus on 
the identity of the proper measures of performance. The well-known 'cloud of dust' metaphor, 
then again, argues that M&A creates period of turbulence during which so many different 
variables change that the impact of a merger or acquisition on a company's performance can 
not be iterated or identified, at least not in the short run. Regardless, the different results of 
studies using different measures of M&A success have also contributed to the increased 
discussion and research attention. 
 
 
Sub-phenomenon 5: Counterintuitive unsuccessfulness of M&A 
 
Many of the measures that actually are employed to the analysis of M&A success indicate, 
however, that M&A activity is unsuccessful. There is much disagreement whether this 
applies to most M&A, M&A on average or just a significant share of M&A, but failure is 
indisputably common. Evidence of improvement in the M&A success rate is, likewise, hard 
to find. Explanations provided for unsuccessfulness are plenty, including e.g. the use of 
wrong evaluation criteria, managerial hubris, flimsy rationales, inadequate and/or hurried 
execution, poor post-merger process management, conflicting cultures, bad timing and so on.   
 
The high rate of failure opens an arena for various types of M&A-supporting activity, 
research investigating whether failure is actually common, research investigating reasons for 
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failure, research implying ways to avoid failure as well as numerous types of advisory and 
consulting activities including e.g. financial, strategic, process, functional, culture and change 
management services. Altogether, the risk of M&A failure creates many opportunities and 
attracts considerable academic and professional attention. 
 
 
Sub-phenomenon 6: Overpowering Influence of Shareholder Value Considerations on 
M&A 
 
In the jungle of measuring M&A success, shareholder value considerations have lately 
arisen as the major validation for M&A activity. Alternating waves of mergers and demergers 
as well as takeovers and divestitures, however, indicate that something is fundamentally 
wrong in the way executives infer the benefits and perils in M&A decision-making situations. 
Numerous authors have argued for the necessity of a ‘strategic fit’ and inter-firm synergies in 
M&A processes (e.g. Porter 1987, Clarke 1987), but these strategy concepts are not enough 
to conceptualize the (economic) rationales for altering the boundaries of the firm.  
 
Shareholder value considerations in M&A are 'handy' in the sense that while they can, 
often fallaciously, be argued to be the best indicators in safeguarding shareholders' interests, 
they are also a medium for exercising capital market governance. Capital market pressure is 
growing faster than e.g. product market competition or strategic fit as a reason for performing 
structural and M&A changes (Kirchmaier 2000). Arguably, shareholder value is also a 
measure more easily manipulable than e.g. sustained profit, which can be perceived to be a 
benefit in the eyes of parties whose financial well-being is dependent on share price 
performance, including e.g. top managers, investment bankers, management consultant or 
generally anyone under share option or share related bonus schemes. The 'value' or 
'shareholder value' considerations became almost fad-like in the 1990s, naturally attracting 
the attention of researchers and practitioners alike.  
 
 
Sub-phenomenon 7: Attitude and Behavior of M&A professionals  
 
An emerging M&A related discussion involves the attitudes, behavior and incentives of 
various stakeholder groups in the context of M&A. Perhaps most interestingly, investment 
bankers and similar groups of 'M&A professionals', whose potential financial upside is 
enormous enough to render moral dilemmas, are beginning to drift in the spotlight. 
Stallworthy and Kharbanda (see e.g. 1988, 30) have devoted a series of publications on the 
mixed outcome scenario of takeovers, acquisitions and mergers. They advocate a somewhat 
anti-Wall Street view by claiming that “only the go-betweens benefit”. Kesner, Shapiro and 
Sharma (1994) argue that there is a definite incentive asymmetry between investment bankers 
and shareholders of acquiring companies. Furthermore, Fuller and Jensen (2002) have 
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recently argued that CEOs should start to “say no to Wall Street” and reverse the recent 
practices in which financial analysts and intermediaries drive firm valuations and 
expectations. Such research results, the media coverage Wall Street enjoys and the fact that 
many of the best earning individuals work for financial intermediary organizations are partly 
responsible for the current and increasing attention on M&A. 
 
 
Sub-phenomenon 8: Non-Prescribeability of Post-Merger Processes 
 
Finally, despite numerous academic and professional efforts, M&A and particularly post-
M&A process management, remains by and large a non-prescribeable issue that needs to be 
considered case-by-case. Subsequently, the number of people employed by M&A projects 
both inside and outside the merging firms is high and has increased further with the 
increasing amount of M&A activity in the economy. Thus, both the continuous search for 
post-merger management methods and the sizeable impact of M&A integration planning and 
execution activity on people, firms and society play a part in the increasing M&A attention.  
 
The above listing demonstrates clear motivations for continuing to tackle M&A as a 
research subject. The following sections attempt to lay the foundation for establishing a 
closer understanding for M&A by performing a brief conceptual analysis of the literature. 
This is done by incorporating three foci. Firstly, the definitions of M&A, which establish the 
conceptual boundaries of the discourse, are overviewed. Secondly, the various justifications 
for the existence of M&A, as put forward by established M&A schools of thought, are 
analyzed. Thirdly, perspectives on the internal organization of M&A are presented through an 
analysis of M&A processes. All through the analysis, the aim is to extract questions regarding 
the organization of economic activity in order to be able to analyze the findings from the 
perspective of the governance theories of the firm. 
 
 
6.2 The Boundaries of M&A 
 
The first task in investigating M&A from the viewpoint of the organization of economic 
activity is to look at what the boundaries of M&A are. Whether it is the literature, the 
business terminology or the actual phenomenon itself, the boundaries of M&A can be 
understood through its definitions.  
 
Thus the various definitions of a M&A can be suggested to map what is inside and what 
outside M&A, i.e. setting the boundaries of the concept. Some definitions emphasize the 
organizational context of M&A:  
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"The term 'merger' has two meanings in the context of 
combining organisations. Merger can refer to any form of 
combination of organizations, initiated by different kinds of 
contracts. The more specific meaning that separates mergers 
from acquisitions is that a merger is a combination of 
organizations which are similar in size and which create an 
organization where neither party can be seen as the 
acquirerer." (Vaara 2000, p. 82) 
  
Other definitions highlight the importance of corporate identity: 
 
“Consolidation implies the combining of two or more firms 
submerging .. into a new corporate identity, while 
acquisition involves .. a company which retains its corporate 
identity” (Marchildon 1991, p. xi) 
 
"Merger – the absorption of one firm by another.  A 
combination of two or more companies in which the 
resulting firm maintains the identity of the acquiring 
company" (Scott 1997)  
 
Dictionary definitions work on a very general level and highlight the difficulty of drawing 
boundaries between mergers, acquisitions and takeovers: 
 
“[A merger is a] fusion of two companies or, sometimes, an 
acquisition or a takeover of one company by the other” 
(Reuters 1982: Glossary of International Economic and 
Financial Terms.) 
 
Some definitions stress the disappearing of the former corporate entities more than the 
birth of a new one: 
 
A merger occurs when "two or more enterprises cease to be 
distinct or there are arrangements in progress or being 
contemplated that will lead to enterprises ceasing to be 
distinct” (Competition Bureau, Government of Canada, 
2001) 
 
In recent management literature, the negotiation aspect is emphasized: 
 
“The word merger refers to negotiations between friendly 
parties who arrive at a mutually agreeable decision to 
combine their companies .. In general, mergers reflect 
various forms of combining companies through some 
mutuality in negotiations” (Weston et al. 2001, p. 6) 
 
Some definitions stress the complementarity and learning rationales of the mergers: 
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A merger happens when two firms combine their practices 
in order that each gains a new area of expertise (Holtzman 
1994) 
 
Elsewhere, traditional economics literature has at times put it rather simply: 
 
“[A merger:] Firms combine the factors of production in 
different proportions” (Jervis 1971, p. 1)  
 
While recent, arguably academically sound definitions give more emphasis to the M&A 
process: 
 
The expression M&A has been established to represent both 
joint agreement between the management of two firms to 
merge that is submitted to the shareholders for approval 
(including consolidation where the separate firms are 
dissolved into a new joint corporate identity) and 
acquisition of one firm by another through tender offer (i.e., 
publicly announced takeover bid) (Larsson 1990, cf. Jensen 
1985) 
 
In financial literature, capital structure has often been seen as the key: 
 
“A merger .. is an amalgamation or fusion of two or more 
firms into a new firm with a different capital structure” 
(Reid 1968, p. 22)  
 
In legal dialogue, the European Union's definition92 of "concentration", implying the 
common features of both mergers, acquisitions and other arrangements leading to the 
agglomeration of economic entities, is often employed. According to it, a merger occurs 
when: 
d) Two or more previously independent undertakings merge 
e) One or more persons already controlling at least one undertaking, or one or more 
undertakings, acquire, whether by purchase of securities or assets, by contract or 
by any other means, direct or indirect control of the whole or parts of one of more 
other undertakings. 
f) The creation of a joint venture performing on a lasting basis all the functions of an 
autonomous economic entity. 
 
As can be seen in the definitions, the phrase ‘mergers and acquisitions’, or M&A, is a 
reference to two categories of merger activity: mergers by consolidation and mergers by 
acquisition. Scholarly literature generally holds the term ‘merger’ to include both 
                                                 
92 Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 of 21 December 1989 on the control of concentrations between 
undertakings, published in the Official Journal. Only the published text is authentic: OJ C 385, 31.12.1994, p. 
12. 
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consolidation and acquisition activity, but this study uses the term M&A (mergers and 
acquisitions) to encompass both fields. In essence, M&A can, and has been, treated as a 
single phenomenon in management, economics, business history, industrial organization, law, 
econometrics and finance alike (Marchildon 1991). 
 
There are common denominators between the various definitions. Generally, the 
definitions all suggest that with M&A, we are facing a change process. The question is: what 
is the instance that changes? Looking beyond the surface of the definitions, at least the 
following change instances can be identified: 
 
• Organization of activities and assets 
• Human interplay 
• Organizational reality 
• Financial structure 
• Corporate identity 
• Number of existing companies 
• Allocation of resources and/or factors of production 
• Ownership structure 
• Legal incorporation of companies 
 
Looking at these instances, it could be claimed that the definitions of M&A, in addition to 
setting the conceptual boundaries, explicitly relate M&A to the organization of economic 
activity. As seen in Appendix 2, theories of the organization of economic activity at the level 
of the firm, i.e. governance theories of the firm, are essentially about the contracts of 
organizing assets and activities as well as the contracting problems involving organizational 
realities and financial trade-offs.  
 
 
 
6.3 The Existence of M&A 
 
The investigation of the existence of M&A concentrates on a key set of questions 
concerning the role of M&A on at least three levels: the economy, the organization and the 
individual. In order to understand the essence of M&A, their existence should be scrutinized, 
and ultimately justified, on all of these levels. Fortunately, research on the various aspects of 
M&A, for example their economic justification, role in organizing economic activity, profit-
seeking objectives and other functions have been researched in depth since the 1970s. 
Unfortunately, various different perspectives have been presented and the scope of the 
research is much too broad for an complete in-depth coverage in this the context of this study, 
so the analysis is limited to a compact but investigative overview of the established schools 
of thought (See e.g. Haspeslagh and Jemison 1991, Cording et al. 2002, Weston et. al 2001, 
Larsson and Finkelstein 1999, Gammelgaard 1999, Marchildon 1991, Bengtsson 1992 and 
Auerbach 1988). 
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The aim of this Section is to look into the major motivations, justifications and 
explanations put forward for performing M&A. A variety of categorizations addressing 
different schools, approaches and arguments are presented in a number of review-type books 
and articles (e.g. Haspeslagh and Jemison 1991, Weston et al. 2001, Cording et al. 2002 and 
Larsson and Finkelstein 1999). In this study, these motivations are categorized, close to the 
lines of Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) under the four headings of capital markets, strategy, 
humans and organizations and process. These ‘schools’ can be argued to form unique 
perspectives with different mindsets but similar research agendas; analyzing the existence of 
M&A. Here, the aim is also to give an overview of the different perspectives and thereby 
establish an understanding about the key issues in M&A. Ultimately, the purpose of this 
section is to identify relevant questions concerning the organization of economic activity, for 
which clarification could be sought from the various governance theories of the firm as 
explained in the introduction of this appendix. 
 
 
6.3.1 Capital Markets  
 
What Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) peg the 'capital markets school' is fundamentally 
represented by financial economics work around the key concept of the creation and 
allocation of value through M&A93. Despite extensive empirical research showing that 
acquisition hosts will generally not gain in shareholder value, it is argued that M&A in 
general does create value and thereby encourages a market for corporate control.  
 
Two fundamental studies on the research of the value outcomes of M&A in the US in the 
1980s by Jensen and Ruback (1983), and Jarrell, Brickley and Netter (1988) conclude that, on 
average, target company shareholders value increases by approximately 20-30%, whereas the 
value gain on the hosting company’s side is marginal if any. The spread of the researched 
M&A value outcomes is great and there are also a number of studies that argue against any 
net value gain existing.  
 
Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991, p. 296) list a number of nation-based studies that support 
the general conception that targets gain more than hosts and the net outcome is positive 
presented in these two overviews and express the general notion that “financial economists 
conclude that acquisitions and mergers benefit society by creating wealth”. Ownership is thus 
changed in the hope that the new owners can put the transferred assets into better use. 
 
                                                 
93 It must be noted that from the perspective of the financial economics, mergers and acquisitions are not exactly 
the same thing. Whereas the analysis of shareholder value outcomes of mergers of equals is still a realm without 
evidence conclusive enough to draw prescriptive implications, the analysis of acquisitions and take-overs has 
been analytically framed with e.g. the concepts of ‘value capture’ and ‘value transfer’ from acquisition hosts, 
governments and bondholders in order to explain net shareholder value gains (Haspeslagh and Jemison, p. 296-
298). 
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There is also a wealth of literature arguing against this. Nickell  (1995) and Pene (1995) 
summarize the evidence in the literature according to which gains from takeover activity 
accrue primarily to the shareholders of the acquired companies rather than to the bidder. 
Bühner (1990) finds that gains by shareholders of acquired companies only represents a part 
of the losses by shareholders of the acquiring company in an overwhelming majority of cases. 
Richter (1999, p. 262), having analyzed a wealth of studies in Germany and in the UK, 
concludes that total shareholder value thus remains level at best following acquisitions and 
that acquisitions are not statistically followed by improvements in financial performance. 
These are merely a couple of examples. 
 
Financial economics authors in this stream of thought (e.g. Lewellen 1971, Brealey and 
Myers 1988, Werden et al. 1996) base their work on several fundamental concepts and their 
underlying assumptions, namely a) the efficient markets hypothesis, b) agency theory, c) free 
cash flow analysis, d) the market for corporate control and e) the capital asset pricing model 
(CAPM). (Haspeslagh and Jemison, p. 293-295) 
 
The efficient market hypothesis suggests that the market value of a firm’s stock price 
reflects an unbiased estimate of all publicly available information about the firm’s future cash 
flows and their related risks. Thus, it is argued, any acquisition that causes immediate 
increase in market value is good and vice versa. On the whole, extensive research has 
concluded that acquisitions do not, on average, create value for the acquiring firm. 
Acquisition targets, however, do yield a significant premium to their shareholders (Jensen 
and Ruback 1983, Jarrell, Brickley and Netter 1988). Agency theory, which is elaborated in 
more detail in Appendix 2, argues that problems arise in M&A situations when managers’ 
and owners’ interests are not congruent (Holmström 1979, Fama 1980). This may result in 
non-value creating acquisitive behavior due to e.g. empire-building acquisitions (Roll 1986) 
and managerial risk reduction through diversifying M&A (Amihud and Lev 1981). Free cash 
flow analysis, then again, is argued to reveal whether managers are acting in the 
shareholders’ interest and allocating the appropriation rights of free cash flow to them 
(Jensen 1987). The market for corporate control (Manne 1965, Jensen 1986), which is 
defined as the right to determine the management of corporate resources, including the right 
to hire, fire and set top-level management compensation rates (Fama and Jensen 1983), 
essentially refers to the fact that different management teams compete against each other over 
the control of corporate resources (Jensen and Ruback 1986). They are measured against each 
other in terms of the shareholder value they are able to create. The CAPM provides a 
framework for assessing the rate of return that the market expects of an asset to earn, given its 
riskiness (Brealey and Myers 1988, Weston and Copeland 1987), with many applications to 
the acquisition evaluation. (Haspeslagh and Jemison, p. 293-295) 
 
The methodology used by the capital markets stream consists almost entirely of event 
studies (See Brown and Warner 1980) that analyze the share prices of listed firms involved in 
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the M&A over a short period surrounding the announcement. Shortly put, if the net change in 
shareholder value during this short period is positive, the capital markets school concludes 
that wealth is created.  
 
The key sources of financial synergy from M&A are argued be a) reduced capital cost as 
internal financing is cheaper than external financing, b) the utilization of tax shield and c) the 
increase in the debt capacity of the merged company. As Weston et al. (2001) point out, there 
was already early on considerable empirical evidence (see e.g. Nickell 1978, Nielsen and 
Melicher 1973) that the rate of the premium paid to the owners of the acquired company was 
greater when the cash flow rate of the acquirer was greater than that of the acquired firm. 
Raising the debt rate also creates financial synergy through the exploitation of the tax shield. 
This strategy is efficient as long as the value from reduced tax is higher than the cost of 
financial distress (Brealey and Myers 1988, see Gammelgaard 2001, p. 7). Weston et al. 
(2001, p. 143) also mention a possible gain in the economies of scale in flotation and 
transaction cost of securities.  
 
This basic agenda and methodology of the capital markets school raises, however, serious 
concerns about the limitations of the capital markets approach, the most grave of which is its 
obsession with short-terminism, emerging from the underlying assumptions. For example the 
efficient markets hypothesis, which suggests that the market value of a firm’s stock price 
reflects an unbiased estimate of all publicly available information about the firm’s future cash 
flows and their related risks, feeds an impatience into the methodology. Conclusions about 
the value outcome of M&A are drawn even before the organizations have been merged, 
based solely on the reaction to the announcement (which can be and often is withdrawn or 
altered).  
 
Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991, p. 298-299) present two further, related problems with the 
capital markets school. The first is that the assumptions simply “do not reflect the realities of 
the managerial world”. In the real world, i) shareholders do not possess a full understanding 
of how the strategy of the firm will evolve and/or be developed in the future, ii) cash flows 
effects associated with the merger or acquisition cannot be accurately predicted and iii) 
managers and employees are certainly not perfectly aligned to the sole task of maximizing 
shareholder value (Donaldson and Lorsch 1983, Simon 1976), all of which are assumptions 
that the capital markets view adopts.  
 
Secondly, the view can be argued to drive a simplistic conception of the firm and has 
arguably contaminated the markets with value short-terminism. Haspeslagh and Jemison 
(1991, p. 299) argue that the efficient markets hypothesis fails and/or the financial markets 
are too impatient (Jensen and Fuller 2002) as more and more seriously and continuously 
undervalued firms appear. An increase in the number MBOs is an indication of this. These 
days, it is no miracle to see a publicly listed firm have a market capitalization seriously less 
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than its book value, which can be argued to hint in the same direction. This critical 
vocalization is concluded by the argument that “changes in share price provide a convenient 
but hazardous and single-minded measuring stick” (Ibid., p. 300) and reminds the academic 
community of the more long-term M&A evaluation strategies based on the accomplishment 
or non-accomplishment of strategic objectives. These M&A evaluation strategies are more 
widely used in non-Anglo-American countries, e.g. Germany, Japan and Switzerland. 
 
 
Ramifications 
 
From the standpoint of this study, perhaps the most interesting question concerns the role 
of agency theory94 as a fundamental theoretical cornerstone of the capital markets school. 
Given the central roles of shareholders and managers and the shifting patterns of power 
between them (Berle and Means 1932), agency theory is relevant in that it provides useful 
insight into analyzing their relationship. The basic setting deals with inefficiencies resulting 
from the incongruence of their interests (Holmström 1979, Fama 1980) and the possibility of 
shirking that necessitate monitoring from the shareholders’ side. 
 
Agency theory has contributed to the analysis of the financial aspects of M&A since the 
1970s. Jensen and Meckling's (1976) seminal paper presented key findings in both the theory 
of finance and agency theory, both of which had remarkable repercussions to M&A. Agency 
theory soon spurred seminal M&A articles (e.g. Jensen 1986, Amihud and Lev 1981) 
carrying the capital markets mindset in the form of share price event study methodology. 
Financial economists (see e.g. Myers and Majluf 1984, Eckbo 1983, Jensen and Ruback 
1983) were equally keen on M&A research. As Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) indicate, the 
emphasis in M&A has strongly been on capital markets oriented research. A further 
indication of the intertwining of the finance and agency theory realms is that lately, the roles 
of investment bankers in M&A have been scrutinized from an agency theoretic point of view 
(e.g. Sharma 1997, Kesner, Shapiro and Sharma 1994).  
 
The question becomes: if agency theory is so relevant in understanding shareholder-
manager relationships, what more can it contribute to the understanding of M&A? The 
existence of M&A can be linked, at least in some cases, to a corporate governance struggle 
involving questions of incentive establishment and allocation. Furthermore, it can be 
speculated that interest incongruence exists in multiple patterns across the organization, not 
only between the ‘collectives’ called ‘shareholders’ and ‘managers’. Could the analysis of 
interest incongruence in M&A refined by incorporating analysis at the level of management 
layers, business units, and even entire firms? What implications do possible further agency 
                                                 
94 For an in-depth overview of agency theory, see Appendix 2 
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settings are there in M&A situations? These avenues remain largely unexplored. More 
agency theoretic viewpoints are elaborated upon in Appendix 2.  
 
The possibility of input from other theories of the firm should not be overlooked either. 
An apparent source of justifications (due to the shareholder value intensity of the capital 
markets school) rises from property rights literature. What, then, are the justifications this 
TOF puts forward for the transfer of assets from one set of shareholders to another? Does a 
closer investigation of the shareholder-based theories help us to understand the efficiency, 
authority, information and incentive mechanisms, which set the boundaries for M&A?  
 
Another important set of questions deals with the role of shareholder value considerations, 
both in the form of the capital markets perspective on M&A and the (possibly) related 
theories of the firm in the organization of economic activity. To what extent do shareholder 
value considerations drive the existence of M&A in practice? How and in what direction do 
the shareholder value-related mechanisms drive the boundaries (see above) and the internal 
organization (see below) of the firm? Are there, for example, correlations between the types 
internal organization changes following M&A and changes in shareholder value.  
 
The answer to the first question can be speculated immediately. As outlined earlier, pure 
short-term shareholder value considerations, as emphasized by the capital markets school, are 
indeed considered the main judge of M&A rationales in the contemporary financial market 
driven economies. This is regardless of the various problems of the capital markets approach 
in its underlying assumptions, neglect of organizational realities as well as the empirical 
evidence indicating a large share of value destroying M&A outlined earlier: 
 
“Despite these and other problematic assumptions, the American and 
British business environments largely accept the capital markets 
perspective and the impact on current shareholder value as the 
overriding benchmark by which to judge the quality of [M&A] 
decisions” (Haspeslagh and Jemison 1991, p. 299). 
 
It is also argued that this view may have become dominant in the US because research on 
M&A has been “financially oriented with an emphasis on measuring the outcome” solely 
from the point of view of shareholder value (Ibid., p.299-300). The question becomes: has it 
really? One of the major objectives of this study as well as its potential extensions is to map 
the de facto fundamentals of the M&A discourse and see whether and to what extent the 
capital markets approach and its underlying theories of the firm, namely agency theory and 
property rights theory, have been the driving forces of the discourse. 
 
As outlined earlier, pure short-term shareholder value considerations are indeed 
considered the main judge of M&A rationales in regardless of the various problems of the 
  257
capital markets approach in its underlying assumptions and neglect of organizational realities 
as well as the empirical evidence indicating a large share of value destroying M&A.  
 
 
6.3.2 Strategy 
 
Since the focus of this study are the governance theories of the firm, the detailed analysis 
of the strategy stream is focused strictly on issues that are directly relevant to the 
understanding of M&A from a governance point of view, i.e. the concepts of relatedness and 
synergy. The scrutiny of what has grown into a competence-based perspective of the firm as 
well as the extensive competitive strategy literature is primarily left for future research. These 
discourses are far too complex to be dealt with in the limited space of this essay. By 
concentrating on two concepts that the various corporate strategy schools agree on, 
relatedness and synergy, the analysis also avoids getting into the continuous rope pulling 
between the various strategy schools. 
 
In contrast with the capital markets school, the strategy stream of M&A emphasizes the 
case of individual firms and lowers the level of the analysis from the wealth of the economy 
to firm-specific outcomes. Naturally, however, M&A is more of a central issue in certain 
areas of corporate strategy practice and research than others.  
 
Key M&A related corporate strategy areas could be categorized as follows (along the lines 
of Weston et al. 2001):  
1. Efficiency gains 
2. Risk and diversification 
3. Operating synergies 
4. Financial strategy 
5. Competitive realignment 
6. Competence, resource, information realignment 
7. Redistributive realignment 
 
 
The basic agenda of the strategy stream can be argued have started from a rationalistic 
analysis of the fundamentals of the firm: 
 
“Claiming that the average performance findings of financial economists 
are of little relevance to the strategist in individual firms, strategic 
performance researchers have set out to examine the performance impact 
of a whole series of characteristics of the acquirer, the target, or the 
relation between them. The variables deemed to be associated positively 
with performance include relative size, market share, pre-acquisition 
profitability, and pre-acquisition growth and pre-acquisition experience” 
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(Haspeslagh and Jemison 1991, p. 300, see also Kitching 1967, 1974, 
Fowler and Schmidt 1989). 
 
With the rise of the competence perspective to corporate strategy (see e.g. Hamel and 
Prahalad 1990, 1994, Rumelt, Schendel and Teece 1994) and a more elaborate understanding 
of the need for strategic and organizational fit (e.g. Porter 1996), the relatedness of activities 
has received extensive and increasing attention. Already the earlier contributions in the spirit 
of the resource-based theory of the firm (Rumelt 1974, 1982, Bettis 1981, Nelson and Winter 
1982) found that large firms that were unrelated diversified (often as a result of M&A 
activity) were outperformed by firms with related activities on the whole. Early studies using 
managerial judgment as a measure of performance (e.g. Kitching 1974) also support this 
finding. Thus generally, relatedness between activities, i.e. synergies arising from appropriate 
portfolio management, restructuring, sharing of activities and the transfer of resources (Porter 
1987), is argued to be a driving force behind the successful co-existence between merged 
firms in certain industries (e.g. pharmaceuticals). This is not insignificant vis-à-vis the 
existence of M&A. 
 
The notion of synergy, then again, has derived from two particular intellectual 
orientations. The first is the theory of differential managerial efficiency (Teece 1987), which 
argues that M&A gains are due to more efficient organizations and pooling of 
complementary resources (Gammelgaard 2001). The other relates to the replacement of 
inefficient management following M&A, i.e. the operation of an allocative market for 
corporate control (Fama 1980, Manne 1965, see also Walsh 1988, 1989). More specifically, 
M&A synergies have also been categorized into operational synergies95, collusive 
synergies96, managerial synergies97 and financial synergies98 according to their measurability 
and the ability to generate benefits (Weston et al. 2001, Larsson and Finkelstein 1999). 
 
Authors in the strategy stream have addressed the problem of M&A implementation by 
advocating better pre-M&A analysis and post-M&A planning (Salter and Weinhold 1979, 
Howell 1970, Berman and Wade 1981). In practice, this implies a better definition of the 
steps in the M&A processes99, conventionally consisting of the definition of objectives, 
search and screening, strategic evaluation, financial evaluation, negotiation, agreement and 
post-merger-integration (Haspeslagh and Jemison 1991, p. 13, also Salter and Weinhold 
1979). 
 
The empirical evidence on both relatedness arguments and synergy arguments is, however, 
not straightforward. It has been argued that relatedness, although it gives a conclusive ex ante 
                                                 
95 Resulting from economies of scale in e.g. production, R&D, staff functions and marketing. 
96 Resulting from increased market power and bargaining power 
97 Corresponding to the efficiencies from the market for corporate control 
98 As elaborated in the previous section 
99 For a fuller analysis of the M&A processes, i.e. the internal organisation of M&A, see Section 2.3. 
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indication of potential sources of value creation, does not determine the nature, scope and 
profitability of value creation (Haspeslagh 1986, Haspeslagh and Jemison 1987). A possible 
explanation is the neglect of post-merger implementation work: 
 
“Taking synergies from relatedness for granted is symptomatic of a more 
fundamental weakness of the strategy school: its disproportionate 
emphasis on the strategic task, leaving aside practical impediments to 
value creation such as interpersonal, interorganizational, and intercultural 
friction” (Haspeslagh and Jemison 1991, p. 302). 
 
In addition to the criticism directly related to the its M&A insights, the perspective suffers 
from the cloud of criticism bestowed by the continuous rope-pulling between the various 
corporate strategy schools, as much of the research effort in strategic M&A research 
concentrates on arguing about old propositions. This hampers further development and 
progressive new research. 
 
 
Ramifications 
 
The discussion of synergy-based ex ante and ex post value creation and related frictions in 
M&A represents an extremely interesting question to the realm of the theories of the firm. 
How does an ex ante indication of potentially significant but unsure value creation influence 
M&A decision-making? With their detailed analysis of the incomplete contracting setting, 
governance theories of the firm, especially transaction cost economics and agency theory, 
should be able to model and analyze such M&A settings. Likewise, the ‘frictions’ mentioned 
in the M&A value creation setting are directly addressed by transaction cost economics. The 
general question thus is: How do transaction frictions influence the existence, boundaries and 
processes of M&A? 
 
In addition to discussing the firm level upshots of M&A activities, the strategy stream 
discusses issues related to industry and market structure as well as industry-wide vertical 
integration issues (Rumelt 1982, Christensen and Montgomery 1981). What input do the 
theories of the firm have for industry market structure and industry-wide vertical integration 
questions? 
 
 
6.3.3 Humans and Organizations 
 
Whilst the capital markets school concentrates on wealth effects at the level of the 
economy and the strategy stream at the level of the firm, what is called here the 'humans and 
organizations' stream has “focused on the people aspects of [M&A] implementation, often to 
the neglect of strategic requirements” (Haspeslagh and Jemison 1991, p. 303). The research 
  260 
incorporates contours reflecting human resource management, crisis management and 
cultural compatibility ideas100.  
 
An important proponent of the human resource management literature is naturally the 
discussion of the employment relationship and contract pioneered by Simon and March 
(1952), which has its connections to the governance theories of the firm. From the standpoint 
of the employee or individual, much of the human resource management literature 
incorporates an organizational, softer perspective on both pre- and post-merger processes, 
thus departing drastically from the capital markets perspective. Similarly, the humans and 
organizations stream departs from the capital markets and strategy streams as it emphasizes 
on the negative impacts of M&A, e.g. labor turnover, which is considered an indication of a 
crumbling morale in the workplace101. This negative predisposition is shared by the crisis 
literature, which concentrates mostly on the adaptation process of the employees at the time 
of, typically, a hostile takeover. Cording et al. (2002, p. 17) elevate the employee distress 
perspective as a completely separate school of its own, given the contributors' background in 
industrial and organizational sociology and psychology, which thus differs remarkably from 
most M&A authors (See Buono and Bowditch 1989). 
 
The view on cultural compatibility applies seminal corporate culture literature (e.g. Schein 
1992, Deal and Kennedy 1982) to the context of M&A, emphasizing that a great deal of 
attention should be paid to the cultural compatibility between the merging organizations 
(Sales and Mirvis 1985). This argument, despite the fact that it draws directly from the 
culture literature and has thus different intellectual roots than the strategy stream, resembles 
the relatedness arguments in the way it talks about the need for similarity between 
organizations. Furthermore, the culture approach also explicitly argues that history matters, 
which is in accord with the competence perspective to strategic M&A literature (Blake and 
Mouton 1984). Finally, the resemblance of the two approaches is capped by their mutual 
emphasis of communication and information exchange in order to ensure that the M&A is 
assumes the form and is understood as a smooth interorganizational process (Buono, 
Bowditch and Lewis 1988), which is characterized by a long period of two-way 
communication and interaction. Empirical research advocating the dangers of cultural 
compatibility and acculturation is relatively abundant (see e.g. Chatterjee et al. 1992, 
Nahavandi and Malekzadeh 1988, Cooper and Cartwright 1992).  
 
It is also relevant to include individual-level M&A considerations in the humans and 
organizations stream. Managerial hubris and empire building have been attributed as the most 
important motivations behind M&A behavior. Roll (1986) initially elevated hubris as an 
equally important motivation for M&A as taxes, synergy and removing inefficient 
                                                 
100 For a list of authors in specific research topics, see Haspeslagh and Jemison 1991, p. 304-305 
101 This is quite opposite to the capital markets perspective, which traditionally emphasises the welfare gains of 
M&A and views labour turnover as a positive thing given that it is a potential synergy instance  
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management. Hayward and Hambrick (1997) relate the acquisition premiums paid to the 
extent of CEO hubris, and their findings imply that hubris might actually be a primary reason 
for acquisition price-related M&A 'failures'. 
 
On the whole, authors in the human and organizational behavior literature stream “let 
organizational issues outweigh an acquisition’s strategic potential and consider integration 
issues primarily from the standpoint of whether individuals accept the new situation” 
(Haspeslagh and Jemison 1991, p. 306). 
 
Ramifications 
 
With its organizational inclination, the humans and organizations stream poses rather 
different questions about the existence, boundaries and internal organization of M&A. In 
addition to lowering the analysis to the level of the individual, the organizational behavior 
literature poses the important question: Do organizational considerations (or realities) 
threaten justifications for the existence of M&A? One could also wonder what kind of impact 
organizational considerations at the level of the individual can have to the boundaries, i.e. 
definition, of M&A. On the basis of the evidence in the crisis literature, it seems viable to 
suggest that M&A is accomplished only after true integration of soft issues and cooperation 
patterns have also taken place. 
 
The humans and organizations stream on M&A derives from the same original conception 
as early incomplete contracting literature and subsequently all theories of the firm based on 
this notion (most importantly transaction cost economics and new property rights theory), the 
uniqueness and incontractability of the employment relationship (Simon 1951). Since the 
humans and organizations stream lies close to early incomplete contracting literature (e.g. 
Simon 1945, 1951, Coase 1937, 1960) the incomplete contracting theories of the firm should 
be able to contribute to our understanding of M&A from an organizational standpoint. Which 
conceptual elements do organizational M&A and incomplete contracting theories of the firm 
have in common? 
 
 
6.3.4 Process  
 
The fourth stream of M&A literature, i.e. the process stream (see e.g. Hunt 1990, 
Haspeslagh and Jemison 1991, Pablo 1994, Larsson and Finkelstein 1999), was spurred by 
the strategy school’s inability to emphasize the significance of the M&A processes. The basic 
argument is that the M&A process itself can be an important determinant of the various 
M&A outcomes (Jemison and Sitkin 1986). It is clear, however, that the process stream and 
the strategy stream derive from similar intellectual bases and authors of the process stream 
have often contributed across. A process stream could thus be viewed as a subset of a more 
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general strategic research stream in M&A (Vaara 2002). Indeed, the process stream does not 
mitigate the importance of a strategic and organizational fit, but rather draws from classic 
contributions in this field (e.g. Mace and Montgomery 1962, Lawrence and Lorsch 1967). 
 
As recognized by Puranam (2001, p. 6-7), one of the central tenets in the process approach 
is that the acquisition of the equity of another company does not automatically lead to the 
creation of necessary links between the resources of the merging companies. Costly 
transactions, most importantly the alignment of incentives, the creation of coordination 
mechanisms and the adjustment of information flows governing the use of the resources, are 
needed (Ranft 1997, Zollo 1998, Zollo and Singh 2000). Subsequently, the process stream 
emphasizes the role of post-merger integration and the extent of administrative integration 
after the merger.  
 
The process stream in M&A is interested in the role of change and change management as 
potential sources of improvements in competitive advantage (Jemison and Sitkin 1986). Here, 
the creation of value in the M&A context is thus not a given outcome of an ‘average’ merger 
or acquisition (like the capital markets stream and partly the strategy stream endorse, see e.g. 
Jensen and Ruback 1983 and Jarrell, Brickley and Netter 1988, Kitching 1967, 1974, Fowler 
and Schmidt 1989), but the M&A process is an underlying mechanism which, if skillfully 
managed, can potentially help create value through corporate renewal (Haspeslagh and 
Jemison 1991). What the process stream is naturally most interested in is the M&A process, 
or, arguably, a number of M&A processes (Hunt 1990, Pablo 1994).  
 
A key aspect in the value creation is the active management of the M&A process. Already 
Mace and Montgomery emphasized the critical role of top management in determining the 
success of the process and subsequent value creation: 
 
“The value to be derived from an acquisition depends largely upon 
the skill with which the administrative problems of integration are 
handled. Many potentially valuable acquired corporate assets have 
been lost by neglect and by poor handling during the integration 
process” (Mace and Montgomery 1962, p. 230, in Haspeslagh and 
Jemison 1991, p. 307) 
 
 
Ramifications 
 
The process approach directly poses some acute questions about M&A: What is the 
internal organization, i.e. processes, phases and structures, of M&A? Furthermore, if the 
process is seen as an opportunity to influence the de facto outcome of M&A, what are the 
ways in which a more profound understanding of the M&A process can influence its 
management? Investing in post-merger integration processes, managing corporate culture and 
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focusing on value creation are some of the solutions provided in M&A literature (see e.g. 
Birkinshaw et al. 2000, Shirivastava 1986, Jemison and Sitkin 1986, Cartwright and Cooper 
1993, Larsson and Lubatkin 2001). 
 
 
6.4 The Internal Organization of M&A 
 
What the process stream is naturally most interested in is the M&A process (Jemison and 
Sitkin 1986), or, arguably, a number of M&A processes (Hunt 1990, Pablo 1994). 
Conceptually, the M&A processes are the 'content' of M&A and thus different views on what 
the M&A processes are correspond directly to the internal organization of M&A. 
 
The process approach has been used to understand M&A in general, as well as partitioning 
the temporal content of the M&A project. Before the rise of the process stream in the 1980s, 
conventional M&A literature argued for a sequential, one-process view of M&A. The 
conventional view of the M&A process is illustrated in Figure 11. 
 
Figure 11: Conventional view of the M&A process (Haspeslagh and Jemison 1991) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Proponents of the process stream of M&A, however, argued that there are at least two 
different processes, namely the decision-making process and the integration process 
(Haspeslagh and Jemison 1991, p.12). According to their view, M&A provides an 
opportunity for improvement by acting as a change catalyst: 
 
"In the process perspective, [M&A] are not independent, one-off deals. 
Instead, they are a means to the end of corporate renewal. The transaction 
itself doesn't bring the expected benefits; instead the actions and activities 
of the managers after the agreement determine the results." (Haspeslagh 
and Jemison 1991, p.12) 
 
Accordingly, this more recent view on the M&A process holds managers responsible for 
managing the M&A process in a way that carries the result. The human element is also 
incorporated in the beginning of the whole M&A process, i.e. in the triggering and 
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conception of M&A ideas. Jemison and Sitkin (1986, p. 146) argued for using a combination 
of managerial and theoretical thinking by arguing that “clues to understanding acquisition 
outcomes may be discovered more readily in a variety of theories that direct to the underlying 
process-driven impediments to effective acquisitions” than applied and managerial research/.  
Figure 12 and 
 
Figure 13 present a) the process stream's views of the embeddedness of the acquisition 
process in certain strategic and organizational fit and b) a coarse division of acquisition 
process problems. Both of these views engulf the same sequential steps as in the conventional 
view on the M&A process. 
 
Figure 12: The process streams' view of the embeddedness of the M&A process in a certain 
strategic and organizational fit (Jemison and Sitkin 1986) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13: The process streams' view of the M&A process problems (Haspeslagh and Jemison 
1991) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Jemison and Sitkin (1986) propose three critical dimensions for M&A process 
management, i.e. strategic, organizational and process factors. They argue that acquiring 
companies’ managers frequently omit a variety of impediments in the process of analyzing, 
negotiating and integrating target firms. Such M&A process impediments or problems, that 
e.g. Jemison and Sitkin categorize into activity segmentation, escalating momentum, 
exceptional ambiguity and management system misapplication, have attracted further 
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considerable research attention to the process perspective in general (see e.g. Greenwood et 
al. 1994, Ashkanasy and Holmes 1995, Mottola et al. 2000, Kohers and Ang 2000). 
Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) have identified two major categories of such problems, 
decision-making process problems and integration process problems, as highlighted in  
Figure 13. Marks and Mirvis (1998) have elaborated the M&A process problems further 
and have classified the M&A process into three main phases according to the emerging 
problems.  These are illustrated in Figure 14. 
 
Figure 14: A classification of the M&A process into three phases according to emerging process problems 
(Marks and Mirvis 1998) 
 
Phase Problem 
Pre-Combination Unclear business strategy 
Weak core business 
Poor combination strategy 
Pressure to do a deal 
Hurried due diligence 
Overvalued targets and overestimated synergies, prospects and returns 
Combination Integration seen as distraction from “real work” 
Misunderstood value added and critical success factors 
Psychological effects denied or ignored 
Culture clash denied or ignored 
Post-Combination Renewed merger syndrome 
Rushed implementation 
Insufficient resources deployed 
Unanticipated implementation obstacles 
Coordination snags 
Inattention to team building 
Culture by default, not by design 
Unintended impact on employment attitudes and hence business performance 
Missed opportunities for organizational enhancement 
 
The process perspectives can be criticized a) for their linearity and b) for the lack of 
feedback mechanisms. The M&A project can also be seen as an iterative, incremental 
development, where setbacks and repetitions of a particular phase of the M&A process are 
not only possible, but also likely. Several parts of the M&A process can also be performed at 
the same time, for instance the search and selection for other candidates can still be ongoing 
even though evaluations and negotiations with found potential M&A partners are already 
ongoing. Similarly, developments in later stages (e.g. financial evaluation) can have 
significant feedback loops to earlier stages (e.g. strategic objectives) and vice versa. Thus 
even though the process models are useful for conceptualizing the various tasks of the M&A 
project, their temporal linearity is questionable. Feedback and overlapping iteration of 
multiple stages occurs mostly within the acquisition justification and acquisition integration 
phases (as in 
 
Figure 13), which renders Haspeslagh and Jemison's conceptions slightly less prone to this 
criticism than the traditional view. 
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Post-merger processes have received considerable emphasis and their role in value 
creation has been a subject of an intense discussion. Early on, Shrivastava (1986) identified 
unsuccessful post-merger processes management as a main reason for the high rate of 
divestment of fairly recently acquired companies. Integration in 1) procedures (operations, 
management control, strategic planning) 2) physical assets (product lines, production 
technologies, research and development, equipment, real estate) and 3) culture (management 
selection, organizational structure, corporate culture, strategic frame of reference, employee 
motivation, leadership development) is perceived crucial for M&A success (Shrivastava 
1986, p. 65).   
 
Larsson has advocated this view at length (see Larsson 1989). In the late 1990s, post-
merger process literature has become more fine-grained emphasizing special fields of post-
merger integration, e.g. communication and statements (Weston et al. 2001, p. 17-20), 
information systems integration (e.g. Weber and Pliskin 1996, Robbins and Stylianou 1999), 
learning (e.g. Kreiner and Lee 2000) and corporate culture and HRM aspects (e.g. Weber and 
Ganzach 1995, Olie 1994). 
 
From the perspective of the theories of the firm and the organization of economic activity, 
a number of interesting questions arise. Firstly, how do the dynamics of pre-merger (decision-
making) and post-merger (integration) processes differ? Clearly, the two phases are split by a 
contract, and thus theories of the firm should be able to provide insights to how different pre- 
and post-merger processes influence the resulting governance structure102. Secondly, what 
are the 'process problems' in the light of governance? Also, coming back to the conventional 
view of the M&A process, what are the ramifications of e.g. agency theory on the negotiation 
phase of the M&A process? How can transaction cost thinking be applied to the strategic 
evaluation phase? What other insights do the theories of the firm have for the internal 
organization of M&A? 
 
The views on the M&A so far have been limited to managerial and financial concerns. In 
addition to this, there is a need to map the psychological and organizational processes related 
to M&A more carefully. Thus, what organizational considerations or assumptions 
concerning the M&A process should we be aware of? 
 
Furthermore, it must be acknowledged that the M&A process involves a number of 
different stakeholder groups, and the above models only present a firm-internal perspective to 
looking at the M&A process. For example, the role of management consultants is often 
significant in the setting of strategic objectives, search and screening, strategic evaluation as 
                                                 
102 The pre- and post-merger process problem setting is very reminiscent of the ex ante and ex post constraints or 
transaction costs of contracting situations 
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well as post-merger processes. Investment banks, then again, are often responsible for the 
financial evaluation (due diligence), negotiation and, increasingly and more often than is 
realized, the initiation or triggering of the whole M&A idea. Lawyers (mostly external) 
handle the agreement (contracting) phase of the process and are a key group in case of 
antitrust, i.e. looking at the possible adverse economic effects to a merger "with both market 
power and efficiency consequences" (Williamson 1996, p.281, footnote 4). The conclusion 
from this is that professional services are an important stakeholder group in the M&A 
process, especially if their remuneration is tied to outcomes and not behavior. What is the 
relationship between the firm and professional services? How can it be analyzed in the light 
of e.g. agency theory to understand the governance outcomes? Do professional services 
advocate any theories of the firm, M&A perspective or governance outcome in particular?  
 
 
6.5 Summary 
 
This Appendix aimed at providing a conceptual elaboration of the state of the M&A 
discourse by highlighting some of the key aspects of M&A research. This was done firstly by 
outlining some of the major motivations for increasing academic attention on M&A. The 
reasons were perceived to be two-fold. On one hand, there have been numerous real-life 
M&A sub-phenomena, which have definitely contributed to the attention that M&A has 
received from academic and professional communities. On the other hand, significant 
developments in various theoretical fields parallel, interlinked and overlapping with M&A 
have taken place during the same period. M&A, a significant and exciting management 
research phenomenon, has acted as a convenient subject for studies using an increasing 
variety of disciplinary angles. These disciplinary angles are reflected in the justifications put 
forward for the existence of M&A.  
 
The conceptual boundaries of M&A, embodied in the numerous definitions selected from 
the literature, were also examined. Here, the disciplinary plurality was also highlighted. The 
definitions generally emphasized the role of M&A in the organization of economic activity, 
given that the organization of activities and assets, human interplay, organizational reality, 
financial structure, corporate identity, the number of existing companies, allocation of 
resources and/or factors of production, ownership structure and the legal incorporation of 
companies were found to be central to the definitions. Furthermore, the various justifications 
for the existence of M&A, as presented in a plethora of literature and review books and 
articles, were overviewed. The different groups were categorized as 'capital markets', 
'strategy', 'humans and organizations' and 'process', which respects the original and sound 
categorization of Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991). Here, questions addressing the 
organization of economic activity and the governance theories of the firm in particular were 
identified. Finally, the internal organization of M&A, i.e. the processual approach to M&A, 
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was elaborated further by discussing the features, problems and emphases of different process 
approaches presented in the literature.   
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7 APPENDIX 2: GOVERNANCE THEORIES OF THE FIRM  
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
In order to investigate the contribution of theories of the firm to our understanding of 
M&A, an overview of the various attempts to formulate a theory of the firm is required. The 
most prominent branches in the governance theory of the firm literature include the 
neoclassical firm-as-a-production-function literature (e.g. Arrow 1951, 1962; Arrow and 
Debreu 1954; Debreu 1959 and Solow 1963), the nexus of contracts view (E.g. Alchian and 
Demsetz 1972; Jensen and Meckling 1976; Fama 1980 and Cheung 1983), the formal and 
positivist agency work and principal-agent theories (E.g. Hart and Holmström 1987; Ross 
1973; Holmström 1979, 1982; Eisenhardt 1989; Jensen 1983, 1985; Fama and Jensen 1983; 
Jensen and Meckling 1992 and Harris and Raviv 1978), early incomplete contracting theory 
characterized by the coordination problem (e.g. Coase 1937; Simon 1945, 1951; Malmgren 
1961), transaction cost economics (e.g. Williamson 1971, 1975, 1977, 1985, 1986, 1991 and 
1996) as well as the property rights theory perspectives (e.g. Furubotn and Pejovich 1972; 
Hayek 1937, 1945; Coase 1960; Hart 1989; Grossman and Hart 1986; Hart and Moore 1990; 
Kreps 1990).  
 
A conceptual analysis of the governance theory of the firm literature is employed as the 
research methodology in order to build a solid understanding of the governance theories of 
the firm. Arguably, governance theory of the firm literature attempts to tackle M&A concepts 
and phenomena directly. These direct linkages between “the true and undisputed” (Foss 2000, 
xv) cornerstones of theory of the firm literature and M&A phenomena must be explored in 
detail, since they can contribute to our understanding of what a) definition or true nature, b) 
justification of existence and c) internal processes are.  
 
All governance theories of the firm are more or less centrally interested in the nature of 
contracting. Thus the type of contracting is a good starting point for when attempting to 
categorize the governance theories of the firm. Neoclassical economics, which dominated the 
landscape in the analysis of the organization of economic activity before the rise of the 
theories of the firm, considers contracting a mere side effect or outcome of continuous market 
interaction. After the reign of neoclassical economics during the first part of the 20th century, 
legally oriented and formal (e.g. P-A) contracting literature (Posner 1979; Fama 1980; 
Cheung 1970; Demsetz 1967; Alchian and Demsetz 1972) developed further using the notion 
of complete contracting. An alternative to this approach, focusing on the incomplete nature of 
contracts, developed from the Coasian concept of social cost (Coase 1937, 1960) and the 
Simonian approach to the employment contract (Simon 1951). It started gathering momentum 
in the 1970s and 1980s with the rise of transaction cost economics (Williamson 1975, 1985) 
and new property rights theory (Hart 1989; Grossman and Hart 1986; Hart and Moore 1990; 
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Kreps 1990). The logic behind using this rather traditional categorization is that introducing 
yet another categorization for the governance theories of the firm would add confusion. The 
categorization depicted in Figure 15 (strongly influenced by an earlier categorization by Foss 
(2000)) is thus both relevant and practical for the purposes of this analysis. 
 
Figure 15: Governance theories of the firm with regards to their type of contracting, key assumptions and 
main contribution to the organization of economic activity (modified from Foss 2000) 
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Governance theories of the firm have introduced the widely known assumptions of asset 
specificity, maximizing behavior, bounded rationality, risk preferences, moral hazard, 
complete contracting, efficiency equilibriums and rationality to the context of institutional 
analysis. For instance, transaction cost economics has introduced the notion of a transaction 
cost, manifested in its part the importance of authority in justifying the existence of firms and 
introduced a conceptual explanation to three prevalent organization modes, i.e. markets, 
hybrids and hierarchies. Property rights theory has stressed the importance of ownership and 
Maximization     
Calculativeness
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the authority that it bears with it in the determination of the organization of economic 
activity. Early incomplete contracting has indirectly argued against detailed strategic 
planning and advocated spontaneous ordering of economic activity in contemporary society 
by implying that not everything can be contracted. Then again, agency theory has argued for 
the importance of incentives and information in contracting settings, with a remarkable 
contribution to corporate governance. 
 
The aim of Appendix 2 is to provide a conceptual overview of the various governance 
theories of the firm as well as investigate their potential linkages and contributions to the 
analysis of mergers and acquisitions. This is performed by incorporating three foci. Firstly, 
the general structuring of the governance theories of the firm is outlined together with some 
speculation of how the theory of the firm, by and large, could relate to M&A research and 
decision-making. Secondly, the governance theories of the firm, namely the neoclassical 
theory of the firm, the nexus of contracts perspective, agency theory, early incomplete 
contracting theory, transaction cost economics and property rights theory, are overviewed 
together with pertinent analysis of the linkages and contributions to the realm of M&A. The 
linkages are categorized, with the aim of constructing a governance theoretic approach to 
M&A, according to the M&A existence, boundaries and internal organization rationales that 
the governance theories of the firm provide. Finally, an analysis of the criticisms and 
shortcomings presented against the governance theories of the firm, as well as their 
application to M&A, is presented, together with a brief note on how the competence 
perspective, which is can be seen as either complementing or contrasting to the governance 
perspective (See e.g. Williamson 1999, Madhok 2002), could be related to this discussion and 
possibly contribute to the analysis of M&A. There have been some attempts to integrate the 
governance and competence perspectives using e.g. the dynamic transaction cost approach 
(Langlois 1992), the information and organization approach (Casson 1997) and the 
organization of economic activity as a common denominator (Madhok 2002). Thorough 
integrative analysis is, however, beyond the scope of this study and is largely left for future 
research.  
 
 
7.1.1 Neoclassical economics – the firm as a production function  
 
Overview 
 
Neoclassical theory of the firm is based on fundamental assumptions about price taking, 
Pareto-optimality and competitive equilibrium (Arrow 1951, 1962, Arrow and Debreu 1954, 
Debreu 1959).  
 
Key message: The firm is a production function, with decision-making mechanisms 
and consequently governance structures being dependent on utility 
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maximization in the presence of budget constraints and zero 
transaction costs (De Alessi 1983).  
 
While assuming e.g. perfectly complete contracting (also known as 'neoclassical 
contracting') and symmetry of information in the market, the neoclassical literature employs a 
simplistic view of the firm, or more radically exercise "neglect of the firm" (Foss 2000, p. 
xvii). The neoclassical theory of the firm employs the firm as a transaction mediating 
mechanism, i.e. a part of the market mechanism. Economic behavior within firms is governed 
by pure utility considerations and the firm is not a governance mechanism, but merely a black 
box that contains the production function.  
 
 
Contribution to M&A 
 
Neoclassical economics is interested in M&A, but not especially at the level of the firm. 
Economists in this tradition have identified that mergers occur in waves (Bain 1944, Stigler 
1950) and that they are vehicles of agglomeration, leading to monopoly concerns (Stigler 
1951). Strict assumptions concerning e.g. complete contracting, perfect information, utility 
maximization and the constraints of the production function have rendered neoclassical 
theories a rigorous theoretical tool for analyzing and modeling industry level developments 
and outcomes, especially from a market power perspective.  
 
Neoclassical reasoning has acted as a strong underpinning for industrial organization 
literature, which has since the times of e.g. George Stigler, Joe Bain, Kenneth Arrow and 
Gerard Debreu in the 1950-1960s been primary advocates of rigorous analytical reasoning in 
organizational and institutional economics. Current proponents of industrial organization (e.g. 
Luis Cabral, Stephen Parente, Gregory Werden, Andy Cosh, R.-L. Manning and Ingela 
Brundin just to mention a few) have developed industrial organization to a heavily applied 
direction. There are several application areas, most of which acts on the industry level, where 
1990s industrial organization has been successful at pointing out wealth, efficiency, market 
power and price level effects with pure microeconomic reasoning that still bears a strong 
neoclassical flavor. Examples of such application areas include antitrust, legal and regulatory 
considerations in the hospital, pharmaceutical, airline, energy and telecommunication 
industries. 
 
However, it is the same strict assumptions that enable analytical scrutiny at the level of the 
industry that can be suggested to deoperationalize the neoclassical theory of the firm at the 
level of the firm. In neoclassical economics definitions of M&A, a merger, when analyzed at 
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the level of the firm, is considered a mere amalgamation of two production functions103. 
Similarly, neoclassical economics sees the maximization of abnormal profit through 
monopoly power as the only justification for the existence of M&A. Furthermore, 
neoclassical economics is not interested in the managerial, psychological, legal or 
organizational processes the M&A. It is thus legitimate to say that neoclassical theory of the 
firm, constrained by its assumptions and limited in its interest, doesn’t seem to significantly 
deal with the boundaries, existence and internal organization of M&A at the level of the 
firm. 
 
 
 
7.1.2 Nexus of contracts perspective 
 
Overview 
 
The nexus of contracts view derives both its name and its underlying principle from 
Jensen and Meckling’s 1976 paper, which can be argued to be seminal in a number of 
governance theories of the firm. Central to this approach is the conceptualization of the firm 
as a form of legal fiction, which serves as a nexus for complete contracting relationships. 
This notion is shared by a number of other influential governance theory of the firm 
contributions, e.g. by the seminal works Alchian and Demsetz (1972) as well as later inputs 
by Fama (Fama 1980, Jensen and Fama 1983) and Cheung (1983). 
 
Key message: The firm is a form of legal fiction, which serves as a nexus for 
complete contracting relationships (Jensen and Meckling 1976).  
 
The nexus of contracts perspective is based on the idea of “divisible residual claims on the 
assets and cash flows of the organization that can generally by sold without the permission of 
the other contracting individuals” (Jensen and Meckling 1976: 311). This implies that firms 
are best understood as merely special kinds of market contracts and the types of problems 
associated with firms are similar to those present in the market. Alchian and Demsetz (1972) 
make this point with a common non-market coordinated contracting relationship, i.e. the 
employment relationship: 
 
“It is common to see the firm characterized by the power to settle  
issues by fiat, by authority, or by disciplinary action superior to  
that available in the conventional market. This is delusion. The firm  
does not own all its inputs.” (Alchian and Demsetz 1972, p. 772) 
 
                                                 
103 On the level of the industry and the level of the economy, the neoclassical literature is more interested in 
what the merging firms are like, since this might be significant from the point of view of monopoly power and 
macroeconomic stability respectively. 
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Actually, much of the governance theory of the firm literature originates from the seminal 
Alchian and Demsetz (1972) paper, given that it effectively introduced the notion of an 
agency problems between the owners and managers of companies and further reinforced the 
early property rights and contracting ideas initiated in the 1960s (Alchian 1965, Demsetz 
1967). Recently, together with rise of new theories of the firm, the complete contracting 
perspectives have been heavily criticized. For example, Williamson (1996, p. 283) pegs 
differential risk anomaly explanations to contractual anomalies, widely used by the early 
complete contracting theories, as “fads and fashions, which are best sorted out by sustained 
academic critique”. 
 
 
Contribution to M&A 
 
The conclusion the nexus of contracts perspective draws concerning the centrality of 
contracting to the organization of economic activity is that actions and transactions involving 
firms are essentially similar to those on the market. This has remarkable repercussions on our 
understanding of mergers and acquisitions. If as an employer I can “fire or sue [an 
employee], just as I can fire or sue my grocer” (Foss 2000: xxxi), does this imply that just as 
a firm can buy products or services, it can actually buy an organization or a part of it? Is the 
signing of a ten-year, mutually exclusive contract with a small importer the same thing as 
acquiring that firm for ten years?  
 
The nexus of contracts perspective challenges the definitions of M&A. The boundaries of 
M&A are not set by the type of contract but the outcome of arrangement104. From the 
perspective of the nexus of contracts, it doesn’t matter whether the contract between two 
companies is a mutually exclusive and exhaustive sales agreement, or a merger agreement. 
Within a given time frame, the outcome vis-à-vis the organization of economic activity is the 
same.  
 
Lately, contributions in the nexus of contracts stream have echoed the ideas of M&A 
shareholder value literature [find sources] in that interest should center on the guaranteeing 
function of equity capital in determining the scope and size of the firm (Barzel 1997: 77-78). 
Again, it is the outcome, not the type of contract that matters. In this view, the nexus of 
contracts perspective challenges the other justifications for the existence of M&A presented 
in the M&A literature. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
104 The importance of ‘outcome’ is highlighted in Jensen 1983. Here, ‘outcome’ can be though to refer to what is 
nowadays been conceptualized as the organization of economic activity (Williamson 1996, 1999; Madhok 2002)  
  285
7.1.3 Formal and positivist agency theory 
 
Overview 
 
Parallel and linked to the nexus of contracts view, formal work on agency theory took off 
in the 1970s with the publication of such seminal works as Ross (1973) and Holmström 
(1979), but rose to prominence only after the formal models were branched out to cover a 
multitude of real-life contracting phenomena (Jensen 1983, 1985, Jensen and Meckling 1976, 
1992, Fama 1980, Fama and Jensen 1983). For a good overview of the 1980s developments 
see “The Theory of Contracts” by Hart and Holmström (1987). 
 
The key idea behind agency theory is that incentive mechanisms are designed, in the 
presence of perfect information, in a way that determines the resulting contracting forms. 
This so-called mechanism design literature (for an elaboration between the different branches 
of agency theory see Hart and Holmström 1987) assumes that the parties striking a contract 
are characterized by unbounded rationality (Holmström 1979), contracts can be crafted in 
unrestricted complexity and that information is complete in nature even if it can be 
asymmetric between the contracting parties. Contrary to the property rights approach (e.g. 
Grossman and Hart 1986, see Section 3.2.6 below), the mechanism design literature holds 
that there are no residual property rights since each party's obligation to the other is 
completely specified for every state of nature (Holmström 1979). 
 
Agency theory has developed along two primary lines of thought, namely positivist 
agency theory and principal-agent literature (Jensen 1983, Eisenhardt 1989). Positivist 
agency theory is focused on goal conflict between the principal and the agent and is primarily 
concerned on the subsequent analysis of the governance mechanisms arising to limit the 
agent's opportunistic behavior. It also introduced the terms 'outcome-based contract' and 
'behavior-based contract' (Fama and Jensen 1983) to governance literature, linking incentive 
structures and contracting directly to the agency problem. While an outcome-based contract 
pegs the rewards of the agent to the resulting state of economic organization, a behavior-
based contract pegs it to the agent’s behavior that may in theory lead to any contingencies 
vis-à-vis economic organization. It is shown that the selection of incentive form in an agency 
problem situation influences the selection of the governance form (Jensen and Meckling 
1976) and thus the organization of economic activity. (Eisenhardt 1989, p. 59-60) "All of the 
relevant contracting action is packed into ex ante incentive alignments" (Williamson 1985, p. 
27). Jensen argues that "positive theories are required for purposeful decision-making" 
(Jensen 1983, p. 319), emphasizing their managerial relevance (Harris and Raviv 1978) 
 
The more formal treatments of the principal-agent (P-A) setting, then again, hold the same 
postulates as the positive agency theories, but the inclusion of private information, implying 
information asymmetry, has operationalized the P-A setting. In short, "the focus of P-A 
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literature is on determining the optimal contract, behavior versus outcome, between the 
principal and the agent" (Eisenhardt 1989, p. 60).  
 
Key messages: "Principal-agent relationships should reflect efficient organization of 
information and risk-bearing costs" (Eisenhardt 1989, p. 59).   
 
Incentive mechanisms are designed in the presence of perfect 
information and contracting situations are characterized by unbounded 
rationality. Thus contracts can be crafted in unrestricted complexity. 
(Holmström 1979) 
 
As a theory of the firm, agency theory directly sets to the task of "developing a body of 
theory to explain why organizations take the form they do and why they behave as they do" 
(Jensen 1983, p. 319). Agency theories thus place major emphasis on the contracting 
environment in the determination of the existence, boundaries and internal organization of the 
firm: 
 
 ".. capital intensity, degree of specialization of assets, information  
costs, capital markets, and internal and external labor markets are  
examples of the factors in the contracting environment that interact  
.. to determine the contractual forms" (Jensen 1983, p. 334-335) 
 
As Holmström and Milgrom (1994) point out, the incentive structure of a firm is a key 
variable in determining the size of the firm. They refer to an empirical study comparing the 
circumstances in which insurance salesmen are working independently and in which they are 
employed in an insurance company. The study implies that the type of insurances sold (e.g. 
life insurance vs. travel insurance) and the possibility to measure the output of the salesmen 
determines the appropriate incentive structures, which then determine whether the salesmen 
prefer to work for him/herself or the firm. By doing this, Holmström and Milgrom in effect 
incorporate the concepts of monitoring and authority, which are central concerns of the less 
formal agency-related approaches based on the notion of incomplete contracting.  
 
On the other hand, vertical integration can be seen as an “extreme form of relational 
contracting, in which the parties submit to the common authority of a chief executive” 
(Milgrom and Roberts 1988: 446-447, see also Klein, Crawford and Alchian 1978). The role 
of authority, authority being understood as the right to pick some action that affects part or 
whole of an organization (Simon 1951), is thus evident in the context of incomplete 
contracting and establishes as a common denominator between the complete-contracting 
based agency-related work and academic perspectives on incomplete contracting. It is, 
however, important to realize that authorities are not necessarily driven only by 
considerations of efficiency but also by personal interest (Williamson 1985, Grossman and 
Hart 1986) or even by bribes and favors (Milgrom and Roberts 1988). The monitoring 
solution provided to this problem is the solution provided for the traditional P-A problem of 
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corporate governance: introducing non-executive directors. This is a mere example, as 
corporate governance and the incentive settings between stakeholder groups have been 
researched extensively from an agency theoretic point of view in the context of e.g. 
diversification decision-making (see e.g. Amihud and Lev 1981; Fama and Jensen, 1983; 
Denis, Denis and Sarin, 1999), managerial compensation (e.g. Baker, Jensen & Murphy, 
1988; Jensen & Murphy, 1990), bargaining (e.g. Baldenius, 2000), distribution network 
building (e.g. Baiman & Rajan 2002), and M&A (See e.g. Kesner, Shapiro and Sharma, 
1994; Walker & Weber, 1984; Walking and Long 1984, Stallworthy & Kharbanda, 1988) 
likewise. 
 
 
Contribution to M&A 
 
Agency theory has provided social scientific research with a theoretical tool, which can be 
employed to "common problem structures .. across research domains" (Eisenhardt 1989, p. 
64). Given the many application areas above, it seems natural that agency theory can be 
applied to the analysis of M&A as well. These represent both the inter-firm, inter-stakeholder 
group, intra-firm and the industry level settings. Thus agency theory is capable of analyzing 
organizational restructuring, like M&A, on a number of levels of analysis.  
 
Arguably, positivist agency theory, with its inclusion of softer assumptions about the 
contracting environment (concerning e.g. the nature of information and the completeness of 
contract-writing) is managerial and interpersonal in nature. With the incentive arguments, the 
principal-agent framework is especially useful for understanding the motivations behind 
M&A at the level of the individual. For example, agency theory predicts that risk-neutral 
managers are more likely to engage in vertical integration than risk-averse ones due to 
differences in the incentive structures of outcome- vs. behavior-based contracts (Walker and 
Weber 1984, Eisenhardt 1989). Also, conglomerate mergers and acquisitions have been 
linked to manager-controlled firms (Amihud and Lev 1981), which is consistent with agency 
theoretical arguments concerning the tendency of managers to engage in empire-building and 
personal risk-diversifying M&A activity (Jensen and Meckling 1976). Managers that have 
equity positions in their firms have also been found to be exert less resistance towards M&A 
(Walking and Long 1984). 
 
Agency theory has another major contribution to the study of M&A at the level of 
organization in the treatment of information (Eisenhardt 1989). The most conspicuous 
information aspect of the organization is the epitome of the corporate governance system, the 
board of directors. Looking from the point of view of agency theory, boards are used as 
monitoring devices for shareholders interests (Fama and Jensen 1983). They have, however, 
another role as information conveyers between managers, shareholders and the public. 
Agency theory provides both incentive and information-based reasons for agency problems 
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and thus solutions to agency problems must engulf mechanisms to alleviate both. 
Information-related concepts, e.g. information asymmetry, are very useful in analyzing M&A 
decision-making processes. The incompleteness, asymmetric nature or exchanging of 
information are determinants of both the progression of an M&A process and an underlying 
reason why some separate entities are united into one hierarchy. In addition to the fact that 
agency theory can treat entire organizations or groups of people as principals or agents, 
agency theory can also be argued to provide answers to firm-level M&A outcomes105. Thus 
the information-related aspects of agency theory, as discussed in the context of the capital 
markets school of M&A in Appendix 1, are a direct input into the discussion concerning the 
existence of M&A at the level of the firm106.  
 
Agency relationships along the different phases of the M&A process involve multiple 
stakeholder groups, e.g. owners, managers, employees, governments and different 
professional services providers (Parvinen and Tikkanen 2002). Incentive asymmetries, which 
can be considered key to the creation of the presented M&A outcomes, are underpinned by 
information, risk and self-interest considerations among others. Striving for an understanding 
about these types of linkages between information asymmetries, incentive asymmetries and 
M&A outcomes is a fruitful exercise for researchers and practitioners alike.  
 
Thus, the conclusion this section discussing agency theory in M&A as a whole is that 
agency settings do influence the process and thus the outcome of the M&A. Generally, the 
corporate governance aspects of agency theories thus seem extremely fruitful for the analysis 
of the existence of M&A and influence the organization of economic activity through the 
determination of governance structures. The various incentive and information asymmetries, 
then again, can be seen to have a significant impact on the details of the M&A process, i.e. 
the internal organization of M&A. The argument that agency theories are, strictly speaking 
and from a social scientific point of view, neither models nor theories as such (Eisenhardt 
1989, Foss 2000) can be assumed to imply that the applicability of agency theory to M&A 
research and decision-making is limited. Thus, researching potential academic and 
managerial avenues for the utilization of agency theory could prove out to be useful.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
105 This is not to say that some industry-level outcomes could not be explained by agency settings. When 
analyzing the incentive structures of e.g. investment banks, it seems that an entire profession has an incentive 
asymmetry with the rest of the economy or at least with the 'top manager collective' of some particular 
industries. In any case, major firm level M&A outcomes of agency settings can be argued to have industry level, 
or even global, ramifications (e.g. market power, industry inefficiency, financial market driven-recessions, 
employment issues, resource allocation and so on) 
106 Interestingly, many pro- and anti-M&A weapons, e.g. greenmail, golden parachutes and poison pills are 
based on corporate governance manoeuvring 
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7.1.4 Early incomplete contracting and the coordination problem 
 
Overview 
 
In 1937, incomplete contracting was introduced by Ronald H. Coase, who broke the 
neoclassical assumptions of the complete contracting perspective and questioned why 
transactions are shifted from markets to organizational frameworks and the efficiency effect 
of spontaneous market order (North 1990, Hayek 1937) relinquished. The ideas that were 
first incorporated as a departure from traditional economic theory were that contracting 
involves self-interest-seeking that causes transaction costs (Coase 1937) and that property 
rights matter in the determination of the organization of economic exchange and social costs 
emerge (Coase 1960). 
 
Coase was thus the first to introduce the costs of transacting in the market, incurring 
mainly from learning about and haggling over the terms of trade. The introduction of 
transaction costs necessarily also differentiates between types of relationships or interaction: 
long-term and complex relationships involve a substantially larger amount of haggling than 
simple spot contracts. Regardless, long-term and complex exchange and interaction 
relationships are essential to e.g. the success of organizations working primarily in 
convoluted business-to-business industries (e.g. Axelsson and Easton 1992). Yet the theory 
suggests that many of these exchanges would, in the presence of transaction costs, remain 
unrealized and Pareto-sub-optimal exchanges take place instead.  
 
Despite Coase's contribution as early as the 1930s, the incomplete contracting tradition did 
not really take off before the 1960s. This was partly due to the fact that neoclassical 
economics developed swiftly in the mid 1900s and basically established a dominant foothold 
in economics, management and organizational discourse. Another significant factor was that 
Coase's (1937, 1960) reasoning needed support from the academic invention and diffusion of 
the notion of incomplete contracting in order to be fully recognized.  
 
Bounded rationality (e.g. Simon 1951; March and Simon 1958) is a key concept in 
contracting literature. In essence, their argument is that it is not only the laws of economics, 
but also behavioral patterns and psychological principles that govern the organization of 
economic activity. Economic actors are inherently boundedly rational, i.e. cannot be 
conscious of all relevant characteristics and terms of the contracting setting. Similarly, all 
contingencies and conditions of all possible contracting nuances cannot be engulfed by any 
(written or oral) contract. Furthermore, economic actors are also faced with a moral hazard 
due to the combination of an asymmetry in their preferred outcomes of the contracting 
situation and the unobservability of their activities by other parties. Thus all contracting, but 
particularly market contracting characterized by short-term relationships, is subjected to 
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severe behavioral limitations and all contracts are ultimately incomplete. This reasoning, 
coupled with Coase's (1937, 1960), represents the fundamentals of the incomplete contracting 
tradition. 
 
 
Key message(s) Transacting in the market involves contracting costs due to e.g. self-
interest seeking (Coase 1937). 
 
 Property rights matter in the determination of the organization of 
economic exchange (Coase 1960) 
    
Market exchange is plagued by bounded rationality and moral hazard, 
which create a coordination problem in the organization of economic 
activity (Simon 1951). 
 
 
A distinguishing feature of Coase’s (1937) explanation for the emergence of the firm is 
that it is ultimately due to the coordination problem. Langlois and Foss (1999) have 
elaborated on the coordination problem and acutely redefine the firm as an institution that 
lowers the costs of coordination in a world of uncertainty. This conspicuously Coasian 
reasoning opens at least two avenues to analyze the coordination problem in incomplete 
contracting.   
 
Firstly, the environment in which the contract is struck can be altered to convey 
information about the terms of trade and the possible outcome patterns. An important 
consideration of entering into a long-term relationship in order to alleviate transaction costs is 
the introduction of implicit contracting and trust. Tacit and implicit conditions of a contract 
are somewhat immune to at least two major categories of transaction costs, namely 
information costs and haggling, which brings about major improvements in contracting 
efficiency. 
 
Secondly, transaction costs can be reduced by giving one party authority over the terms of 
trade (Williamson 1996). According to Coase (1937), the presence of authority is precisely 
what defines the firm: authority represses the price mechanism of the market by issuing 
compelling instructions or orders in a repeated manner. This bears close resemblance to 
Simon’s (1951) analysis of the employment relationship. Simon compares the contracting 
efficiency of spot contracts and employment contracts, pegging the latter as the more efficient 
on grounds of flexibility in the context of a potentially repeated relationship. The 
employment relationship is a bundle of both implicitly and explicitly uttered contingencies of 
the employment contract, which is manifested in e.g. the multiplicity of remuneration, 
monitoring and enforcement mechanisms. Furthermore, the notion of authority is central in 
the definition of the employment relationship: while the employee is subject to the authority 
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of his superior, an independent contractor, working often on the basis of a spot contract or a 
string of spot contracts, acts more autonomously. 
 
 
Contribution to M&A 
 
The coordination problem and its solutions are linked to the M&A discussion in two ways. 
On a more general level, Coase’s and Simon’s original ideas act as the basic foundation for 
the markets vs. hierarchies, i.e. the boundaries of the firm discussion. They introduce the key 
semantics and the central idea of incomplete contracting to the more recent transaction cost 
economics and property rights literature107. As the contribution of these two closely related 
research streams indicates, their impact on how M&A is viewed by the academics has been 
more than substantial108. Furthermore, all of the governance theories of the firm that rely on 
Coasian and Simonian ideas about the functioning of organizations can be hypothesized to be 
able to broaden their input to the organization of economic analysis. This surely makes 
Coase’s and Simon’s groundwork a relevant contribution from the perspective of M&A 
literature as well. 
 
Beyond this indirect input to M&A, the identification of the coordination problem as the 
raison d’être of the firm as an institution is a major finding from an M&A perspective as 
well. The coordination problem can be perceived to act on all units of analysis within a firm. 
Uncertainty prevails and therefore the coordination problem is a conceptual tool at various 
levels of analysis: shop floor, business unit, single organizations and holding companies 
likewise. The same rationales are available in the analysis of two or more firms, and how to 
efficiently coordinate them, i.e. whether to merge, which firms or parts of firms to merge, to 
merge or to acquire etc. The coordination problem of Simon’s (1951) employment contract 
and Coase’s (1937) market transactions is essentially the same as the problem of selecting 
merger or acquisition candidates, modes, methods and the resulting organization structure. 
Both are issues of the “governance structure” (Williamson 1996), which already highlights 
the importance the incomplete contracting tradition in defining the boundaries and internal 
organization of M&A likewise.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
107 See the transaction cost economics and property rights perspective sections below 
108 See the ‘contribution to M&A’ part of Sections 7.1.5 and 7.1.6 respectively 
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7.1.5 Transaction cost economics 
 
Overview 
 
Transaction cost economics (TCE) (epitomized by the works of Oliver E. Williamson, see 
e.g. 1971, 1975, 1985, 1986, 1991 and 1996) as well as property rights theory (embodied by 
the works by Oliver Hart and various associates, see e.g. Grossman and Hart 1986, Hart 1989 
and Hart and Moore 1990), both incomplete contracting theories, are distinguished from the 
coordination problem discourse in that they incorporate ideas from contracting and agency 
theories, combining them into a more operational form (Williamson 1985). The key idea 
behind them is ex post opportunistic behavior and its influence on governance structures109. 
 
TCE inter-links the earlier assumptions of moral hazard, opportunism and incomplete 
contracting110 with the notion of asset specificity. Defining the concept of quasi-rents from an 
economics point of view, early transaction cost economics literature111 pegs asset specificity 
as the single most important precondition for the existence of quasi-rents and the attempt to 
appropriate them112 (Williamson 1985).  
 
Based on the above, Williamson (Williamson 1971,1975, 1985, 1986, 1991, 1996) has 
constructed a strikingly cohesive theory. Blending the “self-interest seeking with guile” 
embodied in opportunism with the sequential nature of decision-making implied by the 
uncertainty from bounded rationality, he presents first the distinction between two 
governance structures: ‘market’ and ‘hierarchy’ (Williamson 1975). Later, the literature has 
extended to include a third governance structure, commonly known as ‘hybrid’, to represent 
intermediate, incremental and relational forms of contracting and safeguarding the 
contingencies of these contracts (Williamson 1985, 1996). While 'hierarchy' is synonymous 
with 'firm', real life 'hybrids' include such organizational arrangements as networks, alliances, 
joint ventures and clans (Powell 1990). 
 
The basic TCE reasoning behind the determination of governance structures is that asset 
specificity facilitates opportunism. Incomplete contracts, resulting from incomplete 
information and bounded rationality, are subject to continuous changes in the degree of 
uncertainty surrounding the potential outcomes. This subjects the party with specific assets to 
continuous renegotiating of contract terms, as the non-contingent party uses the threat of 
                                                 
109 This is also the main critique of both streams on the nexus of contracts view and the coordination perspective 
110 The two first ones introduced by agency literature and the last by the coordination perspective of Coase 
(1937) and Simon (1951). 
111 The concept of asset specificity was initiated, as is rightfully pointed out by Foss (2000), in Klein, Crawford 
and Alchian’s 1978 paper 
112 The quasi-rent and appropriation discussion actually captures, quite like the bulk of transaction cost 
economics, many of the concepts introduced in agency and contracting theories, e.g. risk preferences, 
asymmetric information, hidden action and information, adverse selection, signalling, moral hazard/opportunism 
and second best outcomes. 
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hold-up (withdrawal) to appropriate the possible quasi-rents of the contract. This results in 
Pareto-inferior outcomes and prompts the emergence of non-market governance structures.  
 
Key message: Asset specificity, facilitating opportunism, and bounded rationality, 
implying incomplete contracting, lead to the appropriation of quasi-
rents through hold-up. This prompts the emergence of non-market 
governance structures, i.e. hybrids and firms. 
 
The solution to this problem of extending the boundaries of the firm to achieve Pareto-
improvement dates back to Williamson’s early work on antitrust efficiency considerations 
(Williamson 1971). Already at this point, the relevance of more ‘human’ fields of 
organizational study, especially contract law (e.g. Llewellyn 1931, MacNeil 1974) and 
behavioral organization theory (Simon 1945, 1951; March and Simon 1958) to the 
boundaries discussion is explicit. This is visible in the following extract: 
 
“.. when conflicts develop, the firm possesses a comparatively efficient  
resolution machinery. To illustrate, fiat is frequently more efficient  
way to settle minor conflicts .. than is haggling or litigation” (Williamson   
1971, p.114) 
 
The determination of governance structures is therefore a weighing of alternatives, which 
are characterized by an unknown or uncertain set of issues relating to not only the pure 
economic efficiency, but also the other transaction costs113. As the problems of governance 
are not necessarily related to economic efficiency, neither are the solutions. For example, the 
existence of authority to facilitate efficient dispute resolution can be a major factor in the 
determination of the governance structure and hence in the organization of economic activity. 
This illustrates the explanatory power of the transaction cost approach. In theory, nearly all 
aspects of governance can be reduced to transaction cost based analysis. 
 
 
Contribution to M&A 
 
At a general level, transaction cost economics has managed to develop a set of conceptual 
tools to analyze the boundaries of a firm. As Klein (1988) rightfully points out, the 
applicability of the concepts and terminology of asset specificity and property rights 
perspectives is not limited to the mere analysis of single firms, but is especially valuable in 
the analysis of inter-firm activities, e.g. M&A.  
 
                                                 
113 Williamson uses an analogy from contract law, ‘forbearance’, which essentially refers to the ability of a 
hierarchy, through the allocation of authority (reminiscent to the semantics of agency theory) to establish an 
internal justice system to resolve conflicts effectively (Williamson 1991). The bottom line of dispute resolution 
is that it is more efficient under a governance structure marked by authority and the psychological appeal for a 
solution (i.e. hierarchy) is argued to apply to other contracting problems alike. 
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To start with, TCE discusses the concept of the organization of economic activity from the 
standpoint of M&A, more specifically e.g. diversifying mergers and antitrust (Williamson 
1996, Chapter 11). According to this argument, M&A and antitrust are the main cases or 
drivers of economizing and can be "held to be primarily responsible for shaping and changing 
the organization of economic activity" (Williamson 1996, p.279). Moreover, transaction cost 
economics can be said to approach explicitly the question of justification for the existence of 
M&A. M&A is a essentially an outcome of the seeking for an efficient114 governance 
structure under the assumptions of incomplete contracting and ex post governance. 
 
On a more practical level, transaction cost economics has, with its basic contribution to the 
incomplete contracting perspective, offered a set of tools for assessing M&A processes both 
within and outside the merging organizations. Some of the concepts used to analyze M&A 
today, in e.g. corporate strategy conversation, can be argued to have been introduced through 
transaction cost economics. Without the input of transaction cost economics, M&A and 
antitrust wouldn’t be “assessed with reference to ease of entry, economies of scale, 
managerial efficiencies, or related transaction cost features” (Williamson 1996, p. 287, 
footnote 14).  
 
Additionally, transaction cost economics argues that the human elements of transactions, 
behavioral attributes of human actors and the cognitive complexity of information, are of 
critical economic significance due to the fact that they are largely responsible for the ex post 
bargaining. In the context of M&A, this corresponds to post-merger processes. From the 
point of view of the conceptual tools and the analysis of human elements in forming the 
transaction environment, transaction cost economics can thus be said to also tackle the 
internal organization of M&A, i.e. the nature of M&A processes somewhat.  
 
Along the same lines, transaction cost economics also discusses in depth the impact of 
M&A on the ‘transacting environment’ or the ‘transaction cost balance’. For example, 
Williamson (1985, p.100) mentions that vertical integration through a merger or an 
acquisition can lead to reduced market efficiency, because it may imply a change in the 
transaction cost balance in a way that discourages entry. As mentioned above, M&A also has 
“anticompetitive concerns .. regarding the cost of capital” (Williamson 1985, p. 101, Posner 
1979). Depending on the type of M&A processes, the capital structure of the merged firms 
can alter the transaction cost balance in a way which leads to efficiency losses, especially if 
capital assets are long-lived and specialized to the market, i.e. asset specificity is high. This is 
yet another ramification to the internal organization of M&A, i.e. the processes and decisions 
through which the deal is carried out.  
 
                                                 
114 In terms of both pure production costs and transaction costs 
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Generally, transaction cost economics scorns the type of dichotomous reasoning it 
incorporates in the governance structure discussion in the context of M&A: 
 
“Dichotomous reasoning – by artificially classifying mergers or predation as 
Type A / Type B  is too simple. Efforts to derogate strategic behavior have 
likewise been overdone.” (Williamson 1996, p. 305) 
 
It seems, however, that many of the aspects of the old industrial organization tradition 
have contributed and continue to contribute to M&A discussion through transaction cost 
economics. The importance of the inputs of transaction cost economics in understanding 
M&A is mirrored in the growing appreciation for transaction costs in antitrust enforcement: 
 
“Public policy toward firm and market organization is unavoidably 
transformed as the concept of the firm as a governance structure takes hold 
and by efforts to assess complex contracts in a comparative institutional 
way.” (Williamson 1985, p. 365)  
 
Transaction cost economics can be argued to be extremely influential at assessing M&A, 
to the extent that, “in effect, firms that are proposing a merger are now invited to present 
evidence as support for the merger” (Williamson 1985, p. 370) by antitrust authorities. It 
must be noted that this attention is seems to be overwhelmingly concentrated in the legal 
spheres of M&A and other application areas are lacking (Joskow 2002). 
 
In fact, the relationship between the development of transaction cost economics and 
antitrust legislation has formed an intriguing discourse. Williamson argues that antitrust 
legislation has developed in line with our increased understanding of transaction cost 
economics and shifted the focus of antitrust legislation away from monopoly power to 
efficiency and economizing (Williamson 1996, p. 281). Notably, commentators have argued 
that this development has been insignificant (e.g. Stigler 1982). Regardless, transaction cost 
economics can be said to approach explicitly the question of the existence of M&A. M&A is 
a main driver of the organization of economic activity and it is a essentially an outcome of 
the seeking of an efficient (in terms of both production costs and transaction costs) 
governance structure under the assumptions of incomplete contracting and ex post 
governance. 
 
Regardless of the fact that market power has, according to Williamson, ceased to be the 
main case of antitrust reasoning: “the important issues in the control of monopoly are 
economic” (Dewey 1959, in Williamson 1986, p. 287), this does not render the concept of 
power as meaningless in the sphere of M&A. On the contrary, authority and power can be 
seen as key considerations of the efficiency of the organization of economic activity in M&A.  
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The idea of authority115 as a transaction cost reducing dispute resolution mechanism can 
be directly applied to an M&A decision-making situation. Establishing a common authority 
through M&A can reduce transaction costs if there is a danger for lengthy and costly legal 
disputes or hostile marketing activities between two firms. Here again, pure TCE reasoning 
discusses explicitly one justification for the existence of M&A. Authority is also a key 
consideration in defining where M&A occurs. As the authority of the hierarchy is involved in 
the anticipation of unforeseen contingencies, it becomes the key determinant of which 
superior-over-the-market governance modes are available to the firm. The role of authority is 
elevated in importance and the task of maintaining and improving authority becomes a key 
M&A consideration. TCE thus holds the boundaries of M&A to be defined in terms of the 
availability of information regarding different governance structures; M&A will occur in the 
presence of potential gains from (and information about) new information and authority 
structures that economize on transaction costs. The basic argument is thus that there is more 
to integration represented by M&A that the mere transfer of property rights.  
 
Furthermore, transaction cost economics incorporates elements from both finance and law 
dialogues into the discussion about its relationship to M&A. For example, cost of capital 
considerations have long been linked especially to vertical merger rationales (Williamson 
1975, 1977b, see also Posner 1979). Williamson (1996, p.285) also encourages an 
incremental and fungible approach into understanding M&A from a legal point of view. In 
accord with the property rights perspectives, transaction cost economics also holds that 
ownership matters (Williamson 1985, p. 29). M&A, which can be seen as, and is often only 
seen as, a transfer of the ownership of an asset thus presents a change in the balance of 
transaction costs as formerly market mediated transactions between the two firms come under 
hierarchical governance. As M&A also influences both or all relevant organizations, the 
relevant transaction costs vis-à-vis other parties in the market are changed. 
 
There is no doubt that transaction cost economics, which has been primarily concerned 
with vertical structures, has contributed a great deal more to our understanding of vertical 
than horizontal M&A. Regardless, the reasoning behind transaction cost economics is, as a 
driver of the organization of economic activity, applicable to M&A in more than just vertical 
mergers. The way in which transaction cost economics generally discusses the existence of 
hierarchies as well as the boundaries and internal organization of the firm has generally 
contributed to our understanding of M&A as a driver of the reorganization of economic 
activity. The realm in which transaction cost analysis is applied to M&A could be boldly 
extended to increasingly discuss e.g. the rationales of where to draw organizational 
boundaries horizontally, the efficiency implications of horizontal M&A in terms of 
transaction cost and the comparison of different M&A processes in terms of their influence 
                                                 
115 Authority, as it is used here, refers to the rights to hire and fire assets of the firm (including people). The 
authority is usually albeit not always personified in executive managers 
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on the transaction cost balance before and after a merger. In practice, this could mean that the 
transaction costs of performing a vital function (e.g. procurement for a assembly-oriented 
manufacturing firm) would be measured before and after a capacity-increasing horizontal 
merger to evaluate its success.  
 
Transaction cost economics also adopts a "comparative contracting perspective" 
(Williamson and Bercovitz 1996, p. 7), i.e. it compares all kinds of contractual arrangements 
on the basis their cost properties. Naturally, the comparative "efficiency oriented approach 
can be applied .. to decisions regarding the organizational structures within firms" (Richter 
1999, p. 60). For M&A, this implies that transaction cost economics logic can be used to 
analyze numerous instances that deal with the eventual internal transaction costs related to 
the M&A processes.  
 
Pressures to diversify prompted a significant share of all mergers during the 20th century, 
especially during the merger wave of the 1960s. The logic behind the diversification thinking 
has subsequently been analyzed using transaction cost economics logic. More specifically, 
the focus has been on the synergistic efficiency considerations, and they have been analyzed 
with respect to their transaction cost economic properties (Richter 1999, p. 51-55). Richter's 
transaction cost economics logic manifests how both economies of scale-based synergies 
between two separate businesses lower the transaction costs of using a factor of production 
(e.g. the same investor, the same external consulting services, the same distribution channel), 
thereby encouraging diversification into seemingly unrelated businesses. Similarly, potential 
benefits from diversification may arise if one business creates such positive externalities (e.g. 
a great motivation within a research department) that can be internalized by the other 
business in the form of productivity enhancing spillover effects. However, the potential 
benefits from diversifying mergers have to be pegged against the costs of running unrelated 
activities and the costs of the post-merger integration process. More generally, according to 
the transaction cost logic, firms will diversify until the economies of scope are equal to the 
diseconomies mounting from sheer organizational scale (Rumelt and Steven 1992). 
 
At least the following internal organization issues and their transaction cost applications 
can be identified: 
 
Table 25: Internal organization issues from transaction cost economics 
 
INTERNAL 
ORGANISATION ISSUE 
TRANSACTION COST 
ECONOMICS INSIGHT 
REFERENCES 
Formation of teams Incorporate authority, facilitate 
specialization, extract joint production 
gains, overcome indivisibilities and offer 
insurance thereby lowering transaction 
costs (also when related to M&A) 
Williamson 1975, Ch. 3 
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(De)centralization  Transaction cost efficiency criteria should 
be used to decide on the degree of 
decentralization  
Pugh 1997 
Richter 1999 
Head office size and functions Varying incentive intensity, opportunism of 
sub-groups and bounded rationality of 
managers set limits to head office size and 
functions 
Williamson 1971, 1975 
Besanko et al. 1996 
Number of management layers Bounded rationality sets an upper limit for 
the number of communication channels a 
manager can deal with. This determines the 
efficient number of management layers. 
Williamson 1975  
Besanko et al. 1996 
Administrability / fiat Hierarchies provide power and authority 
that remove inefficiencies from bargaining 
and coordination processes 
Barnard 1938 
Simon 1951 
Williamson 1975, 1993  
Morgan 1986 
 
Given that M&A influences dramatically the internal organization of the firm, it can be 
concluded that the aforementioned considerations offer at least partial insight into what the 
potential transaction cost problems of M&A processes, particularly post-merger processes, 
are.  For example, running an integration project in two organizations with very different 
degrees of decentralization in decision-making will inherently be difficult. Likewise, a very 
large number of management layers can set limits for what can be done during an M&A 
process. In real-life M&A projects, multiple layers of middle management often dilutes the 
original intent of top management and very little actually changes at the grassroot or 
shopfloor level. 
 
Concluding, TCE has revolutionized the way we look at the organization of economic 
activity, the existence of hierarchies as well as their boundaries and internal organization, and 
has thus generally contributed to our understanding of M&A. Transaction cost economics 
succeeds, partly due to its interdisciplinary nature, at contributing to M&A thought on all key 
levels of analysis: the existence, boundaries, and internal organization of M&A. 
 
 
7.1.6 Property rights and new property rights theory 
 
Overview 
 
Property rights literature and the view that ‘ownership matters’ dates back to early authors 
in so-called Austrian economics116, who discussed private ownership rights as the 
fundamental concept behind capitalist, spontaneous ordering of economic activity. 
Subsequently, it was actually the early contracting literature (of e.g. Coase 1960, Alchian and 
Demsetz 1972, Demsetz 1967, Alchian 1965, 1967 and Furubotn and Pejovich 1972, cf. 
Williamson 1993, p. 26-27) that were the primary advocates of property rights thinking until 
                                                 
116 An ‘Old’ (Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk, Friedrich von Wieser, Carl Menger), a ‘New’ (e.g. Ludwig von Mises, 
Joseph Schumpeter 1942, Friedrich von Hayek 1937, 1945) and a ‘Late’ (e.g. Israel Kirzner 1972) strand of 
Austrian Economics are often identified in the related literature (cf. e.g. Foss 1997) 
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the emergence of the so-called new property rights theory (e.g. Grossman and Hart 1986, 
Hart 1989, 1990; Hart and Moore 1990 and Kreps 1990). 
 
Property rights are defined as "the set of economic and social relations defining the 
position of each individual with respect to the utilization of scarce resources" (Furubotn and 
Pejovich 1972, p. 1139). Alchian (1967) has argued that economics is in essence the study of 
property rights and property rights theory derives heavily from neoclassical economics. This 
is visible in the central position of resource allocation and maximizing behavior.  
 
Two strands of property rights theory exist, namely 'traditional' and 'new' property rights 
approaches. Traditional property rights theory rests on the three key principles that a) it is the 
tendency of individuals "to seek their own interest and to maximize utility subject to existing 
organizational structures" (Furubotn and Pejovich 1972, p. 1137), b) wealth maximization is 
not assumed because mistaken property rights alignments are responsible for inefficiencies 
through wrong resource allocation (Alchian and Demsetz 1972) and c) transaction costs are 
recognized to be greater than zero (Coase 1960, see De Alessi 1983, pp. 66-67). Born in the 
1960 and 1970s, traditional property rights co-existed with the early incomplete contracting 
literature, Williamson's early transaction cost economics work, as well as agency theory.  
 
The so-called new property rights theorists (see e.g. Hart 1989, Hart and Moore 1990, 
Grossman and Hart 1986), then again, have continued researching property rights from an 
institutional perspective. By the 1980s, incomplete contracting literature had already 
developed and diffused enough to influence the property rights literature. New property rights 
theory thus acknowledges incomplete contracting and the influence of ex post behavior on 
contracting outcomes. New property rights literature has concentrated more on researching 
the role of property rights in a) the determination of information structures and b) the 
allocation of authority.  
 
Key messages: Property rights define the position of individuals with respect to the 
utilization of scarce resources. Property rights assignments govern 
value maximization behavior and thereby facilitate the allocation of 
resources to their highest valued uses, influencing the level and 
character of economic activity (Furubotn and Pejovich 1972). 
 
Different ‘systems’ or ‘sets’ of property rights present decision makers 
with different structures of incentives, resulting in different alignments 
of resources and different input-output mixes, and thus governance 
structures (Alchian 1965, 1967, Demsetz 1967). 
 
The ownership of a factor of production determines the control rights 
over output. The control rights determine the boundaries of the firm 
(Hart 1986). 
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Contrary to TCE117, new property rights theory suggests that integration (M&A) or 
internal organization is not able to remove opportunism as such, but the choice of governance 
structures can shift the incentives for opportunistic behavior through the reconfiguring effect 
it has on ownership rights. TCE holds that notions of asset specificity and incomplete 
contracts as the fundamental building blocks for the justification for hierarchies, new 
property rights theorists argue that it is the ownership of a factor of production that 
determines the control rights over output. The control rights, the ability to exclude other 
agents from deciding on the use of certain assets, are what determine the boundaries of the 
firm (Hart 1986). Asset specificity is just a product of non-contractible investment and the 
ultimate determinant of whether or not Pareto-suboptimal outcomes are reached is ownership. 
If one undertakes non-contractible investment in terms of an asset owner by somebody else, 
the control rights create an opportunity for hold-up and quasi-rent appropriation. 
 
A second difference gushes from the perspective on authority, which in property rights 
theory is not inherent in the governance structures of the firm but arises from its ownership. 
This is in line with a long philosophical capitalist tradition118. Foss has succinctly succinct 
summarized the authority reasoning in the new property rights theory: 
 
"The ability to deprive an agent of the piece of capital with 
which she works (and to which she might be heavily 
specialised) is what provides room for authority" (Foss 
2000: xliii) 
 
Authority, therefore, is determined by ownership, which gives a better understanding on 
how authority is actually allocated within the arising hierarchies. A whole stream of corporate 
governance literature, both from the sociological (see e.g. Lash and Urry 1987, Scott 1990, 
1997, Herman 1981) and the institutional and organizational economics perspective (see e.g. 
Holmström and Tirole 1989, Gaved 1995), which conspicuously incorporates the principal-
agent construct to a large extent, has subsequently taken over the discussion of the allocation 
authority and control vis-à-vis ownership and work. It could be argued that traditional 
economics-oriented property rights literature has been somewhat subdued or at least heavily 
complemented by corporate governance literature that is not a holistic academic stream of 
                                                 
117 In the words of Foss (2000: xli), “the ideas elaborated by Oliver Hart, John Moore and others over the last 
fifteen years or so may be seen as a formal version and development of elements found in Williamson’s work”. 
118 From a social scientific point of view, the idea of property rights dates back to the early legal and social 
philosophers, such as Thomas Hobbes, John Locke and John Stuart Mill. The property rights theory of the firm 
shares the authority of ownership ideals introduced by John Locke (ca. 1772) in 'Two Treatises of Government'. 
The basic idea is that in a industrial civil society, it is no longer work, but ownership that determines the control 
rights over output. Similarly, Locke also acknowledges the mutually reinforcing coexistence of legal order and 
property rights: the existence of a legislative authority is necessary to the maintenance of property rights. Based 
on Locke's views on property, utilitarists then linked authority even more closely to property rights. The key 
idea was that authority over one's own property (money) gives authority over people and things that can be 
controlled or purchased respectively. 
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literature, but derives from a number of disciplinary orientations, including not only 
economics but also organization theory and sociology. 
 
The basic idea that property rights influence authority, incentives and behavior (Coleman 
1966) is not difficult to accept. From the standpoint of the organization of economic activity, 
early contracting literature suggests that the realignment of property rights in 'non-standard' 
ways in order to capture productivity increases, which is responsible for the arising of 
'complex' forms of contracting (see Furubotn and Pejovich 1972). "The crucial task for the 
new property rights approach is to show that the content of property rights affects the 
allocation and use of resources in specific and predictable ways" (Furubotn and Pejovich, p. 
1139) so that the organization of economic activity, "the effect of various property rights 
assignments on the level and character of economic activity in the community" (Furubotn and 
Pejovich, p. 1139) could be conceptualized better. New property rights theory thus attempts 
to address the existence, boundaries and internal organization of firms directly.  
 
A deep familiarization of the contours of institutional and organizational economics in the 
context of the conceptual analysis seems to reveal some converge between agency and 
property rights theories. Starting with the publication of Jensen and Meckling's (1979) article, 
conspicuously representing traditional property rights theory while integrating the structure of 
property rights to agency theoretic stakeholder considerations, the two streams have been in 
increasing dialogue. It seems that the emergence of so-called ‘new property rights theory’ 
(e.g. Grossman and Hart 1986, Hart 1990, Hart and Holmström 1990) has been influenced by 
the development of agency theory. Whereas agency theory was in its cradle in the 1960s, 
when e.g. Ronald Coase (1960) and Armen Alchian (1965, also Alchian and Demsetz 1972) 
wrote seminal articles highlighting the importance of ownership and property rights, many of 
the new property rights theorists, e.g. Oliver Hart, have also written extensively about agency 
problems.  
 
 
Contribution to M&A 
 
Already the early complete contracting literature presented the very basic contribution of 
property rights theory to analyzing M&A (e.g. Coase 1960, Alchian 1965, Demsetz 1967). 
The contribution to the boundaries, i.e. definition, of M&A is straightforward. M&A, from 
this perspective, is defined as a transfer of ownership, control and/or appropriation rights. The 
traditional property rights literature considers the firm to be defined and demarcated by the 
"structure of property rights within which the firm exists" (Jensen and Meckling 1978, p. 2). 
M&A is thus a mere transfer of these property rights and the new entity is defined by the 
structure of property rights after the transfer. New property rights literature (Hart and Moore 
1990, p. 1120) defines M&A as a transfer of "residual rights of control over the firm's assets". 
M&A, in this view, provides an opportunity to shift governance structures, which, then again, 
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can shift the incentives for opportunistic behavior through the reconfiguring effect it has on 
ownership rights. 
 
What is more, property rights theory holds M&A as a vehicle for changing the ownership 
of a set of assets, thereby allocating (or attempting to allocate) the production resources in the 
hands of those who can use those assets most productively. M&A is thus merely a 'natural' 
allocation mechanism and should, from this respect, always be justified on grounds of 
economizing and productivity. Property rights theory thus very much addresses the question 
of the existence of M&A and provides a simple and solid answer for it. 
 
Similarly, property rights literature directly addresses the case of shareholder value 
perspectives for M&A and arguably presents an intellectual foundation for the capital 
markets school. The rights of shareholders are accentuated by the crucial role of property 
rights in the efficient allocation of resources. A careful definition of individual property rights 
diminishes uncertainty and promotes the efficient allocation and use of resources (Demsetz 
1964), whereas the existence of a market place (stock exchanges) for the transferability and 
competitiveness of ownership rights (Cheung 1970) ensures the allocation to the highest 
valued uses (Furubotn and Pejovich 1972).  
 
With respect to corporate governance issues in the context of M&A, "the market for 
control of the enterprise" (De Alessi 1983, p. 67), property rights theory argues that changes 
in property rights influence the utility maximization setting, changing e.g. the conditions of 
monitoring, detecting, policing and enforcing (Larner 1966), of managers significantly 
(Furubotn and Pejovich, p. 1147, 1149). This highlights further the role of property rights 
considerations in the capital markets perspective. The major question in property rights 
literature has become the determination of how well the market or hierarchy protects 
shareholders' wealth and property rights. Three issues dominate the discussion: market 
valuation (share prices), managerial rewards (stock options, handcuffs and parachutes) and 
competition among managers (corporate governance and managerial politics) (Furubotn and 
Pejovich 1972, p. 1150). Interestingly, these three are exactly the same three that dominate 
M&A discussion in the capital markets perspective. It could therefore be argued that, 
theoretically and ideologically, there should be a direct linkage between the capital markets 
perspective of M&A and basic property rights principles.  
 
However, this is not, at least to a large extent, the case. Looking at the existing literature, 
the capital markets school and its shareholder value emphasis are more linked with corporate 
strategy literature from the competence perspective than with property rights literature. 
Actually, the extant linkages are very few. One of them is the idea of Economic Value Added 
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(EVA)119, which essentially accounts for the opportunity cost of equity capital in the 
determination of a company's net income. The linkage to property rights ideology is that is 
that shareholders, in return for providing the risk-bearing function, get unlimited upside 
potential by acquiring property rights to the residual income. Also Jensen (1989) and 
Pejovich (1990) have attempted an integration of the two. These attempts to integrate 
shareholder value and property rights perspectives make little reference to M&A directly. 
Therefore, it would be severe exaggeration to speak of a direct connection between the 
capital markets approach to M&A and the property rights theory of the firm.   
 
Indirect linkages prevail. As said, new property rights theory argues that corporate 
governance issues, as such, can influence the organization of economic activity. Shareholders 
have property rights over assets yet are dependent on managers to appropriate their fullest 
value, and therefore are inclined to monitor them. Monitoring costs explain the heterogeneity 
of firm size and type of organization within an industry (Williamson 1967, and De Alessi 
1983). M&A represents a step towards the 'natural' boundaries and internal organization of 
the firm in a given industry120. "Taking .. the structure of property rights into account is thus 
beginning to yield insights not only to why firms exist, but also into the choice of particular 
kinds of business organizations" (De Alessi 1983, p.68). M&A's existence is justified as a 
driver towards this kind of governance structure. Furthermore, ownership changes facilitate 
changes in the structure and allocation of authority within the organizations, which ideally 
lowers the transaction cost of breaking up old and designing new dispute resolution 
mechanisms and information structures. Thus, the contribution of TCE and new property 
rights theory vis-à-vis authority as a justification for the existence of M&A is very closely 
related. 
 
In sum, property rights theory attempts to provide a solid justification for the boundaries 
and existence of M&A, but its contribution to the internal organization of M&A is very 
limited if existent at all. M&A, a transfer of property rights creating discontinuity in the 
governance structure of the organization and thus a possibility to change the incentive 
structures, is justified as an allocation mechanism which shift the organization towards more 
efficient authority structures and resource allocation. This clear intellectual contribution 
stems from the same feature of property rights theory that renders it nearly useless for 
analyzing M&A processes more carefully. Namely, property rights theory is closer to a 
higher-level logic, principle or philosophy than an operable theoretical model (Foss and Foss 
2000). 
 
                                                 
119 As introduced and trademarked by Stern Stewart and Company, EVA refers to the monetary value of an 
entity at the end of an time period minus the monetary value of that same entity at the beginning of that time 
period. For a company, EVA is calculated as after-tax earnings minus the opportunity cost of capital. As with 
any other entity, economic value added essentially measures how much more valuable a company has become 
during a given time period (Investorwords.com Investing Glossary) 
120 Intuitively, this would explain industry merger waves. 
  304 
 
7.1.7 Shortcomings of governance theories  
 
An M&A-minded conceptual overview of the governance theories of the firm would not 
be complete without a collection of critical judgments concerning the various theories. The 
criticisms can be categorized along two dimensions, i.e. whether the criticism is towards a) a 
specific governance theory of the firm or the governance theories of the firm in general and 
b) the governance theories themselves or their application or applicability to M&A. Given the 
chronologically and thematically intertwined development of the various governance 
theories, which can also be seen in Figure 15 above. The criticisms are here grouped 
hierarchically, with general criticisms outlined first, criticisms concerning certain groups or 
theories or their shared assumptions next and criticism regarding single theories after that. 
The implications for the applicability of these criticisms are carried along the way.  
 
 
Criticism towards the governance theories of the firm in general 
 
Firstly, the governance theories of the firm have a rather limited scope in organizational 
analysis. They are, by definition, theories of the firm, whose main level of analysis is the 
single organization, and, to some extent and with some governance theories (e.g. agency 
theory), the level of the individual. In this sense, the governance theories of the firm do not 
contribute extensively to discussions operating on higher levels of analysis.  
 
Nevertheless, M&A is topic and phenomenon, which incorporates inter-organizational, 
industry level and, to some extent, macro-level issues. The strength of theories of the firm in 
the analysis of M&A as an institutional phenomenon yields a shortcoming to considerations 
at a higher level of analysis. The governance theories of the firm belong a larger area of 
organizational research, namely organizational economics, which also contains research 
avenues devoted to inter-actor (e.g. relationship), inter-organizational (e.g. networks, 
alliances, partnerships), industry (e.g. clusters, market structure) as well as global (e.g. the 
‘network society’, population ecology) level analyses (Tikkanen and Parvinen 2002). Lessons 
from such avenues as these should be drawn to complement the analysis of M&A from the 
perspective of the governance theories of the firm in order to build a fuller organizational 
economics understanding of M&A. 
 
Secondly, As discussed on numerous occasions, M&A is an interdisciplinary research area 
inviting academics from numerous disciplines, e.g. finance, business, management, 
accounting, organization theory, sociology, law, social psychology and so on. Despite the 
many governance theories of the firm and their different assumptions and historical 
backgrounds, the theories of the firm, despite the richness they provide to the discourse, are 
somewhat fixed to an economics mindset. M&A cannot be easily tackled with governance 
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theories of the firm that have strict assumptions emerging from their economics background. 
The major problem with the “economic approach“ in the governance theories of the firm is 
that they sometimes “postulate hypothetical ideals, making it nonoperational [and] focuses 
too narrowly, thereby omitting or undervaluing important attributes” (Williamson 1996, p. 
286).  
 
Thirdly, the governance theories of the firm have also been criticized for their narrow 
focus on the economic effects of corporate restructuring. M&A is also a bureaucratic effort, 
which is frequently diverted or defeated by dysfunctional responses from various stakeholder 
groups often working with non-economic rationalizations, e.g. workers, labor unions, 
governments or ‘politicized’ competition authorities (See e.g. March and Simon 1958, chap. 
2). The social and human perspective to M&A is, despite growing interest, still frequently 
omitted. The efficiency reasoning behind the justification of the boundaries discussion pegs 
theories of the firm “bad for practice” (Ghoshal and Moran 1996: p. 1).  
 
Fourthly, another criticism in the direction of the governance theories deals with the lack 
of decomposing and systematically analyzing the specifics of the internal workings of the 
firm. For example, "organizational economics scholars employ terms like moral commitment, 
trust and social conventions mostly in ad hoc form without analyzing the empirical 
conditions for their suitability or adequacy" (Mueller 1995, p. 1222). This criticism thus 
interlinks with the general criticism that governance theories of the firm have not been 
empirically validated (Perrow 1986, cf. Conlisk 1996, Vriend 1996). A repercussion of this is 
that in the analysis of M&A processes, governance theories of the firm need to employ not 
only economic measures and tools, but consider the dynamic and interactive nature of 
stakeholder relationships and, perhaps, derive from institutional sociology121.  
 
As is seen in the elaboration of shortcomings in specific theories of the firm (below), some 
of the prevailing disagreements between the governance theories of the firm establish 
limitations to the applicability of the theories of the firm to M&A in general.  
 
 
Criticism towards particular assumptions  
 
Many of the important assumptions that are often shared by more than one governance 
theory of the firm have been criticized. Firstly, the assumption concerning the 
opportunistically behaving human, the Macchiavellian Man, is criticized heavily for the 
exclusion of such considerations as collaboration and moral (Ghoshal and Moran 1996, p. 
                                                 
121 In must be noted that also agency theory but particularly game theory are applicable at the level of a single 
individual and that non-efficiency considerations can already be built into such decision-making models 
(Nilakant and Rao 1994) 
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14)122. Arguably, even if this simplified model of human nature is appealing and renders 
generalization, the critics are right. Incorporating a more multi-faceted and diverse human 
element (i.e. the idea of homo sociologicus) into the governance perspectives would reduce 
homogeneity of contracting outcomes and introduce unpredictability, which is only rational. 
 
Secondly, the assumption for a drive towards commonly defined 'success', often measured 
in terms of pure efficiency, has been criticized (Ghoshal and Moral 1996, p. 14). The 
argument here is that not all actors are striving for the same goals and, even if actors would 
be completely self-interest seeking, there is still potential for collaborative and/or peaceful 
coexistence. As is admitted by Ghoshal and Moran (1996), this perspective is much better 
understood in later theory of the firm developments (e.g. North 1990, Coase 1988, arguably 
also Hart and Moore 1990).   
 
Thirdly, one of the early, heavily criticized assumptions employed by some governance 
theories of the firm is that of perfectly complete contracting (e.g. Alchian and Demsetz 1972, 
Jensen and Meckling 1976, 1978, Fama 1980, Klein, Crawford and Alchian 1978). As 
originally demonstrated by Simon (1951) in the context of employment contracts, there is 
strong reason to believe that contracts cannot be written exhaustively to include all possible 
contingencies. This follows Llewellyn’s (1931) original contention that all contracts are 
always incomplete. Williamson (1975) raised a concern about the significance of incomplete 
contracting in the determination of contracting outcomes. Namely, the fact that contracts 
cannot be written to include all possible contingencies gives rise to opportunistic behavior ex 
post, which, then again, is prompts the emergence of hierarchies instead of market 
contracting.  
 
These criticisms towards the assumptions of opportunistic behavior, pure efficiency-
seeking and perfect contracting can be assumed to have significant repercussions in the way 
governance theories of the firm can be applied to the academic and real-life analysis of 
M&A. The three criticisms raise at least three issues, which should be briefly analyzed, 
namely a) the role of collaborative action in M&A, b) the role of managerial and other non-
efficiency minded M&A strategies (e.g. hubris-driven M&A) and c) the role of non-
contractible (ex post) bargaining in M&A (e.g. employee and labor union non-compliance to 
post-merger plans). 
 
M&A is actually a good example of the real-life fact that seemingly similar contracting 
settings can spur various different types of behavior. Already in the planning phase of a 
                                                 
122 Ghoshal and Moran's (1996) arguments are intended to highlight weaknesses in transaction cost economics 
reasoning, but in the author's opinion, criticism dealing with such fundamental assumptions should be able to be 
generalized to other governance theories of the firm and the governance perspective in general. Many of the 
criticisms are directed at the underlying assumptions about human nature, efficiency orientation and the 
tendency to simplify contracting settings, all of which relate to the economics mindset of the governance 
perspective and subsequently, all of the individual governance theories of the firm. 
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prospective merger, acquisition or takeover, the managers, shareholders and employees of 
bidders, targets and equals likewise have the choice of which attitude to assume: friendly, 
hostile or somewhat indifferent. The same applies for the actual negotiations concerning the 
terms of the deal. What seems arguable is that whether to apply predatory tactics and/or 
behave opportunistically is at least partly a human choice, not a result of the contracting 
environment. Ghoshal and Moran's (1996) criticism concerning the lack of human 
consideration in governance theories of the firm highlights the importance of psychological 
and organization theoretical considerations in the determination of the internal organization 
of M&A both ex ante and ex post. In practice, this implies that stakeholder group incentives, 
emotions and intentions should be mapped and managed both before and after the M&A 
agreement. 
 
The criticism against pure efficiency-minded goals and success criteria in the governance 
theories of the firm is directly applicable to M&A settings, and relates strongly to the 
justification for the existence of M&A. Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) categorize M&A 
related motives into three categories: a) efficiency or synergy, b) managerial hubris and c) 
agency problems. As we know that also the two categories of non-efficiency-minded 
explanations of M&A are well researched from governance theoretical angles, starting with 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Roll (1986), this piece of criticism seems less pertinent to 
M&A as an application area of the governance theories of the firm, since governance theories 
have, indeed, been used to analyze non-efficiency minded goals and motivations of M&A. 
What seems more pertinent, however, is the lack of success or evaluation criteria that would 
respect these apparently valid non-efficiency-oriented motivations. Profitability (e.g. EPS, net 
income), growth (e.g. CAGR), financial productivity (e.g. EVA, ROI, ROCE) and 
shareholder value (e.g. P/E) measures dominate in the determination of success123. Arguably, 
given that the governance theories of the firm have been able to explain M&A using 
motivations that are not tied to pure economic efficiency, they should be able to evaluate 
them using a diverse set of criteria including measures beyond the very same efficiency 
mindset. 
  
The criticism highlighting the role of non-contractible bargaining has strong repercussions 
to the analysis of M&A. M&As are typically large deals, in which perfect contracting or 
monitoring are impossible. Particularly the middle managers and the employees of the 
merging companies have a possibility to undermine the integration process and cause 
considerable harm to the operation of the new merged entity. Grassroot level behavior, which 
is particularly important after the merger, is impossible to govern through contracting. This 
implies that imperfect contracting has particularly strong upshots in the determination of 
post-merger processes. On the other hand, the incontractibility of all aspects of inter-
                                                 
123 The financial earnings, growth, productivity and value measures of M&A success are many. Examples 
include EPS (earnings per share), net income, CAGR (compound average growth rate), EVA (economic value 
added), ROI (return on investment), ROCE (return on capital employed) and P/E (price/earnings) changes. 
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organizational exchange can be argued to justify the existence of M&A and act as a prime 
motivator for executing at least some M&A deals. An example of this is the increasing 
tendency of large pharmaceutical firms to acquire smaller biotech companies instead of 
contracting with them. Contracting and external patent portfolio maintenance costs are, quite 
simply, too high and the Big Pharma rather subject the biotech firms to their hierarchical 
command than waste money on contracting that is, in any case, severely incomplete and thus 
bears the risk for ex ante opportunism. 
 
 
Criticism towards individual governance theories of the firm  
 
In order to bring the analysis further, a closer investigation of the criticisms presented 
towards individual theories of the firm is needed. Here, attention is paid to criticisms in the 
direction of neoclassical theory of the firm, agency theory, transaction cost economics and 
property rights theory. The early nexus of contracts and early incomplete contracting 
perspectives mainly deal with completeness of contracting, which was already discussed 
above. The focus is now turned to analyzing governance theories of the firm that are not as 
focused on single contracting assumptions (i.e. neoclassical theory of the firm, agency theory, 
transaction cost economics and property rights theory) and the criticism they have received, 
which naturally reflects the shortcomings and inadequacies of their theoretical foundations. 
Again, the focus is not only on how the governance theories of the firm have been criticized, 
but particularly on what repercussions these criticisms have on the contribution that the 
governance theories can have vis-à-vis the existence (justifications/motivations), boundaries 
(definitions) and internal organization (pre-and post-M&A processes) of M&A.  
 
 
Neoclassical theory of the firm 
 
In addition to the general and assumption-specific criticisms above, one of the most 
important criticisms in the direction of neoclassical microeconomic theory of the firm is 
towards the assumption that the internal workings of a firm are irrelevant in establishing an 
understanding about and explanation of aggregate market outcomes, i.e. 'the black box' 
(Mueller 1995, p. 1222). Organizational economics, as a whole, can be seen to have emerged 
due to this single shortcoming in traditional neoclassical economics. As social scientific 
academic thought advanced in the 20th century, it became more and more evident that some 
of the analytical principles and ideas of traditional economics could be used to analyze 
organizations without strict formalization. This is where the industrial organization tradition, 
Hayekian property rights thinking and Simonian organizational theory enter the picture, 
laying the foundation for governance theories of the firm and, on a larger scale, the analysis 
of the organization of economic activity, i.e. organizational economics.  
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In any case, the consideration of a merger as a mere amalgamation of two production 
functions limits the applicability of neoclassical theory of the firm to the discussion 
concerning the definitional boundaries of M&A. More specifically, neoclassical theory of the 
firm has been argued to be confined by strict assumptions concerning not only e.g. complete 
contracting and utility maximization as already discussed above, but also perfect information. 
Similarly, the omission of other justifications for the existence of M&A than the 
maximization of abnormal profit through monopoly power severely limits the ability of 
neoclassical economics to discuss the existence of M&A. Finally, the fact that neoclassical 
economics is not interested in the managerial, psychological, legal or organizational 
processes related to M&A makes it impossible to partake in the discussion of these issues in 
the context of M&A as well.  
 
Therefore, by and large, neoclassical theory of the firm, even though it has acted as both as 
a ‘springboard’ and as a ‘dartboard’ for organizational economics contributions, is severely 
limited in its ability to contribute directly to the contemporary M&A dialogue. At the level of 
the firm, these limitations seem to apply equally much to the existence, boundaries as well as 
the internal organization of firms. On the other hand, at the level of the industry and at the 
level of the economy, neoclassical literature has considerable merit in analyzing the qualities 
of M&A from the perspective of antitrust, monopoly power, macroeconomic stability, wealth 
and market efficiency.  
 
 
Agency theory 
 
In addition to the general and assumption-specific criticisms above, agency theory has 
mostly been criticized for the narrowness and limitations of its analysis as a theory of human 
behavior (Nilakant and Rao 1994). Kaplan (1983) questions the argument that managers are 
involved in continuous utility maximization. Perrow (1986) argues that agency theory omits 
opportunistic behavior by principals, underestimates the importance of authority, neglects 
empathetic behavior and fails to account for organizational slack and promotion policies, 
which reduce the effects of adverse selection and moral hazard. The argument is that that 
positivist agency theory is abstract and minimalist (e.g. Perrow 1986) and that formal P-A 
work has a constrained mathematical nature (Hirsch et al. 1987, Perrow 1986). This makes 
agency theory somewhat inaccessible to organizational theorists and other M&A related 
audiences. This line of criticism applies to agency theoretic analysis of M&A just like other 
contracting settings. It renders agency theory a valid, but not sufficiently generalizable as 
method in analyzing complex organizational realities. The repercussion is that agency theory 
needs to be complemented with other perspectives that do not try to model the contracting 
setting as strictly or simplify behavioral and organizational realities so strictly. 
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Moreover, agency theory, as a social scientific theory, has been argued to be 
epistemologically incomplete and represent rather a collection of models and frameworks 
than a holistic theory (Eisenhardt 1989). This has led to somewhat limited appreciation in the 
academic community and thus at times reduced the number of articles applying agency 
theory contemporary management issues, such as M&A in the 1990s.  
 
Considerably less criticism has been presented about the argued ability of the principal-
agent setting to explain and predict certain performance and behavior outcomes. Nilakant and 
Rao (1995) argue that agency theory omits a number of sources of outcome uncertainty 
within the organization. Most importantly, contemporary agency theory, even though it has 
incorporated multiple agency settings and contract renegotiation (Gupta and Romano 1998, 
Al-Najjar 1997, Tsoulouhas 1999), still lacks consideration of the dynamics of incomplete 
knowledge and information asymmetry in the creation of incentive asymmetries and, 
consequently, outcomes. Understanding incomplete knowledge and information asymmetries 
and their effects on M&A processes and outcomes is particularly important in the analysis of 
e.g. M&A involving immaterial resources (e.g. patent-intensive industries such as ICT and 
biotech) and acquisitions of less developed organizations (e.g. privatized ex-communist state 
monopolies, firms in the developing countries). More generally, the interplay through which 
information asymmetries affect the outcomes of particular parts of the M&A process is 
understood rather poorly. Much like multiple agency settings and incomplete contracts, these 
are, however, avenues, which can be pursued in future research and are not excluded by the 
nature of agency theory.  
 
Finally, a problematic aspect of agency theory from the perspective of analyzing M&A is 
that agency theory is ultimately not interested in organizational boundaries at all. Given 
certain P-A conditions, agency theory doesn't care whether the change in governance 
structure involves the amalgamation of organizations or not. Agency problems and their 
solutions are indifferent of organizational boundaries, unless they are significant from the 
perspective of incentives. Since incentive structures are not strictly defined by organizational 
boundaries, agency problems and their solutions do not match M&A settings one-to-one. 
Even though agency theory can be applied to analyze numerous M&A related issues, it does 
not address M&A per se. 
 
Thus, on the whole, criticisms on agency theory argue that it is not a sufficient as a 
theoretical foundation and not generalizable enough as an M&A tool (Perrow 1986). It needs 
to be complemented with other perspectives that fill these voids.  
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Transaction cost economics 
 
In addition to the general and assumption-specific criticisms above, Williamson (1985, p. 
390-393) has also identified a number of limitations to the reasoning presented in transaction 
cost economics. Here, these limitations are explored and analyzed in terms of the types of 
shortcomings they imply to how the theory can be applied to the understanding and analysis 
of M&A. Three basic limitations are listed: transaction cost economics is crude, it is given to 
instrumentalist excesses and it is incomplete. 
 
The crudeness of the theory of the firm as presented by transaction cost economics is 
manifested in the primitiveness of the models, the underdeveloped nature of the trade-offs 
between governance structures, severe measurement problems and the too many degrees of 
freedom (see Williamson’s 1985 self-criticism). The primitiveness of the models makes the 
application of transaction cost economics theory to real life settings, M&A or any other, 
difficult. Likewise, the trade-offs between different governance structures, e.g. when 
evaluating the rationality of two different structures as M&A outcomes, would be central to 
the analysis and their underdevelopedness complicates application. The measurement 
problem is a very general M&A argument in the sense that M&A creates so much turmoil 
within and around the organizations that it is very difficult to single out or measure the gains 
or losses of changes in governance structure. This does not imply, however, that transaction 
cost economics would be useless in the context of M&A, but sets some limitations to the 
cases to which the theory can be easily applied. Generally, the clearer the governance 
structure options and fewer the changing variables, the simpler the application and evaluation 
of transaction cost economics reasoning to M&A. 
 
The instrumentalism critique relates to the human element of the theory, which is closely 
related to the internal organization of M&A processes. In transaction cost economics, 
humans are unrealistically calculative and the theory omits irrationality. The main 
repercussion is that transaction cost economics fails to accurately analyze the M&A 
processes, e.g. the triggering of M&A ideas, selection of M&A strategy, initiation of the 
M&A dialogue as well as negotiation, contract writing and various post-merger processes. On 
the other hand, the insistence of rationality is also a great strength of economics (Arrow 
1974) and helps transaction cost economics deal with the basic questions of the theory of the 
firm as well as the existence and boundaries of M&A as a social scientific discourse. 
 
One major criticism towards TCE is concerned with the lack of application of TCE into 
M&A issues beyond the simplified make-or-buy setting. Rumelt and Steven (1992) and 
Richter (1999) have indicated that TCE thinking can be applied to a number of issues close to 
a) the diversification and b) the internal organization of firms, which are dramatically 
changed as a result of M&A decisions. Ghoshal and Moran (1996: 13), however, peg 
transaction cost economics as "bad for practice" by arguing that: 
  312 
 
"Prescriptions drawn from this theory [TCE] are likely to be not only 
wrong but also dangerous for corporate managers because of the 
assumptions and logic on which it is grounded" (Ghoshal and Moral 
1996: 13). 
 
The core message of this criticism is that TCE, as a theory, much due to the unrealistic 
assumptions outlined above, is not ready to be applied to decision-making since it considers 
organizations as mere substitutes for structuring efficient transactions when markets fail. 
Arguably, this does limit the ability of transaction cost economics to analyze the internal 
processes of firms, which naturally also applies to M&A. In fact, also Williamson (1985, p. 
392) argues that the incompleteness of transaction cost economics hinders the application of 
the theory to such non-ceteris paribus situations, which M&A represent. It is also mentioned 
that the study of the internal organization of the firm is very primitive and suffers from a 
general lack or theoretizations on the internal, administrative aspects of organizations. As the 
organization is not understood properly, it is very hard to understand the outcomes of the 
various M&A processes on the organization of economic activity within the involved firms. 
 
To conclude, transaction cost economics succeeds, partly due to its interdisciplinary 
nature, at contributing to M&A thought on all key levels of scrutiny: the existence, 
boundaries, and internal organization of M&A. It is evident, however, that the limitations of 
transaction cost economics are limiting the application of the theory to especially the 
understanding of the internal organization or, in other words, the processes of M&A.  
 
 
Property rights theory 
 
In addition to the general and assumption-specific criticisms above, the peril of the 
property rights theory is that it offers a simplistic, quasi-economic theory to justify an 
ownership-centered approach to the boundaries of the firm discussion. While property rights 
theory has undoubtedly yielded valuable insights into justifying the existence of M&A as an 
authority and resource allocation ideology, it might withdraw high-level attention away from 
the organization(s) as such. Resorting to the property rights approach as the sole theoretical 
foundation without understanding its shortcoming in the organizational side risks elevating 
M&A decision-making above the essential substance of management: the organization. 
Limiting the analysis of M&A situations to financial due diligence, consolidated balance 
sheet valuations, market response estimates, market share analyses, technology valuations, 
scenario-building and so on is to peg portfolio management as the task in M&A strategy and 
mitigate the relevance of e.g. restructuring, maintaining or achieving operational 
effectiveness, sharing activities and transferring skills which in strategy jargon establish the 
central meaning of synergy (see e.g. Porter 1987, 1997).  
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Furthermore, the very basic ownership-centered property rights mindset omits softer sides 
of the organization. In the 1990s, however, a number of extensions to property rights theory 
the have evolved, addressing e.g. power and capabilities (Rajan and Zingales 1998), 
cooperation and corporate culture (Kreps 1990) as well as teams and the inalienability of 
human capital (Klein 1988). The extensions have remarkably broadened the theoretical scope 
of the property rights approach, although one might question how the explanatory power of 
the new pack of theories measures against the simple appeal of the shareholder value 
approach in the minds of managers.  
 
But while property rights theory manages to analyze the allocation of authority more 
succinctly, many concepts wonderfully incorporated in Williamson’s work are sacrificed “on 
the altar of formalization”  (cf. Kreps 1996). Property rights theorists unequivocally deny the 
need for bounded rationality as a primary behavioral assumption (Hart 1990) and thereby lose 
the explanatory power of ex post contractual reasoning. Consequently, new property rights 
theorists overlook the importance of the employment relationship as well as softer aspects of 
the organization like power, capabilities and culture (Rajan and Zingales 1998).  
 
Another serious (arguably intentional, cf. Hart 1989) omission is the fact that new property 
rights theory fails to incorporate other aspects of the organization beyond ownership, e.g. 
structure and communication as independent determinants of the efficient contracting setting. 
This converges with the aforementioned general idea that Pareto-improvement possibilities 
are limited to the reallocation of ownership and control rights. Property rights literature fails 
to acknowledge that economizing on the organizational structure and information channels 
may have welfare consequences. At the same time, it thus fails to understand the ‘synergy’ 
arguments in M&A and generally leads to an incomplete understanding of M&A. 
 
Given the difficulties new property rights has with the assessment of both managerial 
decisions made under bounded rationality, the difficulty of assessing the ex post efficiencies 
of ownership changes and the neglect of numerous softer organizational realities, new 
property rights theory, whilst it succeeds at providing a clear-cut explanation for the existence 
of M&A, fails to scrutinize the boundaries and the internal organization of M&A. If the 
outcomes of ownership changes didn't suffer from ex post anomalies and information was 
indeed perfect, property rights explanation could handle the boundaries question easily: 
M&A starts where the net efficiency outcome of a change in ownership is positive. The 
shortcomings in terms of the processes or internal organization of M&A are straightforward. 
New property rights simply mitigates the importance of internal processes, elevating the 
impact of ownership on efficiency far beyond e.g. organizational structures and information 
channels. It is unclear whether the investigation of internal markets (within hierarchies) could 
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be employed with the property rights approach to justify the internal organization of M&A 
through similar resource allocation efficiency claims124. 
 
 
 
7.2 What could the competence perspectives offer? 
 
This study has so far focused solely on the governance approach to the theory of the firm 
and what have become known as the governance theories of the firm, with very little regard 
to other research avenues that have provided and could provide insights to the analysis of 
M&A. There are a number of motivations for this. Firstly, it seems that the governance 
perspective (Williamson 1999), as it is broadly interpreted here, consists of fragmented 
theories that need to be reconceptualized so that it is better operationalizable in the context of 
phenomenon-centered inquiry. Only after this is done can the governance theories of the firm 
be related to other research streams in a more elaborate manner. Secondly, the governance 
theories of the firm are insufficiently applied to managerial thinking. Regardless of the fact 
that the governance perspective discusses crucial M&A aspects, professional and semi-
professional M&A dialogue leans on more easily comprehendible managerial rules of thumb, 
like value creation, competitive positioning, competence development, market power 
maximization and so on. The governance perspective needs to be chewed thoroughly in order 
to make its lessons accessible to a wider audience. Thirdly, the governance theories work on 
varying levels of analytical and social-philosophical depth and can thus, combined, provide a 
multi-faceted approach to M&A. Finally, a conceptual analysis has to be limited to a 
manageable set of theoretical perspectives. Here, the governance theories of the firm, with a 
short comparative reference to the competence perspective, were perceived as a controllable 
research area with enough common denominators (e.g. history, traditions, assumptions etc.).  
 
In addition to the governance perspectives, the theory of the firm discourse has recently 
been enriched by theories that have come to be known as the competence- (or, alternatively, 
resource-, capability-, or knowledge-) based views of the firm. These research streams, which 
can be argued to be heavily overlapping and complementary, constitute the so-called 
‘competence perspective’ which has been seen as one of two dominant perspectives in 
contemporary strategy research (Williamson 1999). This Section concentrates on introducing 
a) the distinction between major sub-paradigms, b) the intellectual roots, and c) the key 
messages of the competence perspective in order to be able to reflect them to the 
development of the marketing research discourse.  
 
                                                 
124 The author is interested in investigating whether intra-organizational ownership of a particular aspects of the 
M&A process (e.g. the search and screening phase or the post-merger information systems integration) could be 
conceptualized using the property rights approach. Intuitively, allocating the property rights, authority and 
resources to the hands that put them into most use within the organization(s) would promote success in M&A 
process management. 
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This section offers a brief glance at the fundamentals of the so-called competence 
perspective to theory of the firm and its existing and potential inputs to M&A analysis. The 
purpose here is not to present an exhaustive investigation of the neither competence based 
strategy research, nor its linkages to M&A, but rather to relate the governance theories of the 
firm to an arguably equivalent theoretical perspective. At the same time, the purpose is to 
manifest the breadth of the issue and thereby put the governance theories of the firm in 
perspective: they are, however broad and all-encompassing they might sometimes seem, 
merely a corner of management literature that has, despite differences, some indisputable 
common emphases and areas of interest125. 
 
 
7.2.1 Distinguishing between different competence-related approaches 
 
According to Foss (1997), the economics-oriented capability/competence perspectives are 
characterized by the evolutionary theory of the firm (or ‘evolutionary economics’, Nelson 
and Winter 1982) and of the contributions of some influential post-Marshallian economists 
(Richardson 1972; Loasby 1991, 1999). In these theories, the conceptual focus is on the 
efficient use of bounded knowledge and on adapting to unanticipated change. These 
approaches emerged in the 1970s and 1980s as a critique to the rather static, equilibrium (of 
economic efficiency)-oriented governance theories of economic organization. They focus on 
institutions that will make best use of dispersed knowledge and allow adaptation to change to 
take place in firms (Foss 1997).  
 
In strategy and organization research, similar competence-based approaches also emerged 
after the 1970s. Most importantly, they consist of the resource-based perspective of the firm 
(e.g. ‘the resource dependence’ view by Pfeffer and Salancik 1978; also Wernerfelt 1984; 
Dierickx and Cool 1989), the dynamic capabilities perspective (Nelson 1991; Teece, Pisano 
and Shuen 1997), the knowledge-based theory of the firm (Kogut and Zander 1992; Nonaka 
and Takeuchi 1995) and the core competencies/competence-based competition theory 
approach (Hamel and Prahalad 1990; Sanchez and Heene 1997). 
 
Some debate concerning the relationships between different viewpoints within the broad 
competence paradigm, and whether each viewpoint constitutes a theory of the firm in its own 
right (see e.g. Eisenhardt and Santos 2000; Kogut and Zander 1992; Kogut and Zander 1996) 
exists. For instance, while the ‘resource-based view’ argues for the importance of a wide 
array of fungible competences generally not distinguishing or prioritizing between different 
asset categories, the ‘knowledge-based view’ concentrates on and argues for the importance 
of human assets, learning, intellectual property rights and organizational knowledge. The 
basic postulates are the same: the level of analysis is the firm and the basic argument is that it 
                                                 
125 These, in the author’s opinion, include e.g. the emphasis on contracting,  the interest in efficiency, the interest 
in the governance mode of the firm, as well as the depth and fundamental nature of analysis.  
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is the distinctiveness and inimitability of resources that matters in the fundamental task of 
sustaining competitiveness.  
 
The knowledge-based view emphasizes the role of human knowledge in this process and 
can in this sense be viewed as a subset of a more overarching resource-based theory of the 
firm. Both strands emphasize the role of information and communication as a fundamental 
factor in the determination of de facto organizational structure. Furthermore, there is a further 
strand of literature that emphasizes the role of information processing even more, arguing that 
one important function of the firm is to adapt to and process new information in order to 
survive the problems of bounded rationality and coordination (See e.g. Huber 1990; Cremer 
1980; Aoki 1986; cf. Simon and March 1958). Thus, despite differences in the degree of 
importance on the role of knowledge and information, the competence perspectives have 
similar priorities and emphases (See Figure 16). The issues and logic behind the Figure are 
discussed in the next Sections 7.2.2-7.2.4.  
 
Figure 16: The competence perspective with regard to the key intellectual origins, main emphases and the 
conceptualization of the organization of economic activity 
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7.2.2 The intellectual origins of the competence approaches 
 
The background or origins of the resource- (and knowledge-) based theory of the firm 
exhibits great diversity, with the majority of the resource-based aspects being found in the 
proximity of the fields of economics and business administration. Among the more evident 
areas of intellectual foundation within different business administration specialisms, e.g. 
strategy, international business studies and technology-based literature, however, a clear 
effect of organization theory and organizational psychology can be distinguished. More 
specifically, the two further prominent intellectual bases of the resource-based theory of the 
firm are found in evolutionary economics on the one hand and in the early Penrosian concept 
of the firm as a collection of resources and services organized under an administrative 
framework on the other (Penrose 1959). 
 
The primary contribution from the realm of evolutionary economics comes through the 
concept of learning. Nelson and Winter’s (1982) identification of the need for agents to 
constantly build new representations of the environment and develop new skills to exploit 
arising opportunities in order to maintain efficient governance structures is a fundamental 
idea in the resource based theory of the firm. Especially in environments strongly 
characterized by permanent and repeated opportunities for technological and organizational 
innovation, the ability to acquire information and convert it into knowledge to grow the 
intellectual capital of an organization, i.e. ‘learn’, is of central importance (Dosi and Marengo 
1994). Thus the basic idea in evolutionary industrial organization economics of relating 
competence and learning with organization and structure (Dosi and Marengo 1994, 164-165; 
Dosi, Winter and Teece 1992), is an essential building block of the resource- and knowledge-
based views, as is an emphasis on innovation and technology along the lines of Schumpeter 
(e.g. 1908).  
 
Apart from evolutionary economics, the origins of the resource-based theory of the firm 
date back to Edith Penrose’s (1955, 1959) initial attack on her contemporaries’ shared neo-
classical perception of the firm as a production function. Her basic argument states that firms 
may be understood as collections of resources and services performed by these resources, all 
organized under a common administrative framework. This conceptualization is necessary for 
understanding the learning, growth and restructuring processes of firms. Interestingly, 
Penrose relates the whole discussion to the question of the boundaries of the firm by phrasing 
the final question of her paper: “Are there limits to the size of firms?” (Penrose 1955, p. 539). 
Even though Penrose writes from a non-economics basis, she immediately pegs the 
boundaries discussion a central concept of the resource-based, like any, theory of the firm. 
Arguably, the Penrosian boundaries discussion has received enormous help from 
Williamson’s transaction cost analysis of the problems with market governance, justifying the 
mission to explore the internal dynamics of the firms more carefully (Teece 1982). 
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7.2.3 Key messages of the competence perspective 
 
The concept of core competence, central to the resource-based strategy language, was first 
introduced by Selznick (1957). Core Competencies (CC) and Distinctive Capabilities (DC), 
are defined as 
 
[CC] “Corporate wide technologies and production skills 
that empower individual businesses to adapt quickly to 
changing opportunities.” (Hamel and Prahalad 1990) 
 
[CC] “Collective learning in the organization, especially 
how to coordinate diverse production skills and integrate 
multiple streams of technologies within an organization” 
(Hamel and Prahalad 1990) 
 
[DC] “A set of differentiable skills, complementary assets 
and routines that provide the basis for a firm’s competitive 
capacities and sustainable advantages.” (Teece, Pisano and 
Shuen 1990) 
 
Competencies serve as the basic guiding tool for organizational design (Richardson 1972). 
In the same instance, Richardson emphasizes the importance of knowledge assets and 
elaborates the semantics, introducing “the term capabilities to talk about the necessarily 
limited range of productive knowledge firms and individuals possess” (Foss 2001: xlvii). 
Again, the determination of governance modes is a central, underlying purpose for the 
analysis of capabilities and competences, as Richardson concludes how governance structures 
and cooperation modes actually reflect the complementarity and similarity degrees of the 
capabilities used (Richardson 1972, 893-894). 
 
Vis-à-vis Williamson’s work, Richardson elevates resources and capabilities above 
transaction costs as the overriding factor determining the boundaries of the firm. This 
position is also echoed by Demsetz (1993) in his attempt to redefine the knowledge-based 
view as an overpowering theory of the firm on the basis of its explanatory power. Here, 
transaction costs merely mirror the information structures inherent in the marketplace. 
Knowledge and information are prime determinants of economic organization and firm size.  
 
Key messages: Firms exist because they more efficiently than markets produce and 
utilize knowledge, particularly tacit knowledge (Kogut and Zander 
1992). 
 
Moreover, a routine is thought of as ‘the skill of an organization’. 
Capabilities (competencies, dynamic capabilities, higher-order 
organizing principles…) are meta-routines that represent a firm’s 
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capacity to sustain a coordinated deployment of routines in its business 
operations (Foss and Foss 2000).  
 
The boundaries of the firm are determined by knowledge-based 
considerations, not by mere contracting related to the solving of various 
incentive conflicts. Knowledge assets that are non-contestable and 
idiosyncratic are usually governed within the firm, whereas 
complementary but dissimilar knowledge assets are best obtained 
through an inter-firm cooperative arrangement. (Foss and Foss 2000)  
 
Firms’ internal organization is best understood as a matter of creating 
a shared context (e.g. in terms of organizational culture) that can help in 
integrating and utilizing essentially local knowledge to build and 
leverage core competencies (Foss and Foss 2000; Sanchez and Heene 
1997). 
 
Following the concept of the resource-based theory of the firm established by e.g. Penrose 
(1959), Richardson (1972), Rumelt (1974), Nelson and Winter (1982) and Wernerfelt (1984), 
subsequently advocated by e.g. Rumelt, Schendel and Teece (1994), Hamel and Prahalad 
(1994), Demsetz (1993) and many others, a number of authors in the resource-based tradition 
have continued the pivotal prioritization battle about what is really important in the 
determination of governance structures. The debate is mainly one of priority, i.e. which is the 
determinant factor: activities, capabilities, transaction costs, ownership rights or something 
else. 
 
For example, Conner and Prahalad (1996) argue that the organization modes for learning, 
innovation and cooperation are largely determined by the knowledge assets possessed and 
utilized by the organization. The key to operation mode selection, organizational structure 
and, on a side note, firm success, is dependent on what types of knowledge assets the 
organization has ended up with over time. To illustrate, e.g. the vertical boundaries of the 
firm can be determined by the asymmetry in knowledge about a high-tech product’s anatomy 
and production requirements between the firm and its component supplier. If a firm possesses 
unique knowledge about the provision of a product or service, and this knowledge is at least 
to some extent tacit and fungible, i.e. endemic to the organization (Teece, Pisano and Shuen 
1997), the suppliers might not simply understand what is required. Here, “the costs of making 
contracts, of educating potential licensees and franchisees, of teaching suppliers what it is one 
needs from them etc. become very real factors determining where the boundaries of the firm 
will be placed” (Foss 2001, xlviii).  
 
On the other hand, it might be just this tacitness and fungibility that makes the 
organization’s competencies unique, unimitable and therefore success sustainable. Thus the 
resource-based view establishes a set of determinants for governance structures and modes a 
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completely different from transaction cost economics, not to mention the new property rights 
theory.  
 
Information flow, communication structures and, for example, information technologies 
are a mediating mechanism, which also plays a key role in the creation and fruition of 
distinctive competencies. Here, a linkage to the contracting approaches is found. With its 
perception of information, the knowledge-based is actually converging with the theory of the 
firm as an information processor (see e.g. Aoki 1986; Cremer 1990; Bolton and Dewatripont 
1994; Carter 1995), which derives strongly from Williamson’s conception of the firm’s 
information structures (Williamson 1985). Especially the concept of ‘dynamic transaction 
costs’ (Langlois 1992)126 derives conspicuously from both transaction cost economics and the 
innovation perspectives of the resource and knowledge-based views. In the information 
processing perspective, even though the reasoning is not similar to organization theory (see 
Foss 2001), the problem is nearly the same as with the early incomplete contracting theorists 
(cf. March and Simon 1958). It is basically the same coordination problem that emerges in 
both analyses. The notion of dynamic transaction costs, as well as incomplete contracting, 
both argue that a single, definable governance structure, may it be built around employment 
contracts, information structures, both or something else, is unable to solve the coordination 
problem of the firm due to ‘environmental’ limitations. The only difference seems to be that 
the environmental limitation is different; with early organization theory literature, it is the 
notion of incomplete contracting arising from bounded rationality, hidden information and 
information asymmetries, while in the information-based view the environment is argued to 
be in constant flux.  
 
 
7.2.4 The existence, boundaries and internal organization of M&A 
 
The competence perspective has relatively clear implications in the direction of the 
justification for the existence, the definitional boundaries and the internal organization of 
M&A. The key concepts of the competence perspective, e.g. resources, relatedness, learning, 
unimitability, distinctiveness, path dependency, technological and organizational innovation 
and tacit knowledge emerge time and again in the analysis of all of these three areas.  
 
The boundaries of M&A, i.e. how the competence perspective defines M&A, reflect these 
concepts. From the resource-based view, M&A is the amalgamation of two sets of resources 
in order to attain a resource combination, which would not have been attainable otherwise. 
The knowledge-based view argues that such a situation occurs most often between related 
firms in the presence of possibilities for promoting learning and innovation. Another highly 
interesting proposition put forward by the advocates of the competence perspective is that a 
                                                 
126 Langlois and Foss (1999, p. 14) loosely define dynamic transaction costs as the costs of the costs of not 
having the capabilities you need when you need them (See Langlois 1992 for a full treatment).  
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firm’s resource endowment is dependent on the history of the organization. In addition to 
resource amalgamation, M&A also implies path amalgamation. Two organizational entities 
that have thus far had separate and distinct organizational paths merge and from there on 
share a single path. Ideally, the parts of the merged organizations that are unable or unwilling 
to follow this common trail need to be spun off or divested.  
 
This analysis provides a comfortable bridge for analyzing the justifications for the 
existence of M&A as explained by the competence perspective. These are many but similar 
in ideology. Perhaps the most conspicuous is the “synergy” explanation for M&A, which 
essentially states that relatedness between firms is the key to M&A success (see e.g. Lubatkin 
1983, Singh and Montgomery 1987, Chatterjee 1986). Similarly, the role of M&A in 
acquiring otherwise hard-to-get unimitable and distinctive resources and competencies has 
been acknowledged. A distinctive stream of literature has concentrated on the transfer and 
acquisition of unique technologies through M&A (see e.g. Hagedoorn 1990, Hagedoorn and 
Sadowski 1999, Laamanen and Autio 1996, Laamanen 1997). Organizational learning 
through M&A (e.g. Kusewitt 1985, Zollo and Singh 2000, Haleblian and Finkelstein 1999) 
and M&A in technological and organizational innovation (e.g. Kabiraj and Mukherjee 2000) 
are related explanations. Many of these justifications for the existence of M&A rely on and 
emphasize the role of tacit knowledge in value creation. Tacit knowledge can imply the 
possibility for unimitability, can engulf a valuable resource, can be the source of innovation, 
the outcome of learning and so on. It is thus a common environmental denominator for most 
of the competence-based explanations.  
 
Path dependency is also relevant here. The management of fungible capabilities is a 
dynamic process, which often offsets compatibility problems to the realm of M&A. Path 
dependency is central to understanding how to realize strategic objectives (Teece, Pisano and 
Shuen 1994). This, ceteris paribus, makes the resource-based theory of the firm more 
skeptical towards the idea that the strategic goals of an organization can be attained as easily 
through M&A than organic growth, if not easier. Combining organizations implies 
combining two independent historical paths of resource and capability development, which 
necessarily spurs compatibility problems. The dynamic aspects of capability creation are at 
the forefront of the discussion of the knowledge-based view, particularly in the explanation of 
opening windows of opportunity in the face of radical Schumpeterian change (Langlois 
1992). Likewise, it is specifically a characteristic of the knowledge-based approach to 
emphasize the role of information structures in the creation of sustainable capability bundles 
over time (Cremer 1990). 
 
On the whole, the competence perspective has, unlike the governance approach, 
considerable merit in the analysis of the internal organization of M&A. The competence 
perspective has had a strong influence on literature on the M&A process (see e.g. Jemison 
and Sitkin 1986, Shrivastava 1986, Haspeslagh and Jemison 1991, Pablo 1994). One of the 
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basic contributions of the Penrosian boundaries discussion to M&A comes through the 
apparent link is has to horizontal restructuring processes (Teece, Rumelt, Dosi and Winter 
1994). As the organization mode is dependent on the current and aspired configuration of 
capabilities, the capabilities essentially determine the boundaries of the firm and thus act as 
the first and foremost decision-making determinant in due diligence process. Even more 
generally, resource endowments and synergy seeking can be argued to influence pre-merger 
processes like growth strategy selection, candidate selection, strategic and even financial due 
diligence as well as negotiations. Technology and IPR related issues are often important even 
in the contract-drafting phase. Respectively, the resource combination resulting from the 
merger often leads to a reassessment of corporate foci and subsequently to the development 
and execution of the integration plan. Post-merger processes (especially e.g. the divestment 
of business units, the rationalization of personnel, the concentration of staff functions) are 
highly dependent on which capabilities, resources and competencies are seen as valuable 
assets and which not. Ultimately, from the competence perspective point of view, post-
merger processes are about the criteria according to which resources, competences and 
capabilities are evaluated and the process of prioritizing them according to these criteria.  
 
There are interesting repercussions from the prioritization debate127 to the M&A discourse 
and especially to managerial and prescriptive M&A rationales. There are profound 
differences in how e.g. consultants have applied the different perspectives to M&A decision-
making frameworks. There are roughly four categories, all of which follow a different 
strategic paradigm. Firstly, there are cost structure intensive rationales, which can be highly 
appreciative of transaction cost economics rationales, indicating the amount of cost savings 
attainable from M&A through internalizing some functions and outsourcing others. Secondly, 
there are consulting services and frameworks that concentrate solely on shareholder value and 
the rights of shareholders to maximally appropriate their investments. Thirdly, there are 
frameworks concentrating on the basic ideas of path dependency compatibility, fungibility of 
knowledge capabilities and importance of sustained innovation within M&A, which carries a 
strong resource- and knowledge-based flavor. Finally, there are decision-making frameworks 
concentrating on the strategic fit between activities, which can be created through sharing 
activities, transferring skills and restructuring through M&A. This corresponds to Porterian 
portfolio management (Porter 1987). These are mere examples how the battle between 
paradigms diffuse into decision-making rationales and, arguably, can possibly lead to 
territorial-ideological wars in how M&A should be performed and, subsequently, to the 
possible exclusion of important insights across perspectives.  
 
 
 
                                                 
127 I.e. the debate about which issue, e.g. transaction cost vs. resources vs. knowledge vs. activities to prioritize 
in the determination of governance structures (Kogut and Zander 1992, Eisenhardt and Santos 2000, Eisenhardt 
and Martin 2000, Cohen and Levinthal 1990). 
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7.3 Summary 
 
At the theoretical end of the M&A discourse lies the conception of M&A as a driver of the 
organization of economic activity. Theories of the firm, the body of theory that addresses the 
existence, the boundaries and the internal organization of firms, deal closely with the 
organization of economic activity. In doing so, the theories of the firm are hypothesized to be 
able to refine our understanding of M&A, the justifications and explanations of its existence, 
its conceptual boundaries and its internal processes. 
 
This Appendix concentrated on conceptually analyzing the position of the governance 
theories of the firm to the M&A discourse. The aim was to provide an clarifying overview of 
the governance theories and present a hierarchical categorization in order to understand the 
key assumptions and contributions of the various theories. An overview of neoclassical 
theory of the firm, the nexus of contracts perspective, agency theory, early incomplete 
contracting literature, transaction cost economics and property rights theory was provided 
with a focus on their contribution the existence, boundaries and internal organization of 
M&A.  
 
This analysis was perceived to need depth and refinement in the form of criticism 
acknowledgement and an analysis of alternative angles to the organization of economic 
activity. Therefore, an overview of the criticisms and shortcomings presented about the 
governance theories of the firm in general, about some key assumptions held by group of 
governance theories as well as criticism in the direction of individual theories. A short 
passage briefly outlining the basic postulates of the ‘competence perspective’, engulfing the 
so-called resource-, information- and knowledge-based views to strategy research was then 
laid out together with their M&A definitions, justifications and internal organization 
influences. This was done in order to bring in a comparative element and highlight the 
relatedness or of the governance perspectives.  
 
The key findings of this Appendix are firstly that the governance theories of the firm 
discuss amply a number of issues that are of essential importance in the analysis of M&A and 
secondly that there are clear shortcomings in the way they try to define, explain and help in 
the governance of M&A. What this means is that the governance theories of the firm can and 
should be used in discussing M&A and they have vast potential for the development of an 
integrative theory in this field. At the same time, however, it is becoming increasingly clear 
that none of the governance theories of the firm alone, and perhaps not even all together, 
suffice at providing a satisfactorily exhaustive theoretical and semantic arsenal for 
performing and developing M&A theory and practice. Integrative work, definitely between 
governance theories, and possibly between the governance and competence perspectives, is 
needed. 
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8 APPENDIX 3: THE SEMANTICS OF THE STUDY 
 
 
This Appendix aims at clarifying the conceptual and semantical questions that have arised 
during the study. This is done by  
 
a) Outlining the relationships of the major schools of thought that might be 
considered to belong in the category of governance theory from an 
economic history standpoint. The major source for this information is the 
informative History of Economic Thought website at 
http://homepage.newschool.edu/het/. 
b) Listing some of the central concepts of the theoretical discussion 
surrounding the conceptual treatment of the governance theories of the firm, 
M&A, institutional and organizational economics and the organization of 
economic activity in general. These definitions are drawn from the many 
literature sources listed in Chapter 3, whilst explicit original sources, where 
applicable, are referenced in the definitions below.  
 
 
The New Institutionalist Schools of Economic Thought 
 
Much of literature pegged ‘governance theoretic’ in this study refers to the theory of the firm 
centered contributions that have emerged from the traditional New Institutionalist School of 
economic thought. The "New Institutionalist Schools" to refer to the collection of schools of 
thought that seek to explain political, historical, economic and social institutions such as 
government, law, markets, firms, social conventions, the family, etc.  in terms of Neoclassical 
economic theory.  New Institutionalist schools can be thought of as the outcome of the  
Chicago School's   "economic imperialism" -- i.e. using Neoclassical economics to explain 
areas of human society normally considered outside them. In this sense, New Institutionalism 
can been seen as the precise opposite of the old American Institutionalist school, which 
sought to apply the reasoning of the other social sciences into economics.  
 
Although the term "New Institutionalism" is usually reserved for the work of Ronald Coase, 
Armen Alchian, Harold Desmsetz and Oliver Williamson,and others on the transactions costs 
and the property rights paradigm, it can nonetheless be meaningfully stretched to embrace 
"economic" theories of the non-market social relationships (e.g. Becker, Mincer), political 
processes (e.g. the "Public Choice" school of Buchanan and Tullock), jurisprudence and legal 
processes (i.e. the "Law- and-Economics movement of Posner and Landes) and social and 
economic history (the "New Economic History" school of Fogel and North).  
 
While the predecessors of the New Institutionalist Schools include the American 
Institutionalist School, the English Historical School as well as George J. Stigler and the 
Chicago School, New Institutionalism can be divided into five schools.  
 
These schools and their most notable contributors are: 
 
New Institutionalism, including Ronald H. Coase (1910-), Armen A. Alchian (1914-), 
Harold Demsetz (1930-), Herbert A. Simon (1916-), Michael C. Jensen (1939-), Eugene F. 
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Fama (1939-), Oliver E. Williamson (1932-), Richard M. Cyert (1921-), Richard R. Nelson 
(1930-) and Sidney G. Winter (1935-).  
 
New Social Economics, including Theodore W. Schultz (1902-), Jacob Mincer (1922-) and 
Gary S. Becker (1930-) 
 
New Economic History including Robert W. Fogel (1926-), Douglass C.North (1920-), 
Robert M. Townsend (1948-) and Donald/Deirdre N. McCloskey (1942-) 
 
Public Choice School including James M. Buchanan (1919-), Gordon Tullock (1922-), 
Anthony Downs (1930-) and William A. Niskanen, (1933-) 
 
Law and Economics Movement including Richard Posner (1939-) and William M. Landes, 
(1939-). 
 
As is evident, the notion of ‘governance theory’ is, in this study, heavily concentrated on 
governance theories of the firm, which belong to the so-called New Institutionalism. While 
also relevant to the discussion, the other schools have been left for less attention given that 
they mostly operate on a higher level of abstraction and analysis. What is more, the New 
Institutionalism has been influenced by the other schools during their coexistence mostly in 
the latter part of the 20th century. 
 
 
 
 
Some key concepts and their definitions 
 
 
Organization of    There are two principal questions with respect to the 
economic activity  organization of economic activity. The first deals with 
why an activity is organized within firms and not 
purchased in the market, and the other is why an 
activity is organized within a particular firm. 
  
M&A In this study, M&A is defined as a single business 
phenomenon, which engulfs two or more organizations 
within a single organizational boundary and thereby 
significantly alters the organization of economic 
activity. 
 
M&A discourse In this study, the M&A discourse is defined as the 
academic dialogue dealing with the area of mergers and 
acquisitions. 
 
Merger By and large, this study adopts the definition that “a 
merger is a combination of organizations which are 
similar in size and which create an organization where 
neither party can be seen as the acquirerer." (Vaara 
2000, p. 82). 
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Acquisition “The complete absorption of one company by another, 
where the acquiring firm retains its identity and the 
acquired firm ceases to exist as a separate entity” (Ross 
et al. 2000) 
 
Takeover The definition of a "takeover bid" covers three 
situations: (1) acquisitions of an equity security; (2) 
offers to acquire an equity security; and (3) requests or 
invitations for tenders of an equity security. (The 
Supreme Court of New Hampshire, Kaplan vs. Booth 
Ski Group, November 20, 2001). 
 
Theory of the firm  “The body of theory that addresses the existence, the 
boundaries and the internal organization of the firm” 
(Foss 2000, p. xv) 
 
Governance (theory) The general treatment of contracting around the issues 
of appropriation, ownership, alignment of incentives, 
self-interest (Madhok 2002, p. 536), as well as 
authority, the employment relation, economizing and 
coordination, financial structure, regulation and 
property rights (Williamson 1999, p. 1088) and their 
influence on the organization of economic activity. 
 
Competence (theory) Competence theory is seen to consist of a number of 
theoretical branches that emphasize the structure of 
complementarity and similarity among the various 
capabilities in the economy (Langlois and Foss 1999, p. 
4).  
 
Risk preferences An economic actor's risk preferences determine the way 
his utility function behaves with different levels of risk. 
With increasing risk, ceteris paribus, a risk averse actor 
experiences diminishing, a risk neutral actor constant 
and a risk loving actor increasing marginal utility. 
  
Asymmetric information A situation where economic agents involved in a 
economic relationship have different information on the 
qualities of the transaction or on the intentions of the 
parties. 
 
Hidden action Action that can be performed by one party in his own 
interest without the other party knowing.  
 
Hidden information Information about the transaction that is available to one 
or no party of the transaction, but which would typically 
be of use to both parties. 
 
Adverse selection Asymmetric information, creating a possibility for 
opportunistic behavior by the more knowledgeable 
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actor, results in a selection of goods with relatively less 
attractive characteristics being draws to the market. 
 
Signalling The economic actors' possibility to reveal certain 
information about or characteristics of the transaction in 
order to reach a mutually more efficient outcome.  
 
Moral hazard Actions of economics agents maximizing their own 
utility to the detriment of others in situations where they 
do not bear the full consequences of their actions 
because of uncertainty, incomplete information or the 
nature of the contract. 
 
Second best outcomes Incomplete information and risk averse behavior lead to 
the development of sub-optimal, but good, outcomes. 
 
Bounded rationality A behavioral assumption implying that human behavior 
is "intendedly rational, but only limited so" (Simon 
1976, p. xxviii). Economic actors intend to maximize 
profits, but are not always able to do so, because, due to 
bounded rationality, humans are unable to write 
completely unambiguous contracts. 
 
Opportunism A behavioral assumption that refers to the tendency of 
economic actors to "self-interest seeking with guile" 
(Williamson 1991, p.7). Contracting has to account for 
the possibility that the parties will lie about their 
intentions and/or not honor contracts. This leads to 
adverse selection (ex ante) and moral hazard (ex post).   
 
Complexity and uncertainty An environmental assumption that sets a limit for 
human actors to understand the full range of contracting 
outcomes and contingencies. This leads to further 
ambiguity in contracting.  
 
Asset specificity A characteristic of contractual relationships implying 
the extent to which transaction-specific investments 
must be made, which locks actors into the relationship. 
This exposes actors to opportunism, e.g. hold-up, and 
necessitates safeguards, i.e. additional contracting cost. 
 
Small numbers condition A characteristic of contractual relationships, where the 
number of bidders is very limited and this makes it 
difficult to select the lower cost counterpart. This is due 
information asymmetries that give rise to opportunistic 
behavior and is most often apparent in contract renewal 
situations.  
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Ex ante and ex post transaction cost Refer to the transaction costs arising during contract 
preparation and after contract completion respectively 
(Kreps 1990).  
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9 APPENDIX 4: RESEARCH MATERIALS 
 
This appendix contains a number of lists, statistics, tables and materials used and produced 
during the research process of this study. 
 
The essential contents of this Appendix are: 
 
 
1. The data used in the bibliometric analysis 
The initial list of 567 M&A related articles published between 1991 and 2001 in 65 core 
management, economics, business, finance, law, organizational behavior and sociology 
journals, screened from the journals in the Social Science Citation Index (SSCI) on January 
20th 2002. The articles are organized alphabetically according to the journal in which they 
have been published and chronologically, the newest articles first, within the journals. 
 
2. Most-published first author analysis results 
The table displays all of the first authors of the 567 articles, listed according to author 
surname. The number of articles first-authored is given in the row after the surname. 
 
3. Most-cited first author analysis results 
The table displaying 94 of the most-cited first authors, i.e. all authors with at least 30 first-
author citations. 
 
4. Most-cited text results 
The table displays 74 of the most-cited texts, i.e. all texts with at least 20 citations. 
 
5. Network centrality analysis result matrix 
The matrix displays the presence (denoted with 1) or the absence (denoted with 0) of the 28 
theory and 25 antecedent facets (displayed on the X-axis) in the 567 M&A related articles 
(displayed on the Y-axis). 
 
6. Facet co-occurrence analysis result matrix 
The cells of the matrix display the number of articles that contain the two facets in whose 
intersection the cell is situated. 
 
 
 
 
 
